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PREFACE 
This book is not about competitive advantage. It is about competitive dy-
namics. In contrast to traditional management research, I did not seek to 
find those attributes that make some companies achieve superiority over 
others at a given moment in time. Instead, I aimed to investigate why 
competitive advantages are eroded over time and how this process impacts 
the long-term development of industries. Obvious as it may seem, I found 
that firms within a single industry show considerable proficiency in 
copying one another. Moreover, it appeared that this element of competi-
tive imitation heavily influences the development of organizational capa-
bilities by the majority of companies in a particular industry. In contrast, 
few firms seem to possess the creativity that is needed to come up with 
new capabilities previously unknown to all rivals and so disrupt the ex-
isting rules of the competitive game. 
Still, regardless of their role as industry leader or laggard, most indi-
vidual companies do have the intellectual capacity to shape novel capa-
bilities in a unique manner. Whether they manipulate their competitive 
context or merely adapt to it, firms actively search for capabilities in their 
environment. As firms do not search in isolation, it is the interactive na-
ture Of their relationship that, in the end, determines the industry's com-
petitive dynamics. An initial advantage by one company is inevitably 
eroded by the actions of its rivals, and this creates opportunities for yet 
others to create new leads. And so on. Ultimately, the recurrent character 
of this dynamic shapes the progress of an industry and its path of evolu-
tion. It can thus be concluded that firms exert a significant level of control 
over the well-being and long-term development of the larger industrial 
system to which they belong. 
I alone bear the responsibilities for these and other findings derived 
from a study of the music industry and presented in this book. I have tried 
to resolve the strenuous dilemma between management and scholarly 
styles of writing while maintaining academic standards as to its contents. 
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It is up to both categories of readers to judge whether I have succeeded in 
creating such a balance. At the same time, I am confident that the scien-
tific quality of this dissertation has been guaranteed. During the research 
project, I have had the privilege of working under the creative supervision 
of Charles Baden-Fuller at the City University Business School in London 
and Frans van den Bosch at the Rotterdam School of Management/Eras-
mus University. Other scholars to whom I express my gratitude are Henk 
Volberda, who did far more than judging these texts, and Raymond van 
Wijk, who provided valuable comments at different stages. 
I was also lucky to benefit from the interest, cooperation and exper-
tise of a number of record company managers in an industry that deserves 
much more attention from strategy researchers in the future. They are, in 
order of appearance: Marc Marot at Island Records, Ray Cooper at Virgin 
Records America, Clive Rich at BMG Entertainment International UK & 
Ireland, Martin Craig at Warner Music UK, Marcus Turner at Roadrunner 
International, Mike Heneghan at Independiente, and Jeremy Pearce at V2 
Music Group. In addition, I thank Cliff Dane at Media Research Publish-
ing and Stephan Fowler at the IFPI Secretariat in London for providing 
me with 'hard' data on British music companies and the worldwide record 
industry respectively. Thanks also to Lex Harding who, as director of The 
Music Factory, made me realize that the tension between global and local 
market demands is especially strong in the music business. 
Finally, there are a number of people that deserve some special credit. 
Annemarie Stolkwijk at Erasm took care of a large part of the funding that 
backed my visits to the UK. I am grateful to Richard D'Aveni at the Amos 
Tuck School at Dartmouth College for his interest in my project from the 
moment we met during my stay in London. I am also in debt to friend and 
colleague Ron Meyer at the Rotterdam School of Management who, de-
spite a hectic schedule at his new consulting firm, could find the time to 
do a tremendous job on reviewing the manuscript. Further thanks go to 
Babette Hilhorst at Def. for her work on the cover design. Close to my 
heart are Hans and Jannie: this book is yours. Before the page turns to the 
first lines on the relationship between capabilities and competition, I'd 
like to take my hat off to Anja and bow deeply. She showed that it is in-
deed the queen who reigns the chessboard of life to protect him who can 
do only one step at a time. 
Marc Huygens 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: 
Principal Aims of the Research Project 
In this thesis the coevolution of capabilities and competition is investi-
gated. This first chapter explains why the concept of coevolution has been 
selected as the object of research. A rationale is provided for why a study 
into the coevolution of capabilities and competition could be of value to 
management science. It explains how a coevolutionary perspective en-
ables a synthesis of the seemingly polar point of views that rival firms are 
either idiosyncratic or uniform in appearance and behavior. All this is 
framed in a general research aim and a set of accompanying questions that 
guide the project's 'operational' issues. It is proposed that two theories of 
recent interest in the field of strategic management, resource-based theory 
and Schumpeterian competition theory, can be unified in a coevolutionary 
style through behavioral theory's notion of 'search.' The project's empiri-
cal setting is explored by shortly introducing prevalent features of the mu-
sic industry, and precedes a discussion of the methodology used in the 
empirical research. The chapter ends with an outline of the thesis that em-
bodies its general research approach. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
For almost two decades now, management academics and organizational 
practitioners have been searching for ways to sustain competitive advan-
tage. Porter (1980) taught the strategy field how a firm can create insur-
mountable barriers to entry to shield off its competitive arena. Scale 
economies, product differentiation, capital investment and access to dis-
tribution channels are the major sources of barriers which keep rivals out. 
Attractive as such a policy may be for the company in question, Porter's 
work implies that firms should seek a monopoly position to sustain their 
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early lead.1 Irrespective of the economic theorem that such competitive 
behavior reduces consumer welfare, one could raise doubts as to the con-
ceptual validity of this particular notion of competitive advantage.2 How 
can a firm sustain a competitive edge over rivals, if it obstructs even po-
tential rivals to enter its arena? The element of relativity inherent in the 
concept of competitive advantage thus seems to undermine a Porterian 
approach to sustainability. 
At the start of the nineties, an alternative perspective of how firms 
can sustain advantages appeared in new research on the so-called 're-
source-based view of the firm.' Named after Penrose's (1959) classic 
treatment of managerial resources, this approach stresses the role of firm-
specific resources and capabilities in sustaining a competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). Here, firm heterogeneity exists because 
unique historical conditions shape complex patterns of distinct resources 
and capabilities. In effect, differences in organizational asset bundles can 
culminate in one firm having an advantage over others. Moreover, the 
causal ambiguity inherent in the relationship between the leader's capa-
bilities and its success inhibits rival imitation, which enables the leader to 
sustain its competitive advantage (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Reed and 
DeFillippi, 1990). According to the resource-based view, such barriers to 
imitation are the ultimate source of sustainable competitive advantage. 
However, this line of thinking has more recently been criticized for 
its implicit assumption that firms operate in a competitive vacuum (Mont-
gomery, 1995). When a firm's competitive environment alters, the bene-
fits of path dependency may well turn into liabilities which lock a firm 
into its historical trajectory of development. The new competitive de-
mands lead the company into a competence trap, transforming its core 
capabilities into core rigidities (Levitt and March, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 
1992). In a similar way, the fruits of causal ambiguity can become rotten 
when the firm wants to sustain its competitive edge. To exploit its advan-
tage, the leading firm needs to make the knowledge sources underlying its 
capabilities understandable in order to repeat its successful behavior. But 
1 It needs to be stressed here that Porter did not recommend more traditional routes to 
monopoly positions in which vertical integration and horizontal expansion are used to 
"increase the organization's power in exchange relationships and to reduce uncertainty 
generated from competition" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 114). 
2
 Although the argument that monopoly power undermines customer satisfaction is well 
accepted within mainstream economic thinking, Baumol el al. (1982) claimed that the> 
mere threat of entrants forces firms in a monopoly position to be as efficient as possible 
which, according to them, weakens the consumer welfare assumption. 
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this path to replication facilitates rival imitation (Kogut and Zander, 1992) 
so that causal ambiguity "cannot be a source of sustainable competitive 
advantage because it contains the seeds of its own self-destruction" (Col-
lis, 1994: 147). 
The incorporation of a competitive process perspective implies that 
barriers to imitation can do no more than delay the impact of copying by 
rivals. Indeed, Jacobson (1992) argued that competitive advantages will 
inevitably be eroded by the effects of competition and are therefore, at 
best, temporary in nature. This thesis thus follows the advice of Winter 
(1995), who advocated an approach to strategy in which both organiza-
tional capabilities and competitive dynamics shape the transient nature of 
competitive advantages. While the current study acknowledges firm capa-
bilities as a principal source of competitive advantage, it also recognizes 
the restraining effects of rivalry on a leading firm's efforts to sustain its 
competitive edge. Here, competition is perceived as a dynamic process in 
which rival firms search for new capabilities. It is both organizational and 
competitive behavior of rivals over time that matter in this process. 
The lack of such dynamic properties makes neoclassical treatments of 
the price system and oligopolistic theories of industrial organization un-
suitable for research into the field of strategy (Rumelt, 1984).3 Competi-
tion is therefore treated in this study as a Schumpeterian process of 
change and development. According to Schumpeter (1934), rivalry is the 
engine of industrial development, a process which is characterized by the 
continuous emergence of entrepreneurial firms. These companies search 
for new ways and methods of competing to make rivals' existing positions 
obsolete, an act which is called 'creative destruction.' Through thisdise-
quilibrating force, the innovator creates an advantage which can only be 
temporary as the equilibrating force of imitation moves all rivals to adopt 
the new best practice (Iwai, 1984). Because this process repeats itself, 
Schumpeterian competition evolves along a 'punctuated equilibrium pat-
tern,' in which creative destructions punctuate incremental periods of 
convergence.4 
3 An exception to this seems to be a new stream within industrial organization economics 
called game theory, which has been claimed to focus on the dynamics of strategic actions 
and interactions (e.g., Shapiro, 1989; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Apart from the 
argument that game theory's use is limited to a metaphorical level due to the complexity 
of operating techniques (Saloner, 1991), another drawback to its application in manage-
ment appears to be its assumption that firms are homogenous in their objectives and capa-
bilities (Barney, 1994). 
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Empirical research on the competitive implications of technological 
innovation confirmed the presence of this pattern in a number of indus-
tries over time. Abernathy and Clark (1985) observed how, again and 
again, automobile manufacturers disrupted established industry practice 
and undermined rivals' existing positions. Tushman and Anderson (1986) 
presented a similar finding in their longitudinal study of technology-based 
competition in the minicomputer, cement and airline industries. In the 
field of strategic management, research into the relationship between ca-
pabilities and competition over longer periods of time has been rather 
limited. Only recently did D'Aveni (1994) offer an interesting point of 
departure with his theory of 'hypercompetition,' in which competitive 
advantages are rapidly eroded through fast cycles of creative destruction. 
Like Schumpeter, he argued that an industry's evolution is determined by 
the dynamic of competitive interactions among rivals over time. 
RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS 
Schumpeter (1934) claimed that industrial growth and development is a 
direct product of the competitive process. It is 'a force from within' be-
cause discovery is determined by the things that people in organizations 
do. Although firms disrupt current methods when they force themselves 
upon their rivals through innovative behavior, they bring the industry new 
ideas and practices, triggering its further development. This research proj-
ect adopts such an endogenous perspective, and assumes it to be ingrained 
in the relationship between capabilities and competition. This is consistent 
with Henderson and Mitchell (1997), who called for an enhanced under-
standing of the endogenous and reciprocal relationships between capabili-
ties and competition. Indeed, they argued that organizational capabilities 
shape the competitive environment, a process that, in turn, further shapes 
capabilities. These interactions cross multiple levels of analysis and make 
capabilities and competition coevolve over time. 
In other words, the development of capabilities at the firm level is 
both a cause and an effect of the competitive process at the industry level. 
4
 This does not mean, however, that competition will actually turn into a state of perfect 
equilibrium in which competitors are exact replicas. First of all, even marginal differences 
in thoughts and actions between rivals will guarantee a minimum degree of firm diversity 
(Nelson, 1991). Secondly, a period of competition in which firms converge to one another 
through imitation will inevitable be disrupted by the next competitive upheaval. Schum-
peter (1934) called this never-ending story the 'perennial gale of creative destruction.' 
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In his explanation that "coevolutionary effects take place at multiple lev-
els," McKelvey (1997: 360) stressed the need for this compound approach 
to the dynamics within and between firms. He maintained that reciprocal 
relationships between firms in a competitive environment are coevolu-
tionary in nature, the essence of which is in line with the above-mentioned 
idea of coevolution of capabilities and competition. McKelvey continued 
that such a coevolutionary perspective allows for the mutual inclusion of 
seemingly contradictory assumptions in social science that organizations 
are either idiosyncratic or uniform in nature. McKelvey (1997: 356) ex-
pressed the latter dilemma as one in which "it seems impossible to simul-
taneously accept the existence of idiosyncratic organizational events while 
at the same time pursuing the essential elements of justification logic." 
Indeed, whereas more traditional views such as Schumpeterian theory 
perceive firms to be uniform in their appearance and behavior (as the dy-
namic of imitation will reduce variety among rival firms), contemporary 
resource-based theory claims firms to be idiosyncratic in what they have 
and what they do. It is here where a coevolutionary approach can be most 
valuable by attempting to integrate apparently discordant theoretical 
streams. Important as the concept of coevolution may possibly be to man-
agement and organization science, empirical research efforts into its driv-
ers and effects have been limited thus far.5 As one of the few exceptions, 
Kieser (1989) narrated how medieval guilds were replaced by mercantilist 
factories as markets and institutions coevolved. Furthermore, Levinthal 
and Myatt's (1994) study of the mutual fund business confirmed the ex-
istence of feedback effects between the firm's ability to sustain market 
relations and its competitive position. 
In response to the considerable lack of knowledge on coevolutionary 
processes within the field of strategic management, this PhD study aims to 
gain insights into the coevolution of capabilities and competition. If suc-
cessfully pursued, this ambition will contribute to an enhanced under-
standing of the concept of coevolution. In addition, it responds to those 
who argued for a synthesis of firm- and industry-level perspectives in 
strategy research (Baden-Fuller, 1995; Levinthal, 1995). Furthermore, as 
coevolution is unavoidably tied to the dimension of time, the project could 
5
 Research into technological innovation also pays increasing attention to the concept of 
coevolution, be it that its focus is on how specific technologies and industries coevolve 
(e.g., M. McKelvey, 1997; Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). As a consequence, this line of 
work is limited as to its concern for the behavioral component regarding the industry's 
rival firms. 
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add to the development of a dynamic theory of strategy as suggested by 
Porter (1991). In this regard, D'Aveni (1994: 17) argued for a substitution 
of contemporary static theory by dynamic models of strategy, as "success 
depends not on how the firm positions itself at a certain point in time, but 
on how it acts over long periods of time." The study's end results can thus 
also be of interest to firms operating in hypercompetitive contexts. 
In line with the research aim, three broad questions are formulated to 
deal with the actual implementation of this intent: 
How can a revolutionary approach synthesize con-
trasting views on firm uniformity and idiosyncrasy? 
How does coevolution of capabilities and competition 
unfold at both the firm and industry levels of analysis? 
How do rival firms search for new capabilities in this 
particular process of coevolution? 
Obviously, these research questions are related to one another in the sense 
that they, in reversed order, move from a rather specific to a more general 
level of understanding. Inevitably, knowledge on how firms explicitly 
search for capabilities is imperative to a proper appreciation of how the 
process of coevolution takes place at different levels of analysis. In turn, 
this wisdom provides the basic input to the synthesis of opposing views 
on differences and similarities between rival firms. Considering the fact 
that the concept of coevolution is a relatively unexplored terrain of inves-
tigation, the research questions have been defined in rather general terms. 
That is, no attempt was made to specify causalities between (in)dependent 
variables because coevolution is concerned with reciprocal and endoge-
nous patterns of interaction (Baum and Singh, 1994). 
As mentioned, it is both organizational and competitive behavior that 
matter in the coevolution of capabilities and competition. A stream of 
academic literature that pays.attention to both types of conduct, and can 
therefore be of relevance to this siudy, is the behavioral theory of the firm. 
Originally developed by Cyert and March (1963), this line of thinking 
assumes that firms have some degree of control over their market envi-
ronment, and that they adapt to their habitat through learning processes. 
Learning takes place after market feedback brings new knowledge into 
the organization, and is guided by so-called 'standard operating proce-
6 
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dures.' These SOPs determine the extent to which the firm is involved in 
search behavior as response to confronted problems that arise from mar-
ket feedback. A firm can search for new alternatives in two basic ways: 
(1) it can search in the neighborhood of current practice, or (2) it can 
search for radically new alternatives. 
Figure 1.1: Theoretical Underpinnings 
Resource-Based -• -~^ - -— - — ^ Theory of Economic 
View of the Firm / />>. N. Development 
[Capabilities 1^- _ \ Competition | 
\ / \ Research J \. J 
\ / \ Domain J \ / 
\ Search / 
Behavioral Theory 
of the Firm 
Nelson and Winter (1982) further developed these concepts in an 
evolutionary model of innovation and imitation. They translated the SOP 
notion into the concept of routines as organizational carriers of knowledge 
and expertise, and introduced the idea that firms are involved in a process 
of change as they search for new alternatives. The significance of behav-
ioral theory to management science seems to have increased over the past 
years. For instance, Levinthal and Myatt (1994) examined feedback ef-
fects of firms' market activities, while Barnett and Hansen (1996) studied 
how firms adapt in an ecology of learning organizations. Levinthal and 
March (1993) discussed the issues concerned with organizational learn-
ing, and March (1991) explained search behavior in terms of explorative 
and exploitative firm activities. The fact that these publications incorpo-
rate both firm and industry levels of analysis underlines the potential of 
search as a concept in moving towards a coevolutionary view of capabili-
ties and competition. Figure 1.1 shows the research project's objective in 
theoretical terms, and visualizes search's integrative role. 
7 
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RESEARCH SETTING AND METHOD 
The research project's empirical setting for studying coevolution is the 
music industry (or 'record business'). Here, competition evolves among 
those companies which direct their capabilities towards the creation and 
commercialization of music in its different forms. At present, companies 
in the music industry compete for rights.6 The industry has traditionally 
been regarded as consisting of five major record corporations and a host 
of small independent labels. Together, the majors are responsible for over 
85% of worldwide music sales (valued at $40 billion), and this is why 
many see competition in the industry as oligopolistic7 Still, data pre-
sented in later chapters show that this has not always been the case, nor 
that this needs to be so in the future. In recent years, intensifying forms of 
cooperation between majors and independents stimulated both categories 
to replicate each other's capabilities, intensifying direct competition. At 
the same time, ambitious new entrants and digital technology develop-
ments may alter the industry's competitive rules in the near future.8 
The record business is an industry faced with a considerable degree 
of market uncertainty as, in Denisoff s (1986: 1) words, "the components 
of popular music are in constant flux." Innovation in music is a fast-paced 
process, and can be perceived as the interplay between basic market 
forces. Performing as part of a large oversupply of musicians, creative 
artists search for ways to distinguish themselves from rival acts, in the 
process developing new music styles. Whether or not a particular new 
style or act becomes a success is dependent on a fluid and heterogeneous 
market demand, where consumers are favorable but fastidious to musical 
innovation (Denisoff, 1986). This unpredictable and uncontrollable mar-
ket environment represents the operating context for record companies 
6 There are three categories of rights: (1) mechanical rights, which entitle composers and 
the publishing companies to which they are contractually connected to derive income from 
sheet music and record sales, (2) copyrights, which represent the exclusive right for record 
companies to be the first to record and distribute composed music on a carrier, and (3) 
performance rights, which entitle composers and record companies to remunerate fees 
from publicly performed hearings or broadcastings of their compositions or records. 
7- Obviously, the size of the majors' combined share differs from country to country, as 
shown by 1996 figures for the Top Five music markets (published in the December 1997 
issue of Music Business International, page ix): (1) USA 80%, (2) Japan 67%, (3) Ger-
many 93%, (4) UK 82%, and (5) France 95%. In the Netherlands (ranked as number 9), 
the collective major market share was 81%. 
8
 As an illustration, US research consultancy Jupiter Communications estimated that on-
line music sales will grow exponentially from $47m in 1997 to $ 1640m in 2002 (reported 
in Music Business International, June 1997, p. 9). 
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(see Exhibit 1.1). In a world where new acts continue to pop up and music 
exists by the grace of short-lived trends, these firms are the intermediaries 
between artists and public (Burnett, 1996). 
Exhibit 1.1: Record Company Business Processes 
Record companies bridge the gap between the creative community and the consumer 
market. In their attempts to get public attention, record companies continuously re-
new their artist roster as they compete for repertoire. The ability to discover and 
commercialize new music talent is as arduous as it is crucial to a record company's 
existence and success. Innovation in music is not easy to determine let alone meas-
ure, and this elusiveness obstructs the company's search for creative acts. At the same 
time, the velocity with which new music trends emerge and subside makes it hard to 
trace and evaluate intangible customer preferences. The absence of standard rules or 
procedures to estimate an artist's creativity as well as its commercial potential up 
front inhibits a fruitful ongoing new product launch on new music markets. Record 
companies indeed operate in a risky business: whereas each act requires significant 
resource investments, an industry average of only ten percent of all new signings is 
released successfully. Obviously, the uncertainty associated with the quest for new 
products affects the process through which record companies sign and market new 
repertoire. To reduce their chances of failure, firms in this industry typically operate 
along a three-staged process of artist extraction, development and exploitation. 
The discovery of promising acts and their incorporation into the organization is 
the prime responsibility of the company's A&R (artist and repertoire) staff. At a fun-
damental level, A&R involves every aspect of the relationship between an act and the 
record company. The process of extracting acts from the cultural environment starts at 
the talent scout. Not only does the scout listen to the hundreds of demo tapes that are 
sent to the company by aspiring musicians, but he or she also visits live performances 
at bars, clubs and theaters. It is crucial for the scout to operate at a 'street level' in the 
creative community where music originates. Ultimately, the decision whether or not 
an act presented by the scout is being offered a contract resides at the managing di-
rector or the chairman. When the deal has been made, A&R staff supports the newly 
signed act in a variety of ways. An A&R person assigned to the act exploits a personal 
network of record producers, engineers and studios in the actual recording of the 
album. Furthermore, he nurtures relationships with the act's private management and 
publishing company. 
A record company does not necessarily have to be an excellent performer when 
it has a superb capability in discovering new talent. In the end, artists are judged by 
market consumers who therefore need to be convinced of the quality of the firm's 
repertoire. This requires the careful development of artistic careers through the crea-
tion of specific images that tie consumers' attention and emotions to a particular act. 
The artist is uniquely positioned in the music market so that its distinctive value can 
be communicated to potential buyers. The development of the firm's artists is realized 
through regularly organized artist meetings. Here, A&R and marketing people join up 
in a project team where an act's progress in musical orientation and visual image are 
discussed. Special attention is paid to how the media can best be approached, culmi-
nating into a broadly defined campaign program. These temporary projects are coor-
dinated by the head of artist development, whose primary task is to maintain internal 
9 
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communication and track the effects of specific campaigns in the marketplace. Artist 
development is the gray area where musical creativity is combined with commercial 
pragmatism. 
Promotion and distribution is imperative if the record company wants to recoup 
the considerable investments made so far. The larger part of the marketing campaign 
budget is dedicated to promotional activities directed at radio and TV. These are the 
music industry's main channels of communication through which a firm's repertoire 
can be brought under the attention of consumers. The oversupply of recorded music 
makes companies compete for airplay in a crowded and fragmented radio landscape. 
Specialized promo men therefore present sample copies of tracks or albums to disc 
jockeys, and try to convince them to broadcast 'this great record.' At the same time, 
the act's image and identity are communicated through live performances on televi-
sion shows and video clips on MTV. Promotion and sales staff also maintains rela-
tionships with retail chains and record shops, and is backed up by publicity in the 
press. Manufacturing and distribution make sure that the record as a physical carrier -
with the CD as today's primary format - is available on the shelves. During this proc-
ess of exploitation, protection of the company's relationships and its intellectual 
property is crucial. 
The rationale for studying coevolution between capabilities and com-
petition in the record business is threefold. Ranked second only behind 
book publishing, it is the oldest software industry with a history that spans 
more than 100 years, which makes it suitable for the detection of long-
term patterns.9 Furthermore, knowledge is crucial in the performance and 
survival of record companies, and the idea that capabilities are in essence 
integrated knowledge components (Grant, 1996) makes this industry ade-
quate for investigation. Finally, the record business is one of the so-called 
cultural industries which have, until recently, only been of marginal inter-
est to management scholars as objects of empirical research.10 Relatively 
little is known today on organizational and competitive dynamics in the 
music industry to the field of strategic management. The present study can 
thus not only contribute to theory development, but can also be of value to 
the academy's empirical knowledge base. 
9
 The record business is comparable to book publishing (and other industries such as 
theater arts) in the sense that unique talent is tied to the demands for creative products and 
services. At another level, the music industry shows similarities with the oil and movie 
businesses where the industry is structured around five or six major corporations and a 
vast number of independents. The record industry is also one of the major content provid-
ers in a rapidly growing and converging digital network of software and hardware busi-
ness segments (Yoffie, 1996). 
'0 Cultural industries are claimed to offer an opportunity to challenge conventional 
thinking (Call for Papers, 1997), while the film industry has gained some ground as a 
research site for management studies (DeFillippi and Arthur, 1998; Miller and Shamsie. 
1996; Robins, 1993). 
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By nature, it seems impossible to study coevolution without incorpo-
rating the element of time. Research into long-term dynamics of the recip-
rocal relationships between capabilities and competition therefore requires 
an explicit process perspective. Van de Ven (1992: 170) offered three 
working definitions of 'process,' of which "a sequence of events or ac-
tivities that describes how things change over time" is embraced." Apart 
from the fact that such an approach gains a deeper understanding of the 
how and why issues, it is the only one that supports multiple-level re-
search and analysis (Pettigrew, 1992). Moreover, it allows for a 'historical 
development' perspective based on an investigation of specific events and 
stages. Such a Chandlerian perspective is crucial in longitudinal studies 
that consider organizational and competitive behavior of firms over longer 
periods of time. Longitudinal research has been claimed indispensable to 
the field of strategic management as it counter-balances the static limita-
tions of cross-sectional analysis (Porter, 1991). 
To explore coevolution in the music industry, a 'dual methodology' is 
employed, which incorporates both the longitudinal and multiple-level 
research dimensions. The first component consists of a historical study of 
the record business over the period 1900-1990, where coevolution of ca-
pabilities and competition is mainly studied from an industry perspective. 
In line with Berkhofer (1969), the music industry's evolution is narrated 
in terms of particular periods; simultaneous data description and analysis 
is performed to detect patterns and their underlying mechanisms. The sec-
ond research component is designed as a multiple-case study where cross-
case analysis (Yin, 1984) is primarily performed to gain insight into 
coevolution of capabilities and competition at the firm level of analysis. 
Individual cases focus on trajectories of organizational evolution during 
the period 1990-1997, and concern the following record companies: Is-
land Records, Virgin Records, BMG International UK, Warner Music 
UK, Roadrunner Records, Independiente and V2 Music Group. 
Figure 1.2 displays the general research approach that embodies the 
structure of this book. The research aim and its corresponding questions 
discussed in the current chapter provide the input for a discussion of the 
triangle of theories shown in Figure 1.1. Whereas Chapter 2 explores firm 
idiosyncrasy as suggested by resource-based thinking, Chapter 3 takes an 
in-depth look at Schumpeter's theory of competition regarding uniformity 
' ' The other two definitions are: (1) a logic that explains a causal relationship between 
independent and dependent variables in a variance theory, and (2) a category of concepts 
or fixed variables that are operationalized as constructs. 
II 
r 
INTRODUCTION 
among firms. The following chapter integrates these seemingly contra-
dictory theories by drawing upon the search concept, in the process gen-
erating a number of theorized propositions and an integrative framework 
of coevolution. Here, a pure theoretical answer is given to the research 
questions as stated above, based on a synthesis of existing knowledge on 
capabilities, competition and search behavior. Together, these three theo-
retical chapters constitute the first basic section of this thesis. 
Figure 1.2: Structure of the Study 
Chapter 1 
Research Aim 
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Chapter 2 
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1 
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Chapter 3 
Competition 
1 
Theoretical 
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Chapter 7 
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Chapter 8 
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and Conclusions 
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findings 
As a prelude to the empirical part of the study, Chapter 5 discusses 
the specific empirical research methods employed, primarily in terms of 
data collection, analysis and validity. Chapters 6 and 7 move on to an in-
quiry into coevolutionary processes of a dynamic nature as encountered in 
the music business. The first of these chapters focuses on coevolution of 
capabilities and competition from an industry-level perspective in terms 
of socalled 'competitive regimes.' In contrast, the second does so from the 
firm-level point of view in terms of distinct organizational change proc-
esses. The final chapter assesses the validity of the framework through a 
confrontation of the empirical findings with the theoretical propositions. 
Essentially, it addresses the research questions again, incorporating addi-
tional knowledge derived from the empirical setting. Guided by the initial 
research aim, the project's major conclusions are presented, after which 
some future research trajectories are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theory on Capabilities: 
The Contributing Value of Resource-Based Views 
This chapter explains why, according to resource-based thinking, firms 
are essentially idiosyncratic in their appearance and behavior. This view 
assumes that heterogeneity in organizational assets among firms leads to 
differences in the capabilities they have. This is why some firms are able 
to create superior capabilities and, as a consequence, generate a competi-
tive advantage over others. Moreover, the resource-based view of the firm 
argues that such advantages can be sustained through barriers to imitation. 
As firms have their own histories, capabilities are unique in that they are 
built over time through path-dependent processes, and can therefore not 
easily be copied by others. Also, the nature of the relationship between the 
firm's capabilities and its advantage can be ambiguous, as the interde-
pendencies between the various components or parts out of which a spe-
cific capability has been created may be unobservable and complex. As 
resource-based thinking is focused on the firm level, it appears to be ap-
propriate for integration into a coevolutionary approach. Starting with the 
concept of sustainable competitive advantage, this chapter thus explores 
the essence of resource-based thinking. 
SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
It will probably always be arbitrary when the term sustainable competitive 
advantage was coined in public, and by whom. The reason is that its ori-
gins come from different corners of the scientific world: sustainability has 
its roots in the rich field of industrial organization, while competitive ad-
vantage came to life during the institutionalization of the discipline of 
business policy. It was none other than Porter (1980) who knitted both 
ideas together in his impressive inquiry into the nature of competitive 
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strategy. Although he did not use the term explicitly, there can be no 
doubt that the following words enabled a host of others to explore it: "The 
strength of the competitive forces in an industry determines the degree to 
which this inflow of investment [through new entry or through additional 
investment by existing competitors] occurs and drives the return to the 
free market level, and thus the ability of firms to sustain above-average 
returns" (Porter, 1980: 5-6). 
Early Views on Sustainability 
Strategy and strategic management became common language in many 
corporations during the late fifties and early sixties when professional 
schools of management in the United States redirected their business pol-
icy course.1 The leading texts were those from Selznick (1957), Chandler 
(1962), Ansoff (1965) and Andrews (1971). The central idea common to 
all was the executive's task to design a strategy that, in a Darwinian man-
ner, matched environmental opportunities with the firm's competences in 
pursuit of a competitive advantage. The idea of sustainability, however, 
was a key concept in the field of industrial organization, the name of 
which had been introduced by Marshall (1890) more than a century ago. 
Research really started off in the 1930s, and took a flight in the late fifties 
with the works of Bain (1956) and Mason (1957) on concentration and 
entry barriers, performed in the context of the so-called SCP (structure-
conduct-performance) paradigm. 
The industrial organization tradition had originally examined mo-
nopolistic and oligopolistic practices in the context of consumer welfare, 
and the field's principal aim was to provide a knowledge platform for the 
US government. Washington needed unprejudiced intelligence in its task 
to select the most suitable antitrust and regulatory policies, and company 
studies performed by industrial organization advocates came to be a pri-
mary input to its policies. These inquiries made it clear that, depending 
upon the more structural characteristics of the industry, persistent above-
normal returns were possible, an idea contrary to traditional economic 
thoughts on price, demand and supply. This notion of sustainability re-
ferred to the enduring structure of the industry, in which the firm (on its 
' In his exploration into the history of management thinking. Van den Bosch (1993) ar-
gued how early work by Taylor (1911) and Fayol (1916) stressed generic management 
principles but disregarded environmental conditions. As a result, courses in business pol-
icy focused on general instead of strategic management until the 1950s. 
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own or in collusion with a few others) could gain long-lasting profits. But 
during the late seventies, new research efforts took a more prescriptive 
route in the industrial organization field (e.g., Caves and Porter, 1977). 
Porter (1980) argued that the essence of a firm's competitive strategy 
is to create a position in the industry which is defendable against five 
competitive forces: threat of new entrants, threat of substitute products or 
services, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, and 
rivalry among existing firms. In other words, a firm can only sustain its 
above-average performance by shielding off competitors and in this way 
being the sole master in a particular competitive arena. Key to such a 
strategy is the erection of entry barriers such as economies of scale, capi-
tal requirements, and access to distribution channels in order to deter rival 
firms. However, Teece (1984: 94) argued that such a focus on "how to 
increase profits (and, if necessary, reduce consumer welfare) by contain-
ing or restricting competition" stands in sharp contrast with industrial or-
ganization's intentions to discover ways to "increase consumer welfare by 
enhancing competition." Pushing the essence of these words even further, 
Cooper (1995) noticed that Porter's original notion of competitive strat-
egy results in firm behavior that avoids competition, and in its pure form 
creates zones of no competition.2 
Porter (1980) had indeed avoided the term sustainable competitive 
advantage, presumably because his own conceptual exposition obstructed 
him to do so. When a firm succeeds in creating what is essentially a mo-
nopoly position, it has no rivals to compete with, and the sustained returns 
to such a firm can therefore never be related to the concept of competitive 
advantage. Without competitors, a firm can have no advantage at all; it is 
the relative and relational property of the word itself that inhibits its appli-
cation to those circumstances in which there is no other entity to relate it 
to. The simplicity of this logic explains Porter's negligible attention to the 
concept of distinctive competence, despite its crucial role within early 
business policy thinking. For without competition, there will be a scarcity 
of pressures on the firm's ability to create unique capabilities (Barnett, 
Greve and Park, 1994). It would take Porter another five years to come up 
with a solution to the absence of capabilities in his ideas on competitive 
strategy. 
2 More recently however, Porter's (1990) view of competition has changed into a more 
assertive one where competitive pressures force rival firms to be involved in innovative 
behavior; in the end, such entrepreneurial conduct will benefit companies' competitive 
vitality. 
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Contemporary Views on Sustainability 
In the meantime, the discipline of industrial organization had generated 
two offsprings that both focused on the role of firm efficiency as ob-
structing monopoly positions, be it from different perspectives. On the 
one hand, the 'contestability' school, developed by Baumol, Panzar and 
Willig (1982), sees the threat of potential entrants as sufficient in forcing 
incumbents to take the most efficient route to the market. What matters 
here is an absence of entry barriers - to which governmental policies 
should be directed in order to protect social welfare - and the possibility 
for all competitors to use the same productive techniques. The 'Chicago' 
school, on the other hand, does recognize differences in firm resources, 
but any gains to be derived from this heterogeneity are short-lived. 
Stimulated by the early work of Knight (1921) and flourished under the 
leadership of Stigler (1955), this view argues how firms pursue efficiency 
by means of economies of scale in production and distribution. 
Although both schools at the time explicitly excluded the possibility 
for firms to enjoy long-lasting above-average returns, the emphasis on 
firm behavior in the causal relationship between conduct and performance 
changed things dramatically. This new development not only changed the 
course of thinking within the industrial organization discipline, but also 
left its mark on the field of strategic management. Porter (1985) intro-
duced the firm's value chain as the primary source of competitive advan-
tage and, at last, explained how sustainability could be achieved. Firms 
were to create systems of interlaced activities tailored to their positioning 
strategy, resulting in proprietary learning, economies of scale, knowledge 
linkages within the corporation, technology patents, and channel loyalty. 
These elements form the protective barriers to imitation that safeguard the 
firm's competitive advantage - grounded in the unique constellation of its 
value chain - from erosion by rivals. 
Although the concept of sustainable competitive advantage had al-
ready been used before Porter's work on competitive advantage, its 
popularity in management publications and corporate offices now ex-
ploded in an unprecedented form.3 In his article Sustainable Advantage, 
Ghemawat (1986) discussed the types of advantage firms need to avoid 
imitation by rivals: size in the target market in terms of scale and scope 
economies and experience effects, superior access to customer markets as 
well as to resources such as know-how and other inputs, and the ability to 
3 See, for instance, Buaron (1981). 
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influence public policy and restrict competitors' moves. The strategy field 
had evolved in its beliefs concerning the essential meaning and primary 
determinant of sustainable competitive advantage. Whereas the concept of 
SCA originally referred to abnormal returns over a certain period of cal-
endar time due to the monopolistic structure of the industry, it now came 
to be tied to firm behavior and subjugated to imitation by rivals. 
The idea that the sources of sustainability could well be situated 
within the firm as a direct result of its own activities instead of nestled in 
the external conditions of its habitat, acquired form and substance with 
Barney's (1986) discussion on 'strategic factor markets.' He argued that 
performance variations between firms are the outcome of differences in 
efficiency with which they implement their strategies: "Firms can only 
obtain greater than normal returns from implementing their product mar-
ket strategies when the cost of resources to implement those strategies is 
significantly less than their economic value" (1986: 1232). Different ex-
pectations and plain old luck determine the ability of firms to create or 
exploit such competitive imperfections in strategic factor markets. In re-
sponse, Dierickx and Cool (1989) amplified Barney's arguments on how 
to create a competitive advantage into the more specific question of what 
determines the sustainability of competitive advantage. 
A Definition of SCA 
According to these authors, the most crucial organizational assets are 
those that have been accumulated within the firm, and for which no open 
market exists on which they can be traded freely. Such firm-specific re-
sources can only be a source of sustainable competitive advantage if they 
meet the test of replication: the firm's competitors have to be thwarted in 
their attempts to imitate or substitute these assets. From this moment on, 
strategy thinkers adopted Grant's (1991: 123) argument that the speed of 
erosion of competitive advantage through imitation by competitors "de-
pends critically upon the characteristics of the resources and capabilities." 
The field's new ideology made academics turn their backs towards tradi-
tional industry analysis. Firm strategy was no longer an issue of obtaining 
monopoly profits through restriction of competition; what mattered now 
was efficiency in exploitation of resource advantages, a view clearly in-
spired by the newly advanced contestability and Chicago streams of 
thought in industrial organization. 
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Although management scholars used to see the period of calendar 
time as the mandatory determinant of sustainability,4 contemporary strat-
egy thinking has substituted this factor by the possibility of competitive 
duplication. Indeed, this study conforms itself to this second notion of 
sustainable competitive advantage, and adopts the definition suggested by 
Barney (1991: 102): "A firm is said to have a sustained competitive ad-
vantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not simultane-
ously being implemented by any current or potential competitors and 
when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strat-
egy." Likewise, a created competitive advantage is sustainable "only if it 
continues to exist after efforts to duplicate that advantage have ceased." 
Although the conceptual tenor of sustainability should now be clear, a 
closer look at what has been called the 'resource-based view of the firm' 
is necessary to incorporate the value of firm resources and capabilities 
into its meaning. 
RESOURCE-BASED VIEWS OF THE FIRM 
Strategic management's current passion for resources and capabilities in 
its search for the sources of sustainability has not only evolved out of 
avant-garde approaches to IO, but has also descended from management 
research into corporate strategy (see Figure 2.1). In his original investiga-
tion of the relationship between diversification strategy and economic per-
formance, Rumelt (1982) expanded the concept of synergy to the broader 
one of relatedness between various units within the multi-business firm. 
In doing this, he proposed that sharing particular core factors within the 
corporation induced relatedness among its business units: "[...] particular 
attention was paid to the absence or existence of shared facilities, com-
mon selling groups, and other tangible evidence of attempts to exploit 
common factors of production" (1982: 360). In time, other researchers, 
which conducted quite a number of sequel studies in which alternative 
methodologies were employed, confirmed his results.5 
4 Jacobson (1988). for example, tied a sustainable competitive advantage to the ability of 
firms to earn abnormal returns for a substantial number of years, whereas Kay (1993: 166) 
claimed that the best measure of the sustainability of competitive advantage is "the extent 
to which a firm continues to enjoy above-average profitability year after year." 
5 See. for example. Bettis (1981). Montgomery (1982), Palepu (1985). and Lubatkin and 
Rogers (1989). 
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Figure 2.1: Origins of the SCA Concept 
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The role of organizational assets within this line of research gradually 
shifted in character from being a determinant of relatedness to an ex-
planatory variable of performance at the industry level.6 Schmalensee 
(1985) claimed that more than 80 percent of the variance in business unit 
profitability was not related to industry effects, while Jacobson (1988) 
could only observe a remote influence of market forces on the persistence 
of above-normal returns to firms. Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1986) 
argued that traditional ideas on industry attractiveness should be given 
second thoughts considering the evidence that sources of efficiency dif-
ferences can be located at the firm level. In yet another test, Hansen and 
Wernerfelt (1989) stated that building an organizational context is twice 
as important as the firm's selection of growth industries. Finally, Rumelt 
(1991) found that differences in returns are explained six times more by 
business-unit effects than those of industry. 
At an even earlier stage, others had noted the significance of firm 
resources and capabilities to survival and success. Within the discipline of 
population dynamics, Astley (1985) had claimed that capabilities define 
the genetic make-up of firms. In the field of technological innovation, 
Abemathy and Clark (1985: 5) saw the ensemble of tangible resources, 
human skills, relationships and tacit knowledge as "competitive ingredi-
ents from which the firm builds the product features that appeal to the 
marketplace." But in the world of strategy, things really started off when 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) published an article on corporate strategy that 
rocked managerial thinking. These authors championed the idea that cor-
6 In this study, 'organizational assets' encompasses both resources and capabilities. 
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porate-wide technologies and production skills, embodied in so-called 
'core competences,' are the real sources of advantage.7 
Firm Behavior and Capabilities 
So although its incubation time took a while, a newborn perspective on 
strategy came into being at the start of this decade. It was christened the 
resource-based view of the firm, after the title of an article written by 
Wernerfelt (1984). He, in turn, had picked up Penrose's (1959) theory of 
corporate growth in which the firm's expansion is primarily determined 
by the availability of firm-specific management resources. According to 
contemporary proponents of the resource-based view, there are at least 
two reasons why firms should build their strategy upon an infrastructure 
of resources and capabilities instead of relying upon an analysis of their 
external environment. First, the various frameworks and conceptual mod-
els firms use as tools for external analysis are public property, so the ex-
pected variance in firms' outlook on their environment will be very low 
(Barney, 1991). Second, whereas the firm is assumed to have little or no 
control on the pace of external change, it is far more sensible to trust the 
stability of the firm's own organizational assets, as their development can 
be controlled to a much higher degree (Grant, 1991). 
If the environment is supposed to have the same features to all rivals, 
then there is no choice but to accept the idea that firms have to be differ-
ent.8 If this would not be the case, any form of competitive advantage is 
simply not possible; if firms are all alike, and the setting in which they 
compete is the same to all, then any advantage created by one will be im-
mediately eroded by the others. This is exactly the orthodox approach to 
economics that has been criticized by less rationalistic academics such as 
Penrose (1959). Thus, not only because we intuitively know that no one 
organization is the same as any other, but also because there is plenty of 
evidence that there are indeed companies that perform (much) better than 
their rivals and seem to have a competitive advantage, the resource-based 
view has adopted the assumption of firm heterogeneity. A variety of rea-
7 Until further notice, the words competences and capabilities will be used interchangea-
bly, although there seem to be conceptual differences in that Prahalad and Hamel's con-
cept of core competences is mainly related to a firm's technology base. 
8
 Of course, firms can appear to be similar in their competitive behavior. The next chapter 
discusses how rival firms aim to copy each other's capabilities and in this sense try to be 
alike, "the point made here, however, is that firms differ with respect to the resources and 
capabilities that lie deep down in the organization. 
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sons explain for the natural differences between companies operating in 
the same business area. 
Because the behavior of an organization is reducible to the behavior 
of its individual members (Nelson and Winter, 1982), all organizations 
must be unique to some degree as no individual is the same as any other. 
This is the crux of the heterogeneity assumption, out of which all other 
reasons cited below seem to arise: if individuals eventually form the or-
ganization's behavior, and this behavior can be mirrored by the practices 
and business processes in which the firm's capabilities are rooted (Stalk, 
Evans and Shulman, 1992), then firms can and indeed do have different 
competences on the basis of which they can create and exploit competi-
tive advantages. This is not to say that firms will breed distinctive com-
petences and, in effect, a competitive edge of their own accord as soon as 
they employ human labor. It is merely argued that, in the end, unavoid-
able uniqueness of each firm's personnel makes the company what it is: a 
distinct entity that is distinguishable from others through its behavior. 
The idea that an organization's behavior is deducible from the con-
duct of its members has inescapable implications for the firm as a whole. 
Eventually, the sum of the unique courses of thought and action by its 
working members over time results in the creation and development of 
systems, procedures, activities, processes, values and even politics that are 
exclusively tailored to the firm itself. Furthermore, because companies are 
dissimilar in most of these features, they also have different ideas about 
the nature of the business environment in which they operate and, as a 
consequence, also vary in their expectations about the future value of a 
particular strategy (Barney, 1986). Such diversity in 'trade foresight' 
among firms is reflected in the heterogeneity firms display in their reser-
voirs of resources and capabilities. Over time, companies make their own 
decisions as to which organizational assets to acquire or develop, based 
on distinct perceptions of the future. 
Firm Heterogeneity and Knowledge 
This brings us to the essence of the resource-based argument: firm het-
erogeneity in terms of variety in resources and capabilities may increase 
the imbalance between competitors' exclusive repertory of assets and 
their specific market strategy (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). It is this dispar-
ity that may result in significant performance differences, i.e. competitive 
advantages, according to one of its main proponents: "in order for there to 
be a first-mover advantage, firms in an industry must be heterogeneous in 
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terms of the resources they control" (Barney, 1991: 104). It is important 
to note here that, as Rumelt (1984) argued in his discussion on entrepre-
neurial strategy, firm heterogeneity is indeed an outcome rather than a 
given. Denoting the significance of innovative firm behavior, Rumelt 
stressed that "without resource heterogeneity [...] there is Irttle incentive 
for investing in the risky exploration of new methods and the search for 
new value" (1984: 561). Thus, it is the firm's behavior that, in the end, 
makes it different from others. 
In addition, Levinthal (1995) argued that this idea is not restricted to 
firm behavior of an exploratory nature, but also applies to exploitative 
product-market activities through which these organizational capabilities 
emerge. In general, variety among companies reflects their heterogeneity 
at a much earlier point in time, and even minor differences at firms' 
starting points can, over wider spans of time, lead to large-scale inequali-
ties due to their path-dependent nature. A further incorporation of the 
element of time into the resource-based view has been suggested by pro-
ponents of the so-called 'dynamic capabilities view of the firm.' Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen (1997) proposed that dynamic capabilities represent the 
firm's latent abilities to renew, augment, and adapt its core competences 
over time. Such meta-capabilities affect both the rate and the direction of 
the evolution of a firm's organizational assets. 
This dynamic view of the firm as a constellation of resources and ca-
pabilities has been closely coupled to the firm's basic mental mindframes, 
or in more mundane language, its fundamental beliefs about the organiza-
tion's internal and business environment. In this respect, Lei, Hitt and 
Bettis (1996: 559) argued that "dynamic routines refer to the organiza-
tion's cognitive maps and particular approach to framing" that are essen-
tial to the firm's problem-solving requirements to new market approaches. 
In a follow-up article on their notion of 'dominant logic,' an organiza-
tional genetic factor that represents beliefs, ideas and heuristic principles 
concerning the firm's business, Bettis and Prahalad (1995: 8) claimed that 
an organization's intelligence is its ability to learn over time, and "what an 
organization is able to learn can be transformed into organizational 
knowledge." More and more, strategy scholars are convinced that the 
most valuable resource for a firm's competitive advantage is knowledge. 
Leonard-Barton (1992) was probably the first to embrace these 
thoughts under the label of the 'knowledge-based view of the firm.' She 
defined a core capability as a four-dimensional knowledge set underlying 
a firm's competitive advantage, reflecting accumulated firm behavior over 
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time. Employee skills and physical technical systems are both knowledge 
reservoirs, while managerial systems and company values can be thought 
of as knowledge-channeling mechanisms. Conner and Prahalad (1996) 
have called a knowledge-based perspective the essence of the resource-
based view, while Grant (1996: 375) only recently stated that "knowledge 
has emerged as the most strategically-significant resource of the firm." In 
doing this, he claimed that the essence of an organization's capability is 
the complex integration of the firm's stock of specialist knowledge with 
the objective to repeatedly perform a productive task. The value created in 
such a firm-specific process will, in the end, be crucial to a firm's com-
petitiveness. 
Barriers to Imitation 
Organizations are different in their repertories of organizational assets 
such as people, capabilities and knowledge, and this heterogeneity enables 
firms to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. But having a com-
petitive edge is something entirely different than keeping it alive. Com-
petitors who notice their respective disadvantages are highly motivated to 
destroy such detriment in order to regain what they have lost, to also gain 
extraordinary returns, or to simply keep up in the competitive race. It is a 
reality that leading firms are confronted with: at the very moment a firm 
earns superior returns through the creation of a competitive advantage, it 
also stimulates others to imitate its actions and exterminate its privileged 
position. Thus, in order to sustain a competitive advantage, firms should 
be able to protect the resources that underlie this edge from appropriation 
by rivals. 
Peteraf (1993) argued that, apart from ex ante limits to competition 
for valuable organizational assets, which stem from firm heterogeneity 
and in the end enable the emergence of a competitive advantage, there 
should also be certain ex post limits to preserve that advantage. In his re-
spect, Rumelt (1984) introduced the term isolating mechanisms: firm-
specific assets that act as devices to sustain first-mover advantages and 
the returns derived from them. Today, strategy academics refer to the 
more down-to-earth concept of barriers to imitation that make it difficult 
for rivals to imitate or even substitute for strategically valuable resources 
and capabilities over substantial periods of time (Mahoney and Pandian, 
1992). Effective barriers to imitation should create delays in competitors' 
detection of the firm's supranormal returns, frustrate their ability to prop-
erly diagnose the exact configuration of the organizational sources that 
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bestow the competitive advantage, and obstruct rivals' acquisition of these 
assets. 
The challenge for a firm and its management is thus to erect a set of 
powerful barriers to imitation that reduce or even eliminate existing and 
potential competitors' ability or desire to imitate its specific sources of 
competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Apart from the ob-
vious necessity to continuously develop assets over time, another re-
quirement to be met in this respect is texture complexity: complexity in 
system configurations of organizational resources and capabilities will 
confound rivals' ability to analyze the sources of success (Black and Boal, 
1994). The problem, however, is that the least imitable assets are those 
that have gradually evolved over time instead of deliberately designed by 
plan. In the words of Barnett, Greve and Park (1994: 12): "what resists 
being designed by strategists also resists being imitated by them." Firms 
can also protect their most valuable knowledge by reducing its observ-
ability to the outside world and by preventing its expropriation (Lie-
beskind, 1996). 
Figure 2.2: The Logic of Resource-Based Views 
Firm Heterogeneity 
Firm-Specific ' N . f Competitive N, / / 1 ' Barriers to 
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fx Ante Limits to Competition £x Post Limits to Competition 
The notion of barriers to imitation is crucial to the resource-based 
views of the firm in its search for sustainability, for without the existence 
of these barriers it is simply not possible for companies to preserve a 
competitive advantage.9 The pivotal role of these obstacles lies in their 
capacity to obstruct the perfect mobility of organizational assets among 
firms. Orthodox economic thinking, as well as traditional 10 models, as-
9
 For matters of convenience, the resource-based view, dynamic capabilities view and 
knowledge-based view are from here on collectively referred to as resource-based viewS 
of the firm. 
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sumed that firms within a sector of industry are identical in the sense that 
they can command the same resources and production methods. Whereas 
this point of view holds that any differences between firms evaporate im-
mediately because organizational assets can be transferred almost per-
fectly and without any problem whatsoever, resource-based views adhere 
to the opposite perspective of imperfect mobility (Conner, 1991). So by 
protecting the idiosyncratic nature of the successful firm, barriers to imi-
tation sustain its competitive advantage as they maintain firm heterogene-
ity (see Figure 2.2). 
IMPEDIMENTS TO SUSTAINABILITY 
The sound reasoning with which resource-based views discuss the strate-
gic value of barriers to imitation makes them very attractive to those who 
wish to understand the sources of sustainability. But despite reported suc-
cess stories of companies such as Canon (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) and 
IBM (Peters and Waterman, 1982), a growing body of theoretical contri-
butions challenge that even prestigious and resourceful firms are able to 
sustain competitive advantages. Jacobson (1992) reasoned that abnormal 
returns to superior information can only be temporary because, eventu-
ally, knowledge is dispersed through market forces. In a similar vein, 
D'Aveni (1994) maintained that many industries have experienced a shift 
to 'hypercompetition,' where advantages are rapidly created and eroded. 
If this is true, the validity of resource-based arguments on sustainability 
seems to be in doubt. A closer look at the notions of causal ambiguity and 
path dependency, crucial to resource-based reasoning, reveals a possible 
reason for this basic flaw. 
Diffusion of Property and Knowledge 
The rapid erosion of patents and trade secrets through competition is not 
an exclusive phenomenon of current times. Marshall (1890) observed how 
the diffusion of practical and scientific knowledge by trade journals aided 
rivals in their attempts to invade the competitive territory of successful 
firms. And this is just one of a variety of mechanisms that enable diffu-
sion of the outcomes of innovative firm behavior over a population of 
competitors. For instance, valuable information can become public prop-
erty when gathered by trade associations or more independent institutions 
such as industry observers, business analysts and brokers. Furthermore, 
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research publications, informal lines of communication among colleagues 
employed by rival firms, and even forms of industrial espionage can be 
crucial in this respect. Finally, diffusion of ideas occurs via alternative 
routes like workforce mobility among firms, industry-wide suppliers or 
customers, and reverse engineering (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). 
Resource-based views acknowledge this and, more than that, embrace 
it in the argument that the real sources of sustainability often do not rest in 
such having resources, but instead lie in the firm's doing capabilities 
(Hall, 1993). Those skills and competences that have an integrative, coor-
dinative or creative quality are critical to the preservation of competitive 
advantage, simply because they can not as easily be imitated as the firm's 
other assets. The character of doing capabilities is to a very large degree 
dependent upon the underlying knowledge patterns residing within the 
firm's organization. Indeed, "there is a close connection between the type 
of knowledge possessed by the personnel of the firm and the services ob-
tainable from its material resources" (Penrose, 1959: 76). The more 
unique and idiosyncratic a company's knowledge is in content and form, 
the more problematic imitation will be for its competitors. It will therefore 
often be much easier to copy the property-based resources generated by 
such knowledge-based resources than to replicate the latter (Miller and 
Shamsie, 1996). 
Resource-based views further reason how the notions of 'causal am-
biguity' and 'path dependency' transform knowledge-based assets into 
barriers to imitation and thus condition the sustainability of competitive 
advantage. Although at first sight the logic of this reasoning is appealing, 
both conditions have a 'flip side' as they facilitate and obstruct the con-
tinuation of a competitive advantage. These negative forces, rooted in the 
barriers themselves, impede rival imitation, but at the same time obstruct 
the firm's ability to further exploit and continue its newly developed com-
petitive advantage. This chapter ends with a discussion of how barriers to 
imitation can thus become barriers to sustainability. In this respect, it un-
covers a fundamental limitation of resource-based reasoning on the role of 
firm capabilities in sustaining a competitive advantage. 
To avoid confusion, the terms imitation and substitution will not be 
treated as separate categories here. Ghemawat (1991: 91) explained that 
"the conceptual distinction between imitation and substitution as threats to 
scarcity value is that the former increases the supply of sticky factors 
while the latter effectively depresses the demand for them [...] this con-
ceptual distinction is often less clear-cut in practice." The reason is that 
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pure forms of imitation virtually never occur. Marshall (1890: 517-518) 
noted that "even in the same place and the same trade no two persons pur-
suing the same aims will adopt exactly the same routes." On principle, 
this means that each imitative trial is, in essence, a ceremony of substitu-
tion. Accordingly, Nelson and Winter (1982: 123) stressed that "the imi-
tator is not directly concerned with creating a good likeness, but with 
achieving economic success - preferably, an economic success at least 
equal to that of the original. Differences of detail that are economically of 
no great consequence are perfectly acceptable." 
The Liability of Causal Ambiguity 
The first keystone upon which resource-based views have constructed the 
argument of sustainable barriers to imitation is Lippman and Rumelt's 
(1982) concept of 'causal ambiguity.' In other words, the uncertainty in-
volved in analyzing the exact nature of the successful firm's knowledge 
bundle often makes it extremely ambiguous for rivals to determine which 
organizational assets are really critical to that firm's competitive advan-
tage. Lipmann and Rumelt (1982: 420) argued that "it may never be pos-
sible to produce a finite unambiguous list of the factors of production re-
sponsible for the success of such firms," and in this sense "ambiguity as 
to what factors are responsible for superior (or inferior) performance acts 
as a powerful block on both imitation and factor mobility". If competitors 
do not know what to copy, imitation becomes next to impossible, and this 
reduces the negative effects of imitation upon the sustainability of the 
leading company's competitive advantage. 
The degree of ambiguity, and thus its inherent power as a barrier to 
imitation, is an outcome of the characteristics of the leading firm's indi-
vidual resources and capabilities as well as the way in which they are 
linked to each other. In this respect, the strategic quality of these assets is 
dependent upon their observability, complexity and interdependency 
(Winter, 1987). When the particular competences of a firm are hidden 
from the direct eye, rivals will find it difficult to identify them. When a 
firm's strategic asset bundle is highly complicated and sophisticated in 
nature because of an elaborated development process, competitors will 
have a hard time re-manufacturing them. When a firm's core capabilities 
result from a number of interactive systems of inextricably intertwined 
organizational assets, imitators will be faced with significant difficulties 
on both matters of specification and duplication. Together, these attributes 
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create formidable barriers to imitation that enable the superior firm to 
fight off rivals. , 0 
Proponents of resource-based views often like to refer to causal am-
biguity as favorable towards the protection of the innovator's sources of 
competitive advantage. But it seems rather inconsistent that resource-
based views pay exclusive attention to the glittery part of the argument, 
while neglecting its gloomy aspects. It should not be forgotten that the 
firm's distinctive resources and capabilities in the end stem from the col-
lective and cooperative behavior of its members. And in its difficult task 
of dealing with these social phenomena, management faces the same 
problem politicians are also confronted with in a much wider context: so-
cial behavior can not be systematically structured, managed and influ-
enced as pleased, and well-intentioned policies always have (unsuspected) 
negative side-effects. And so it is for corporations: the weaknesses that 
confront commercial entities are very often a consequence of the strengths 
of their strategies. 
In a similar vein, the effects of causal ambiguity can be an advantage 
and a liability to the firm. For ambiguity to be a barrier to imitation, both 
the leading firm and its rivals must be faced with the same level of uncer-
tainty surrounding the respective assets and their linkage to competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). If the successful firm's managers do have an 
understanding of the various causalities, competitors will be able to break 
down the barriers by using one or more of the above-mentioned diffusion 
mechanisms and thus inhibit sustainability (the successful firm's manag-
ers can be offered a better contract by rivals, for example). So in order for 
its advantage to be sustainable, the first-mover firm itself should not be 
faced with a lower degree of ambiguity than its rivals. But if this is true, 
then the leading firm, lacking a comprehensive understanding of its 
sources of advantage, will not be able to continue its competitive success: 
the company is, just like its rivals, unable to replicate that what created the 
advantage in the first place (Teece, 1984). 
This last point has also been advanced by Reed and DeFillippi (1990: 
90-91), claiming that "ambiguity may be so great that not even managers 
within the firm understand the relationship between actions and out-
comes." Moreover, "where ambiguity is so great that managers do not 
understand intrafirm causal relationships, or factor immobility exists, it 
may be impossible to utilize competences for advantage." Rumelt (1987: 
'0 In this sense. Porter's (1996) recent work on activity systems claims interdependencies 
between individual firm activities to be key to a company's strategic capabilities. 
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144) also reasoned that in cases of significant causal ambiguity, "success-
ful entrepreneurs are no more likely to repeat their success than de novo 
entrants." Further exploitation of the leading firm's competitive edge de-
mands a reduction of the level of ambiguity, which, in turn, entails de-
clining degrees of inobservability, complexity and interdependency. 
Winter (1987) noted that for competences to be expanded and exploited, 
they should be articulable, observable and simple. But this enables suc-
cessful imitative efforts by rivals, which again forestalls sustainability. 
As noted, contemporary resource-based thinking is placing its bets on 
knowledge as the paramount component of barriers to imitation and sus-
tainable competitive advantage. The idea is that the idiosyncratic nature of 
the firm's knowledge base raises the degree of causal ambiguity and 
thereby precludes rival attacks. Knowledge is thus claimed to be the most 
strategically relevant resource in the corporation's portfolio of assets. For 
instance, Liebeskind (1996) argued that organizational knowledge can be 
kept proprietary through internalization of knowledge transactions within 
the firm and disaggregation of organizational tasks. However, such poli-
cies may very well lead to considerable transaction costs and failures to 
communicate within the firm. According to Grant (1996), the pivotal role 
of knowledge is its integrative ability to economize on communication, 
but to achieve such efficiency, the level of common or routine knowledge 
has to be high. This will inevitably increase rivals' chances of successful 
replication efforts. 
In the same vein, Baden-Fuller and Pitt (1996) claimed that new ideas 
can be most effectively exploited if they become the property of all or-
ganizational members. Communication within the company is a necessity 
to realize such an ambitious goal, but again imitation by rivals will be 
simplified as entrepreneurial knowledge becomes widespread throughout 
the leading firm. It seems that even knowledge can not escape the essence 
of dual reasoning. It is primarily the tacit component of knowledge assets 
that prevents their articulation, thereby increasing the complexity and 
inobservability of the firm's internal success factors. In this situation, both 
the leading company and its rivals are faced with difficulties in replication 
and high barriers to imitation. Indeed, Spender and Grant (1996: 8) 
stressed that "the dilemma for management is that, for the same reasons 
that competitors cannot replicate the firm's knowledge, the firm itself may 
not understand it well enough to exploit it effectively." 
This dilemma has also been discussed by Kogut and Zander (1992), 
claiming that replication of knowledge within the firm and its imitation by 
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other companies are 'blades of the same scissors.' The firm's desire to 
grow and to enhance efficiency by further exploitation of its advantage 
calls for codification and simplification of the underlying knowledge, 
which also provokes copying behavior by rivals. A catch-22 situation 
arises: the level of causal ambiguity surrounding the successful firm's 
asset base should be high to avoid imitation by its competitors and,at the 
same time, should be low to enable exploitation by the company itself. 
Whatever choice it makes within such a setting, the firm will never be 
able to gain a sustainable competitive advantage, simply because the al-
ternatives are mutually exclusive. In one of the few querulous writings on 
resource-based theory, Collis (1994: 147) indeed noted that "causal ambi-
guity ultimately cannot be a source of sustainable competitive advantage 
because it contains the seeds of its own self-destruction." 
The Liability of Path Dependency 
The second keystone on which resource-based theories have built their 
premise that barriers to imitation can lead to sustainable advantages is 
known as 'path dependency.' In their eyes, firm heterogeneity is time-
dependent: throughout the years, firms create different resource bundles 
as a result of gradually growing differences in management styles, cul-
tural values, processes and procedures. Over time, individual firms de-
velop unique routines to repeatedly perform organizational tasks, and 
these routines can eventually turn out to be (at the basis of) the company's 
distinctive competences. Such strategic resources and capabilities are "the 
cumulative result of adhering to a set of consistent policies over a period 
of time" (Dierickx and Cool, 1989: 1506). When this leads to a competi-
tive advantage, the successful firm will be able to sustain that edge in two 
ways: (1) rivals can not copy them precisely because it took the leading 
company a long time to develop them in a unique way, and (2) by the time 
rivals have succeeded in imitating the target capabilities, the pioneer has 
used its lead to move on and further develop its distinctive competences 
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). 
But instead of viewing routines as evolving into core capabilities that 
sustain a competitive advantage, Nelson and Winter (1982) defined their 
concept of routines in an entirely different way: "It may refer to a repeti-
tive pattern of activity in an entire organization, to an individual skill, or, 
as an adjective, to the smooth uneventful effectiveness of such an organ-
izational or individual performance" (1982: 97). Hannan and Freeman 
(1984: 154) saw the creation of highly standardized routines as cardinal in 
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firms' search for reliability and accountability, but also stressed that "the 
very factors that make a system reproducible make it resistant to change." 
So considering routines as possible roots of a company's strategic assets 
is only one side of the coin; the development of routines also involves the 
creation of organizational procedures and systems through which the 
principles and heuristics tied to the firm's activities become effective. 
Both organizational thinking and doing evolve into monotonous rituals. 
In their writing on organizational evolution, Tushman and Romanelli 
(1985) noted that the institutionalization of routines goes hand in hand 
with the evolution of commitment, and adopted the Weickian idea that 
'habit becomes a substitute for thought.' Ghemawat (1991), in his publi-
cation on commitment, argued how firms' investment in distinct assets are 
usually tailored to specific strategies. Such a fit causes firms to be locked 
into their original intentions, as accumulated stocks of strategic factors 
over time restrain companies in their decisions to disinvest or act upon 
new opportunities. In other words, firms are persistent in their course of 
action over time and thus resistant to change. Boeker (1989) claimed that 
past organizational strategies have a bearing on the present. The firm's 
commitment to particular courses of action in terms of asset bundles, and 
patterns of activity that have become routinized as distinctive compe-
tences are major barriers to renewal, and so is the distribution of power 
within the firm. 
This last point has also been noted by Levinthal and March (1993), 
who argued that political power within the organization often rests with 
managers responsible for past success, even when the firm is not success-
ful anymore. Such individuals are often reluctant to abandon the way in 
which they perceive the features of the company and its business envi-
ronment. Rigidities arise when such mental models are incompatible with 
today's realities, and tend to worsen if power positions remain the same. 
Thus, the role of learning becomes an indispensable component in ex-
plaining the impact of path dependency, especially when one recognizes 
that "the routinization of activity in an organization constitutes the most 
important form of storage of the organization's specific operational 
knowledge" (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 99). Unavoidably, routines retard 
the learning ability of especially successful firms by reducing their capac-
ity to cope with contextual transitions. 
The idea that the development of new knowledge is sacrificed by the 
firm's devotion to current knowledge has given rise to the notion that or-
ganizations are bound to fall in so-called 'competence traps' (Levitt and 
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March, 1988). In this situation, firms respond to novel developments by 
using the routinized competences that once were the foundation of suc-
cess, but today are completely out of sync. Such firm behavior will not 
only inevitably lead to the end of its competitive advantage, but will also 
have a continued negative impact on its future performance for as long as 
the company holds on to past beliefs. This explains the fact that many 
firms that have been industry leaders in the past have been knocked off 
their pedestals by rivals who were able to create the new resources and 
capabilities required for competing under new circumstances (Rumelt, 
1984). The inertia with which successful firms react to the changing world 
inhibits their capacity to assume the offensive and to embrace organiza-
tional renewal. 
Path dependency may be the source of a company's competitive ad-
vantage, but it is also a force that will destroy such an advantage and thus 
prevent its sustainability. Routinization, commitment and learning form 
the backbone of competitive advantage, but will unavoidably also break 
its neck. The inertia that in the end arises out of these determinants of path 
dependency restrains the company's potential capacity to further explore 
new capabilities and possibilities. And such innovative behavior is an ab-
solute necessity if the firm aims to utilize its competitive edge and keep 
rivals at a distance. Lei, Hitt and Bettis (1996: 565) proposed that, next to 
its more positive effects, path dependency can lead to "produce inflexibil-
ity, eliminating the dynamic quality of core competences, and thus loss of 
competitive advantage." Nelson and Winter (1982: 135) insisted that we 
"should come to grips with the fact that highly flexible adaptation to 
change is not likely to characterize the behavior of individual firms." 
It appears that both causal ambiguity and path dependency have a 
dual nature: they act as barriers to imitation for competitors and, at the 
same time, act as barriers to sustainability for the pioneering firm itself. 
Both barriers have a limited number of determinants that define their re-
spective intensity. Causal ambiguity is measured in the character of the 
firm's capability bundle in terms of observability, complexity and inter-
dependency, while path dependency is measured in the level of inertia in 
terms of routines, commitment and learning. Although the barriers of 
causal ambiguity and path dependency are similar in their effects on 
sustainability, one should not forget that there is an important conceptual 
difference: whereas causal ambiguity restrains sustainability by limiting 
the first-mover firm's current choice set, path dependency acts as a con-
straint on sustainability by limiting its future choice set. 
32 
RESOURCE-BASED VIEWS 
SUMMARY 
At first sight, resource-based views seem to offer an adequate line of rea-
soning for our original purpose: to integrate theories that emphasize firm 
idiosyncrasy or uniformity, so that coevolution can be studied from both 
the firm and the industry-level perspective. Not only does resource-based 
thinking focus on the bearing of capabilities to competitive advantage (in 
contrast to the Porterian industry-structure or 'positioning' school), but it 
also sees the firm as principal unit of analysis. Moreover, firms are con-
sidered to be idiosyncratic because of the heterogeneity that marks their 
bundles of resources and capabilities (as Table 2.1 summarizes). In this 
sense, this chapter thus addressed the first two research questions posed in 
Chapter 1. Altogether, its explicit perspective on firms as distinct collec-
tions of capabilities makes resource-based logic highly appropriate as a 
first theoretical building block that supports an integrative framework on 
coevolution. 
Table 2.1: Resource-Based Thinking Summarized 
Key Arguments and Core Concepts Roots and Conceptual Studies 
Competitive advantage originates 
from firm heterogeneity in resources 
and capabilities 
Penrose (1959), Nelson and Winter 
(1982), Teece (1984), Barney (1991), 
Peteraf(1993) 
Competitive advantage can be sus-
tained through barriers to imitation 
as 
• path dependency makes hetero-
geneous firms more idiosyncratic in 
their capabilities 
• causal ambiguity exists in the de-
terminants of the firm's superior per-
formance 
tippman and Rumelt (1982), Rumelt 
(1984), Winter (1987), Reed and 
DeFillippi (1990) 
Dierickx and Cool (1989), Chemawat 
(1991), Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) 
Still, the resource-based theory's virtue of idiosyncrasy may easily 
become a detriment when it is not recognized that firms also display be-
havior that increases their uniformity. When rival firms, all made up of 
distinct organizational assets, aim to copy each other's capabilities, they 
become increasingly similar as to their competitive behavior as well as to 
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their capabilities. This explains for the paradoxical character of causal 
ambiguity and path dependency as barriers to both imitation and 
sustainability. If one overstates the uniqueness of firms and, as a result, 
undervalues the idea that firms try to be the same at a competitive level, 
both causal ambiguity and path dependency can indeed be perceived as 
barriers to imitation. But if one recognizes the idea that rival firms in a 
competitive arena or industry often tend to move towards each other over 
time, both phenomena may well turn into barriers to sustainability. 
Table 2.2: Main Empirical Works on Resource-Based Thinking 
Empirical Study 
Collis (1991) 
Hamel (1991) 
Leonard-Barton (1992) 
Research Focus 
Value of capabilities to 
competitive strategy 
Internalization of skills 
through partnerships 
Role of capabilities in prod-
uct and process develop-
ment 
Research Method 
Case study of 3 firms in the 
bearings industry 
Multiple-case study of 9 
international alliances 
Twenty case studies of proj-
ects in 5 firms 
Hall (1993) 
Henderson & Cockburn 
(1994) 
McGrath eta/. (1995) 
Miller &Shamsie (1996) 
Value of intangible assets to 
competitive advantage 
Measurement of R&D com-
petence 
Relation between new ini-
tiatives and capabilities 
Property- versus knowledge-
based resources 
Multiple-case study of 6 
firms 
Econometric model of 10 
firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry 
Regression analysis of 40 
firms 
Statistical analysis of film 
industry over 30 years 
The implicit neglect of the possibility that firms do display a certain 
degree of uniformity by contemporary resource-based thinking not only 
characterizes most of its conceptual work." Table 2.2 recapitulates the 
major empirical contributions made in the name of the resource-based 
" To be precise, here the term 'contemporary' refers to the writings that have been pub-
lished under the formal heading of the resource-based view of the firm since the late 
eighties. 
34 
RESOURCE-BASED VIEWS 
perspective. Apart from that there appears to be a shortage of empirical 
work in this research area, it is striking that only one of these contribu-
tions (the Henderson and Cockburn (1994) study) recognizes the signifi-
cance of rivalry (although it measures firm heterogeneity instead of actual 
imitation efforts). The other studies primarily report the process through 
which capabilities are built, and focus on the properties and characteristics 
that distinguish one type of capability from another. However, they do not 
pay explicit attention to competitive pressures, that is, the competitive 
context in which capabilities matter. 
Clearly, resource-based theory lacks a view of how uniformity in 
firm behavior can come about. The most obvious situation in which firms 
move towards each other seems to be the process of competition. Ulti-
mately, rival firms in an industry have to manage system dynamics of in-
novation and imitation if they attempt to create or overcome a competitive 
advantage. This is the subject of discussion in the next chapter. 
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Theory on Competition: 
The Contributing Value of Schumpeterian Views 
This third chapter explains why, according to Schumpeterian logic, rival 
firms tend to become increasingly uniform in their posture and behavior 
as the competitive process unfolds. When a particular pioneering firm in-
troduces a new set of competitive rules to the industry, it creates a com-
petitive advantage based on some new capabilities. Noticing the success 
of the innovating firm, lagging rivals will inevitably be forced to copy the 
leading firm's configuration of capabilities. Assuming that intelligence is 
equally spread over a population of competitors, the other firms will suc-
ceed in their imitative behavior. Whereas resource-based thinking argues 
that firm idiosyncrasy increases over time as a result of path dependent 
processes, this line of reasoning concludes that rivals move towards each 
other as time goes by. Still, Schumpeter (1934) assumed that there will 
always be new innovators that disrupt established practice in the industry. 
In other words, the industry's evolution is triggered by the endogenous 
force of competition, that is, a 'force from within.' This implies that any 
competitive advantage is transient in nature, an idea that provides the 
starting point of an exploration into Schumpeterian competition. 
TEMPORARY COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Strategy scholars have since long searched for the sources of sustainable 
competitive advantage, but it seems that there are still no clear-cut expla-
nations for what should or could determine the sustainability of a firm's 
competitive edge. It has been shown in the previous chapter that pioneer-
ing firms are unlikely to prevent rivals from copying their organizational 
assets that sustain its first-mover's advantage. Like the traditional industry 
analysis perspective, resource-based views seem to run into problems 
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when trying to theorize how firms can create a sustainable competitive 
advantage. Although the added value of resource-based views to the field 
of strategy has been substantial, it could well be that strategic manage-
ment's goal to unravel the phenomenon of sustainability has always been 
a bit too ambitious. The main reason for strategy's Holy Grail syndrome 
can be found in its traditional neglect of the dynamics underlying the 
competitive process. 
Optimistic Views on Advantage 
According to Porter (1991), the added value of resource-based views will 
primarily lie in the explanations they offer for corporate strategy issues. 
Although some say that success in diversification moves as based upon a 
limited number of core capabilities can only be explained in retrospect 
(Carroll et al., 1996), there is indeed an implicit focus on corporate diver-
sification in much of the work done in this direction (Mahoney and Pan-
dian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). And this is no 
wonder if one remembers from the previous chapter that resource-based 
thinking was partly stimulated by research findings on the relationship 
between diversification strategy and economic performance. It should also 
not be forgotten that Prahalad and Hamel's article on core competences is 
essentially an exposition on corporate strategy. They argued that core 
competences should "constitute the focus for strategy at the corporate 
level" (1990: 91), and should be seen as "the glue that binds existing 
businesses" because they embody "the engine for new business develop-
ment" (1990: 82). 
Apart from being a crown jewel of the corporation (Collis and Mont-
gomery, 1995), the notion of competence also renewed interest into the 
nature of organizational behavior that characterizes the firm's develop-
ment of resources and capabilities. For it is precisely this behavior that, 
further down the line of causality, enables firms to take and hold position 
on the chosen product market, and may lead them to a competitive ad-
vantage. However, the growing number of resource-based proponents 
seems to have been carried away by enthusiasm, and the strategy field's 
well-established sense of optimism led to an effort to incorporate the no-
tion of sustainability in its analyses. Montgomery (1995) observed how 
this rather exaggerated reaction resulted in a gap between strategic man-
agement's ideals and what can be seen in reality. She also noted that this 
discrepancy between romantic goals and observed facts is a point "where 
the resource-based literature falls dangerously short" (1995: 257). 
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The theoretical arguments which culminated into the original re-
source-based framework were supposed to suggest "the kinds of empirical 
questions that need to be addressed in order to understand whether or not 
a particular firm resource is a source of sustained competitive advantage" 
(Barney, 1991: 115). But a more fundamental question seems to be 
whether the framework itself has to be empirically tested before using it 
as a tool in the analysis of strategy and competitive advantage. As shown, 
resource-based thinking experiences a shortage of staunch empirical re-
search efforts. The reason, according to Doz (1994: 2), is that "research 
on core competences has so far been driven by theory building and theory 
refutation." More openness towards more 'pessimistic' views on compe-
tition and firm advantages, such as those advocated by evolutionary 
economists and, to a lesser degree, scholars in the field of population dy-
namics, could therefore be of a contributing value to resource-based 
thinking. 
Realistic Views on Advantage 
These social-economic schools of thought pay significantly more attention 
to the role and nature of competition over time. Whereas traditional re-
source-based thinking perceives competition essentially as a one-way 
process, these disciplines incorporate an evolutionary perspective that ac-
centuates the quality of competitive interaction at the industry level. As 
argued, resource-based perspectives stress the significance of causal am-
biguity and path dependency in what is considered to be the firm's main 
task: the erection of barriers to imitation to shield off rivals. But such 
thinking does not consider the impact of competitors that display a con-
tinuous tendency to imitate those who lead the pack of rivals.1 As soon as 
the innovating firm wants to exploit its newly-created advantage, or aims 
to further develop its advantage, the necessary decrease in path depend-
ency and causal ambiguity causes a shift in the balance of competition in 
favor of rivals on the lookout and ready to duplicate the firm's success. 
Figure 3.1 shows that there is an alternative route to determining the 
effects of barriers in the competitive process: it starts at the side of rivals, 
ends at the other side of the scales where the focus is on the leading firm, 
' In this sense, innovation is not restricted to something technological. Instead, this thesis 
incorporates a view of innovation as the creation and development of new capabilities 
through which firms can maintain or improve their competitive position in the industry by 
competing differently. 
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and involves both barriers to sustainability and barriers to imitation. Such 
reasoning permits the composition of a somewhat tangible image of com-
petition's interactive nature, in which the related routes of competitive 
causality are united by the dual character of the barriers. As these barriers 
undermine the existence of sustainable advantages, the figure enables an 
exploration into the temporary nature of competitive advantage. That is, 
any advantage will eventually be eroded by the actions of both the leading 
firm and its competitors. In other words, "it is no longer a question of 
whether the current competitive advantage will be eroded but rather a 
question of when" MacMillan (1988: 111). This statement calls for an 
exploration into the body of knowledge on temporary advantages. 
Figure 3.1: Why Advantages Are Temporary 
Competitive Dynamics 
Innovative and ' r \ . { Competitive > / ^ Imitative and 
Leading Firm f ^ X "v Advantage ) x f ^ Lagging Rivals 
Barriers to Imitation Barriers to Sustainability 
The difficulties confronted with when championing the doctrine of 
sustainable competitive advantage do not imply that the strategy field 
should restrain itself from inquiries into medium-term benefits of innova-
tive strategies. In a recent publication, Winter (1995: 159) mentioned that 
"the emphasis the strategy literature gives to sustainable advantage may 
have the unintended consequence of diverting attention from the effective 
pursuit of transient rents." His opinion conforms to that of Jacobson 
(1992), who argued that the successful firm's competitive advantage will 
inevitably be eroded by imitating rivals, and that in this process barriers to 
imitation can do no more than delay the impact of imitation. Consistent 
with the above-mentioned arguments, such a view implies that competi-
tive advantages are at best temporary. In his discussion on 'hypercom-
petition,' D'Aveni (1994) noted that barriers to imitation frequently miss 
the strength management thinkers commonly assume. 
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The period over which a successful innovator generates above-
average returns is not only dependent upon the height of the barriers to 
imitation, but is also subject to the intensity of competition that defines 
the strength of the barriers to sustainability. In more down-to-earth lan-
guage, both the abilities of the leading firm and those of its rivals deter-
mine the innovator's returns to its competitive advantage. It is rather naive 
to simply assume that companies operate in a competitive vacuum, yet 
this is exactly what resource-based thinking seems to do (Montgomery, 
1995). The inconsistency in its reasoning is unquestionable if one consid-
ers the essence of such an assumption: on the one hand, a specific firm is 
perceived to be highly intelligent in comparison to the lower life forms 
represented by its rivals. On the other hand, this unequal distribution of 
intelligence is not corrected for: competitors are presumed to be passive 
players who act as ornaments to decorate the set for the leading role's 
glory. 
The most obvious weakness of this premise is the incongruous way in 
which agility and obedience as opposite forms of firm behavior have been 
allocated to leader and laggards. Apart from these contrasting expecta-
tions on competitive behavior, a far less visible flaw lurks in the implicit 
presumption that firm heterogeneity can be stated in terms of intellectual 
capacity. However, differences in organizational assets, even knowledge, 
can not simply be restated in terms of variety in intelligence. Instead, a 
more sound assumption would be that rivals at least actively try to imitate 
the success of the leader. When competitors experience a decrease in re-
turns or even a loss, while at the same time spotting enhanced profits at 
the innovator, they will be stimulated to commit themselves to imitation 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). It won't take many years before some or most 
of them launch a counterattack using an equal (or even better) package of 
organizational assets. 
In this process, barriers to imitation temporarily delay rivals' ability 
to imitate, and this explains why "competition does not instantaneously 
and costlessly drive rents (if they were to arise) to zero" (Schoemaker, 
1990: 1183). Moreover, in addition to the rebuttal of this well-known as-
sumption among orthodox economists, the two-way process of rivalry 
presents another outcome that deserves attention here. If the first-mover 
firm's alternative route to success turns out to increase profits and life 
chances, the innovation will almost certainly be dispersed throughout the 
herd of lagging competitors (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). However, the 
inevitable reduction in firm heterogeneity does not transform rival firms 
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into perfect replicas because they never will be identical on all significant 
attributes (McKelvey and Aldrich, 1983). The reason for this is that none 
of the methods by which organizational assets diffuse among companies 
are, to use Nelson and Winter's (1982: 65) words, "so cheap and effective 
as to make it plausible to assume that anything known to one firm is 
known to all." 
PROCESS-BASED VIEWS OF COMPETITION 
So although firm heterogeneity will always be maintained at a certain sub-
stratum, the responsive behavior of rivals to entrepreneurial actions of the 
innovating firm tends to eliminate variety among competitors in their 
sources of success or survival. From the moment a firm flourishes from a 
new approach to the business, others will inevitably try to copy its sources 
of success. If their attempts are fruitful, even more imitators will follow, 
attracted by the observation that it is possible for others than the original 
innovator to make a fortune on the basis of new capabilities. The speed 
with which the new rivals start to compete on these novel competences 
accumulates over time as the ease and possibility of reproduction in-
creases. Finally, the innovating recipe becomes familiar to the total pack 
of rivals, and what remains of the diversity among firms will no longer lie 
at the level of competitive advantage: in their industry, rival firms will 
show a tendency towards uniformity. This idea of competition was first 
preached by Schumpeter (1934) in his theory of economic development. 
The Interactive Nature of the Innovation-Imitation Process 
According to Schumpeter, it is impossible for firms to have a sustainable 
competitive advantage because - consistent with the discussion on the 
dual nature of barriers - all strategies and capabilities can be duplicated in 
the end. The first mover's competitive advantage is therefore destined to 
be destroyed by followers, reflecting its temporary nature. But why do 
firms develop new organizational assets to achieve a leadership position 
in their business if such behavior will be copied anyway? Why do inno-
vators create new resources and capabilities if the resulting competitive 
edge will only be temporarily enjoyable? Schumpeter's answer is that, 
just like the envious platoon of laggards is stimulated in its behavior to 
imitate the leader, pioneers are challenged to create followers out of their 
rivals. Competition becomes a highly interactive process in which both 
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the innovator and the imitators in a particular industry are motivated to act 
in response to each other's presence and performance. 
There are a number of elements that motivate a company in its efforts 
to be the first one that brings a new, problem-solving idea to the market. 
Apart from the joy of creating something different, there are more pla-
tonic incentives such as the will to erect a new business empire or the 
thrill of power and independence. But the principal element is the firm's 
drive to compete, and to dominate all other contestants while at the same 
time being admired by them. According to Schumpeter (1934: 93), entre-
preneurs are characterized by "the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to 
prove oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits 
of success, but of success itself." He further noted that financial prosper-
ity is of secondary concern-as it is not a source, but an appreciated out-
come of the innovator's success. Although monetary gains are essential to 
the further growth of the firm, both issues do not constitute the primary 
objective of its search for new ways to compete. 
In the same vein, Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) stressed the im-
portance of companies having ambitious aspirations beyond their current 
competitive capacities as a prerequisite to achieving industry leadership. 
Whereas the innovator possesses some sort of voluntary drive to suppress 
its rivals by competing victoriously, the latter often have no choice but to 
confront the leader and adopt its sources of success. Some of them will 
notice the pioneer's increase in returns in sharp contrast to their own stag-
nant profits, and decide that imitation will be the most suitable route to 
enhanced performance. These will be the ones that are quick to react and 
seize the opportunity to steal a ride and profit from the leader's innovative 
ideas. Others, struggling with the rigidities of their own past, only notice 
the seriousness of a performance decline when it is almost too late. Such 
firms are normally forced to copy the successful firm(s) just to survive. 
The interconnected motivation to compete against those who are su-
perior or inferior can also be extracted from Nelson and Winter's (1982: 
266) expression that "there is both a carrot and a stick to motivate firms to 
introduce better production methods." It is obvious that without the pres-
ence of a first-mover firm, there will be no imitators. At the same time, 
one should bear in mind that there will be no innovator without the exis-
tence of (potential) followers. It is the inevitable interaction between 
leader and followers that touches the essence of the competitive process. 
In this process, the role of new resources and capabilities is inherently 
paradoxical. If companies do not create new capabilities, they will not be 
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able to survive (like the leading firm, imitators are essentially involved in 
creating something new). However, when firms do create new capabili-
ties, they will not be able to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage 
(which obviously applies to both leader and followers). 
This was also recognized by Schumpeter (1934: 89) in his observa-
tion that an entrepreneurial company "leads in the sense that he draws 
other producers in his branch after him. But as they are his competitors, 
who first reduce and then annihilate his profit, this is, as it were, leader-
ship against one's own will." In line with this paradox, it is assumed in 
this thesis that the process of creating and developing new capabilities is 
both a cause and an effect of the competitive process. Capabilities evolve 
out of the competitive conduct among rivaling firms, and "organizations 
coevolve through these reciprocal interactions, developing strategic capa-
bilities whether or not by the design of strategic managers" (Barnett and 
Hansen, 1996: 142). Companies, in their united roles of innovator and 
imitator, introduce and adopt new capabilities as they are involved in a 
competitive process. Thus, when a new competitive recipe has proven 
successful, competitive dynamics make sure that uniformity among rival 
firms in an industry will increase. 
The Temporal Nature of the Innovation-Imitation Process 
Competition is a process in which the dynamic of innovation and imita-
tion among rivals shapes its outcome. This implies that competitiveness is 
a property of collections of companies, and that strategy should best be 
understood in a competitive context. Traditional resource-based views, in 
contrast, have so far almost exclusively focused their inquiries on organ-
izing mechanisms and forces underlying the process of asset development 
that can be found within the firm (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Such a 
unilateral approach thus tends to discount the impact of rivalry upon the 
process of capability creation and development, subordinating competi-
tion to a property of markets (Barnett and Hansen, 1996). But competitive 
advantage can only be created if one understands the character of compe-
tition in an industry (Grant, 1995). Levinthal (1995) therefore stressed 
that research in resource-based views must link firm-level analyses with 
industry-level competition in order to add further value. 
Henderson and Cockburn (1994: 63) also remarked that "studies of 
the evolution of capability at individual firms have greatly enriched our 
understanding of the nature of particular competences ... but by and large 
these insights have not been incorporated into studies of aggregate firm 
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behavior or systematic studies of competition." Such criticism is probably 
rooted in the fact that most of the popular studies into resources and capa-
bilities have been published as success stories of individual firms. Pres-
tigious corporations' core competences were analyzed over time, while 
firm performance was measured in terms of successful diversification ef-
forts.2 The competitive process came to be neglected, although these in-
vestigations did indicate the relevance of time-based research into firms 
and their industries. Still, Montgomery (1995) argued that proponents of 
resource-based views incorporate a too narrow window of time and, as a 
consequence, fail to address the dynamics of competition. 
As the process of competition is characterized by reciprocal firm be-
havior that results in both the creation and diffusion of new and successful 
routes to competitive advantage, the logical sequel move indeed seems to 
be the incorporation of time. The reason is that we simply can not assume 
that interactions between rivals no longer continue once the total popula-
tion of firms competes on the same rules of success. It is the unremitting 
zeal of firm motivation that continually drives the interactive process of 
imitation and innovation and makes it start over and over again, not wait-
ing for the eventual state of perfect competition. This dynamic view of 
interactive competition is also known as the process of 'creative destruc-
tion,' originally coined by Schumpeter (1934) in his explanation of why 
industry leadership changes over time. According to his ideas, there will 
always be companies that are motivated to create new success and simul-
taneously destroy the current state of affairs. 
Fundamental to Schumpeter's process of creative destruction is the 
creation of new combinations, which disrupt the industry's established 
order and initiate economic change. These new combinations not only 
involve the introduction of new products and processes, or the opening up 
of new markets and alternative supply routes. They also concern "the car-
rying out of the new organisation of any industry" (1934: 66). Schumpeter 
was clearly not only thinking of innovation in the more limited sense of 
technologies. Instead, he was especially interested in the behavior of those 
companies that search for new ways of competing and make rival firms' 
positions obsolete. The Schumpeterian view of competition has received 
increasing attention in contemporary strategic management thinking. Ba-
den-Fuller and Stopford (1994) labeled firm actions that initiate creative 
destructions as 'strategic innovation,' whereas D'Aveni (1994) refers to 
them in terms of'disrupting the market.' 
2 Prototype studies are Prahalad and Hamel (1990) and Stalk. Evans and Shulman (1992). 
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ENDOGENOUS VIEWS OF COMPETITION 
The cardinal question to be answered before any analysis of the competi-
tive behavior of firms over considerable periods of time can be launched 
is: What really determines the progress of industries in their capacity as 
evolving socio-economic systems? In other words, what is the nature of 
the forces that drive the development of industries as consisting of strug-
gling rivals? Schumpeter was probably the first to tackle this issue explic-
itly in his theory of economic development, based upon his principles of 
creative destruction.3 The logic underlying his arguments not only pro-
vided him a suitable answer to these questions, but also addressed eco-
nomic science's right to exist. Schumpeter (1934: 63) argued that if "the 
economy, in itself without development, is dragged along by the changes 
in the surrounding world," there would be no economic development as 
the reasons for such progress lie "outside the group of facts which are de-
scribed by economic theory." 
Dynamic Competition as an Endogenous Force of Development 
According to Schumpeter, economic progress is, as a rule, the outcome of 
innovative actions of those companies that are determined to crush the 
competition. In this sense, development is a product of the competitive 
hustle, that is, 'a force from within.' In fact, this emphasis on progress as 
an endogenous outcome had already been proposed some fifty years ear-
lier by Charles Darwin (1859): "Some make the deep-seated error of con-
sidering the physical conditions of a country as the most important for its 
habitants; whereas it cannot, I think, be disputed that the nature of the 
other habitants with which each has to compete is generally a far more 
important element of success." Although Darwin and Schumpeter differed 
in their perception of how progress unfolds - whereas the biologist em-
phasized a continuous flow of development, the economist was more con-
cerned with discontinuous jumps - both regarded the force of rivalry as 
the internal motor of development. 
Despite this long-standing wisdom, the field of strategic management 
has apparently been more impressed by the arguments of both industrial 
organization economics and early writings within the research territory of 
3
 Although this thesis refers to the 1934 English translation. Schumpeter had originally 
published his work in 1911 under the German title of Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Ent-
wicklung. 
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population ecology.4 In these disciplines, the idea was that exogenous 
factors such as technology, information or legal and fiscal constraints 
were the true determinants of both company behavior and industry devel-
opment (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Shepherd, 1979). The promi-
nence of this idea within strategy thinking can be observed in one of the 
most influential publications on strategy of the 1980s. In their article on 
strategic change, Hrebeniak and Joyce (1985: 337) defined the alignment 
of firm competences with changing environmental conditions as "proac-
tive or reactive organizational behavior in anticipation of or reaction to 
exogenous variables." Instead of looking at the competitive interactions 
between rivals within the industry atmosphere, the idea was to study the 
interactive nature of an individual firm with its wider environment. 
This exogenous outlook made strategy schools of thought disregard 
the role of competition in their understanding of why and how industries 
develop over time. In the industry-analysis approach proposed by Porter 
(1980), industry evolution is primarily determined by changes in exoge-
nous elements such as uncertainty of information, consumer behavior, 
demographics and trends, technological developments, costs of capital 
and wages, and government policies. Resource-based views do not seem 
to be interested in the issue of industry dynamics, but do point to envi-
ronmental turbulence as a force of external change when discussing the 
need for companies to adapt their organizational assets to new situations 
(Grant, 1991). The fact that both perspectives regard industrial develop-
ment as an outcome of mainly exogenous forces is not a surprise if we 
remember from the previous chapter that their core notion lies in shielding 
off rivals: the first builds upon the idea of barriers to entry, while the latter 
depends on barriers to imitation. 
Indeed, Levinthal (1995) expressed his deep concerns about the strat-
egy field's exclusive focus on exogenous change and its ignorance of a 
new stream of research into population dynamics. This growing body of 
literature came into existence during the 1980s as a response to the 1977 
publication of Hannan and Freeman's seminal work on population ecol-
ogy. A crucial argument within these follow-up studies was that, as Astley 
(1985: 229) argued, "homeostatic forces within populations," instead of 
some other external forces (that is, pressures from outside the respective 
system), were regarded as determining both the path and the rate of evo-
4 Of course, another possibility is that, from the late 1970s on, the field of strategic man-
agement was largely ignorant of the existence of the alternative argument that develop-
ment is endogenous in nature. 
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lutionary change.5 In a similar way, McKelvey and Aldrich (1983) noted 
that the environment is not some sort of Big Brother watching over a 
cluster of rivals, and punishing those that are out of line. Rather, compet-
ing organizations influence each other by means of their actions, and de-
velopment occurs when new possibilities or opportunities for some firms 
evolve out of the activities of others. 
Some of the critique directed at the original proposals of Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) was concerned with definitional problems around the 
concepts of species and populations. But the main point of attack was di-
rected at the fact that a solid model of competition was missing in their 
analysis (Young, 1988). Indeed, this endogenous driving force has been 
further explored by more recent studies into population dynamics (e.g., 
Boeker, 1991; Barnett, Greve and Park, 1994; Barnett, 1997). In a differ-
ent academic setting, but at approximately the same time, another small 
group of researchers turned their attention to the endogenous nature of 
development. That line of work, according to economist Romer (1994: 3), 
"does not invoke exogenous technological change to explain why income 
per capita has increased by an order of magnitude since the industrial 
revolution [...] it tries instead to uncover the private and public sector 
choices that cause the rate of growth." Those involved were economists 
with strong feelings for the creative aspect of technological innovation. 
To overcome the shortcomings of economic neoclassical growth 
models, these scholars aimed to capture two neglected facts into realistic 
models of growth: (1) discovery is endogenous in nature in that it is de-
termined by things that people do, and (2) firms are able to enjoy (tempo-
rary) monopoly returns on these discoveries (Romer, 1994). Stimulated by 
research into technology by academics like Dosi (1984) and Freeman 
(1982), models of a neo-Schumpeterian nature were developed in which 
industrial innovation is at the heart of economic development. It was the 
work of Nelson and Winter (1982) that explicitly integrated the competi-
tive element into the notion of technological innovation from a dynamic 
point of view. They argued that the interplay between these ingredients 
makes "firms evolve over time, with the condition of the industry in each 
period bearing the seeds of its condition in the following period" (1982: 
19). Thus, the forces of change are endogenous to the industrial system 
itself. 
-> Clearly, research into population dynamics conforms to Darwin's original idea of grad-
ual evolution, as opposed to Schumpeter's discontinuous jumps. 
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Dynamic Competition as an Endogenous Force of Industry Evolution 
So if industry development is not triggered by exogenous conditions like 
consumer demographics or basic technologies, but instead is propelled by 
the endogenous force of competition, then industry structure can never be 
the driver of that force. Instead of shaping the competitive process, indus-
try structure (as seen at a specific point in time throughout its develop-
ment) is merely an outcome of the competitive process that continuously 
changes its texture (Hill and Deeds, 1996). A crucial question therefore 
seems to be: What is the engine that drives the process of competition? It 
has already been argued that firms' motivation to compete with each other 
in an industrial arena in essence drives the process of rivalry. Ambitious 
companies are eager to show their superiority, while lagging firms are 
stimulated to challenge the position of such industry leaders in order to 
share their success or to simply survive. 
But the mere existence of motivation at one, a few, or even all of its 
organizational members will not give the firm sufficient grip in its ambi-
tion to compete successfully. It can, however, be very helpful in its task of 
developing organizational assets that are needed to create competing 
products and services. Without the required resources and capabilities, 
companies will not win over, or catch up, with rivals whatever their am-
bitions may be. It is simply not enough for companies to want something; 
they also have to do something to achieve these aims. In this respect, 
firms need to create property and knowledge as a basis on which they can 
compete. Such company behavior culminates in the creation and devel-
opment of new capabilities. So although firms compete with one another 
via product markets where consumers act as biased referees, the basis of 
such rivalry lies within the rivals themselves. Capabilities-based competi-
tion is essentially interaction between what organizations are able to do. 
This idea that competition, and as a result industry evolution, comes 
from the things firms do, is core to the endogenous perspective outlined 
above. Technology, for example, does not drive an industry's develop-
ment; it is what firms do with it that determines the course of industrial 
evolution. Due to technology's public availability, companies can only 
effectively compete if they have unique capabilities that make the best of 
the opportunities derived from a particular technology (Teece, 1987). In 
this respect, firms have to exploit a given technology better than their ri-
vals do as "technology cannot be management's primary solution because 
it is every competitor's potential solution" (Clark, 1989: 94). Winter 
(1987) even argued that firms should shift their emphasis from producing 
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technology to making use of competitive 'weapons' other than techno-
logical innovation. Due to the speed with which basic technologies are 
diffused over rivals (see Exhibit 3.1), creative behavior of firms can better 
be defined in terms of its implications for competitive success, and such 
behavior is shaped by the presence of firm capabilities. 
Exhibit 3.1: Diffusion of Innovations 
In their attempt to catch up with a pioneering company, various replication instru-
ments enable imitators to significantly reduce the period of time over which the inno-
vator enjoys its first-mover or competitive advantage. An investigation by Mansfield 
(1988), for instance, showed that, on average, rivals often do not need more than 12 
months to acquire the necessary information on the basis of which, in no more than 
three more years, they can copy technological product and process innovations. And 
there's more to it than just time effects: in another study, Mansfield, Schwartz and 
Wagner (1981) found that development costs for followers are 35 percent less than 
those originally incurred by the innovator. Late movers achieve even further cost ad-
vantages because they are able "to 'free-ride' on a pioneering firm's investments in a 
number of areas including R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure development" 
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988: 47). 
It's not only technology that spreads out rather rapidly over an industry; Porter 
(1980) already stated that any advantage based upon proprietary knowledge forms 
attached to experience or learning wil l unavoidably be destroyed through rivalry. 
Teece (1987) not only argued that trade-secret protection is strictly possible for 
chemical formulas or when the underlying technology of a product can be kept se-
cret, but also mentioned that the significance of patents is often grossly overesti-
mated. Apart from some industries such as pharmaceuticals, patent protection is 
largely ineffective "because the legal requirements for upholding their validity or for 
proving their infringement are high," and, as a consequence, "many patents can be 
'invented around' at modest costs" (1987: 188). Finally, advantages based upon geo-
graphic preemption and investment tactics in plant and equipment, as well as first-
mover benefits derived from economies of scale or access to distribution channels, 
frequently do not resist the imitating power of rivals (Lieberman and Montgomery, 
1988). 
It is thus assumed in this thesis that the progress of an industry as a 
collection of rivals is an endogenous matter. Figure 3.2 illustrates how 
this process is determined by the creation and development of capabilities 
at rival firms as an expression of their motivation to interact on a hostile 
basis. As argued before, those organizational assets that underlie a firm's 
competitive advantage are inevitably imitated by competitors. At the same 
time, this tendency of companies to become perfect replicas is halted by 
the assumption that firms are different from each other just like human 
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beings are. Such a basic level of firm heterogeneity will therefore always 
leave room for the creation of new competences by those motivated to 
overthrow the establishment (Rumelt, 1984). As a consequence, new ca-
pabilities do not only inject the adrenaline into the process of competition, 
but also are the upshot of rivalry as companies learn how to deal with 
competitive challenges (Barney and Zajac, 1994). 
Figure 3.2: Industry Evolution as an Endogenous Process 
Level of 
Heterogeneity 
Time • 
In other words, the competitive beast never comes to rest as the en-
dogenous character of capabilities-based competition keeps the 'wheel of 
competition' turning. Indeed, Marshall (1890: 286) noted that "the prog-
ress and diffusion of knowledge are constantly leading to the adoption of 
new processes and new machinery .which economize human effort." In 
this regard, Mahoney and Pandian (1992) pleaded for the development of 
an endogenous theory of heterogeneity in response to resource-based 
views' basic flaws. They continued that the key to such a theory was the 
incorporation of existing evolutionary thoughts. This thesis conforms to 
the above assumptions on endogenous development as are embraced by 
Schumpeter's theory of economic development and its contemporary de-
scendant, Nelson and Winter's (1982) evolutionary theory of economic 
change.6 
6 Although these publications differ somewhat in their level of analysis, both are regarded 
as landmark studies that deal at a conceptual level with 'evolutionary economics' theory 
(Rumelt. 1984). The latter term is therefore used in this thesis for matters of practicality. 
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By focusing on the endogenous dynamics of competition, it is how-
ever not claimed that exogenous factors are not relevant to firm strategy. 
Indeed, new laws or regulation imposed by government, shifts in technol-
ogy external to the industry, or changes in market characteristics may im-
pact the industry's development. But, as argued above, such factors only 
seep through as a result of the providential behavior of distinct firms in 
the industry. Thus, it is argued here that in the field of strategic manage-
ment the role of exogenous forces in the development of industries has 
traditionally been overemphasized at the cost of the incorporation of a 
competitive process perspective. A long time ago, military strategist Carl 
von Clausewitz argued that war is a destructive act in which force and 
intelligence are used to achieve superiority over the enemy. At the same 
time, he noted that conditions of locality, time of day and weather are 
"circumstances which always attend the application of the means" (Von 
Clausewitz, 1982). 
COMPETITIVE REGIMES 
Rival firms' motivation to compete and therefore to create new capabili-
ties represents the cardinal driving force of change within the competitive 
landscape. Schumpeter (1934) discussed how these endogenous dynamics 
of competition ensure the industry's future development, preventing a 
collapse of the industrial system. According to him, acts of creative de-
struction by entrepreneurial firms are repeated over time, so that the rules 
of competition are redefined again and again. Each time, pioneers create 
new bundles of capabilities, enforcing their rivals to replicate these or-
ganizational assets and conform to the new competitive doctrine. The 
ideas in this book reflect Schumpeter's notion of industry evolution as 
subsequent phases of disequilibrium competition over time. During each 
of these phases, dynamics of innovation and imitation induce uniformity 
among the population of rival firms in terms of competitive capabilities. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates this repetitive pattern in which industry evolu-
tion is determined by changes in capabilities on which rivals compete. It 
visualizes how industry evolution is driven by subsequent phases of com-
petition in which new competitive capabilities are introduced and imi-
tated. In this thesis, such phases are referred to as 'competitive regimes:' 
periods during which competition as a dynamic process of innovation and 
imitation evolves around a particular theme or set of competitive rules, 
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based upon distinct bundles of capabilities.7 An industry can therefore be 
characterized as consisting of different competitive regimes over time. As 
old competitive regimes are substituted for by new ones, new rounds of 
development prevent a breakdown of the industrial system (Day, 1984). It 
is not the industry that is created again and again, but rather the formation 
of new regimes that constitute the development of the industrial system: 
"A complete reorganisation of the industry occurs, with its increases in 
production, its competitive struggle, [and] its supersession of obsolete 
businesses" (Schumpeter, 1934: 131). 
Figure 3.3: Competitive Regimes and Capabilities 
Change in 
Capabilities 
Industry 
Evolution 
Time 
A new competitive regime does not signal the arrival of a new indus-
try. Instead, it reorganizes an industry's existing collection of capabilities 
that underlies established business practice on the basis of which firms 
compete in an industry. The pioneering firm that introduces this revolu-
tionary package of capabilities clearly does things radically different if 
compared to the way competition evolved in the past. As a consequence, 
the innovator renders established practice obsolete. The scalariform pat-
tern of industrial development displayed in Figure 3.3 indicates how the 
innovator's introduction of new capabilities and competitive rules to the 
industry disconnects subsequent competitive regimes from one another. In 
this sense, Schumpeter (1934: 216-217) remarked that "as a rule the new 
does not grow out of the old but appears alongside of it and eliminates it 
7
 In accordance with Dosi (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982). the term regime has 
been adopted to stress the idea that each period has its own distinctive paradigm of com-
petition. 
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competitively,1' and that "the development which then starts again is a 
new one, not simply the continuation of the old." 
In a Schumpeterian world, a creative destruction represents a dise-
quilibrating force upon the industry's development, initiating a new com-
petitive regime. However, the subsequent force of imitation is a more 
gradual and equilibrating one, which brings the rival population back at an 
equivalent level of capabilities and competition (Iwai, 1984). In other 
words, competitive regimes arise in line with the so-called 'punctuated 
equilibrium paradigm' originally posed by the natural historians Eldredge 
and Gould (1972). According to this Kuhnian outlook, industries evolve 
through relatively long periods of incremental development, punctuated 
by creative destructions that mark the beginning of a new competitive re-
gime. Abernathy and Clark's (1985) longitudinal analysis of the American 
automobile business indeed shows such a pattern in which different suc-
cessful car manufacturers over time disrupted the industry and established 
new competitive regimes on the basis of new capabilities.8 
This process of radical substitution has also been noted by academics 
into population dynamics who investigated the rise of new populations 
and the fall of existing ones.9 Although both population dynamics and 
evolutionary economics recognize the importance of competition to the 
process and path of industrial development, these disciplines remain at 
odds regarding their primary principles. In studying the survival and de-
mise of organizational forms over time, population dynamics emphasizes 
the relationship orfit between a particular population and its environment. 
In contrast, evolutionary economists are more interested in the endoge-
nous driving forces of long-term change. This crucial distinction was 
noted by Winter (1990), who also commented on population ecology's 
belief that individual firms are subject to environmental and exogenous 
selection forces that undermine their ability to change. Opposing such a 
deterministic view of why firms fail to survive over long periods, he 
mentioned how "evolutionary economics emphasizes that organizations 
do not just adapt to change, they cause it" (1990: 293). 
8
 A punctuated equilibrium view of industry evolution opposes the idea that industries 
evolve through stages of emergence, growth, maturity and decline (e.g., Levitt, 1965: 
Porter, 1980). Thus, "the implicit (or sometimes explicit) biological life cycle metaphor 
seems to be misleading" (Abernathy and Clark, 1985:14). 
9 For example, McKelvey and Aldrich (1983: 124) argued that "sudden increases in or-
ganizational mortality rates ('shake-outs') do not happen all the time - they are not con-
tinuous - but rather happen at uncertain intervals for many populations." 
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SUMMARY 
In our quest to study coevolution from an integrated point of view in 
which both firm idiosyncrasy and uniformity play a part, a Schumpeterian 
view of competition seems to be suitable as the second theoretical build-
ing block. Whereas population ecology's notion of competition focuses 
on the rise and fall of populations in their attempts to achieve a fit with 
exogenous environmental forces, the Schumpeterian outlook regards the 
competitive process as an endogenous force of change in which capabili-
ties of rival firms matter. As Table 3.1 summarizes, Schumpeterian theory 
of competition takes the industry as the primary unit of analysis, in which 
competitive interactions among innovators and imitators shape the indus-
try's evolution over time. It therefore assumes that, in each competitive 
regime, rival firms show a tendency towards uniformity at the industry 
level. Like the previous chapter on capabilities, the current one thus ad-
dressed the first two of the original research questions. 
Table 3 .1 : Schumpeterian Competition Summarized 
Key Arguments and Core Concepts 
Competitive advantage originates 
from innovative acts of creative de-
struction 
Roots and Conceptual Studies 
Schumpeter (1934), Baden-Fuller and 
Stopford (1994), D'Aveni (1994) 
Competitive advantage is only tempo-
rary in nature because 
> imitation processes make heteroge-
neous firms more uniform in their 
capabilities 
Schumpeter (1934), Nelson and Win -
ter (1982), Iwai (1984), Lieberman 
and Montgomery (1988), ]acobson 
(1992), D'Aveni (1994) 
» competitive regimes continue to 
punctuate the industry's evolution 
Schumpeter (1934), Day (1984), 
Abernathy and Clark (1985) 
The Schumpeterian view does accept some basic level of firm het-
erogeneity, for without it, future acts of creative destruction would not be 
possible. Still, much of its focus is on how the competitive process in-
duces uniformity among rivals (and thus results in temporary competitive 
advantages) without paying explicit attention to firm idiosyncrasy in that 
process. This bias can also be found in most of the empirical work on 
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Schumpeterian competition published in management journals so far (of 
which the most important ones are comprised in Table 3.2). Apart from 
the observation that four out of six studies treat industry-specific techno-
logical developments as the paramount force of competition, it is remark-
able to find that the competitive behavior of rival firms is considered to be 
rather homogenous. 
Table 3.2: Main Empirical Works on Schumpeterian Competition 
Empirical Study 
Abernathy & Clark (1985) 
Research Focus 
Typology of technological 
innovations in industry 
evolution 
Research Method 
Historical analysis of the 
automobile industry 
Tushman & Anderson 
(1986) 
Meyer eta/ . (1990) 
Carud & Kumaraswamy 
(1993) 
Impact of technological 
discontinuities on compe-
tence 
Typology of firm responses 
to industry discontinuities 
Impact of technology net-
works on competitive dy-
namics 
Longitudinal analyses of 3 
industries 
Historical analysis of the 
hospital industry 
Case study of 1 firm in the 
computer industry 
Stopford & Baden-Fuller 
(1994) 
Tripsas(1997) 
Common attributes of stra-
tegic innovation 
Role of complementary 
assets in surviving creative 
destructions 
Multiple-case study of 7 
firms 
Longitudinal analysis of the 
typesetter industry 
Although these empirical research efforts do describe competitive 
behavior at individual firms, this is only done for those who initiated the 
creative destructions (that is, the strategic innovators that enforced the 
new rules of the game upon the industry). Moreover, such behavior is de-
scribed in terms of its impact on the industry's evolution, instead of 
adopting a more process-oriented view of how these companies created 
the capabilities that eventually transformed their industry. Meyer, Brooks 
and Goes (1990) and Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) seem to be the 
exceptions to this last point, as they did generate insights on what firms 
actually do. However, both did not investigate this behavior in a competi-
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tive context of innovation and imitation (like the other studies displayed in 
Table 3.2 did). 
Whereas resource-based thinking lacks a view of firm uniformity in 
its analysis of competitive advantage, the Schumpeterian perspective does 
not seem to pay explicit attention to the role of firm idiosyncrasy in its 
inquiry of competitive dynamics. To exploit these mutual and comple-
mentary strengths and weaknesses, the next chapter integrates both views 
into a framework of coevolution of capabilities and competition, building 
upon the notion of search as posed by behavioral theory. 
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Coevolution of Capabilities and Competition: 
An Integrative and Multi-Level Framework 
The previous two chapters on capabilities and competition showed that 
the behavior of firms is hard to grasp without due consideration of their 
competitive environment. At the same time, they pointed out that com-
petitive processes at the industry level are difficult to judge without a 
proper appreciation of what its constituent rivals actually do. A revolu-
tionary perspective requires a synthesis of both morals, and is therefore 
framed around the idea that rival firms in a particular industry context 
tend to display two basic types of behavior. On the one hand, organiza-
tional processes make sure that distinct, firm-specific capabilities arise in 
individual companies. On the other, forces of competition ensure that, in 
the end, firms choose those strategies that make their capabilities com-
patible to the rules of the competitive game. Whereas organizational be-
havior at the firm level tends to increase rivals' idiosyncrasy, competitive 
behavior at the industry level tends to raise their uniformity. This chapter 
presents a framework of coevolution in which both points of view are in-
tegrated, in the process generating a number of tentative propositions. In 
this sense, coevolution refers to the reciprocity between capabilities and 
competition, which shapes the development of an industry and its con-
stituent firms. 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SEARCH CONCEPT 
The 'behavioral theory of the firm,' which has originally been developed 
by Cyert and March (1963), pays attention to both organizational and 
competitive behavior, which makes it indispensable for a coevolutionary 
view of capabilities and competition. This theory assumes that firms have 
some degree of control over their market environment, and that they adapt 
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to their habitat through learning processes.1 Learning takes place after 
feedback loops bring new market knowledge to the organization, which 
confronts the firm with particular problems. Firms respond to such prob-
lems through what is called 'search' behavior by which they pursue new 
or alternative ways of doing. According to Cyert and March (1963), firms 
display two basic types of search behavior: (1) they can search in the 
neighborhood of current practice, or (2) they can search for radically new 
alternatives. Cyert and March treated this distinction primarily in organ-
izational terms, but stressed its applicability at the competitive level. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) embraced this dichotomy by referring to it 
as local and distant search. Here, problem-solving behavior is directed at 
(1) the amplification and improvement of current practices, or (2) the 
creation of something entirely new. This dual nature of search closely re-
sembles March's (1991) paradox of exploitation versus exploration. 
Whereas exploitation involves the "refinement and extension of existing 
competences, technologies, and paradigms," exploration refers to the "ex-
perimentation with new alternatives" (1991: 85). According to March, 
both phenomena are characteristic for how firms learn - in other words, 
for how their search behavior takes shape. By incorporating behavioral 
theory as the third major building block of an integrative approach to 
coevolution of capabilities and competition, this thesis assumes that com-
petitors can be involved in exploitative and explorative search behavior at 
both the firm and the industry level.2 
It appears that inclusion of the search concept into the management 
literature has been rather limited, and this would indeed account for its 
lack of an integrative or coevolutionary perspective.3 Moreover, theory on 
search has so far been somewhat ambiguous as far as levels of analysis 
are concerned (with the exception of March (1991), who did discuss the 
implications of exploration versus exploitation at the organizational and 
competitive level). Early publications on search (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982), for example, primarily discussed the search 
concept from a firm point of view, although they did mention its competi-
' Cyert and March (1963) adopted a rather broad view of the firm's market environment, 
whereas this thesis obviously focuses on only a part of that context, that is, the competitive 
environment. 
2 From here on, neighborhood or local and distant or global search will only be referred 
to in relation to others' work; otherwise, exploitative and explorative search are used ex-
clusively to avoid confusion. 
3
 Important exceptions, as we will see, are Lant and Mezias (1990), Barnett et al. (1994). 
Barnett and Hansen (1996), and Stuart and Podolny (1996). 
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tive consequences. More recent work (e.g., Barnett and Hansen, 1996; 
Stuart and Podolny, 1996) studies search without explicitly considering its 
process and content at interrelated levels. In this chapter, it is attempted to 
fill that gap in the literature, and to theorize on search behavior of rival 
firms at the distinct but interrelated industry and firm levels of analysis. 
COEVOLUTION FROM AN INDUSTRY-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
Chapter 3 discussed that firms cannot be considered as simple stand-alone 
entities in a largely undefinable operating context. Instead, firms build 
capabilities in an industry environment where they compete with other 
rivals, each of which employs its bundle of capabilities in the competitive 
process. Some firms create competitive advantages by introducing new 
capabilities to the industry, but others will unavoidably manage to repli-
cate these capabilities. As more rivals find ways to build the capabilities 
required for competing under the new rules of the competitive game, the 
pioneer's advantage eventually disappears. Moreover, rival companies 
become increasingly homogenous as to their strategy and capability bun-
dles. Such interaction patterns of innovation and imitation form the en-
dogenous driver of an industry's evolution (Schumpeter, 1934). It appears 
that, in a competitive context, many rivals are involved in search behavior 
to upgrade their capabilities. 
This is in line with Cyert and March's (1963: 177) premise that be-
havioral theory can be "a basis for describing the behavior of certain ag-
gregates of firms - specifically for an industry." In a behavioral view of 
the firm, rival firms are related to each other as each of them searches for 
new capabilities to compete in their industry. Indeed, in so-called "ecolo-
gies of competition, the competitive consequences of learning by one or-
ganization depend on learning by other organizations" (March, 1991: 81). 
In other words, actions taken by one company in search of capabilities 
have implications for the direction of search behavior at its rivals.4 In 
their study of firms' local search for technological positions, Stuart and 
Podolny (1996: 36) remarked that "firms do not search in isolation; rather 
they search as members of a population of simultaneously searching or-
ganizations." Companies become rivals not simply because they happen 
to operate in the same habitat, but because they influence each others' 
search behavior. 
4 In this sense, there is a similarity with contemporary approaches to game theory which 
aim to model strategic interactions between competitors. 
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Competition as a process of capabilities-based innovation and imita-
tion creates dynamic pressures for rivals to search for capabilities, either 
as leaders or as laggards. Such forces are not some abstract outcome of 
competition as a general phenomenon, but are a direct consequence of the 
explicit actions of the firms that make up an industry. Because "competi-
tion triggers self-reinforcing, reciprocal effects in an ecology of learning 
organizations," it is not something external to the firm, but can best be 
understood as integral to an organization's search behavior (Barnett and 
Hansen, 1996:141).5 After all, in their search for capabilities, firms not 
only evolve in their role as competitors, but also activate new search be-
havior at the other players in a particular industry. The idea that it is the 
search behavior of players which underlies the competitive dynamics of 
an industry can be rephrased into the following 
Proposition la: Coevolution of capabilities and competition is shaped 
by search behavior of rival firms in a process of inno-
vation and imitation at the industry level. 
The Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
That competition evolves around the dynamics of innovation and imita-
tion is common knowledge these days.6 Even before Schumpeter, Mar-
shall (1890: 635) had already observed that "the services rendered to so-
ciety by employers and other undertakers are of two classes, those who 
open out new and improved methods of business, and those who follow 
beaten tracks." Intuitively, one would think that innovation and imitation 
of capabilities at the industry level resemble practices of exploration and 
exploitation respectively: new capabilities are introduced by the innova-
tor, while the imitators take care that these capabilities are further spread 
throughout the industry. Such reasoning would, however, ignore the no-
tion that imitators "exercise entrepreneurship as much as the innovators 
5 It is important to note that Barnetl and Hansen (1996) aimed to integrate the concept of 
search with population ecology theory, and therefore embraced a Darwinian view of com-
petition in which rivalry evolves as a continuous process. This thesis, in contrast, attempts 
to integrate the notion of search with evolutionary economics and therefore adopts the 
Schumpeterian idea of rivalry as a discontinuous process. This difference, however, does 
not negate the relevance of Barnett and Hansen's argument presented in the text. 
6
 Obviously, there are differences of opinion regarding the speed with which innovations 
are being imitated. Whereas resource-based views and neo-classical economics take oppo-
site stands in this respect, evolutionary views appear to be somewhere in the middle of this 
'short-long' time dimension. 
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themselves" (Jacobson, 1992: 788). One should not forget that even from 
the imitator's point of view, the search for new capabilities embodies a 
highly innovative activity (Winter, 1984). 
In other words, exploitation of an innovation at the industry level 
should not be mistaken for the diffusion process of that innovation. Like 
the pioneering company, imitators are involved in explorative search for 
new capabilities, and are less likely to be engaged in exploitative search 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Still, there is a notable difference between the 
search behavior of innovators and imitators: while the pioneer has to first 
define the right question before finding an answer, laggards only have to 
search for the right answer as the question is already known. The hard act 
of detecting a new question is characteristic for the Schumpeterian entre-
preneur who searches for new ways of competing and makes rivals' posi-
tions obsolete. Recently, Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994: 53) introduced 
the strategic innovation concept: "the creation of combinations of actions 
hitherto deemed impossible," enabling the pioneer to redefine the rules of 
the competitive game and force rivals to compete on a new basis. 
Competitive behavior of firms in terms of strategic innovation thus 
produces a creative destruction in the industry. Crucial to such behavior 
are radical changes in the cognitive structures and mental models of the 
(managers of the) pioneering firm that, as Schoemaker (1990) argued, lie 
at the core of strategy. It is grounded in the search for alternative concep-
tions of rivalry and "the rejection of simplistic ideas that success is pre-
determined by mechanistic formulas" (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1994: 
26). In the end, the pioneer introduces new capabilities to the industry, 
and forces its rivals to be engaged in explorative search to imitate its ca-
pability base and to conform themselves to the new competitive rules. The 
industry is marked by a period of turmoil in which both the innovator and 
its imitators engage in explorative search for new capabilities. Creative 
destruction is at the heart of the foundation of new capabilities at the in-
dustry level which, according to Schumpeter (1934), acts as a disequili-
brating force. 
Still, the growing prominence of imitation during an industry up-
heaval represents an equilibrating force that brings rival firms back to an 
equivalent level of capabilities, strategies and competition (Iwai. 1984). 
From the moment the industry's rivals have managed to adopt the new 
competitive rules, they concentrate their subsequent efforts on getting 
every ounce out of them. In other words, competition does not turn into a 
state of perfect equilibrium once the industry leader's competitive advan-
61 
COEVOLUTION OF CAPABILITIES AND COMPETITION 
tage has been eroded through imitation. Instead, competitive behavior of 
rival firms centers around further modification of the latest competitive 
recipe, "yet relying on the fundamental designs pioneered by the innova-
tor" (Teece, 1987: 190). Instead of exploring radically new alternatives, 
rivals are now involved in exploitative search behavior, which is directed 
at the stabilization of industry-wide conventional competitive practices 
over time (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Here, the industry's rivals engage in the further proliferation of the 
capabilities initially founded during the preceding episode of creative de-
struction. Search behavior is directed at the improvement of current and 
accepted practice. Although competition is still characterized by the dy-
namics of innovation and imitation, capabilities tend to disperse more 
quickly among the population of rivals. The reason is that close resem-
blance in thoughts, capabilities and activities places competitors "in a 
much better position to imitate or learn and build from each others' work 
than firms with different strategies and capabilities" (Nelson, 1991: 70). 
This implies that even temporary competitive advantages are difficult to 
realize as relatively minor adaptations to capabilities are subject to rapid 
imitation forces.7 In such an environment, "the production techniques of 
firms will tend to be bound together more closely [and] the competitive 
race would be 'closer'" (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 217). 
The use of the search behavior concept in a coevolutionary view of 
capabilities and competition suggests that exploration and exploitation at 
the industry level do not equal the innovation-imitation dynamic. Instead, 
the competitive process of imitation and innovation functions as a context 
in which rivals display two basic types of search behavior. On the one 
hand, explorative search involves the pursuit of alternatives far removed 
from previous competitive formulas, and results in the foundation of 
novel capabilities at the industry level. On the other, exploitative search 
involves the hunt for expansion in the neighborhood of current competi-
tive recipes, and causes further proliferation of these capabilities. Still, 
rivals interact competitively in both situations, be it that there may be dif-
ferences in the 'closeness' of competition and the presence of competitive 
advantages. In sum, 
7 One would therefore expect that in such a context small improvements in capability 
bundles are hard to assign to individual firms. 
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Proposition lb: Explorative and exploitative search behavior of rival 
firms results in the foundation and proliferation of ca-
pabilities at the industry level. 
Obviously, capabilities are difficult to relate to search behavior at the 
industry level as their origins unavoidably lie at the firm level. Indeed, 
most definitions of capabilities focus on their attributes that contribute to 
the firm's unique organizational behavior.8 Furthermore, today's strategic 
management research stresses the value of knowledge as a deeply hidden 
but fundamental component of a firm's capabilities (e.g., Hedlund, 1994; 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996). However, this focus on 
knowledge has led to a neglect of other organizational resources in strat-
egy research (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Physical assets, property 
rights, reputation and other forms of capital on which capabilities are built 
are often overlooked, "but there is no a priori reason why they should not 
be included in a more comprehensive evolutionary theory of the firm" 
(Fosse/ al., 1995:6). 
The distinction between managerial, input-, transformation- and out-
put-based capabilities offered by Lado et al. (1992) and further elaborated 
by Lado and Wilson (1994) does encompass various kinds of organiza-
tional capital next to knowledge (see Table 4.1). Moreover, this particular 
typology allows for the explicit incorporation of search behavior as fun-
damental to capabilities, and also recognizes the significance of mutual 
interaction patterns between capabilities and competition. The first cate-
gory, managerial capabilities, points at search behavior in terms of above-
mentioned (changes in) cognitive structures and mental models which 
underly a strategic vision. Input-based capabilities concern search behav-
ior regarding the acquisition and/or mobilization of specialized and unique 
assets. Transformation-based capabilities involve innovation, firm culture 
and organizational learning. Finally, output-based capabilities refer to (in) 
visible assets like physical outputs, brand name, reputation and relation-
ship networks. 
8 Still, definitions vary from integrated clusters of idiosyncratic assets (Teece et at., 
1997). a firm's capacity to deploy resources via distinct organizational processes (Amit 
and Schoemaker, 1993) to bundles of firm-specific knowledge sets (Leonard-Barton. 
1992). 
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Table 4.1: Categories of Capabilities 
Managerial 
Capabilities 
"The unique capa-
bilities of the orga-
nization's strategic 
leaders to articulate 
a strategic vision 
[and] the unique 
ability to enact a 
beneficial firm-
environment rela-
tionship" (p. 703) 
Input-Based 
Capabilities 
"The physical re-
sources, organiza-
tional capital re-
sources, human 
resources, knowl-
edge, skills, and 
capabilities that 
enable a firm's 
transformational 
processes to create 
and deliver prod-
ucts and services 
that are valued by 
customers" (p. 704) 
Transform-Based 
Capabilities 
"Organizational 
capabilities re-
quired to advanta-
geously convert 
inputs into outputs 
[which] include 
innovation and 
entrepreneurship, 
organizational cul-
ture, and organiza-
tional learning" (p. 
705) 
Output-Based 
Capabilities 
Physical outputs 
and "all knowledge-
based, invisible 
strategic assets, 
such as corporate 
reputation or image, 
product or service 
quality, and cus-
tomer loyalty" (p. 
708) 
Source: adapted from Lado and Wilson (1994) 
Over time, these types of capabilities are proliferated at the industry 
level, but it seems unlikely that each individual capability is exploited in 
its own right. As these various categories of capabilities are essentially 
components to be combined in a more holistic construct (Lado et al., 
1992), one would expect that proliferation increases the complexity and 
cohesiveness of collections of individual capabilities over time. In the 
end, such collections make up distinct activities, and this is why, accord-
ing to Nelson and Winter (1982) exploitative behavior is reflected in the 
cultivation of activities. In accordance with Lado et al. (1992), prolifera-
tion of capabilities may thus be reflected in the exploitation of activities 
which link firms to their input markets, as well as to their output markets. 
Both are tied to one another in the firm's organization that represents the 
fundamental context in which capabilities are shaped and culminate into 
systems of activities (Hedlund, 1994; Volberda, 1998). 
A Coevolutionary View of Competitive Regimes 
The premise that capabilities are proliferated at the industry level once 
competitors are on an equal footing regarding their understanding of the 
competitive rules, seems to bear some profound implications for the in-
dustry's evolution. When the search behavior of rival firms in an industry 
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shifts towards exploitation of known capabilities, the danger exists that, in 
the hypothesized end, incremental adaptations to these capabilities will no 
longer emerge. Firms have a natural tendency to be engaged in exploita-
tive search behavior as its returns "are positive, proximate, and predict-
able" (March, 1991: 85). In theory, the best strategy for any individual 
rival firm is therefore to "emphasize the exploitation of successful explo-
rations of others" (Levinthal and March, 1993: 104). But this would 
eventually drive out any act of innovation, which would endanger the sur-
vival of the industry as a whole. Endless proliferation of capabilities via 
excessive exploitative search behavior drives the industry into a down-
ward spiral. 
Still, industries may survive and continue to evolve as a result of two 
possible occurrences. Although uniformity among rivals increases signifi-
cantly as they display a growing amount of exploitative search behavior, 
there will always be a basic level of diversity among the industry's con-
stituent firms (Nelson, 1991). There will therefore always be a chance that 
one of these rivals restores its hopes into explorative search and intro-
duces a new strategic innovation to the industry. A second possibility is 
that the requisite variety comes from outside the industry. After all, the 
tendency of industry players to continue their focus on exploitative search 
makes them rigid and susceptible to new entrants whose critical attitude 
towards established practice may return the industry to a state of creative 
destruction (Levinthal and March, 1993). In both situations, competitive 
dynamics "comprise powerful countervailing forces to the tendency for 
experience to eliminate exploration" (March, 1991: 85). 
Repeated over time, this dynamic between explorative and exploita-
tive search behavior represents a principal and endogenous driving force 
of industry evolution in which capabilities are founded and proliferated 
again and again. This implies that the industry evolves through multiple 
competitive regimes, in each of which competition is based upon particu-
lar competitive recipes and capabilities. Competitive regimes are charac-
terized by distinct product markets (Porter, 1980), technologies (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986), and stress particular points in the organization's 
value chain (Porter, 1985). The creative destructions that start a new com-
petitive regime make the industry go through a series of discontinuities. 
This idea opposes the traditional argument that such shocks are primarily 
the result of exogenous and abstract developments in new technology, 
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global communication or government policies, but conforms to findings 
reported in empirical studies on technological innovation.9 As a result, 
Proposition lc: At the industry level of analysis, coevolution of capa-
bilities and competition embodies a sequence of com-
petitive regimes. 
COEVOLUTION FROM A FIRM-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
According to Cyert and March (1963), organizational learning is guided 
by so-called 'standard operating procedures.' These SOPs determine the 
degree and direction of the firm's search behavior as a response to en-
countered problems that arise from market feedback. Nelson and Winter 
(1982) translated the notion of SOPs into the concept of routines as or-
ganizational carriers of knowledge and expertise, and argued that such 
routines influence firms' search for new alternatives. Not only do routines 
shape the organizational processes underlying capabilities (Winter, 1995), 
but they are also key to the learning processes by which firms adapt to 
changes in their environment. This conforms to behavioral theory's idea 
that organizations have some degree of control over their habitat, and im-
plies a voluntary perspective of firm behavior, as opposed to a determi-
nistic one. The latter dichotomy was first introduced by Child (1972) in 
his discussion of environmental selection and manipulation. 
Those on the voluntaristic side argue that managerial action, creativ-
ity and free will constitute a firm's strategic choice in adapting to or ma-
nipulating its environment (Bourgeois, 1984).10 In contrast, deterministic 
views perceive the environment to be the ultimate source of change: or-
ganizations or entire populations of firms without a (static) fit between 
9
 In their longitudinal analysis of the American automobile industry-, Abernathy and Clark 
(1985) documented how, over time, the industry evolved through distinct periods in which 
various US car manufacturers achieved success through technological innovation by rede-
fining established industry practices. Based upon historical evidence from the computer, 
cement and airline industries, Tushman and Anderson (1986) elaborated on Abernathy and 
Clark's work by contrasting competence-destroying and competence-enhancing disconti-
nuities. 
10 There is, however, some obscurity as to the application of strategic choice in manage-
ment literature: while Hrebeniak and Joyce (1985: 337) referred to it as "proactive or re-
active organizational behavior in anticipation of or reaction to exogenous variables." 
March (1981) discussed it in relation to the creation of endogenously changing environ-
ments by organizations themselves. Obviously, this thesis follows the latter view. 
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their internal and external contexts will inevitably be eliminated by envi-
ronmental selection forces.11 The strategic management field, with its rich 
body of research into organizational change, has come up with enough 
evidence that firms can and do adapt to environmental turbulence to im-
prove performance. Gersick (1994: 11) indeed argued that the focus of 
management research should shift from whether or not firms adapt to 
"when and how organizations steer successfully through changing envi-
ronments." Such a voluntaristic point of view implies that firms can either 
be pro-active or reactive in their search behavior. 
In descending from the broader level of competition to the specific 
level of the firm, it seems that organizations search for capabilities in their 
efforts to instigate or, less ambitiously, accommodate to changes in their 
operating environment. Hedberg et al. (1976) in this respect discriminated 
between adaptive and manipulative actions: whereas adaptation embodies 
a firm's response to an environmental stimulus, an act of manipulation 
actually provokes such environmental reactions. Whereas "the adaptor 
defends, conforms or submits," the manipulator is "aggressive, proud, 
perhaps selfish" (1976: 46). Again, one can adopt a revolutionary per-
spective as there seems to be a strong resemblance with the foregoing dis-
tinction between innovators and imitators. Whereas the manipulating firm 
impresses itself into its competitive environment, the adapting organiza-
tion maps its competitive environment onto itself. Thus, 
Proposition 2a: Coevolution of capabilities and competition is shaped 
by search behavior of rival firms in a process of ma-
nipulation and adaptation at the firm level. 
The Creation and Refinement of Capabilities 
As said, search behavior of firms is initiated by market feedback loops 
that internalize environmental knowledge into the organization (Cyert and 
March, 1963). According to Ghemawat and Ricart i Costa (1994: 59), 
firms can process information and know-how in two ways: "using it to 
search for improvements within a framework of fixed beliefs about how 
the environment behaves and responds to organizational actions vs. using 
it to reconsider the beliefs themselves." Intuitively, one would think that, 
at the firm level, manipulation of and adaptation to the competitive envi-
' 1 This is also the religion on which population ecology theory (discussed in Chapter 3) 
built its theoretical and empirical research base. 
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ronment resemble acts of exploration and exploitation respectively: while 
new practices are explored by manipulators, adaptors engage in exploita-
tive search of existing practices. However, this would discount resource-
based theory's idea that firms which adapt to changes in their habitat are 
involved in creative behavior as they dissociate themselves from path de-
pendencies (Teece et ah, 1997). 
Adaptation by individual firms is obstructed by the presence of idio-
syncratic routines that have been built up over time. Chapter 2 already 
discussed how increasing commitment to existing routines reduces a 
firm's flexibility in changing environments and raises organizational iner-
tia. Over time, such frictions permeate its managerial and technical sys-
tems that, together with skills and values, make up the firm's capabilities. 
When adaptation becomes a prerequisite for survival, firms often tend to 
stick to these routinized capabilities, turning them into core rigidities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). The longer the period during which an organiza-
tion is soaked in plasticity forces, the more difficult it will be to adapt to 
changes in its competitive environment (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). 
As a consequence, organizations are "typically much better at the task of 
self-maintenance [...] than they are at major change," even in the face of 
major environmental upheavals (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 9). 
In other words, both manipulators and adaptors engage in explorative 
search at the firm level, as their organizational context facilitates or ini-
tially obstructs efforts to experiment with new alternatives. At the same 
time, the above argument points at an essential difference in the way ma-
nipulators and adaptors explore new capabilities. According to Schumpe-
ter (1934), the manipulating act of creative destruction is more often than 
not injected into an industry by outsiders or newcomers. This is consistent 
with the accepted idea that new entrants are free from established routines 
developed for different times and places (Carroll et al, 1996). In contrast, 
incumbent companies need time to adapt to a new competitive doctrine as 
path dependencies lead them into competence traps when the rules of 
competition change (Levinthal and March, 1993). Whereas manipulators 
search for new industry practices, adaptors search for ways to first escape 
the rigidity from current routines, and then to adopt the new practices.12 
'2 More recently, research by Stopford and Baden-Fuller (1994) has shown that incum-
bents can also manipulate their competitive environment through strategic innovation, be 
it that such rejuvenators were rare to find. They indeed noted that few incumbents "carry 
renewal forward to the point where they harness new-found capabilities to the extent of 
transforming their industries" (1994: 523). 
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Explorative search within a population of rivals is dedicated to the 
creation of new capabilities. At the industry level, rival companies will 
show an increasing degree of uniformity in (terms of the competitive out-
comes of these) capabilities as more of them manage to adapt to the 
changed rules. But because individual firms have distinct histories that 
make them heterogeneous at a basic stratum, the way in which they create 
new capabilities (as well as their particulars) may differ considerably 
(Nelson, 1991). This variety in capabilities at the firm level increases once 
the various rival firms have managed to adapt, and start to refine the 
newly created capabilities. This two-phased process of capability building 
has been noted by Winter (1995: 151) in his distinction between a firm's 
ability "to amplify the contributions of present resources and expand ex-
isting lines of activity," and its more creative ability "to combine re-
sources in novel ways and establish new activities." 
Not only at the industry, but also at the firm do rivals prefer exploita-
tive over explorative search (March, 1991). While exploitative search for 
capabilities is aimed at the generation of certain returns via the steady, 
incremental improvement of products and processes, earnings from the 
rapid and radical redefinition of beliefs and operating heuristics during 
exploration of new capabilities are much more equivocal. Explorative 
search behavior has little to do with regular patterns of activity, because 
there are no clear-cut prescriptions, elementary procedures or programs 
through which firms can systematize creative behavior (Schoemaker, 
1990). On the other hand, the refinement of capabilities builds on estab-
lished routines and cognitive structures, and enables the firm to standard-
ize its operations to a certain degree.13 The tendency of firms to engage in 
exploitative search after they have been involved in explorative search has 
also been noted in early studies on organizational adaptation. 
For example, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) explained how organi-
zations are often involved in periods of convergent change, in which ex-
isting structures, activities and capabilities are even further exploited. 
These stages of fine-tuning are punctuated by revolutionary organiza-
tional adaptation in which novel strategies, processes and capabilities are 
explored.14 Such radical shifts represent "revolutionary changes of the 
13
 It is not claimed that exploitative search is easy for firms to be engaged in. but rather 
that a certain degree of regularity characterizes an organization's exploitative search ef-
forts. Problem solving is unlikely to be integrated into repeatable patterns that build a 
firm's creative capacity, and it is therefore highly unlikely that explorative search can be 
routinized. 
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system as opposed to incremental changes in the system" (1985: 185). 
Mintzberg and Waters (1982) found a similar pattern in their longitudinal 
study of Steinberg Inc. During its life, this firm went through occasional 
'sprinting' phases in which adaptation was represented by opportunistic 
leaps into short-lived strategic windows. These entrepreneurial-driven 
stages were followed by periods of refinement, in which organizational 
stability was matched by rigid and planned firm policies. Considering the 
above, one could theorize that 
Proposition 2b: Explorative and exploitative search behavior of rival 
firms results in the creation and refinement of capa-
bilities at the firm level. 
In their search for exploiting existing practices and exploring new 
alternatives, firms go through processes of organizational change (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Most often, exploitative 
search is embodied in incremental change, by which the organization 
evolves through a multitude of small actions (Quinn, 1980). In this re-
spect, exploitative search is a cumulative activity focused on areas of the 
firm's established capabilities (Stuart and Podolny, 1996), which accu-
mulates organizational knowledge in ways that become routinized over 
time (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The creation of new capabilities, how-
ever, is more a matter of radical or strategic change, and consists of three 
core dimensions (Pettigrew, 1987): context, content and process. Table 
4.2 shows the four drivers of strategic change that make up the change 
context: (1) the appointment of new top executives, (2) changes in formal 
ownership structure, (3) new perceptions of opportunities or threats in the 
industry, and (4) a decline in the company's performance (Grinyer and 
McKiernan, 1990).'5 
Table 4.2 also presents four firm attributes that make up the content 
of change (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991): (1) its vision of where it aims to 
be in the (near) future, (2) its scope of activities in terms of both custom-
ers served and geographical markets covered, (3) its competitive position 
relative to its rivals, and (4) the core capabilities needed to attain that po-
sition. In essence, the combination of all four attributes makes up the 
'4 It has to be noted that Tushman and Romanelli (1985) claimed these upheavals to be 
triggered by sharp changes in technological, political or legal forces, exogenous in nature. 
'5 Obviously, any combination of these four elements can trigger the start of a firm's 
change process. 
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firm's competitive strategy, which has been claimed elemental to the di-
rection of change (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). Indeed, Hofer (1980) 
mentioned that strategic turnarounds involve a radical change in the firm's 
competitive strategy, and noted that firms can only make such turn-
arounds during the emergence of 'strategic windows' over the industry's 
evolution. As a result, "firms usually have fewer opportunities to improve 
their strategic positions than they do to improve their operating efficien-
cies" (Hofer, 1980:30). 
Table 4.2: Attributes of the Core Dimensions of Strategic Change 
Context Content Process 
New Executives 
New Ownership 
New Threat/Opportunity 
Performance Decline 
Strategic Vision 
Strategic Scope 
Market Positioning 
Required Capabilities 
New Philosophy 
Reorganization 
Internal Ventures 
Novel Acquisitions 
New Alliances 
Status Reevaluation 
Learning New Skills 
Resolving Dilemmas 
The table further displays a number of core features of the process of 
strategic change that contribute to the creation of new capabilities. Re-
building the firm in such an explorative manner often involves an elabo-
rate redefinition of its philosophy, the reorganization of the company's 
structure and processes, and a new perception of the value of particular 
groups, functions or activities within the company (Miller and Friesen, 
1980; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Establishing new ventures, alli-
ances and acquisitions can also play an important part in the exploration 
of new capabilities during the change process (Hamel, 1991; Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997). Learning new skills and resolving dilemmas represent 
two final components that support the search for new capabilities during 
radical change programs (Hampden-Turner, 1990; Baden-Fuller and Stop-
ford, 1994). Combined, the above features may comprise explorative 
search behavior and result in the creation of capabilities at the firm level. 
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A Coevolutionary View of Organizational Change 
The premise that capabilities are refined at the firm level once firms have 
managed to adapt to major changes in their competitive environment has 
implications for the way that organizations evolve over time. As firms 
display a natural tendency to prefer exploitative search behavior over ex-
ploration (March, 1991), the danger exists that they fall into so-called 
'competence traps' (Levinthal and March, 1993). Increasing routinization 
of capabilities makes experimentation with alternatives progressively less 
attractive, simply because "knowledge about and use of old competencies 
inhibit efforts to change capabilities" (1993: 102). When the need to adapt 
to major changes in the competitive environment arises again, such or-
ganizational rigidity can preclude the firm's effective adaptation to the 
new circumstances. This means that, as the short run is increasingly 
privileged by exploitative search behavior, the long-term survival of firms 
may become endangered (Levinthal and March, 1993). 
Still, the voluntaristic point of view incorporated in behavioral theory 
suggests that firms are able to turn their efforts towards explorative search 
behavior again. This is subscribed by Hedberg et al. (1976), who ex-
plained that, once the need to adapt has been recognized, a firm initially 
intensifies its efforts to 'do as before, but more.' This search response rep-
resents "a course of action that can be rationalized as an attempt to last out 
a period of adversity that is perceived or hoped to be temporary" (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982: 122). At a certain moment, investment postponement, 
cost cutting and asset reduction shape restructuring policies to regain fi-
nancial stability.16 Unlearning of established routines continues through 
changes in strategy, personnel and ideology. As the organization moves 
on, problem solving and exploration of new alternatives gradually build 
the routines and new capabilities required to pursue the firm's novel stra-
tegic course.17 
1 6
 Such 'operating' change is characterized by cutbacks in operating functions and the 
disposal of primarily fixed assets (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). It often also involves 
the sudden removal of substantial numbers of employees and an improvement in opera-
tional efficiency (Robbins and Pearce. 1992). 
1 7
 The trajectory of change proposed by Hedberg et al. (1976) still represents the domi-
nant view on organizational change in contemporary management literature. For instance, 
in their crescendo model of rejuvenation, through which firms can break free from estab-
lished mindframes and routines, Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) studied how. after 
necessary but temporary reductions in costs and activities, a new vision and business strat-
egy channel the engineering and leveraging of novel capabilities. Ghoshal and Bartlett 
(1996) showed how, guided by the inspirational leadership of top executives, firms go 
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The above implies that firms evolve through multiple periods of or-
ganizational change, in each of which capabilities are created and refined. 
Routines seem to play a key role in the repetition of these capability de-
velopment trajectories. This is because capabilities are built on hierarchies 
of routines in which inertia is hidden deep (Nelson and Winter, 1982).18 
Routines permeate the process of capability building, so that even during 
the creation of new capabilities inertia starts to penetrate firms' organiza-
tional structure and processes (Rumelt, 1995). Routines thus appear to be 
both a blessing and a curse: they are mandatory in processes of change to 
create new capabilities, but at the same time obstruct subsequent trans-
formation processes as they increase inertia. Rival firms can therefore be 
expected to repeat the Hedberg et al. (1976) change trajectory over time 
during which the search for new capabilities at the firm level switches 
from creation to refinement and back. In other words, 
Proposition 2c: At the firm level of analysis, coevolution of capabili-
ties and competition embodies a sequence of organ-
izational changes. 
A N INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COEVOLUTION 
The separate treatment of explorative and exploitative search behavior at 
the firm and industry levels of analysis seems to remove some of the am-
biguity with which recent literature applies the search concept to various 
levels of analysis. For instance, the above shows that search processes at 
the firm and industry level share similarities as to their direction and cau-
sality. As a rule, exploitative search follows explorative search (and vice 
versa), culminating into the creation/refinement and foundation/prolifera-
tion of capabilities at the firm and industry respectively. Whereas search 
occurs in a process of manipulation and adaptation from the point of view 
of the individual firm, search behavior among rival firms in an industry 
takes place in a process of innovation and imitation. Finally, the dynamic 
of explorative and exploitative search behavior drives the evolution of 
both the firm and the industry over time in a world where capabilities and 
competition coevolve. 
through a carefully phased transformation process in which short but disruptive periods of 
restructuring were followed by the creation of corporate-wide capabilities. 
'8 The idea that organizational capabilities can be viewed as a hierarchy to facilitate inte-
gration of the firm's knowledge components has also been advanced by Grant (1996). 
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At the same time, the foregoing made it clear that it can be difficult to 
split up search behavior distinctively at firm and industry levels of analy-
sis. For instance, the concept of strategic innovation was discussed from 
an industry-level perspective, but essentially describes individual behavior 
at the firm. In a similar vein, the advantage of newcomers over incum-
bents in terms of the absence of routines was treated from a firm-level 
perspective, but in truth explains collective behavior at the industry. Such 
complications probably account for the reported ambiguity that surrounds 
the concept of search, but at the same time points at its virtue in facilitat-
ing an integrated view of the reciprocal relationships between capabilities 
and competition. The search concept appears to be crucial in combining 
firm and industry perspectives of coevolution, as it not only highlights 
apparent similarities, but also exposes some noteworthy contrasts between 
the two. 
Figure 4.1: An Integrative Framework of Coevolution 
/ 
Behavior 
, 
i 
Process of 
Innovalion-lmitation 
Process of 
Manipulation-Adaptation 
1 ' 
Search 
Beha vior 
Foundation and Proliferation 
of Capabilities 
Creation and Refinement 
of Capabilities 
Competitive 
Regime 
' ' 
Industry Evolution 
Firm Evolution 
. . 
Organizational 
Cha ige 
One of these differences concerns the difficulties encountered by ri-
val firms in different dispositions. It has been argued that explorative 
search is far more laborious for the innovator than for its imitators, as the 
latter group of rivals searches for answers to a question already found by 
the pioneer. But at the same time it has been noted that explorative search 
is more difficult for adaptors than for manipulators as the latter are free 
from the rigidity arising from established routines. The irony of course is 
that, in a competitive environment, individual innovating and imitating 
firms take on the role of manipulator and adaptor respectively. Instead of 
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adopting a one-sided point of view towards search, an integrative per-
spective in which both firm and industry levels are taken into account 
could forestall such biases. One possible integrative framework of 
coevolution of capabilities and competition is presented in Figure 4.1, 
which centers around the unifying concept of search behavior. 
The framework shows how coevolution of capabilities and competi-
tion results from a firm's interactions with its competitive environment, 
that is, with the other rivals in the industry. At a concrete level, the firm 
searches for capabilities to adapt to, or even manipulate, its competitive 
context. But as a collection of rival companies, firms are engaged in the 
search for capabilities at the more abstract level of competition where the 
dynamic of innovation and imitation rules. Obviously, the creation and 
refinement of capabilities by firms impacts the development of capabili-
ties at the industry level in terms of foundation and proliferation (and vice 
versa), simply because they coexist in an ecology of competition. Over 
time, these reciprocal relationships shape both firm and industry evolution 
as competitive forces make the search for capabilities alternate between 
the rejuvenating properties of exploration and the self-destructive tenden-
cies of exploitation. 
In this regard, the integrative framework explicitly addresses the third 
research question raised in the Introduction on the search behavior of 
firms in a revolutionary process. Moreover, it also presents a tentative 
answer to the second research question: How does coevolution of capa-
bilities and competition unfold at the firm and industry levels of analysis? 
Derived from the constructed propositions, the framework displays how 
competitive regimes and organizational change processes shape the evo-
lution of both industry and firm. In turn, these regimes and transforma-
tions are shaped by the (interactive) search behavior of rival firms. Again, 
this shows how the various research questions are related to one another 
as they move from a specific to a general level of understanding. This can 
also be observed in the fact that these 'lower-level' questions, visualized 
in Figure 4.1, culminate into the first research question on the synthesis of 
opposing views on firm differences and similarities. 
Indeed, the framework of coevolution appears to deal effectively with 
the ostensibly contrasting points of view that, over time, rival firms move 
toward a higher degree of idiosyncrasy (as assumed by resource-based 
thinking) versus uniformity (as proposed by Schumpeterian competition 
theory). On the one hand, rival firms tend to become increasingly idiosyn-
cratic as they refine earlier created capabilities at the firm level; the het-
\ 
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erogeneity in routines among organizations makes them different in the 
specifics of their capabilities, and exploitation indeed reinforces such dis-
tinctiveness. On the other hand, rival firms that together make up a certain 
competitive population tend to become progressively uniform once they 
compete under the same rules; exploitation at the industry level indeed 
amplifies such homogeneity in strategy and capabilities. A coevolutionary 
approach as depicted in Figure 4.1 seems to support and converge both 
Schumpeterian and resource-based ideas on firm differences and similari-
ties. 
Finally, the integrative framework explicitly incorporates an endoge-
nous and cyclical perspective on the development of firms and industries. 
The reciprocity between capabilities and competition as an outcome of 
rivals' search behavior appears as a repetitive and two-way switch from 
firm heterogeneity to homogeneity and back. Thus, rival firms can display 
increasing degrees of idiosyncrasy and uniformity at the same time in a 
coevolutionary world. Although firms in an industry search for similar 
capabilities in terms of competitive behavior, elemental differences in or-
ganizational behavior make sure that the way in which these capabilities 
are created and come about varies. In the following chapters, the forego-
ing propositions are tested in the empirical setting of the music industry. 
But before proceeding to a description and analysis of data from the rec-
ord business, Chapter 5 first discusses the methodology applied in the 
collection, organization and interpretation of the empirical material. 
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Research Methodology: 
An Empirical Study into Coevolution 
The previous chapters presented the research project's aim and questions, 
explored the value of theory on capabilities and competition, and gener-
ated some propositions and an integrative framework of coevolution. But 
before testing the latter in an empirical setting, academic rigor demands 
an explicit discussion of the methodology applied in such an investigation 
in order to legitimate the study's results. This chapter starts with a reflec-
tion on the overall research design of the thesis as already touched upon in 
the first chapter, and discusses the primary reasons for why this particular 
design has been adopted. The following section explores the empirical 
study's first component, a historical study, in terms of data collection, 
analysis and validity, and argues why such an inquiry was undertaken in 
the first place. These steps are repeated in a final section that discusses the 
empirical study's second component, represented by a multiple-case 
study. Both the historical and multiple-case study involved the empirical 
setting of the music industry and were longitudinal in character. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Intuitively, the idea that competition is in a state of continuous disequilib-
rium seems to be incorrect: if competition is involved in permanent 
change, one should treat such movement as & process instead of a state. 
Indeed, this is why this thesis often refers to the competitive process when 
dealing with the concept of competition. In line with the endogenous per-
spective advocated earlier, it is further assumed here that this process is 
shaped by the actions of its contestants as they search for capabilities. 
These players usually reveal themselves as organizations in the shape of a 
company or business firm. It is thus important to recognize that it is the 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
collective behavior of the organizational members that matters (Pettigrew, 
1992). Because their actions, and therefore those of their companies, con-
tinue to evolve over time, the coevolution of capabilities and competition 
needs to be regarded as a cumulative sequence of events. In other words, 
a study of coevolution has to address the dimension of time. 
Indeed, the notion of time is elemental to this study's research design, 
and thus impacts the choice of methods applied. To put it quite simply, a 
processual approach requires empirical research methods that incorpo-
rates the dimension of time, in contrast to more conventional exercises in 
comparative statics which are often involved in cross-sectional strategic 
management studies (Pettigrew, 1992). According to Montgomery (1995), 
a broad window of time is imperative to address the dynamics of compe-
tition. D'Aveni (1994: 17) stressed that "strategy requires a theory that 
pays attention to the sequential moves and countermoves of competitors 
over long periods of time." Also, Pettigrew (1990: 272) argued how con-
ducting a longitudinal study "allows the present to be explored in relation 
to the past and the emerging future." Moreover, such studies enable the 
investigation of coevolutionary dynamics by management academics, the 
practice of which "is still at a very rudimentary stage" (Henderson and 
Mitchell, 1997: 6). 
But before an account of the methods applied in the current research 
project is given, the exact meaning of the term process has to be specified 
to forestall potential confusion in the coming pages. According to Van de 
Ven (1992), three approaches to process are commonly used in the strat-
egy literature: (1) a logic that explains a causal relationship between inde-
pendent and dependent variables in a variance theory, (2) a category of 
concepts or fixed variables that are operationalized as constructs, and (3) 
"a sequence of events or activities that describes how things change over 
time" (Van de Ven, 1992: 170). In line with the above approach to 
coevolution, the current study adopts the third meaning of process, as it 
stresses historical development and focuses on incidents and stages (Van 
de Ven, 1992). Crucial in process research is to explain how and why 
processes change over time, questions that are elemental in studying the 
coevolutionary interactions between capabilities and competition. 
Moreover, this third approach to the notion of process is the only one 
in which there is room for dealing with multiple levels of analysis (Petti-
grew, 1992). As noted, resource-based views have been subject to the 
criticism that research has mainly been an issue of how firms develop ca-
pabilities without much attention to the competitive process. For instance, 
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Henderson and Cockburn (1994: 63) remarked that "studies of the evolu-
tion of capability at individual firms have greatly enriched our under-
standing of the nature of particular competencies [...] but by and large 
these insights have not been incorporated into studies of aggregate firm 
behavior or systematic studies of competition." Such a unilateral approach 
thus tends to discount the impact of rivalry upon firms' development of 
capabilities, which subordinates competition to a property of markets 
(Barnett and Hansen, 1996). In this sense, Levinthal (1995) stressed that 
research into capabilities must link firm and industry levels of analysis. 
This study not only assumes that rivals compete on capabilities at the 
industry level, but also acknowledges that organizations have to breed 
these capabilities at the level of the firm. The integrative framework on 
coevolution developed in the previous chapter illustrates how the concept 
of search links both levels of analysis. Firms have to search for new capa-
bilities to perform well in their competitive environment, while competi-
tive pressures, in turn, confront companies with the need to search for a 
novel capability base. The process is one of continuous movement, which 
was reflected in the propositions generated in Chapter 4 that all evolve 
around the idea that search processes shape the development and evolu-
tion of both firms and their industry over time. To test these propositions, 
a 'dual methodology' has been employed in the empirical part of this re-
search project to investigate processes of search and coevolution at these 
different levels of analysis. 
First, processes of search and coevolution at the industry level were 
primarily investigated through a historical study of the music industry. In 
line with most of the empirical work listed in Table 3.2, this study into its 
competitive dynamics (as forces driving the industry's evolution over 
long periods of time) is longitudinal in character. It covers the period be-
tween 1877 and 1990, and this makes it possible to detect shifts in com-
petition over time. In contrast, processes of search and coevolution at the 
firm level were mainly examined via a multiple-case study of individual 
record companies. In line with most of the empirical work displayed in 
Table 2.2, this study into firms' organizational change processes covers 
several firms and the more limited time frame of the period 1990-1997. 
The fact that the scope of the empirical data displayed and explored in this 
thesis has been confined to the music industry means that a trade-off has 
been made between the breadth and depth of data collection and analysis. 
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HISTORICAL STUDY 
In defense of longitudinal research methods, Porter (1991) noted how 
studies into the dynamics of strategy should nudge into the world of the 
historian. Building upon this idea, Van den Bosch (1993) proposed a 
Chandlerian approach to theory development, claiming that history mat-
ters to strategy. In a new introduction to his 1962 publication on strategy 
and structure of the industrial enterprise, Chandler himself mentioned how 
he, as a young historian, was struck by the enormous attention his book 
received from managers. Although he composed the historical develop-
ment of four individual firms, Chandler performed an additional activity 
traditionally not undertaken by scholars in history. His descriptions were 
followed by a comparative analysis from which he derived his findings on 
organizational innovation. Chandler thus practiced comparative history as 
he managed to bridge the historian's role as storyteller with the social sci-
entist's responsibility of interpretation. 
Application and Setting 
While historians tend to be primarily concerned with the particular and 
the unique in their descriptions, social scientists are often especially inter-
ested in the general and the repetitive in their explanations. In response, 
Berkhofer (1969) suggested a behavioral approach to historical analysis in 
which there is room for both narration and meaning. After all, "the type of 
description of a phenomenon determines the type of explanation needed 
for understanding that phenomenon" (Berkhofer, 1969: 282). Indeed, Me-
gill (1989: 634) discussed how the prejudice for universality, or "the gen-
eral elevation of explanation over description," has been challenged in 
more recent years. Although the imbalance still exists in the fields of eco-
nomics and sociology, it is accepted today that description is no longer the 
simple act of data collection. While description was traditionally regarded 
as a neutral exercise preceding the 'grand' work of explanation, it is now 
perceived as an activity that displays actual processes. 
So instead of treating change as a number of successive events on a 
linear time scale, change is being understood as a process dependent on 
particular dynamics. This alternative approach to the notions of time and 
change enables a convergence between description and explanation 
(Berkhofer, 1969). The history of the music industry that is presented in 
Chapter 6 adopts such an approach: it not only describes the industry's 
evolution in terms of facts and figures, but also analyzes the particular 
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processes that drove its development. In this sense, historical description 
and contemporary analysis of what happened are performed simultane-
ously. The scope of the historical study has been limited to the American 
segment of the music industry for two reasons. First of all, the US record 
industry is unique regarding the availability of data for the extensive time 
period under consideration. Secondly, the events that shaped the indus-
try's evolution primarily concerned American record companies (at least 
until the eighties), while US-based music has for a long time dominated 
international markets.1 
Data Collection 
According to Tuchman (1994: 311), "attributing meaning to patterns is 
quite another matter" than the detection of these patterns, and involves the 
disclosure of processes. In addition, he emphasized the usage of qualita-
tive over quantitative data in historical studies because the first is more 
meaningful. Although it is more difficult to discover patterns in qualita-
tive than in quantitative data, the first type is richer and provides far better 
opportunities to apply meaning to the information once the patterns have 
been detected. Indeed, the historical study of the music industry builds to 
a large degree on data of a qualitative nature that has been disclosed in a 
variety of articles and books on the record business outside the boundaries 
of strategic management research. Still, quantitative data has been em-
ployed in this part of the empirical study to illustrate and support the de-
scription of certain developments, be it that the existence of structured 
quantitative information was found to be rather limited. 
The many secondary sources from which the qualitative data was re-
trieved can be roughly divided in three streams of cultural studies into the 
music business. First, research publications on the economics of the music 
industry offered insights into topics of industry organization, musical in-
novation and structural changes. The second domain involved writings on 
record companies in general and on individual firms, and provided intelli-
gence on the activities and organization of record companies as well as 
the technologies they applied. Finally, studies in communication supplied 
information on the relationship between the record business and the media 
industries. Quantitative data was collected from three respected industry 
associations: the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the 
' Still, any developments of a more international nature that somehow impacted the US 
record industry's progress have been taken into consideration, and were incorporated in 
the historical study to prevent inappropriate exclusion of relevant data. 
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National Music Publishers' Association (NMPA) and the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (or IFPI). In effect, the historical 
study does not present any new or previously unpublished data, be it that 
its longitudinal compilation has not been performed earlier in such detail. 
Data Analysis 
To provide an input for analysis, the accumulated data was structured 
along four basic dimensions. First of all, the historical study's emphasis 
on the dynamics of time called for a chronological organization of the 
data set. Furthermore, the assembled evidence was structured according to 
the treatment of various prominent record companies that continued to 
come up across sources at different points in time. In addition, the data set 
was framed on a competitive dimension, which essentially involved the 
identification of changes in the industry's oligopolistic setting - and this 
included major transitions in the industry's value system from company to 
consumer - over time across different sources. Finally, the collected data 
was organized to particular developments in music markets or, in other 
words, changes in consumer demands for music. Together, these dimen-
sions allowed for a structured and longitudinal description and analysis of 
the music industry's historical development. 
In line with Pertigrew (1997), analysis of the organized data set was 
performed along two related activities: (1) a search for patterns in proc-
esses out of a sequence of events, and (2) a search for the underlying 
mechanisms that shaped these patterns. To test the propositions on 
coevolution at the industry level as advanced in Chapter 4, the first of 
these activities involved the detection of various competitive regimes in 
terms of distinct product markets, organizational value points and tech-
nologies. In a similar vein, the second activity concerned the identification 
of record companies' capabilities around which competition evolved dur-
ing a particular competitive regime. These were classified according to 
one of four capability categories: managerial, input-based, transformation-
based and output-based capabilities. Chapter 6, in which a process-based 
description is linked to an explanation for why these processes happened 
as they did, reflects this combined search for patterns and mechanisms. 
Data Validity 
As said, the secondary sources used in the historical study can be roughly 
divided into three streams of cultural studies. Although these sources fo-
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cused on radically different research questions, the data presented was 
considered to be useful in the current study on coevolution of capabilities 
and competition. For example, a large body of research that focused on 
the economics of the music industry study the relationship between con-
centration and innovation (e.g., Peterson and Berger, 1975; Lopes, 1992; 
Burnett, 1992; Christianen, 1995) has measured the performance of rec-
ord companies in terms of their (album or single release) appearance in 
the Top 100 charts. But in doing this, this type of research essentially 
looked at end products - in other words, the outcomes of firms' competi-
tiveness - whereas this thesis aims to study the capabilities of record 
companies as determinants of their competitiveness. Still, this does not 
obstruct us to incorporate the rich data on which these sources based their 
findings regarding market concentration ratios. 
Similar arguments can be made for research into record company 
activities and into the relationship between these firms and the media in-
dustries. Whereas studies on record company operations (e.g., Peterson 
and Berger, 1971; Hirsch, 1972; Denisoff, 1986; Negus, 1992) investi-
gated the relationship between organization and innovation in music, this 
thesis aims to gain insights on the development of capabilities that lay 
hidden in the organization, and focuses on innovation in capabilities. In a 
similar vein, communication and media studies into the music industry 
(e.g., Gronow, 1983; Laing, 1992; Malm and Wallis, 1992; Burnett, 1996) 
focused on the cultural role of music to specific countries or regions of the 
world in its institutional setting. However, the current study sees music as 
an outcome of record companies' commercial performance in a business 
or competitive setting in their attempt to bridge the creative community 
and the consumer market. 
While all three research streams obviously concentrated on different 
research issues, the accumulated data and corresponding findings were of 
value to an empirical investigation into coevolution. So although the his-
torical study displayed in Chapter 6 does not present any radically new 
data, it does provide a radically new interpretation of the existing data set. 
An additional advantage of the observed diversity in secondary sources 
enabled a check for data consistency both within and across these streams 
of cultural studies. In addition to such 'within-method' triangulation 
(Denzin, 1978), the historical study's reliability was enhanced by means 
of 'between-method' triangulation (Jick, 1979). This was achieved via a 
confrontation of the longitudinal body of qualitative data with the more 
robust and quantitative data that had been collected at the various industry 
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associations, and covered parts or most of the 120-year period under con-
sideration. 
MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY 
This thesis incorporates a historical study of coevolution at the (music) 
industry level because (1) the impact of innovation in capabilities and 
(thus) in competition can only be understood ex post (Schumpeter, 1947), 
(2) this type of research appears especially useful in the development of 
coevolutionary theory which is still in its infancy (Zald, 1996), and (3) it 
allows for a non-deterministic approach to the interpretation of past events 
(Kieser, 1994), which conforms to an endogenous perspective of coevo-
lution. Building upon the research questions stated in Chapter 1, the above 
is in line with Yin (1984), who reasoned that the historical study is a suit-
able research method when the original research question has been stated 
in the 'how' form, when there is no control over behavioral events, and 
when there is a focus on past events. When the same rules apply but the 
focus is instead on contemporary events, Yin (1984) proposed the case 
study as the appropriate research strategy. The second part of the empiri-
cal research, which studies coevolution at the firm level within the music 
industry, thus consists of a multiple-case study. 
Application and Setting 
Whereas the historical study deals with coevolution over various periods 
of competition, the multiple-case study is directed at these reciprocities 
between capabilities and competition during a particular competitive re-
gime, that is, one period dominated by particular rules of the game. In line 
with Eisenhardt (1989), the multiple-case study method was applied for 
two reasons. First, organizational transformation as a mechanism of 
search at the firm level is by definition a process that takes time to unfold, 
and this perfectly suits the case study's distinctive property to master such 
dynamics. Second, observing several settings facilitates the integration of 
findings from individual cases via comparative analysis, and allows for 
the discovery of "different causal or development paths to the same basic 
phenomenon" (McPhee, 1990: 394). Whereas the focal issue of inquiry at 
the various case companies was their search for new capabilities, differ-
ences in the way these companies searched were of special interest to the 
researcher. 
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In contrast to the historical study, which focuses on the American 
industry, the multiple-case study involves companies operating in the 
British music industry.2 Over the years, the significance of this part of the 
music industry has increased, both within the UK and to music markets in 
the rest of the world. A report by the National Music Council showed that 
the music industry contributed £2.5 billion to the British economy in 
1995, surpassing other businesses like water supply, shipbuilding and 
chemicals. During the 1997 elections, Tony Blair mentioned how "the 
music industry doesn't get the recognition it deserves," and created a spe-
cial taskforce for the country's creative industries only six months later.3 
With a present sales value of over £1 billion, the UK is the world's fourth 
largest market, but the BPI claims that the UK music industry is far more 
important as an international repertoire provider. And this makes it one of 
the country's most successful exporting industries.4 
Data Collection 
It was acknowledged that different types of record companies operated in 
the industry, and that different firms could thus experience different types 
of change processes. The case companies were therefore selected through 
theoretical sampling, in which cases were chosen for theoretical catego-
ries instead of statistical reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to generate 
findings which would he generalizable across the music industry, seven 
record companies were investigated, divided over one of four categories: 
(1) independent labels acquired by majors, (2) UK operating companies of 
multinational majors, (3) independent companies, and (4) new entrants. 
Table 5.1 displays these case companies, and provides basic features such 
as ownership, age, number of employees and UK market shares. With 
2
 At the point where the historical study ran over into the multiple-case study, prelimi-
nary interviews were held with top managers at the Dutch operating companies of BMG 
and PolyGram, as well as with the directors of MTV Benelux and local music TV channel 
The Music Factory (who could provide a more remote view of the music industry in the 
Netherlands). A collective finding that emerged from these interviews was that innova-
tions and organizational change processes most often happen in the US and UK industries. 
Due to its geographical proximity, the latter was chosen as setting for the cases. 
3 Talbot, M., "'Blair and Major Vie for Music's Support." Music Week, 8 February 1997. 
p. 1. The taskforce concerned the music, film and fashion industries, and both V2 owner 
Richard Branson and Creation founder Alan McGee were appointed to this team (Talbot. 
M.. "McGee and Branson: We'll Fight for Music." Music Week, 26 July 1997, p. 1). 
4
 Source: BPI Statistical Handbook 1998. This publication also reports on a 1998 survey 
conducted by Gallup that indicated that "more than 50% of [other| UK exporters thought 
the success of British music internationally was helping them to sell their products." 
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hindsight, choosing these research sites was a process of 'planned oppor-
tunism' (Pettigrew, 1990), based on three criteria: (1) firm access and 
category, (2) its reputation within the industry, and (3) general knowledge 
whether the particular company had indeed been involved in a process of 
transformation.5 
Table 5.1: Case Study Record Companies 
Island 
Records 
Virgin 
Records 
BMG Inter-
national UK 
Warner 
Music UK 
Roadrunner 
Records 
Indepen-
diente 
V2 Music 
Group 
Case 
Category 
Acquired 
independent 
Acquired 
independent 
Major operat-
ing company 
Major operat-
ing company 
Independent 
Independent 
New entrant 
Formal 
Owner 
PolyGram 
EMI 
Bertelsmann 
Time-
Warner 
Private 
Private 
Virgin 
Group 
Incorpora-
tion 
1962 
1973 
1980 
1970 
1987 
1983/1996 
1996 
Em-
ployees 
62 
161 
303 
330 
7 
(120) 
17 
(19) 
85 
(251) 
UK Market 
Share 
2.0 
(1.4-2.6) 
8.5 
(6.4-10.7) 
6.4 
(4.7-8.3) 
10.4 
(7.2-12.6) 
0.1 
(0.1-0.2) 
0.9 
(0.2-1.5) 
n/a 
Notes: 
(1) Incorporation refers to date of establishment in the UK. 
(2) UK Market Share refers to the annual averages for the period 1990-1997; fig-
ures between brackets are highest and lowest values during this period. 
(3) The figures between brackets in the Employees column are worldwide ones. 
(4) In May /99#, Philips sold PolyCram for an amount of $10.4 billion to Seagram 
that aimed to integrate the company with Universal. 
(5) Independiente was formerly known as Co! Discs (which explains for the two 
dates of incorporation); UK market shares therefore concern the Co! Discs label in 
the period 1990-1996. 
5 This preliminary knowledge was retrieved from the yearly *'MBI United Kingdom Re-
port" published in the 1994, 1995, and 1996 December issues of Music Business Interna-
tional. 
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Tabte 5.2: Case Study Interviews 
Is and 
Records 
Virgin 
Records 
BMG Inter-
national UK 
Warner 
Music UK 
Roadrunner 
Records 
Indepen-
diente 
V2 Music 
Croup 
Inter-
viewee 
Managing 
Director 
Co-
Managing 
Director 
Director 
Business 
Affairs 
General 
Manager 
Managing 
Director 
and 
Director 
Business 
Affairs 
Managing 
Director 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer 
No. 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
Date 
24-09-97 
27-01-98 
17-09-97 
16-10-97 
19-11-97 
17-11-97 
05-11-97 
and 
03-09-98 
21-11-97 
28-01-98 
30-01-98 
Duration 
2 x 9 0 
minutes 
60 
minutes 
2 x45 
minutes 
90 
minutes 
45 
and 
90 
minutes 
45 + 90 
minutes 
90 
minutes 
Period 
1990-
1997 
1992-
1997 
1990-
1997 
1990-
1997 
1996-
1997 
and 
1993-
1997 
1992-
1997 
1996-
1997 
Taped 
yes 
yes 
yes/no 
yes 
no 
and 
yes 
no/yes 
yes 
In each company, a top manager was contacted and asked to partici-
pate in the research project. With the insurance of first perusal into the 
eventual case descriptions, these persons agreed to cooperate via one or 
two interviews. These key informants had personally supervised or wit-
nessed the changes under consideration, and had been part of the com-
pany during the total period covered by the case study. This means that 
the time-consuming exercise of mining multiple informants throughout 
the company was traded off for the top manager's position as the most 
knowledgeable about the (impact of) changes within the firm (Glicke/ al., 
1990). Although this was desirable in terms of the time-intensive nature of 
the adopted dual methodology in this thesis, and suited the phenomenon 
that personnel turnover is rather high in the record industry, a single 
source of information was obviously a disadvantage. To partly offset this 
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bias in data collection, further public information on the case companies 
was accumulated, primarily through the inspection of all issues of two 
respected industry trade journals, Music Week and Music Business Inter-
national, for the period 1990-1997. In addition, all six editions of The UK 
Record Industry Annual Survey (from 1993 to 1998), edited by Cliff Dane 
at Media Research Publishing, were consulted to retrieve financial and 
accounting data on individual record companies. 
The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that general ques-
tions, which had been framed around the preliminary data, provided a 
context and guiding line for the actual conversation (see Appendix A). 
This allowed for details to surface as the interview unfolded, while at the 
same time a number of broad topics were discussed, such as changes in 
(1) strategy and business philosophy, (2) organizational processes, (3) 
perspectives on competition and cooperation, and (4) firm performance. 
Table 5.2 displays who was interviewed when at each company, the pe-
riod of discussion under consideration, for how long the conversation 
lasted, and whether the interviews were tape-recorded or not. Afterwards, 
recorded interviews were written out in full detail; otherwise, extensive 
notes were transcribed immediately after the conversation had taken 
place. If deemed necessary by the researcher and/or the executive, a fol-
low-up interview was arranged for in-depth discussions of one or more of 
the topics under consideration. 
Data Analysis 
For each case company, a 'data collection file' was created in which all 
longitudinal data was chronologically ordered. These company files came 
to be the groundwork for (1) in-depth case descriptions of organizational 
change at each of the companies, and (2) tables that outlined the major 
events during the period of transformation. Both the case descriptions and 
the event tables were reviewed, corrected and commented upon by the 
interviewees, and provided a basic input for further analysis. In each case, 
the three core dimensions of organizational change as defined by Petti-
grew (1987) were explored to test the advanced propositions on coevolu-
tion at the firm level. First of all, the context of change was analyzed 
along four possible drivers of transformation. In addition, the content of 
change at each case company was explored in terms of its vision, scope, 
positioning and capabilities - in other words, its competitive strategy. 
In line with Huberman and Miles (1994), cross-case analysis on the 
content of change was performed by means of a matrix that visualizes the 
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changes in competitive behavior of the case companies during the period 
1990-1997. Whereas the context and content of change concern questions 
as 'Why did the change take place anyway?' and 'What was the exact 
nature of the change?,' the change process answers the question 'How did 
the change itself take place?' This third dimension was measured in terms 
of the attributes listed in Chapter 4 as deduced from the most prominent 
management literature on strategic change. This exploration into the 
change process was performed for each case company, which in the end 
facilitated cross-case analysis on the role of change in record companies' 
search for capabilities. Again, description and analysis are combined in 
Chapter 7, where the individual case companies are embedded in an ac-
count of the major developments in the music industry during the nineties. 
Data Validity 
It has to be noted that qualitative data collection and analysis is much 
more exposed to negative side effects of subjective interpretation if com-
pared to quantitative methods (see also Exhibit 5.1). This is true for the 
historical study, where the past has been interpreted from today's per-
spective (Megill, 1989), and for the multiple-case study where the ulti-
mate quality of research findings from qualitative approaches varies with 
a researcher's social and conceptual skills (Numagami, 1998). In contrast 
to the historical study, however, the multiple-case study does present sig-
nificant new data on the music industry, and this makes the issue of valid-
ity particularly important. Traditional positivist approaches to research 
(that often refer to studies of a quantitative nature) in this regard empha-
size the concepts of internal, external and construct validity. However, 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994) suggested that, in qualitative studies, these 
concepts should be replaced by notions of credibility, transferability and 
comfirmability. 
Whatever label one uses, the general issue of validity remains in the 
sense that the quality of the research method under consideration must be 
open to judgement. As a start, the multiple-case study's internal validity 
concerns verification of the causality between key constructs (Leonard-
Barton, 1990), and appears to be significant: all the individual case studies 
displayed how their search for capabilities embodied a process of organ-
izational change which, in the end, determined their market performance. 
This pattern was verified across the different company categories that had 
been defined in advance of data collection and analysis through theoreti-
cal sampling. Furthermore, the in-depth case descriptions facilitated the 
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construction of an explanation that was consistent across all seven cases. 
This explanation was based on 'pure' descriptive material as presented in 
the so-called 'Case Boxes' in Chapter 7, and was not subject to any pre-
liminary analysis. 
The multiple-case study's external validity concerns the gener-
alizability of its findings (Yin, 1984), and seems to be high for the music 
industry: seven companies, which together held an average share of 30% 
of the UK music market over the period 1990-1997, were studied in up to 
four different types of companies. In addition, more general data on other 
record companies (which is also discussed in Chapter 7) identified some 
major similarities to the change processes observed in the case studies, 
increasing the reliability of the findings. The multiple-case study's con-
struct validity deals with the question whether the gathered evidence truly 
supports its findings (Eisenhardt, 1989), and appears to be at an accept-
able level: both data sources (private and public) and data collection tech-
niques (executive interviews and article tracking) were subjugated to tri-
angulation, whereas the case descriptions and event tables were reviewed 
by the interviewees (i.e., the key informants) themselves. 
Exhibit 5.1: Research Limitations 
The dual methodology of historical and multiple-case study applied in this thesis is in 
line with previous empirical studies into competition and capabilities respectively 
(see Tables 2.2 and 3.2). At the same time, investigating an empirical setting by em-
ploying these methodologies might reveal more regarding the proposed issues of ex-
ploration than concerning those of exploitation. With respect to the historical study, it 
seems to be unavoidable that, over significant periods of time like the one observed 
here, not all relevant information may have been preserved. Moreover, it is highly 
likely that more striking or outstanding events, instead of the more ordinary or con-
ventional ones, have been registered for later use. In other words, much more data 
may have been stored on events of an explorative nature than those with an exploita-
tive character. 
In a similar vein, the multiple-case study may be subject to such an imbalance, 
be it that in this case the time period under consideration is too short. By investigat-
ing organizational change, one essentially studies a particular movement from an old 
to a new situation in which previously unknown or unusual processes are bound to 
replace the routine or customary ones. Thus, data sources may very well have been 
focused more on explorative than on exploitative events. It is therefore expected that 
the findings that rise from the dual methodology may be biased towards issues of 
exploration. Still, the next two chapters contain ample information to come up with 
new findings on exploitative search at both the industry and firm levels of analysis. It 
is here where the coevolution of capabilities and competition within the music indus-
try is narrated. 
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Coevolution at the Industry Level: 
A Historical Study of the Music Industry 
Thomas Edison, the legendary American inventor, once wrote in The New 
York Times that he was proud of the fact that he had never invented any 
weapons to kill. Still, most of his creations came to be 'competitive weap-
ons' which were at the roots of Edison's business success. Not only did he 
achieve fame by means of his extraordinary ability to develop technologi-
cal devices, but Edison also gained large fortunes through the commer-
cialization of these inventions. Many of his path-breaking discoveries, 
like the incandescent lamp and the motion-picture projector, established 
and dominated new industries in which his company came to be the crown 
competitor. But there was one industry where Edison did not triumph, and 
even failed to compete successfully on a long-term basis with other rivals: 
the record industry. While Edison had pioneered the phonograph, his ini-
tial technological lead was not enough to forestall others with even better 
capabilities that came to shape competition in those early days. 
Starting near the end of the nineteenth century, this empirical chapter 
presents a longitudinal study into more than a hundred years of coevolu-
tion of capabilities and competition in the music industry. In line with the 
methodological objectives of the previous chapter, the aim is to narrate 
the record industry's long-term development so that description and 
analysis are combined. As the first part of this book's empirical investiga-
tion, the current chapter describes and analyzes coevolution primarily 
from an industry level perspective. As a consequence, the historical study 
of the music industry focuses more on similarities between firms than on 
the differences between them (which is the focus of inquiry in the next 
chapter). As said, the availability of reliable data has been the principal 
reason to confine the investigation to the American music industry. Still, 
international developments that somehow influenced the US record in-
dustry's pace of progress have been included. 
COEVOLUTION AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL 
THE CREATION OF STANDARDS 
It is perhaps hard to imagine that today's music industry with its global 
presence and worldwide sales of more than 40 billion US dollars has its 
foundations in the vision and determination of two individuals. The first 
was Thomas Edison who invented the phonograph in 1877. This device 
was essentially a box-shaped cabinet that produced sound emerging from 
a large acoustic horn. By means of a swing, a tin-foiled cylinder on which 
the respective sound was prerecorded could rotate for a short period of 
time. Simultaneously, a stylus moved up and down along prefabricated 
grooves pressed in the cylinder, making the creation of mechanically re-
produced sound a reality (Gwinn et ai, 1987). Edison was convinced that 
the most important applications of his new phonograph lay in the repro-
duction of speech for purposes of dictation and education (Schicke, 
1974), as was reflected in the name of his enterprise: the Edison Speaking 
Company. 
Competition for Technology 
However, Edison's focus on reproducing the human voice resulted in a 
short supply of recordings and a lack of an acceptable degree of fidelity, 
and this limited consumers' adoption of the phonograph. These short-
comings, together with the fact that Edison saw little or no commercial 
value in the phonograph, made him decide that he could better devote his 
time and energy to the development of the electric light bulb. But he was 
forced to go back in business after the year 1886, when Bell Laboratories 
came up with the graphophone (Jones, 1992). Bell's graphophone was an 
enhanced version of Edison's phonograph: the cylinders were made of 
wax, and the machine embodied a new system of sound amplification as 
well as a variable speed rotation mechanism. Edison reacted quickly and 
adopted Bell's wax cylinder, realizing that this material was better suited 
to protect the cylinder's surface from the incisions made by the stylus. 
After 1888, companies such as the North American Phonograph 
Company and the Dictaphone Corporation acquired licenses to both the 
phonograph and graphophone, and attempted to market them as dictating 
machines. But the public showed virtually no interest at all and these 
ventures turned out to be absolute disasters. However, there appeared to 
be one particular company that learned from initial market responses in 
those years. The Columbia Phonograph Corporation noticed how its ma-
chine's sound-producing characteristics attracted a fair amount of public 
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at penny arcades, fairs and amusement centers (Frith, 1992). To Colum-
bia, this indicated that the real commercial value of the phonograph was 
to be found in the entertainment sector, instead of in the office equipment 
business. This discovery, and the fact that Columbia's suppliers of prere-
corded cylinders responded only slowly to an increase in demand at the 
time, stimulated the corporation to manufacture its own cylinders with 
recorded music as a form of public entertainment. 
The capacity to envisage prospective market demands was even more 
present at the early industry's second core character, Emile Berliner. Un-
like Edison, Berliner mastered both technical and market skills, which 
was fundamental to the success with which he commercialized his latest 
invention, patented in 1887. In contrast to the rivaling phonograph, Ber-
liner's gramophone reproduced sound through a horizontal movement of 
the stylus over a flat disc that rotated on a turntable. More significantly, 
Berliner recognized that the gramophone's commercial value was hidden 
in its ability to bring entertainment - especially music - right into people's 
homes (Schicke, 1974; Frith, 1992). Whether or not he had learned from 
Edison's shortcomings is not clear, but Berliner did realize that a mini-
mum supply of high-quality sound recordings was a prerequisite to make 
his product attractive to the consumer market. 
Berliner thus developed a system for the efficient manufacturing of 
recordings by using a zinc plate as master record, from which large 
amounts of ebonite records could be duplicated. At the same time, the lat-
eral rotation movement incorporated in this procedure increased fidelity. 
Edison had used a fairly simple duplicating process through which a 
maximum of only 200 prerecorded cylinders could be manufactured. In 
his view, it was not a necessity to produce high quantities of prerecorded 
material, as his cabinet enabled its user to make his or her own home re-
cordings. But the public was not interested in making its own sound pro-
ductions on fairly expensive unwritten cylinders. Instead, they were more 
eager to listen to someone else's voice and music for entertainment. By 
separating the recording process from the reproduction stage, Berliner 
was able to make much more duplicates at far less costs and of much 
higher quality. In addition, distribution of prerecorded music became far 
less complicated as discs were easier to handle than cylinders (Jones, 
1992). 
Berliner's gramophone was introduced on the market for home en-
tertainment in 1895 by the United States Gramophone Company, and this 
new competition forced Edison to respond fast. He improved his product 
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by developing a spring-motor driven phonograph and at the same time 
established the National Phonograph Company in 1896 (Jones, 1992). 
Together with Columbia, this corporation was responsible for the intro-
duction of the phonograph on the home entertainment market. Over the 
next five years, rivalry between disc and cylinder manufacturers was gov-
erned by fights over patent rights and minor technological innovations 
(Negus, 1992). During this period, Edison, in an attempt to keep up with 
Berliner, developed a molding process that enabled him to mass produce 
his prerecorded wax cylinders. Berliner, meanwhile, ran into a machine 
shop operator named Eldridge Johnson, and the combined strength of 
Berliner's technical and marketing expertise and Johnson's talents in or-
ganization and finance resulted in the launch of the Victor Talking Ma-
chine Company in 1901. 
What followed was an increase in competition as other recording 
firms noticed the lucrative nature of the market for home entertainment 
and followed Victor into this business. Johnson, who had managed to cre-
ate a structured organization out of Berliner's chaotic laboratory, licensed 
Victor's technology to other rival firms such as Columbia. Together with 
a growing consumer preference for the disc system, this proved to be cru-
cial to Victor's triumph in the 'standardization battle' between disc and 
cylinder, which was evident to the industry around 1907 (Schicke, 1974). 
Guided by improvements in the duplication process of prerecorded mate-
rial - which paved the way for mass production and distribution of re-
cordings - the stage was set for the rise and formation of the recording 
industry. While the initial technological developments were primarily an 
American matter, the industry already took on an international character 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. 
International Developments 
In Europe, British Gramophone Company and Deutsche Grammophon 
were founded in 1898, and Pathe Freres, established one year earlier, even 
had its own type of disc. Already in those years, gramophones and re-
cordings were sold in countries outside the United States and Europe such 
as Russia, Egypt and India. During the first decade of the new century, 
most of the larger companies pursued a sweeping internationalization 
strategy (Gronow, 1983). The principal objective was to create a world-
wide network of local factories, subsidiaries and agencies, through which 
products could be offered to consumers in every corner of the globe. The 
implementation of this strategy varied according to whether the company 
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was European or American in origin. Regarding the latter type, Edison's 
National Phonograph Company and Columbia concentrated all manufac-
turing operations in the US; they exported their products to subsidiaries in 
London, from where the items were marketed on the European continent 
through an extensive sales network. 
In contrast, European companies benefited from their governments' 
presence in the rest of the world. The colonies of various European em-
pires were not only used to extract large amounts of natural resources, but 
were also regarded as new markets for Western products. Gramophone 
furniture and recordings were no exception, be it that these products could 
only be afforded by Western administrators and richer local inhabitants. 
European recording companies such as the German Lindstrom Company 
and the French record firm Pathe Freres not only set up factories in vari-
ous European countries, but also established local subsidiaries and agen-
cies in overseas territories (Gronow, 1983). Although Edison, Columbia, 
Lindstrom and Pathe were respectable firms in terms of size and world 
market coverage, none of them was the equivalent of the Victor Talking 
Machine Company, especially after the company teamed up with British 
Gramophone. 
Figure 6.1: The Victor-Gramophone Alliance 
M i Affiliate with pressing plant 
( 1 Subsidiary without factory 
( ) Local agency 
Source: Adapted from Gronow 11983) 
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The mutual agreement between these corporations, not coincidentally 
triggered by a fifty percent ownership stake of Victor in Gramophone, 
was the first horizontal strategic alliance of the record industry (see Figure 
6.1). This pact made the partners split up the world by respecting each 
other's dominant presence in various territories (Gronow, 1983). As an 
American recording company, Victor took care of its home market in the 
United States and established agencies in Central and South American 
countries, as well as in China, Japan and the Philippines. British Gramo-
phone, in a far more decentralized manner, set up actual pressing plants in 
Russia, India and the main countries of Europe, from which smaller 
countries and colonies in Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East were 
managed through agencies. Victor's strategic alliance with Gramophone 
stretched its strategy of achieving maximum consumer adoption of its disc 
system towards the international level. 
At the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, a number of 
events took place that influenced the industry's further progress. As said, 
it was obvious that, in the end, the disc would be triumphant in the tech-
nological standardization battle that had faced the record business. During 
the first century, the consumer market, influenced by Victor's aggressive 
advertising and promotion campaigns (Schicke, 1974), had shown strong 
preference for Berliner's gramophone and associated disc. As a conse-
quence, Columbia - which until that time had produced both formats -
decided in 1909 to stop its cylinder manufacturing activities and to fully 
concentrate its efforts on production and sales of lateral shellac discs. So 
Edison had no choice but to conform, and began to develop his vertical 
diamond discs that were first marketed in 1912. Still, his strong-headed 
character would not allow him to stop making cylinders (Gracyk, 1996), 
and this, as will soon be clear, would ultimately lead to his downfall. 
Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
In the early 1900s, a set of new capabilities was founded at the industry 
level which guided the new rules of competition as introduced by Victor 
(see Table 6.1). Victor's managerial-based capabilities were represented 
by its deviant knowledge that it was not the marginal market for office 
equipment but the latent market for home entertainment that mattered. 
This idea required the availability of a minimum amount of recordings 
and the presence of a maximum degree of fidelity to satisfy consumers. 
Physical resources like the horizontal disc system and a zinc masterplate, 
and human knowledge at the part of Berliner and Johnson provided the 
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input to the fruition of Victor's strategic innovation. The transformation-
based capabilities that embodied its entrepreneurial behavior culminated 
into a structured organization, an efficient flow plant for the assembly of 
large numbers of recordings, and the separation of the actual recording 
process from the manufacturing stage. 
Table 6 .1 : New Capabilities in the Early 1900s 
Managerial 
Market for home 
entertainment 
Availability of 
minimum soft-
ware 
Input-Based 
Horizontal disc 
technology 
Zinc masterplate 
for recording 
Transformation 
Structured firm 
organization 
Efficient manu-
facturing plant 
Output-Based 
Quality gramo-
phone discs 
Technology l i-
cense agreements 
High fidelity of 
recordings 
Knowledge of fi-
nance and tech-
nology 
Separate record-
ing and manufac-
turing 
International stra-
tegic alliance 
Output-based capabilities reflected the physical gramophone discs 
and license agreements, as well as the more intangible alliance that sup-
ported Victor's strategy on an international level. After ten years in which 
various technologies were introduced to the market for soundboxes, Vic-
tor managed to redefine the rules of the competitive game and created a 
competitive advantage during the first decade of this century. But most of 
its rivals had recognized the superiority of the disc system, and managed 
to adopt the new rules and copy the new capabilities near the end of that 
decade. From here on, many of them proliferated the new capabilities in-
ternationally as they built world-wide networks of factories, subsidiaries 
and agencies. However, a more explicit understanding of proliferation by 
record companies cannot be generated from the data. A possible explana-
tion can be that there simply wasn't enough time for proliferation to take 
place on a large scale as the rules or rivalry were altered again on rather 
short notice. 
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THE SHIFT TO SOFTWARE 
Now that the issue of standardization was set and Victor's basic patents 
had expired in 1914, it was somewhat more safe for smaller investors to 
jump into an attractive and fast-growing market. However, the costs in-
volved in acquiring production facilities were high and the process of 
manufacturing prerecorded discs was complex. Even so, a limited number 
of entrepreneurs established small recording companies in Europe, but it 
was not very long before these ventures faced bankruptcy and were taken 
over by their larger counterparts. But independent production on a small 
scale was given another chance: at the time, it was possible to place spe-
cial recording orders at major companies that did have the necessary tech-
nological capabilities and infrastructure. This opened up the possibility for 
smaller companies to market their own products, recorded and pressed by 
larger companies, on a private label. Thus, it was already in the period 
between 1910 and World War I that a relatively large number of small 
and local labels lived in coexistence with a small group of large multina-
tional corporations (Gronow, 1983). 
Competition for Records 
These business practices by small record companies made their bigger 
counterparts aware of the primary distinction between selling gramo-
phones and trading recordings: whereas the market for cabinets would 
eventually be saturated because buying such a machine was an expensive 
but non-recurrent matter, demand for recordings would not come to a halt. 
Once consumers owned a gramophone, they would continue to buy new 
records at relatively low prices to bring the latest music in their living 
rooms. As a result, the relationship between equipment and prerecorded 
material changed in a fundamental way (Frith, 1992). In the early years in 
which the industry was born, a certain minimum supply of recordings had 
been a precondition to capture the home entertainment market for gramo-
phones. In order to sell sufficient numbers of cabinets and make recording 
companies' operations commercially viable, consumers had to be attrac-
ted to their product by offering a minimum amount of recordings. 
But by now it was clear that selling recordings in large quantities was 
a much more profitable operation. As equipment was in widespread use, 
consumers demanded more and new recordings. Most of the record cor-
porations recognized this switch from hardware to software, and aimed to 
capture the biggest piece of the market. As variety in music increased be-
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cause dancing became a popular pastime (making jazz and ragtime flour-
ish), the market became segmented. The common approach was to respect 
the variety of taste present in different countries or socio-cultural groups. 
As a result, record companies issued fairly large amounts of new releases 
in their hunt for market share across these diverse market segments, but 
the number of copies per release was moderate compared to present times. 
Firms accepted sales of a few thousand records per title, which meant that 
average sales were low because economies of scale could not be realized 
(Gronow, 1983). 
Figure 6.2: Constant Value of Music Sales in the 1910s and 1920s (in US $ Millions) 
1913 191S 1920 1925 1929 
Source: See Appendix B 
During these years, recording companies were managed and (par-
tially) owned by engineers, supported by a predominant technical staff 
(Frith, 1992). The emphasis in the firm's policies was therefore largely 
technological in character: resources were primarily directed at a gradual 
improvement of the company's manufacturing and recording processes. 
At the same time, technically skilled managers decided on what was to be 
released on record, but they were only to a minor degree interested in the 
music itself. Edison, for example, personally approved or rejected poten-
tial songs for release, and his opinion that music should be simple and 
loud more often than not clashed with the appetite of the larger public. 
Berliner, on the other hand, was claimed to have great musical knowledge 
and feeling of what could be a hit record, but he was one of the few deci-
sion makers in the American record industry at that time who seemed to 
have such skills (Gracyk, 1996). 
As illustrated by Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2, the focus on records in-
stead of cabinets triggered an increase in music sales. However, the First 
World War frustrated the rapid growth process of the industry. Consumer 
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demand fell as household budgets decreased, and governments placed 
restrictions on the use of primary materials in the manufacturing process 
of cabinets and recordings. Furthermore, continuing war activities in 
colonies prevented safe export overseas and distribution inland. A fine 
example of how the war triggered flexible responses of recording compa-
nies is Victor's invention of a special stylus: with a reproducing tip made 
of tungsten, the company managed to circumvent the restrictions on the 
commercial use of steel (Gracyk, 1996). This again illustrates the strong 
emphasis of leading record corporations on technological matters in their 
strategy during the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Table 6.2: Current Value of Music Sales in the 1910s and 1920s (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
Current Value 
43 
43 
42 
44 
53 
66 
84 
92 
100 
Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1925 
1927 
1928 
1929 
Current > 
106 
92 
79 
68 
59 
70 
70 
73 
75 
Source: See Appendix B 
Market Strategies 
The impact of World War I on the economies of Europe and the United 
States differed greatly. Europe's main countries experienced a lack of fi-
nancial resources, and on the continent infrastructures and cities were ru-
ined. Whereas the American record industry boomed right after the end of 
the Great War to a sales level of more than 100 million records in 1921, 
its European counterpart started to expand again only in 1925 (Gronow, 
1983). While the same statement can be made for the colonial markets of 
the Middle East and Africa, the impact of the war had been limited in Asia 
and South America where sales remained at a more or less constant level. 
Still, worldwide sales took a sharp rise and reached levels of up to four 
times higher than before the Great War (Gronow, 1983). As the market in 
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geographical terms had remained essentially the same, this explosive in-
crease in sales was mainly the effect of market penetration strategies. 
During the pre-war years, firms had targeted the more wealthy and 
respectable classes in society. Production costs of cabinets and records 
were fairly high, resulting in prices that only few households could afford. 
The continuing work on product and process innovation at the technologi-
cally oriented recording companies changed all this in the years after the 
First World War. Apart from learning effects, which stimulated cost redu-
cing innovations in the manufacturing process, a different price strategy 
was realized during the 1920s that was based upon a number of new 
product innovations. Whereas special gramophone models that featured 
electric motors were introduced in relatively small numbers, newly-
developed portable wind-up gramophones were manufactured and sold in 
huge quantities (Gracyk, 1996). While portable and other wind-up models 
were directed at the lower-income segment of the consumer market, the 
luxurious and motor-driven versions were aimed at its higher end. 
This dual price policy was fruitful in reaching as many households as 
possible, and culminated in an explosive growth of record sales, at least in 
the industrializing Western markets. In 1929 more than 150 million rec-
ords were sold in the US, while approximately 110 million units were 
consumed in Europe, with the United Kingdom, Germany and France as 
its primary markets (Gronow, 1983). It is estimated that in those years, 
between 35% and 50% of the total number of households in the Western 
world owned at least one piece of gramophone equipment for entertain-
ment purposes. Although this percentage was much lower in the European 
dominions and even more so in underdeveloped countries (because only a 
small part of their populations could afford such luxury goods), record 
sales were still large enough to attract the attention of major record Firms. 
Through import companies, sales agencies, and local factories, more than 
a total of 300 million records were sold in these various national markets 
in that same year of 1929. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, even after the 
war, recording companies continued to focus on the technological aspects 
of their business. Even their advertising campaigns were primarily tech-
nology-oriented: ads emphasized the new product's latest technological 
advances, its design features, and the company's innovative reputation 
(Negus, 1992). This stress on technology-related issues impacted the 
content of record companies' release policies. Even before the war, the 
leading Firms had competed for a limited number of well-known and very 
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popular theater and opera performers, often releasing exactly the same 
songs or new versions of those recordings. These imitative policies were 
even further amplified through low-cost recordings of popular songs or 
via concerts by anonymous studio performers and symphony orchestras 
(Frith, 1992). Instead of pursuing a more entrepreneurial policy of pro-
moting and releasing new and promising artists, major record companies 
kept doing the same over and over again. 
Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
Table 6.3 shows the bundle of capabilities that were founded when the 
industry's rules of competition shifted during the mid-1910s. Managerial-
based capabilities embodied the strategic knowledge that the endless mar-
ket for recordings was a far better source of revenues than the ending 
market for gramophones. A major condition to success in this market, 
however, was that a minimum amount of cabinets had to be present in the 
consumer market. Regarding the input-based capabilities, theater or opera 
performing stars represented the inflow of human capital, whereas the 
technological skills of both managers and staff comprised recording 
firms' knowledge structure. Transformation-based capabilities covered 
incremental innovations in manufacturing and recording processes, and 
included the capacity-based production of recordings to serve as many 
market segments as possible. All this culminated in a large variety of re-
leases and a growing corporate reputation in terms of technological inno-
vation. 
Table 6.3: New Capabilities in the Mid-1910s 
Managerial 
Market for music 
recordings 
Availability of 
minimum hard-
ware 
Input-Based 
Theater and opera 
performers 
Technological 
skills and experi-
ence 
Transformation Output-Based 
Innovations in re-
cording and 
manufacturing 
Capacity-based 
production 
High release 
variety in re-
cordings 
High techno-
logical status 
However, the data are not clear as to a positive identification of the 
company that introduced these new rules and capabilities to the recording 
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industry. At a rather abstract level, one could say that the minor record 
companies, which initially ordered their records at their larger counter-
parts, had been the pioneers; they had stepped into the new market for 
recordings without becoming involved in gramophones. Still, the major 
record companies managed to replicate the necessary capabilities, and 
after the war proliferated them in two respects. First, they enlarged the 
minimum amount of cabinets available in the consumer market through a 
market penetration strategy in which different gramophone models were 
targeted at different market ends. Second, record companies released new 
issues of popular recordings previously released, and contracted anony-
mous performers and orchestras to record songs and concerts at low cost. 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
An era in which a new industry had been born and international markets 
were created abruptly came to an end when the New York Stock Ex-
change crashed in late October 1929. This event marked the beginning of 
a worldwide economic slump that lasted for almost a decade. Like all 
businesses, record companies were into a harsh struggle for survival. Un-
til the Great Depression, both large and small record firms had existed on 
a marginal basis; profits were relatively low due to the absence of scale 
economies and the lack of a focused market strategy, and their weak fi-
nancial positions had made most record companies especially vulnerable. 
Moreover, the depression had rapidly lowered the public's income and 
forced it to look for other forms of entertainment, as gramophones and 
recordings were still considered as luxury goods. As it happened, two 
substitute forms of entertainment became widely available during these 
years of poverty as a consequence of continuous research efforts into the 
reproduction of sound and vision: radio and talking movies. 
Movies and Radio 
The entertainment value of sound films surpassed that of records on three 
fronts. First, talking movies were something new: until then silent films 
had been accompanied by small orchestras and a person who recited the 
necessary text, but now the characters in a movie actually spoke words 
that could be heard immediately. Furthermore, talking movies delivered 
both sight and sound, one dimension more than records could bring you. 
Finally, talking movies were shown in theaters, and in these troublesome 
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times going to the theater was a way to deal with the discomforts of the 
depression. Under more normal circumstances, record firms should have 
been able to fence off this new threat of substitution that crossed the bor-
ders of the market for home entertainment. Indeed, the largest part of the 
damage done to the recording industry during the Great Depression was 
not a consequence of the introduction of sound films, but was instead a 
result of the widespread availability of radio. 
Building upon new research by physicians like Maxwell and Hertz 
during the 19th century, Marconi's development of wireless telegraphy, 
Fleming's invention of the diode, and De Forest's discovery of oscillating 
properties of his Audion tube all led to the possibility of transmitting 
sound over long distances (Gwinn et al., 1987). The application of the 
electron tube in the early 1920s was the result of investments in collective 
research activities in America and Europe, and culminated into the initial 
production and consumption of radio receiving sets. In those years, hun-
dreds of local transmitting stations were set up in the US until permanent 
networks of radio stations were established in the second half of the 
1920s. In 1926, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) - founded in 
1919 by General Electric - incorporated the National Broadcasting Com-
pany (NBC), which was divided in a Red and Blue Network due to an 
excess of affiliates in the same cities. The other major radio network was 
Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. (CBS), incorporated in 1927. 
These privately owned broadcasting networks were dependent upon 
incoming revenues from advertisers, and radio programming was there-
fore directed at reaching the widest public possible. The situation was dif-
ferent in European countries, because governments set up public broad-
casting companies that were financed by the annual fees of listeners. Most 
European countries followed the course of action pursued in the United 
Kingdom, where Parliament in 1925 had ruled that the privately-owned 
British Broadcasting Company had to be liquidated and replaced by a 
public firm, the British Broadcasting Corporation, today's BBC. These 
established structures in both parts of the Western world were fully devel-
oped when the radio became a common property in many households and 
the artistic potential of radio came to a rise in the late 1920s and early 
1930s (Gwinn et al., 1987). The record industry, already struggling for 
survival in these harsh times, was hurt badly by the introduction of radio. 
Although market prices of radio receivers almost equaled those of 
gramophone cabinets, listening to the first appliance was considerably 
cheaper. Compared to record prices, license fees for European listeners 
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were negligible, while the American public did not face any costs at all. 
Moreover, radio brought a variety of entertainment forms into people's 
homes instead of merely music (Gwinn et al., 1987). News, stage drama, 
documentary programs, light entertainment and poetry reading were pro-
grammed next to live musical performances. At the time, many saw the 
success of radio broadcasting as the definite end of the recording industry. 
The choice between radio and record was easily made by the public in 
times when a job was hard to find, and the new medium offered more fun 
for less or no money. As a consequence, record sales fell from 150 mil-
lion units in 1929 to 25 million copies in 1935 in the United States (see 
Figure 6.3 and Table 6.4) while figures in Europe and the rest of the 
world were in proportion to the American data (Gronow, 1983). 
Figure 6.3: Constant Value of Music Sales in the Great Depression (in US $ Millions) 
Source: See Appendix B 
As a consequence, the record industry was thoroughly restructured. 
Many of the small and locally oriented record companies were not able to 
stand the combined forces of radio and recession; the larger part went into 
bankruptcy while some lucky survivors were purchased by their larger 
counterparts (Frith, 1992). But even major record companies were not 
able to make it on their own, and a number of formidable mergers and 
acquisitions transformed ownership structures in the recording industry. 
In Europe, the leading companies could only survive by means of a com-
bination and in 1931 Electrical and Musical Industries (EMI) was formed 
under British ownership (Gronow, 1983). EMI was incorporated through 
the merger of British Gramophone and British-owned Columbia Ltd. that 
had acquired the American Columbia company already in 1921. At the 
same time, France's Pathe and Germany's Lindstrom joined the EMI con-
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glomerate, which expanded itself even further by swallowing a number of 
smaller labels. 
Table 6.4: Current Value of Music Sales in the Great Depression (in US $ millions) 
Year 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
Current Value 
73 
75 
46 
18 
Year 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
Current Value 
11 
6 
7 
9 
Source: See Appendix B 
THE STAR SYSTEM 
The leading competitors in the US of the 1920s were Victor, Columbia, 
Edison and Brunswick. The latter was originally a billiard equipment firm 
that had diversified into the recording industry in 1919, and became the 
second largest rival in rear of Victor (Gracyk, 1996). In 1930, Warner 
Brothers Pictures acquired Brunswick, but already in 1932 ownership was 
changed again: newly-formed American Records bought Brunswick, and 
reinforced itself only two years later by merging this company with Co-
lumbia (American Records bought Columbia from a British manufacturer 
of radios, which in the meantime had acquired the company from EMI). 
Edison departed from the scene at the start of the depression as his com-
pany went into bankruptcy, and most of the small recording companies 
vanished as debts were insurmountable. Victor was the luckiest of all; a 
reasonably safe financial position had been taken just in time when it was 
purchased by RCA in 1929. 
Competition for Markets 
So instead of four dominant companies and a host of smaller labels, the 
US recording industry at the end of 1935 consisted of only two major 
companies (RCA-Victor and American Records), the newly incorporated 
American Decca Records, and a limited number of minor companies. A 
similar situation could be seen in Europe where, apart from some small 
local firms, EMI faced competition from Telefunken and the British 
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Decca Record Company. The restructuring wave during the first half of 
the 1930s was supplemented by cost-cutting policies at record companies; 
vast amounts of personnel were fired, expensive artists were dropped and 
field recording was minimized. How badly music firms were in need of 
money was shown by Victor: in 1935 the company was forced to with-
draw its shareholdings from EMI, terminating a long-standing 50% own-
ership of British Gramophone, and loosing its link with Europe (Sanjek, 
1991). 
When the worst years of the Great Depression subsided at the start of 
1935, the industry still existed. Record sales started to recover again, 
partly due to a rejuvenated interest from the public, but mainly as a result 
of one record company's pioneering activities. Decca Records, incorpo-
rated in the United States in 1934 by Jack Kapp and Ted Lewis, was the 
first record company that created scale economies in an industry charac-
terized by high initial costs of recording and relatively low reproduction 
costs. Kapp, a former general manager of Brunswick, realized that he 
needed to sell massive amounts of a limited number of releases in order to 
make his business extremely profitable. Instead of investing his partner's 
$250,000 in gramophone manufacturing, Kapp dedicated his resources 
solely to records. On top of that, he developed the 'star system,' a new 
business concept that was based on his ability to discover fresh market 
opportunities and to design new marketing techniques. 
Kapp built his idea of Decca's limited release policy on his knowl-
edge that the majority of record consumers appreciated music from 
popular celebrities and that their buying behavior could be influenced. He 
created a compact artist roster of stars such as the Dorsey Brothers and 
Bing Crosby, who he had lured away from Brunswick when he left the 
company. In addition, he developed aggressive marketing and promotion 
campaigns to bring new releases of his established performers under the 
attention of the public (Frith, 1992). To really boost record sales, these 
campaigns required heavy investment, which could therefore only be de-
signed for a limited amount of releases, and this perfectly suited the size 
of Decca's roster. The established popularity of the company's celebrities 
almost certified a successful launch of each new release, while sales were 
pushed by tailored marketing campaigns and promotion budgets. 
Furthermore, Kapp knew that his unorthodox ideas suited the 
emerging market for coin-operated machines, and that obtaining a sub-
stantial market share in the supply of records for jukeboxes could be a 
very profitable operation (Sanjek, 1991). He thus focused Decca's strat-
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egy on providing highly marketable music indirectly to groups of con-
sumers in public places. In this respect, the record company's numerous 
low-price contracts with jukebox operators and elaborated network of 
distribution channels were indispensable. In 1939, Decca sold more than 
13 million records, while its share of the jukebox market rose to 90%. But 
it was not long before the jukebox market segment was targeted by RCA-
Victor and CBS-Columbia who had noted Decca's success. The entrance 
of these major record companies triggered a rapid growth of the jukebox 
business segment, which by then accounted for approximately 60% of all 
record sales (Sanjek, 1991). 
Figure 6.4: Constant Value of Music Sales in the 1930s and 1940s (in US $ Millions) 
Source. See Appendix 8 
While responding to Decca's successful strategy, the major record 
companies changed their organizations in fundamental ways. The techni-
cally skilled inventor that had traditionally headed recording firms in the 
pre-recession years was replaced by a business-oriented CEO with a 
strong personality, and cash instead of technology became the name of the 
game. The domination of technical staff was reduced as technological re-
search activities were disconnected from record business operations and 
transferred to the parent company (Negus, 1992). Furthermore, brand-new 
departments were installed with large marketing and promotion staffs. 
Inevitably, other record firms had noticed Decca's competitive advantage 
and managed to imitate its highly profitable market strategy. The immedi-
ate result was that both the amount and variety of new releases declined 
considerably, but that the quantity produced of each release was enormous 
(Sanjek, 1991). In the US, record sales in 1938 had an estimated value of 
$26 million compared to $6 million in 1933, the bottom year of the de-
pression (see Figure 6.4 and Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5: Current Value of Music Sales in the 1930s and 1940s (in US $ millions) 
Year 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
Current Value 
7 
9 
11 
13 
Year 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
Current Value 
26 
44 
48 
51 
Source: See Appendix B 
Promotional Policies 
However, returns in 1938 were still just a third of what they had been in 
1929, and it did not take record company executives long to realize that 
most of their money went to the expensive contracts they had with estab-
lished stars. This, and the fact that radio was still the record industry's 
main competitor, forced the major firms to reconsider their strategy in the 
early 1940s. Instead of focusing their business on established but expen-
sive celebrities, developing and building new (but relatively cheap) re-
cording stars became the primary objective (Frith, 1992). In other words, 
the emphasis shifted from serving existing and identified demand patterns 
to creating new musical market segments. Whereas the public used to buy 
recordings from popular artists known from the theater or concert hall, the 
new aim was to sell music from company-created stars to consumers 
whose first contact with these artists was through the record itself. As a 
consequence, live performances became replications of recordings instead 
of the other way around. 
This new relationship between records, artists and markets con-
fronted record firms with the problem of finding an adequate outlet for the 
promotion and marketing of new stars which could reach every possible 
buyer. Up to that moment, billboards and newspapers had been used, but 
market coverage of these tools was limited and was not expected to be 
very effective in the promotion of new and unknown acts. To the music 
business, radio with its extensive broadcasting networks and nation-wide 
coverage seemed to be the most proper outlet. Whereas radio stations pre-
sented record companies the opportunity to extensively promote their 
newly developed stars, record companies, on their turn, provided radio 
with a cheap form of programming (Sanjek, 1991). In effect, the record 
industry very effectively dealt with the two issues it was confronted with 
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in the late 1930s: the answer to the matter of expensive star contracts cre-
ated the problem of finding a strong and quick channel of promotion, and 
solving this issue diminished concerns about the impact of radio on record 
sales. 
Although the details of the link between radio networks and record 
companies varied due to differences in ownership structures between the 
American and European radio stations, this novel relationship could be 
observed at both sides of the Atlantic. However, it was in the United 
States where the star system with its numerous links to other industries 
and mass markets really flourished (Sanjek, 1991). As noted, Victor had 
been purchased by the RCA corporation with its NBC radio network in 
1929, and in 1938 CBS acquired American Records, bringing back the 
Columbia label to where it belonged. Both RCA and CBS had links with 
the film industry, and in this way new stars were exploited on three fronts: 
film, radio and records (Frith, 1992). This was the time of Bing Crosby, 
Benny Goodman and Glenn Miller, and the start of a new era in which 
music such as jazz and bigband came to dominate record companies' clas-
sical repertoire. Revenues increased even further as public advertisers 
showed their interest in these stars. 
Whereas in most European countries record sales only marginally 
increased after the worst years of the depression, the excessive cultivation 
of the star system in America really boosted record sales: 1940 revenues 
doubled those of 1938 while more than 100 million records were sold 
(Gronow, 1983). Record companies' focus on mass markets and the ne-
cessity of collaborating with radio networks did have its negative effects, 
however: radio became a gatekeeper, strongly determining which records 
were being broadcast and therefore responsible for the homogenization of 
public tastes (Frith, 1992). As a consequence, record companies were 
forced to produce music that suited radio programming formats and tastes 
of individual radio personnel. This dependence upon people outside the 
firm's organizational boundaries only strengthened the record industry's 
belief in the benefits of the star system, which moved companies gradu-
ally away from the consumer market. Leading record firms competed on 
the same strategy, and recorded artists according to radio network accep-
tance instead of meeting varying consumer demands. 
Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
Right after the Great Depression, new capabilities were founded at the 
industry level as Decca changed the competitive rules in the record in-
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dustry. Table 6.6 displays the set of capabilities according to the familiar 
distinction. Managerial-based capabilities encompassed the strategic 
knowledge that record buyers tend to prefer music made by celebrities, 
and that high record sales were closely related to the idea that consumers 
can be influenced at a mass level. Input-based capabilities covered a hu-
man capital component (a limited roster of foolproof celebrities) and a 
financial resource element (via a number of extensive marketing and 
promotion budgets). Transformation-based capabilities referred to entre-
preneurship in terms of aggressive marketing campaigns and a profes-
sional business approach to revenues and costs. Output-based capabilities 
embodied elaborated networks of distribution channels and low-price 
contracts with jukebox operators. 
Table 6.6: New Capabilities in the Mid-1930s 
Managerial 
Consumer prefer-
ence for celebri-
ties 
Manipulation of 
consumer taste 
Input-Based 
Compact roster 
of celebrities 
Marketing and 
promotion budg-
ets 
Transformation 
Avant-garde 
marketing cam-
paigns 
Economic ap-
proach to costs 
and revenues 
Output-Based 
Network of dis-
tribution chan-
nels 
Network of 
jukebox con-
tractors 
Once Decca's advantage had been eroded by rivals like Columbia 
and Victor, the above capabilities were proliferated at the industry level. 
Instead of contracting big stars, record companies started to develop their 
own acts in an effort to reduce costs. From here on, artists were built as 
recording stars in contrast to simply signing celebrities who had become 
famous on stage. Furthermore, marketing campaigns were elaborated and 
directed towards radio promotion, as record companies established links 
with radio networks (even through legal ownership structures). Artist 
promotion was even further exploited as newly developed acts got sub-
stantial free publicity when embraced by the film industry and public ad-
vertisers. Crucial in these growing networks of marketing and promotion 
were the extensive relationships between individual persons at record 
companies and the various promotion channels. 
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THE SECOND WORLD W A R 
The Second World War seriously affected the structure of the global rec-
ord industry. In Europe, the only companies that made money were a few 
German recording firms sponsored by the Nazi regime in its abuse of 
film, radio and records for propaganda purposes. Harsh times made the 
wallets thin and, just as in WWI and the Depression, demand for records 
collapsed, as did the European recording industry. Although EMI was 
based in Great Britain, it faced serious problems as sales fell and govern-
ment placed restrictions on material usage. Furthermore, the firm's UK-
based headquarters was out of touch with its French and German affiliates 
that had played a crucial role in the formation of EMI. In the United 
States, the effects of World War II were far more prosperous. Although 
the government put a ban on the manufacturing of gramophones and ra-
dios for home usage, major record companies became the sole supplier of 
music to be shipped to all regions of the world where American GIs were 
fighting (Sanjek, 1991). 
Tape and Vinyl 
Apart from this governmental demand for records, record companies also 
increased sales by recording songs that were supposed to influence or tar-
get the morale of the American population during wartime. There was 
even room for a new record corporation as the establishment of Capitol 
Records in 1941 showed. When the war ended in 1945, the European re-
cording industry only existed in name, whereas its American counterpart 
had reached sales figures it never had known. For the first time since 1921 
when sales hit an all-time high value of $106 million, US record industry 
revenues surpassed this figure by $3 million, while sales at the start of the 
war had an estimated value of only $48 million (see Figure 6.5 and Table 
6.7). The Second World War not only boosted American sales but also 
increased companies' international revenues. Worldwide popularity of 
US-based music flourished as American soldiers, functioning as export-
ers, liberated many European countries (Gronow, 1983). 
The growing export of US-based music strengthened the dominant 
position of the leading American record firms, both in their home market 
and in most European countries. The world war not only proved to be an 
effective exporting vehicle for American records and tastes, but also was 
responsible for a cheap inflow of a new technology called tape recording. 
Although the early principles of magnetic recording had already been in-
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vented by the Danish engineer Poulsen in 1900, the development of this 
technology had stagnated in those years as researchers were more inter-
ested in the gramophone's twofold capacity of recording and reproducing 
sound. But in the late 1930s, German engineers had enhanced and per-
fected the audio tape and its corresponding recording device, and turned it 
into a major component of Goebbels' Nazi-propaganda machine. When 
Berlin fell, a number of tape recording gadgets were shipped across the 
Atlantic by the US Army (Jones, 1992). 
Figure 6.5: Constant Value of Music Sales in the Post-War Years (in US $ Millions) 
1940 1945 1950 1954 
Source: See Appendix B 
After tape technology had been analyzed by military engineers, the 
American government made it available to private companies in 1946. 
During the first five years after the war, the application of a number of 
new technologies changed both product and process operations within the 
record industry. While small companies like Ampex invested huge 
amounts of money on R&D in tape technology to make it suitable for 
commercial purposes, two of the leading recording corporations started 
research on microgroove records (Mittelsteadt and Stassen, 1994). Backed 
by its parent CBS, Columbia developed the long-playing record, which 
was introduced to the market in 1948. This new format stored up to 
twenty minutes of music on both sides and was made of vinyl, a new 
plastic. The application of this material made the record far less breakable 
(and far more durable) than the traditional shellac records. Furthermore, 
the LP had a higher musical fidelity, which significantly reduced the 
amount of distortion and made the reproduction of sound very similar to 
the original material. 
Columbia demonstrated the LP to a team of executives at RCA and 
offered to transfer this technological know-how. Although the advantages 
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of enhanced storage capacity, less breakability and improved sound qual-
ity were obvious, RCA was too proud a company to adopt anyone else's 
technologies but its own (Sanjek, 1991). The corporation immediately 
started its own research on microgroove records and, within just one year, 
was ready to market what came to be known as the single (Mittelsteadt 
and Stassen, 1994). This record format had a much smaller diameter and 
was played at a speed of 45 rpm instead of the slower 331/3 revolutions 
per minute of the LP (the original shellac record turned at a speed of 78 
rpm). The introduction of the single by RCA as a response to the devel-
opment of Columbia's LP provoked another battle of standardization on 
formats. Equipment manufacturers did not wait for this contest to be re-
solved and fabricated new record players that could play all three speeds. 
Table 6.7: Current Value of Music Sales in the Post-War Years (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
Current Value 
48 
51 
55 
66 
66 
109 
218 
224 
Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
Current Value 
189 
173 
189 
199 
214 
219 
213 
Source: See Appendix B 
The battle ended in 1951 when the American government placed the 
two rivals at the negotiating table, where they agreed to stop their cam-
paigns and to make both singles and LPs. Whereas the LP came to be the 
format used for classical music, the single was reserved for more popular 
music as its compactness proved especially effective and efficient in the 
profitable jukebox segment of the market (Sanjek, 1991). In the mean-
time, research activities into tape technology had taken a quick flight, and 
in the late forties Ampex was ready to mass produce tape recordings 
through a high-speed copying system. The early adopters of this system 
were the radio networks of NBC and CBS who used it for programming 
purposes. Although these tape machines required enormous initial in-
vestments compared to gramophones, costs of tape itself were extremely 
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low. Furthermore, tape could be re-used, while many more hours of pro-
gramming material could be stored efficiently. Tape technology was in-
troduced in the record industry when reel-to-reel tape equipment became 
available in 1951 (Jones, 1992). 
These units were promptly purchased by major record companies and 
within a few years tape recording had replaced the electric recording pro-
cess that had been in use since 1925, as the advantages of tape recording 
were numerous (Jones, 1992). First of all, tape was cheap and more than 
eight hours of music could be stored on just one spool of tape. Second, the 
sound recorded on tape could be edited and spliced. Also, recording time 
(and therefore costs) was shortened as the need for multiple takes was 
reduced. Next, the equipment was more portable, enhancing mobility. 
Furthermore, various tracks, taken at a different time, could be captured 
on tape and mixed together onto the mastertape. Finally, even the sound 
quality of tape was better. In short, tape technology provided record firms 
with new recording possibilities and significant cost reductions (Mittel-
steadt and Stassen, 1994). Initially, new developments in recording and 
vinyl formats strengthened the majors' positions. During the first decade 
after the Second World War, the American (and thus the international) 
recording industry was dominated by what was called the 'big four:' 
RCA, Columbia, Capitol and Decca. 
The core strength of these major record companies was their ability to 
control (Peterson and Derger, 1975). The cultivation of the star system 
and their cooperation with radio networks enabled them to control the 
market and the successful entrance of new artists. The in-house develop-
ment of new technologies had put them in control of recording and manu-
facturing. They monopolized record distribution with their control over 
highly structured distribution channels. These firms also controlled the 
European part of the record industry, badly hurt during the recent war, via 
international licensing deals (Sanjek, 1991). In 1951, Columbia signed a 
distribution agreement with Dutch electronics manufacturer Philips, 
which operated in the industry via its record division PPI. At about the 
same time, Capitol formed ties with Telefunken in Europe and EMI in 
Africa. Already in 1949, Decca had stepped into a similar cooperative 
venture with Deutsche Grammophon. RCA was the only major without 
any significant European interests. 
In those first years after the war, management of leading record firms 
deemed it necessary to restructure their company and personnel around 
the concept of control. As said, the cultivation of the star system had re-
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suited in a significant decline in the variety of products, because of a fo-
cus on efficiency and mass products. As a result, the major companies 
gradually changed into formal bureaucracies with large numbers of hier-
archical levels and many segregated functional departments (Peterson, 
1990). Decisions were made at the top, where risk-avoiding policies 
dominated, while the degree of vertical control was high. While the 
amount of internal entrepreneurs with musical knowledge declined, the 
number of administrators focused on figures rose. Management's unlim-
ited desire to raise short-term profits made companies unaware of what 
was happening in the market. RCA, Columbia, Capitol and Decca suspi-
ciously watched each other's moves but forgot to keep track of other de-
velopments and, moreover, neglected new musical trends that proved to 
be highly appreciated by the consumer market. 
THE CREATION OF STYLES 
The first official television broadcast was the BBC's coverage of King 
George VI's coronation in 1937. The pictures were of a quality that would 
have made today's high-definition viewer grimace, but the transmission 
was a landmark after a decade of intense research. Using the Nipkow 
principle, both Baird in the UK and Jenkins in the US had heated up cor-
porate research activities with experiments in 1926. In 1932, the RCA 
laboratories produced the first electronic television, whereas in Europe 
both EMI and Philips were involved in the development of this new 
revolutionary medium. In 1939, RCA's broadcasting company NBC dis-
played the TV publicly at the opening of the New York World Fair. In the 
same year, the NBC network started broadcasting, to be followed only a 
few months later by its main rival CBS. At that time, the number of 
broadcasting hours (two hours per week) and owners of television sets 
(approximately 10,000) in America were limited (Gwinn el ah, 1987). 
Competition for Music 
The technological and market development of this new medium stagnated 
during the Second World War; electronics companies on the European 
continent were destroyed or confiscated by the German army, and elec-
tronic manufacturing companies in Great Britain and the United States 
were forced by their governments to obey Army orders. But it was clear 
to companies, especially in the US, that the global conflict would only be 
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a temporary restriction to the inevitable expansion of the TV broadcasting 
industry. Multi-millionaire Noble spotted enormous opportunities and 
purchased RCA's Blue Network in 1944; thus was the American Broad-
casting Company (ABC) brought to life. And at the end of the war, the 
stage was set for a renewed growth of the television broadcasting industry 
in the United States, its main competitors being NBC, CBS and ABC. The 
industry's growth was indeed explosive: 1 million TV sets had been sold 
in 1949, while more than 10 million receivers had reached the American 
market at the end of 1951 (Gwinn et ah, 1987). 
Industry experts expressed their opinion that the rising popularity and 
success of the television would indisputably lead to the end of radio 
broadcasting. Why would anyone listen to a radio when a television set 
was able to bring both sound and images into one's living-room? This line 
of reasoning dominated among top executives of the leading broadcasting 
companies, and resulted in the transfer of most radio programs, program 
formats and programming personnel to their newly incorporated television 
departments (Peterson, 1990). By the end of 1954, the large American 
radio networks experienced a significant lack of resources: corporate 
headquarters almost exclusively invested capital in television broadcast-
ing, the amount of experienced personnel was limited, nation-wide adver-
tisers directed their marketing budgets to television instead of radio, and 
news, documentaries, drama and various other entertainment programs 
were now within the strict domain of television. Radio executives there-
fore began to direct their heavily curtailed budgets to the cheapest form of 
programming: recorded music (Peterson and Berger, 1975). 
This new demand for records from radio networks was advantageous 
to major record firms. As more records received continuous airplay, the 
amount of promotion and publicity for these records grew, which trig-
gered an increase in record sales on the consumer market (Sanjek, 1991). 
But there was another, more revolutionary effect on the US record indus-
try linked to the rise of television broadcasting at the expense of radio. 
During the first ten years after the war, major record firms had primarily 
been involved in the production of classical music on the one hand, and 
jazz and big-band as alternative forms of popular music on the other. But 
already in 1948, a small record label called Atlantic Records had stepped 
into the R&B (rhythm and blues) segment of the market. Under the super-
vision of Ahmet Ertegun, it had moved into white pop music by 1953, 
followed by other small independent but highly entrepreneurial labels 
such as Imperial, Dot, Sun and Chess. The major corporations, mean-
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while, considered these segments as too limited in size to be qualified for 
commercial purposes or, being far too bureaucratic and lacking market 
knowledge, had not even noticed them at all (Gillett, 1988). 
Atlantic and other small independent record labels effectively met a 
growing market demand as they cooperated with local radio stations 
serving specialized markets. The latter had traditionally suffered from the 
oligopolistic market power of the large radio networks, but now that these 
networks themselves were in trouble, the number of local stations ex-
panded rapidly (Mittelsteadt and Stassen, 1994). Like the independent 
record labels, local radio stations realized that what the market really 
wanted was more variety in music styles. They perceived the market as a 
collection of various segments, each of which evolved around distinct 
musical styles and taste patterns. To meet this variety in musical demands, 
local stations concentrated their programming tactics on one or a few of 
these market sections, a strategy that was soon followed by the local af-
filiates of the radio networks in their response to the rise of television 
(Peterson and Berger, 1975). It was now possible for small independents 
to get their records played on air by a large number of radio stations. 
Figure 6.6: Constant Value of Music Sales in the 1950s and 1960s (in US $ Millions) 
Illlllll 
1965 19bfc 
Source: See Appendix B 
But the new radio landscape in the United States was not the only 
factor in the emerging success of independent labels that searched for new 
musical styles. The technological innovations of tape recording and mi-
crogroove records also played a role in the rise of independent record 
companies - in a way, major record firms themselves were responsible for 
creating a new wave of competitors. Before World War II, initial invest-
ments and operating costs of vintage recording studios and equipment had 
been extremely high; only large and wealthy record firms could afford to 
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be involved in the recording and duplicating process (Schicke, 1974). But 
the cost advantages of tape recording and the mobility of its equipment 
enabled small record companies to create their own studios and record-
ings at acceptable cost. Moreover, the new editing possibilities of tape 
recording, enhanced by the development of the two-track system and the 
invention of 'stereo' in 1958, also contributed to the development of new 
musical styles as artists and producers experimented with tape's new op-
portunities (Jones, 1992). 
As said, majors had complete control over distribution channels until 
the mid-1950s. But the invention of the microgroove record made it pos-
sible to distribute more records at far less costs. The substitution of the 
easy-to-break shellac 78-rpm record by the almost unbreakable black vi-
nyl record accounted for an easier, cheaper and faster distribution process. 
As a consequence, a host of independent distribution companies were 
born, functioning as the minor record companies' lifeline to the retail 
market (Peterson, 1990). Independents mainly released individual songs 
on singles, and these 45-rpm records took far less storage space and han-
dling time than the larger 331/3 LPs. Moreover, the number of different 
places where one could buy a record expanded as a result of these new 
distribution channels. Next to the traditional retailers, records were also 
sold at departments of warehouses or other specialty stores, and even by 
mail via record clubs (Mittelsteadt and Stassen, 1994). 
The independent companies were quick to react to these develop-
ments, and profited from them at various stages of their value chain. First, 
they recorded artists in company-owned low-cost studios with affordable 
but high-quality recording equipment. Furthermore, independent record 
labels managed to close lucrative deals with independent distribution 
companies that spread the compact singles at low cost throughout the 
country. Finally, the new radio landscape with its growing number of 
audience-targeted broadcasters was a very effective promotional vehicle 
for a growing number of independent record companies (Peterson, 1990). 
After 1955, a host of small but entrepreneurial record labels were respon-
sible for a significant increase in both the variety and number of new re-
leases. In these years, artists like Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, Chuck 
Berry, and Little Richard achieved tremendous success. 
The independent sector flourished: whereas the big four owned ap-
proximately 75% of the $277 million US record market in 1955, their 
share tumbled to 34% of a growing market which reached a value of $603 
million only four years later (see Figure 6.6 as well as Tables 6.8 and 6.9). 
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The rigid organizational structures of the major corporations inhibited a 
timely response to new market conditions. Here, the person responsible 
for artist development was more like a decision-maker; he selected the act 
from the firm's established artist roster to record a new song written by 
the company's in-house songwriters. In contrast, the person responsible 
for what came to be known as A&R (artist & repertoire) at the independ-
ent record firm was in fact an entrepreneur; he had a feeling for what kind 
of music or artist could very well be successful in the future, depending 
on his gut feeling and knowledge of the market. Furthermore, he was an 
expert on all aspects of the business, from producer to promoter, and was 
often in charge of the firm (Peterson, 1990). 
Table 6.8: Current Value of Music Sales in the 1950s and 1960s (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
Current Value 
219 
213 
277 
377 
460 
511 
603 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
Current Value 
600 
640 
687 
698 
758 
862 
959 
Source: See Appendix 8 
The significance of the A&R role and the key position of radio disc 
jockeys as gatekeepers to be influenced were not immediately recognized 
by the lagging major companies. Instead, these firms aimed to recapture 
lost market share by directing their attention towards the LP instead of the 
single, and by offering discounts to most of the country's distributors. But 
it lasted until 1964 before the big four realized that the new music styles 
of R&B and rock'n'roll were not just passing fads. The market had con-
tinued to grow in these turmoil years, and this growth was a direct conse-
quence of the independent record firms' discovery that these new music 
styles strongly appealed to the youth part of the market (Frith, 1992). The 
majors had never really addressed this younger generation, but it did not 
take the independents very long to realize that the teenager market was a 
very lucrative one and, moreover, fitted their new music perfectly. The 
uprise of the indies in the second half of the fifties unlocked this youth 
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market, which even today represents the record industry's most important 
consumer group (Denisoff, 1986). 
Table 6.9: How Independents Replaced Majors in the Charts 
Year 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
C4 Ratio 
71 
73 
74 
66 
40 
36 
34 
Firms 
11 
12 
14 
20 
23 
31 
42 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
C4 Ratio 
28 
27 
25 
26 
34 
37 
38 
Firms 
39 
39 
41 
36 
37 
35 
31 
Source: Adapted from Peterson and Berger (1975) 
Note: The number of firms and the Q4 concentration ratio have been based on 
their presence in Billboard's weekly Top Jen list for singles in the popular music 
market. 
A&R Structures 
At about the same time that independent labels started their crusade 
against the major record corporations in the United States, the heavily in-
jured European record industry got to its feet again. Apart from UK-based 
EMI, most of the European record firms had incurred heavy damage from 
the Second World War and had to build their business almost from the 
ground up. In order to do this, they needed a strong financial base on short 
terms, without the cash-consuming process of developing and recording 
their own artists. The licensing and distribution agreements with the 
American majors suited the European companies very well, as such con-
tracts were a logical response to their financial difficulties. The primary 
objective for US-based majors was to collect additional revenues from 
European sales of their recordings while keeping costs at a minimum. But 
as the European record companies regained vigor and vitality, direct com-
petition with the American majors inevitably emerged. 
During the early 1950s, up to 35% of all records sold in Europe were 
actually American records. The use of old-fashioned recording and manu-
facturing equipment made record prices in Europe fairly high in those 
days, which prohibited a significant sales and market growth. But after the 
establishment of the European Common Market in 1958, the European 
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industry came to stand on its own feet. Tariff barriers were lowered, and 
rusty equipment was replaced by large and efficient manufacturing plants 
(Sanjek, 1991). As a forerunner of the coming rise of European record 
firms, EMI had acquired Capitol, one of the four American majors, in 
1955. It was the first time that a foreign firm took control of a major 
American record company, and it would not be the last. Now that EMI 
had its own organization through which it could market British records in 
the US, the company terminated its agreement with RCA in 1957. 
Just like RCA, another American major lost its valuable European 
distribution outlet in 1961, when Philips Phonografische Industrie (PPI) 
terminated its ten-year-old alliance with Columbia. Philips Electronics 
had incorporated its record division in 1950, which had been flourishing 
on an international level through Philips' worldwide network of local sub-
sidiaries. A couple of months after its split with Columbia, PPI purchased 
full-grown independent Mercury to keep its link with the American mar-
ket (Sanjek, 1991). Again, the US had been invaded by a foreign company 
at the cost of American record firms at both the national and international 
level. In 1962, Philips expanded its interest in the record industry via the 
creation of a joint venture between PPI and Deutsche Grammophon that 
operated internationally under the label Polydor. The US majors that had 
been so successful in the first decade after the war, were not only being 
hurt by a host of successful independents, but were also under attack from 
foreign companies that entered their home market. 
Confronted with the need to restore its presence in Europe, RCA en-
tered into a number of distribution arrangements with medium-sized 
European record companies. At the same time, it incorporated a separate 
international division that was responsible for running the company's new 
agreements with British Decca in the UK, Telefunken in Germany and 
Musikvertrieb in Switzerland (Sanjek, 1991). After its divorce from Phil-
ips, Columbia was also forced to install an international division, but its 
approach was different. The company had learned from its experience 
with PPI, and considered the risks of being dependent on local partners 
for international distribution too high. Columbia thus launched a new 
strategy to set up an international distribution network, and installed sub-
sidiaries in the Netherlands and France in 1963 (Sanjek, 1991). Still, these 
new initiatives did not alter the main objective of US firms in Europe: to 
generate additional revenues from American recordings (Laing, 1992). 
While European firms were deeply involved in the development of 
local music and artists, the American majors had no such plans. Market-
122 
A HISTORICAL STUDY 
ing their repertoire on an international level was the most they could do, 
as the majority of their resources was involved in the restructuring of their 
operations in the US. The independent labels had taken over business in 
their home base, and the majors gradually became aware of the fact that 
the increasingly diversifying and growing youth market would indeed be 
of a lasting nature. They had no choice but to reorganize their companies 
and to alter their traditional market strategies. Emphasis was placed on 
discovering and developing new talent in the popular music field, and 
special A&R departments were created (Peterson and Berger, 1975). By 
1964, Columbia and Capitol showed that they had been able to adjust to 
the changing market conditions when their newly incorporated A&R de-
partments achieved success with the discovery of hot acts like the Beach 
Boys and Bob Dylan. 
Both companies also invested heavily to intensify their relationships 
with the industry's main promotion channels. Key persons within their 
promotion departments developed a network of close relationships with 
the most important radio disc jockeys around the country. Apart from the 
benefit of radio stations as promotion vehicles, TV broadcasting provided 
a brand-new opportunity to the record industry. The rise of the independ-
ents had not only been due to the development of new music styles and 
acts, but also to their understanding that these new-born stars were people 
with a distinctive personality and style. Recording stars not only had their 
own typical style of music, but also propagated a unique and eccentric 
image; it was in these turbulent years that sound and image became un-
separable (Frith, 1992). In this respect, free publicity via television was a 
perfect way in which record companies could create new stars for the 
popular music market (Negus, 1992). Next to the cultivation of intimate 
ties with the TV-broadcasting industry, the rebounding majors directed 
massive marketing budgets and campaigns towards this medium. 
In 1964, the British pop scene came to a rise with the Beatles as its 
progenitor. EMI had put considerable effort into local artist development, 
which culminated in its Beatles contract. Their success in America proved 
to be a goldmine for Capitol which licensed and distributed records from 
its parent EMI in the US. The heydays of rock'n'roll came to an end when 
British rock acts like the Rolling Stones, signed up by British Decca, be-
came successful in the United States (Frith, 1992). CBS and Warner, at-
tracted by the commercial potential of these British competitive products, 
quickly established subsidiaries in London. Here, they discovered and 
developed acts like Led Zeppelin who made it big on the US market. Al-
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though this was the first time that US record firms sought new talent out 
of their home base, they still did not have a real multinational artist devel-
opment policy. 
Indeed, the United Kingdom was the only European country where 
American record companies set up branches with the explicit purpose of 
new talent development. In all other countries where subsidiaries had 
been formed, marketing and distribution of US-based records continued to 
be the main objective. Furthermore, the activity of discovering new and 
successful British acts was guided by their commercial potential on the 
American market. In contrast, UK-based record labels initially developed 
new acts for their home market, with the additional advantage of market-
ing them on a broader and international level. Nevertheless, it was this 
period that marked the establishment of a long-lasting Anglo-American 
dominance in global record sales (Laing, 1992). From here on, American 
and British companies primarily pursued the development and marketing 
of English-speaking acts in both their own and foreign countries. 
RCA and Decca, the two leading majors of the original big four, were 
not able to retain their position during the sixties (Peterson and Berger, 
1975). RCA failed to establish itself in the market for popular music, and 
the company could only survive through its superior position in classical 
music (and its highly profitable contract with Elvis Presley, who was 
signed up after recording his first singles at Sun Records). But compared 
to the explosively growing popular music segment, the market for classi-
cal records was steady and mature. In the end, RCA tumbled from the first 
to the very last position in America's top ten record companies within ten 
years. Even Decca, once a prominent entrepreneurial record company and 
pioneer of the star system, was not able to retain its competitive position. 
Decca did have a few top-selling records in the popular music market, but 
as its rivals released hit after hit, the firm's market share continued to fall. 
Both RCA and Decca were not able to break away from established sup-
positions, structures and strategies, and became victims of their own past 
successes. 
Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
During the mid-1950s, the competitive rules of the game shifted again as 
capabilities were founded through the innovative behavior of independent 
labels, with Atlantic as their forerunner (see Table 6.10). Managerial ca-
pabilities reflected the strategic vision that the pivotal consumer base of 
the future was represented by the growing youth market. Here, tastes 
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could even be created by providing a constant stream of new artists and 
popular music forms, demanding a high degree of market responsiveness. 
Input-based capabilities comprised the company's roster of newly created 
and popular artists as a source of human capital, as well as its more tangi-
ble low-cost recording studio. The entrepreneurial management culture, 
the firm's talent discovery skills, and the label's emphasis on innovation 
in music encompassed the transformation-based capabilities. Output-
based capabilities embodied company networks of both local radio sta-
tions and independent distributors, as well as the label's reputation for hot 
music. 
Table 6.10: New Capabilities in the Mid-1950s 
Managerial 
Upcoming 
popular youth 
market 
Continuous 
generation of 
artists and music 
High market re-
sponsiveness 
Input-Based 
Roster of un-
proven and popu-
lar artists 
Low-cost record-
ing studios 
All-round skills of 
owner-manager 
Transformation 
Artistic talent dis-
covery and de-
velopment 
Entrepreneurial 
management 
Label culture of 
musical innova-
Output-Based 
Distribution 
network of in-
dependents 
Network of local 
radio contacts 
Label reputation 
tion 
Once rival firms competed on the same competitive principles and 
capabilities, proliferation of these capabilities took place at three different 
levels of activity. First, record companies expanded their artist discovery 
activities to artist development via image building. Related to this was the 
further exploitation of artist promotion, where relationship networks were 
built with radio networks (surpassing local radio stations) and TV broad-
casting corporations, to market artists' distinctive personality and style. 
Finally, record companies began to elaborate their A&R activities by in-
corporating growing A&R departments (instead of the more individually 
operating A&R persons that initially dominated the independent labels). 
The proliferation of capabilities was directed at the further cultivation of 
the growing youth segment that constituted an increasingly diverse popu-
lar music market. 
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THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
From now on, popular music and its main customer base, the youth seg-
ment, were key to a record company's success and survival. Spending 
money of younger generations increased as the wealth and economies of 
the Western industrialized world exploded during the sixties, while the 
youth's position as a social class was subject to a similar pattern of devel-
opment. But whereas economic prosperity flared, the global political 
situation turned into a snowstorm. The cold war reached its zenith when 
JF Kennedy made Chroesjtsjov bow during the Cuban missile crisis and 
capitalism confronted communism in the bloody bushes of Vietnam. 
Many youngsters on the European and American continents expressed 
their doubts about the validity of the moral factors that lay behind this 
worldwide political turmoil. This heightened social awareness came to be 
manifested in anti-government demonstrations and protest marches. 
Competition for Labels 
Music turned out to be the perfect medium by which these thoughts and 
feelings, also known as flower power, were spread among young people. 
A host of new acts such as Jimi Hendrix, Janis Joplin and the Doors came 
to life that preached a new religion and propagated a more critical view of 
the world. This presented enormous opportunities for record companies in 
the increasingly expanding and demanding youth segment of the music 
market. The problem was that the message propagated in the music was 
not compatible with the younger public's view on large corporations in 
general, perceived to be the same sort of inhuman and power-oriented 
bureaucracies the government was believed to be. True record labels, the 
story went, were big in image but small in size. Traditional major record 
corporations such as RCA and Decca, which once dominated the industry 
through policies of structure and control, were definitely out of favor. 
Their places had been taken in the early sixties by newcomers such as 
Motown and A&M, independent labels that had been able to manage their 
growth process in a prosperous way. But the most remarkable new entrant 
during the 1960s was Warner, a diversified firm that achieved success by 
introducing a new way to build and structure a record company organiza-
tion. In 1958, the big movie corporation Warner Brothers had noticed the 
ease with which independent labels had ruined the dominance of the ma-
jor record companies. As a consequence, it stepped into the lucrative rec-
ord business by creating Warner Bros. Records, while Frank Sinatra's 
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Reprise Records was acquired in 1963. When Steve Ross, president of 
Kinney Corporation, gained financial control of Warner Seven Arts (the 
holding company), he reconfigured Warner's music assets, in the process 
acquiring three of America's most successful independent record labels 
(Sanjek, 1991). Between 1967 and 1973, Ross brought Atlantic, Elektra 
and Asylum into his Warner music company. 
Instead of integrating these smaller companies into the Warner Bros. 
Records label, Steve Ross developed the 'label federation' concept, in 
which individual labels continued to operate in a relatively autonomous 
manner. Under the Warner umbrella, separate divisions were created ac-
cording to music genre: middle-of-the-road (Warner and Reprise), rock 
(Elektra and Asylum), and R&B and soul (Atlantic). This formula enabled 
the labels to maintain their original innovative character in accordance 
with the specific characteristics of their particular target markets 
(Denisoff, 1986). At the same time, the parent company reaped synergis-
tic benefits as it created a company-wide manufacturing and distribution 
setup called WEA. Although there was plenty of room for label managers 
to cooperate, in the end a climate of internal competition for the number 
one spot drove the corporation's success. 
Whereas highly entrepreneurial and market-specific operations such 
as A&R, promotion and marketing were left to the distinct labels, the 
Warner corporation took care of the more administrative activities such as 
record manufacturing, finance and distribution to exploit economies of 
scale (Lopes, 1992). As the first record company with a multi-divisional 
organizational structure, Warner became the leader of the US record in-
dustry only ten years after its diversification into recorded music. To-
gether with Columbia, it held a 15% market share in 1969, followed 
closely by Capitol (Peterson and Berger, 1975). Rank four and five in the 
$1.6 billion market were taken by Motown and A&M, which had both 
managed to grow substantially without losing their feeling for the popular 
market. Especially Motown, with its impressive roster of black R&B art-
ists, released numerous hits. 
Opportunities for record firms to export their products at the interna-
tional level increased during the early 1970s when a new sound carrier 
was introduced. Already in the late fifties, both RCA and Philips had ex-
perimented with tape cartridges. Although the record industry itself had 
been primarily concerned with tape's potential from a recording point of 
view (being the development of multi-track tape and equipment for engi-
neering use in professional recording studios), this research was more in-
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volved in the application of tape technology to the consumer market. RCA 
had started mass production of its system during the 1960s, but the target 
market responded merciless. Consumers experienced severe limitations in 
tape's recording possibilities, regarded the corresponding high-tech 
equipment as too complicated to operate, and missed a system for fast-
playing the tape forward and back. RCA's new business venture came to 
be one of the biggest disappointments in the corporation's history, and 
was canceled in the early seventies (Jones, 1992). 
Figure 6.7: Combined Unit Sales for Major World Markets (in Millions) 
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Source: Data comprised from Hung, M. and E. C. Morencos (1990), Wor ld Rec-
ord Sales 1969-1990: A Statistical History of the World Recording Industry, Lon-
don: IFPI 
Dutch electronics firm Philips had considerably more success with its 
version of the tape cassette, which had initially been introduced in 1963. 
The equipment on which the cassette was played was easy to handle, 
while its compactness and the low price of tape were highly valued by its 
users. Sales experienced an explosive growth after 1969 when the Dolby 
noise reduction system was applied to tape decks and cassettes (Jones, 
1992). During the seventies, ca~sett.es were sold in huge quantities to the 
youth market, not only because they could be listened to via car systems, 
but also because prerecorded tapes were considerably cheaper than rec-
ords. Furthermore, these lower price levels triggered the development of 
new music markets in Asia and Africa where incomes were much lower 
compared to those in the Western industrialized countries (Shuker, 1994). 
Although cassettes were a direct substitute for records, worldwide sales of 
prerecorded music increased rapidly during the 1970s (see Figure 6.7 in 
combination with Table 6.1 1). Faced with such bright figures, the record 
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industry did not bother to pay much attention to tape's illegal copying 
possibilities. 
Table 6 .11 : Individual Unit Sales in M a j o r Wor ld Markets (in Millions) 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Am LP 
n/a 
310.1 
308.0 
288.8 
311.9 
390.0 
395.2 
372.2 
375.2 
A m M C 
n/a 
114.2 
122.8 
123.5 
145.1 
183.7 
217.8 
207.5 
212.0 
Eur LP 
152.8 
185.0 
216.6 
236.0 
240.2 
264.5 
292.3 
271.1 
260.2 
EurMC 
27.0 
41.6 
54.8 
62.5 
72.1 
89.1 
103.7 
103.0 
106.4 
lap LP 
n/a 
62.8 
67.0 
67.7 
75.7 
73.8 
74.4 
70.7 
72.4 
lapMC 
n/a 
21.0 
19.2 
21.0 
25.3 
27.7 
37.2 
49.0 
64.0 
Source: Data comprised (mm Hung, M. and E. C. Morencos (1990), World Rec-
ord Sales 1969-1990: A Statistical History of the World Recording Industry, Lon-
don: If PI 
Note: Am represents North American Unit Sales (rom Canada and the United 
States combined; Eur represents European Unit Sales from France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom combined; lap stands for japan. 
The major record companies had other things on their mind. Warner, 
the new industry leader, became a role model as its rivals aimed to repli-
cate its radically new organizational approach to the record business. Its 
method of divisionalization, further cultivated by the acquisition of inde-
pendent record label Asylum in 1973, had enabled Warner to develop an 
impressive roster of successful rock acts and an extremely hip corporate 
image. In 1969, Columbia purchased Bell Records, renamed it Arista, and 
placed the label in a separate and semi-autonomous division. The Music 
Corporation of America (MCA), originally a talent agency, had stepped 
relatively unnoticed in the record business by creating its own label, and 
had in 1967 acquired Decca. Both CBS and MCA followed Warner's suc-
cessful course of action during the early seventies, incorporating promis-
ing independent labels into their divisionalized structure (Lopes, 1992). 
As a consequence, the number of successful independent labels declined, 
while the US industry returned to an oligopolistic setting (see Table 6.12). 
But while all eyes were focused on Warner, an ambitious European record 
company began to strengthen its position on the US market. 
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Table 6.12: How Majors Regained Control of the Charts 
Year 
1965-1966 
1967-1968 
1969-1970 
1971-1972 
1973-1974 
1975-1976 
1977-1978 
1979-1980 
C4 Ratio 
37.5 
41.0 
46.5 
(46.5) 
47.5 
(46.5) 
57.0 
56.5 
65.5 
74.5 
Singles 
No. of 
Labels 
49.5 
48.5 
48.5 
(44.5) 
51.0 
(47.5) 
43.0 
44.0 
38.0 
33.0 
No. of 
Firms 
33.0 
32.5 
30.5 
(27.0) 
22.0 
(20.5) 
18.0 
17.0 
16.0 
11.5 
C4 Ratio 
n/a 
n/a 
54.5 
60.5 
62.0 
61.0 
66.5 
76.5 
Albums 
No. of 
Labels 
n/a 
n/a 
37.0 
39.5 
39.5 
42.0 
34.5 
39.0 
No. of 
Firms 
n/a 
n/a 
20.5 
16.5 
15.5 
16.0 
16.5 
11.5 
Source: Adapted from Lopes (I992) and Peterson and Berger (1975) 
Note: Whereas Peterson and Berger (1975) investigated the presence of record com-
panies in Billboard's weekly Top Ten list for singles in the popular music market. 
Lopes (1992) investigated the presence of record companies in Billboard's annual Top 
100 for both singles and albums in the popular music market. Peterson and Berger's 
data have been put between brackets where the data of both works overlap in the sin-
gles columns. 
Overproduction Tactics 
After ten years of successful cooperation, Polydor (formerly Deutsche 
Grammophon and under the umbrella of German electronics manufacturer 
Siemens) and Phonogram (PPI, the original record division of Philips 
Electronics) restructured their operations and created PolyGram in 1972. 
The American record firm Mercury was acquired from Philips and got its 
own division within the new company. To expand its interest in the 
American record industry, PolyGram purchased RSO Records in 1975 
and invested in Casablanca Records. With its newly formed organization, 
its novel American outlets, and subsidiaries all over the globe, PolyGram 
at once became the number one record company in the world. Together 
with EMI, which still benefited from its profitable Beatles contract, the 
incoming giant headed towards global sales over $1 billion in 1975 (San-
jek, 1991). For more than three decades, the world record industry had 
been dominated by American firms, but America's finest - CBS and 
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Warner - suddenly found themselves ranked three and four behind two 
European companies. 
The main reasons for this shake-up lay in the differences between 
European and American majors regarding the development of distribution 
channels and international market presence. Except for the American 
market where both were dependent on the presence of Mercury and 
Capitol, PolyGram and EMI had created a strong distribution network 
over the world (Wallis and Malm, 1984). EMI was a direct descendant 
from British Gramophone, which already by 1910 had expanded through 
a large number of foreign subsidiaries. EMI had been able to maintain and 
expand its heritage, enabling the corporation to distribute products via its 
self-built channels. Over time, PolyGram had constructed a similar inter-
national distribution capability. Philips' global network of affiliates had 
enabled PolyGram to set up its own subsidiaries in a large amount of 
countries, through which it distributed its products. Apart from distribu-
tion, EMI and PolyGram were also heavily involved in local artist devel-
opment (Laing, 1992). 
American majors, however, operated on different principles, and the 
scope and nature of their international activities were much more limited. 
They were at the very start of creating their own subsidiaries in foreign 
countries, and exporting home-made records was more on their mind than 
the discovery and development of local talent. In most cases, American 
majors still distributed through local companies, cutting down operating 
expenses (Christianen, 1995). Although they had a presence in South 
America, the prevailing focus was on the main European music markets. 
Apart from their more limited international coverage, the Americans were 
also faced with an uncontrollable variety of distribution channels in the 
United States (Denisoff, 1986). Guided by the rise of the independents in 
the 1950s, multiple distribution channels and retail points had come into 
existence. Apart from specialized independent distribution companies, 
other players like the 'one-stop' and the 'rack jobber' had stepped in. 
The one-stop's original objective had been to serve jukebox operators 
singles from a variety of record companies. But as the years passed, it 
expanded its influence and transformed into a wholesaler for individual 
retail shops. The rack jobber had started out by stocking records at dis-
count chain stores, and gradually moved into drug stores, supermarkets 
and warehouses (Mittelsteadt and Stassen, 1994). Although the number of 
places where records could be consumed swelled, margins of American 
record companies dropped. This setback was a direct consequence of an 
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increase in bargaining power at distributors, which took no risk but 
cashed high profits (Denisoff, 1986). In effect, the American majors, with 
their limited international outlook, owned a big share of their home mar-
ket but could not control its distribution channels. On the other hand, the 
European majors occupied only a modest portion of the US market but 
managed to compensate this shortcoming with a broad international pres-
ence where they did have control over distribution. 
Another cost-inducing factor of distribution was related to record 
companies' focus on the LP as the main product for the popular music 
market, instead of the much smaller single (Lopes, 1992). This emphasis 
was closely tied to companies' aim in the mid-1970s to sell immense 
amounts of records of new and established star acts. The single evolved 
into a promotional tool, which was used to announce a new release of a 
star album and to boost its sales (Denisoff, 1986). Maximization of album 
sales became the prime objective, and it was in this era that new market-
ing and promotion tools such as cover graphics, radio and TV advertising, 
live concerts, press interviews and photo sessions were developed and 
refined (Frith, 1992). More and more, major record companies relied on 
their base of superstars such as Elton John, Paul McCartney and Stevie 
Wonder, whose new releases guaranteed sales of over one million copies 
even before being available at the retailer. 
It has already been said in Chapter 1 that whereas the success of an 
established artist can be predicted without too much difficulty, forecasting 
whether a newcomer's album will be a hit is near to impossible in the rec-
ord industry. This uncertainty has much to do with the continuous path of 
progression of the popular music market and the unmeasurability of what 
consumers like and dislike. During the 1970s, the majors started to cope 
with this market uncertainty by means of spreading their risks through 
what has become known as the 'buckshot theory of record releasing' 
(Denisoff, 1986). As the average chance of success for a newly developed 
act was even less than 10 percent, major corporations began to release an 
enormous amount of new products. The logic of this strategy of overpro-
duction was grounded in two assumptions. First, the more records brought 
to the market, the higher the overall chances of coincidental success. Sec-
ond, the more records produced, the higher the chances of recouping fixed 
costs efficiently (Hirsch, 1972). 
But without established superstars, such a strategy of overproduction 
was not viable. Guaranteed sales of stars were necessary to cover the 
losses and make profits. In the meantime, numerous new releases of un-
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known acts were thrown at the market and the inevitable accidental hits 
made money for the record company in times when superstars did not re-
lease new albums (Denisoff, 1986). This double-barreled strategy, imple-
mented by all big record firms, of being on the safe side and drawing your 
lucky number, was at the time criticized for a lack of musical creativity 
and innovativeness. But that did not matter to the majors as the industry 
experienced a sales growth from $2.0 billion in 1973 to $4.1 billion in 
1978 (see Figure 6.8 and Table 6.13). At the same time, such a strategy 
was extremely effective in curtailing majors' increasing cost base; apart 
from the voluminous marketing and promotion budgets primarily tied to 
superstar releases, costs involved in producing and recording albums had 
also raised significantly. 
Figure 6.8: Constant Value of Music Sales in the 1960s and 1970s (in US $ Millions) 
1965 1970 1975 1978 
Source: See Appendix B 
Whereas in previous times records were pressed immediately after 
music had been recorded, multi-track tape equipment made it possible to 
manipulate sounds and pay much more attention to the final result through 
editing and mixing. This made the specific sound of a record, and there-
fore the producer's role, much more important. As a consequence, the 
producer became a highly-paid professional, while recording time and 
costs increased significantly from the start of the seventies. At the time, 
recording and studio costs, including the producer's fee, were between 
$100,000 and $300,000 (Denisoff, 1986). In order to cut costs, the major 
record corporations began to outsource the recording process from staff 
producers to independent producers, which had created their own small 
companies. This policy matched the majors' cost-cutting strategy of 
which reliance on superstars and the system of overproduction were the 
fundamental components. 
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In a similar way, the major firms reorganized other functions. Corpo-
rate A&R departments were abandoned in line with new divisionalized 
organization structures. Responsibilities for fruitful A&R management 
were placed right down at the level of the various labels themselves, 
where the process of artist discovery and development originated. Fur-
thermore, the majors got rid of their own recording studios to scoop the 
extreme costs of underutilization and maintenance. But they all knew that 
in order to upgrade profits, cutting costs was not enough. Sales had to in-
crease as well, and the dual market strategy of star reliance coupled to 
overproduction was very effective in this respect. The American majors, 
however, recognized even more opportunities to enhance sales levels on 
an international level as they had noticed how EMI and PolyGram with 
their lower US market share had still managed to become the worldwide 
top-selling record firms. 
Table 6.13: Current Value of Music Sales in the 1960s and 1970s (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1968 
1970 
1971 
Current Value 
0862 
0959 
1173 
1358 
1586 
1660 
1744 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Current Value 
1924 
2001 
2186 
2378 
2732 
3501 
4131 
Source: See Appendix B 
With the cassette as medium, CBS and Warner started in the second 
half of the 1970s to open up new subsidiaries in the newly developed 
markets of Africa and Asia (Wallis and Malm, 1984). Although Warner 
and CBS followed the example set by EMI and PolyGram, little attention 
was paid to local artist development. Marketing American records was 
still the primary objective, but at least the significance of being present on 
an international level was finally recognized by the American giants. 
They had no other choice if they wanted to catch up with PolyGram and 
EMI, and in light of this goal CBS and Warner also altered the nature of 
their activities in Europe in these years. Next to selling US-based records, 
their European units became more and more involved with the develop-
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ment of local acts and the creation of national artist rosters (Laing, 1992). 
Likewise, they built company-owned distribution channels in most of the 
countries on the European continent. 
Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
At the end of the sixties, new capabilities were founded at the industry 
level that guided a new competitive doctrine introduced by Warner. Table 
6.14 shows how these capabilities can be categorized into the familiar 
classes. First, managerial capabilities referred to the strategic knowledge 
underlying the federal system: a multi-divisional corporation that covered 
a multitude of taste markets through the incorporation of several labels. 
Input-based capabilities were represented by the individual labels that 
were acquired in the process, and by the corporate-level knowledge of 
how to create a diversified firm. Transformation-based capabilities em-
bodied the innovative process through which individual labels maintained 
valuable autonomy with respect to A&R and marketing & promotion. In 
the same vein, a central administrative & finance department and a com-
mon manufacturing & distribution setup created synergies. 
Table 6.14: New Capabilities in the Late 1960s 
Managerial 
Multiple market 
coverage 
Federal system of 
labels 
Input-Based 
Collection of ac-
quired record 
labels 
Knowledge at 
corporate head-
quarters 
Transformation Output-Based 
Label autonomy 
in A&R and 
marketing 
Common ad-
ministration and 
P&D setup 
High musical 
variety in album 
releases 
Popular corpo-
rate image 
Finally, the output-based capabilities not only reflected physical out-
puts in the sense of increased musical variety in album releases, but also 
concerned the firm's hip corporate image. As rival companies such as 
CBS and MCA copied these capabilities, their behavior moved towards 
proliferation on three levels of activity. The initial idea of artist variety 
was exploited through a strategy of overproduction in which stars and un-
proven acts supported each other in terms of revenues. More elaborated 
marketing tools were developed to maximize album sales of superstars, 
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and involved an increase in promotional effectiveness and artist publicity 
via press, radio and television. The idea of a common distribution setup 
was further exploited on an international level as major record companies 
began to build multinational distribution channels through the launch of 
foreign subsidiaries. 
THE SECOND DEPRESSION 
In 1978, the global record industry flourished like it had never done be-
fore. But this sunny situation was severely clouded when the industry 
went into a painful recession during the final months of 1979. The first 
indicator of this slump had been the divestment of underperforming rec-
ord divisions by American movie corporations. Like Warner, they had 
stepped into the record business during the fifties, but had not been able to 
match its performance. In the beginning of 1979, EMI acquired United 
Artists Records for $3 million, while MCA purchased Paramount Records 
and a number of small labels, such as Dot and Blue Thumb, from ABC 
(Sanjek, 1991). Again, a European record corporation and a former inde-
pendent managed to strengthen their position on the American market. 
Still, sales forecasts in those early months of 1979 were very dark, but 
record executives claimed that such a decline in sales would only last for 
a few months (Denisoff, 1986). 
MTV and CD 
As. a matter of fact, the recession continued for more than two years. The 
major record firms were-convinced that the music styles of the middle and 
late 1970s (punk, reggae and disco) would be of a lasting nature. But the 
market decided differently and sales tumbled between 1979 and 1983 (see 
Figure 6.9 and Table 6.15). In response, the major companies restructured 
their organizations: marketing and promotion budgets were minimized, 
new talent inflow came to a halt, and artist development was restricted. 
All remaining resources were directed at the cultivation of superstars 
(Denisoff, 1986). Thousands of employees, especially within A&R and 
marketing functions, were fired. The record companies directed their full 
attention towards the issue of home taping, which they claimed to be ille-
gal and eating up their profits. Critics at the time claimed that major rec-
ord companies should have been more involved with the future (that is, 
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new artist development) than with new legislation on home taping, on 
which record executives put the blame. 
Figure 6.9: Constant Value of Music Sales in the 2nd Depression (in US $ Millions) 
1977 1980 19»4 
Source: See Appendix B 
But there also was good news: in 1981, American Express and WCI 
created a joint venture called MTV, a new entertainment channel directed 
at the youth segment of television consumers. Because this new music 
television channel would depend on the supply of music videos from rec-
ord companies for programming, the record industry had to be persuaded 
to provide videos without charge. Although MTV claimed itself a new 
promotional vehicle, which would therefore increase record sales, record 
firms at the time were not enthusiastic about providing the channel videos 
for free (Benjack and MacKeen, 1995). Their policies were directed at 
cost cutting, and investment in high-cost video production for an idea not 
yet proven was too risky. Some of the majors provided only a limited 
amount of their small stock of clips, while PolyGram and MCA even re-
fused to supply any video clips. But in 1983, the major record companies 
reacted positively to market research results published by both MTV and 
Billboard, the American record industry's most influential trade journal, 
which supported the argument that television broadcasting of music vid-
eos increased record sales. 
Realizing the new channel's powerful concept of combining sound 
and vision, majors began to produce video clips tied to new album re-
leases, and agreed to provide MTV these videos without charge. The mu-
sic channel proved to be a major promotion outlet like radio had always 
been (in that potential buyers were introduced to new and popular music), 
but MTV offered the added value of one channel covering millions of 
viewers (instead of a multitude of radio stations spread across the whole 
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country). The alternative way of promotion via MTV reduced its com-
plexity, as a relationship with only one gatekeeper that covered a much 
larger consumer base was to be maintained. At another level, the produc-
tion and consumption of videos became a substitution for the expensive 
touring through which acts had traditionally been exposed to the public. 
This enabled record firms to build an artist's image and introduce new 
acts within a time-bound period at far less costs (Denisoff, 1986). 
MTV as an additional promotion channel enabled major record com-
panies to better cope with the uncertainty of radio gatekeeping and the 
high costs of touring and image-building. Together with the benefit of 
additional sales revenues, these aspects of music television turned the 
production of music videos into a necessity for the majors. Furthermore, 
the ability of MTV to discover and build new emerging forms of music 
was appreciated by the record industry in the early eighties (Lopes, 1992). 
New styles of music such as new age and heavy metal were emphasized 
in MTV's play lists, and this benefited the record industry in its need for 
renewed consumer attention to climb out of the recession. And although 
there are still arguments that a clear and positive relationship between the 
airplay of music videos and record sales is debatable (Wallis and Malm, 
1988), it is unquestionable that MTV did have a role in the resurrection of 
the industry (Denisoff, 1988; Banks, 1998). 
Table 6.15: Current Value of Music Sales in the 2nd Depression (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Current Value 
3500.8 
4131.4 
3685.4 
3862.1 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Current Value 
3969.9 
3641.6 
3814.3 
4370.4 
Source: See Appendix B 
Another development that revived consumer interest into music came 
right out of the R&D laboratories of Philips. Upon the discovery that 
digital coding of sound leads to greater accuracy and flexibility in its re-
production, a small group of researchers created the compact disc. The 
Philips board realized that this new digital technology was superior to ex-
isting ones, and rallied forces with Sony to market the product effectively 
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to the consumer. Philips' strong technological knowledge proved highly 
complementary to Sony's distinctive marketing competences, and the alli-
ance was a success. The combination sacrificed its monopoly position to 
gain widespread acceptance of its standard by making the new technology 
available to other major electronics manufacturers via licensing contracts 
(McGinn and Nordsten, 1995). Still, the system would not sell unless a 
minimum amount of music software would be available on the CD for-
mat, so Philips and Sony turned their attention to the music industry. 
In their effort to convince the major record companies to adopt the 
CD system, Philips and Sony came up with at least four advantages of the 
CD over the traditional LP and cassette. First, as nothing in the CD player 
actually touches the surface of the disc, dust, scratches and grease cause 
almost no distortion, which would make it friendly to users. Also, when 
playing the compact disc, a maximum amount of fidelity in reproduction 
is achieved, which would increase listening pleasure. Furthermore, its 
compactness would make it easy to handle, minimize storage space at the 
consumer's home, and optimize efficient distribution for record compa-
nies. Finally, the CD's small size facilitated listening to music via a port-
able player or a car system (Burnett, 1996). It was mandatory that at least 
two majors would adopt the CD standard for the others to follow, and this 
made Philips' partial ownership of PolyGram and Sony's alliance-based 
relationship with CBS of crucial importance to the success of their CD 
project. 
But the major record companies were still faced with losses incurred 
by the depression, and had strong reservations about the compact disc as 
an alternative carrier for their music. They were not sure about the ability 
of this new technology to replace more traditional systems and sound car-
riers. Moreover, they expressed their concerns about the three-cent roy-
alty that the Philips-Sony alliance demanded for each disc sold in the 
marketplace. On the other hand, this format would undoubtedly renew 
consumer interest in music. Moreover, majors were especially charmed by 
the argument that the highly advanced nature of CD technology would 
undermine possible illegal copying activities. In the end, the compact disc 
was launched in 1983, and got the full support of all major record compa-
nies. In 1991, more than one billion CD players had been sold worldwide, 
while almost the same amount of CDs was sold in that year only (McGinn 
and Nordsten, 1995). 
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THE SHIFT TO RIGHTS 
Although CD sales were still modest compared to LP and cassette sales, it 
was clear to the major record companies in the early eighties that compact 
discs would be far more profitable in terms of margins. Without much 
difference in cost base, the CD had been priced fairly high: consumers 
had to pay an amount of money that doubled the price of an LP, and even 
tripled the expenditure on a cassette. Record companies reasoned that if 
they could maintain this price setting, and if indications on the eventual 
adoption of the CD were true, the record business would experience a 
profitable era in the near future. Indeed, a growing number of consumers 
became convinced that the CD's advantages over traditional systems were 
numerous, and that the compact drsc was not a new fad in consumer elec-
tronics. Furthermore, average market prices of CD players decreased as 
more and cheaper equipment was introduced on the consumer market by 
electronic manufacturers that had licensed the CD technology from Phil-
ips and Sony. 
Figure 6.10: Combined Unit Sales for Major World Markets (in Millions) 
Source: Data comprised (mm Hung, M. and E. C. Morencos (1990), World Rec-
ord Sales 1969-1990: A Statistical History of the World Recording Industry, Lon-
don: IFPI, in combination with IFPI (1996), The Recording Industry in Numbers 
1991-1995, London: IFPI 
Competition for Catalogues 
The incentive to buy a CD player was also reinforced by the increasing 
availability of music on compact disc, as the record industry had made a 
commitment to release new albums in the near future on the new carrier. 
140 
A HISTORICAL STUDY 
As a consequence, increasing amounts of consumers substituted their old 
record players for CD equipment and expanded their collection of com-
pact discs (see Figure 6.10). The speed with which this replacement took 
place varied across continents, as Table 6.16 shows. In Japan, where cus-
tomers tend to have a traditional eagerness to adopt the latest technology, 
the new digital format became the primary medium for prerecorded music 
in 1988. In Western Europe, unit sales of CDs surpassed those of LPs in 
1990. The inevitable replacement of vinyl for compact discs showed a 
similar pattern of development in the United States, but it took the CD 
another two years to overthrow the cassette's traditional strong position. 
Table 6.16: Individual Unit Sales in Major World Markets (in Millions) 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
A m M C 
270.4 
373.4 
380.2 
388.8 
441.5 
484.5 
482.4 
473.6 
392.3 
395.° 
Am CD 
0.8 
6.3 
23.9 
56.3 
108.3 
158.6 
219.1 
302.4 
360.1 
440.4 
EurMC 
124.2 
132.1 
148.6 
163.0 
177.9 
199.3 
213.0 
224.9 
210.1 
170.5 
Eur CD 
2.0 
6.0 
14.7 
33.1 
66.8 
119.2 
177.2 
238.4 
291.0 
331.7 
JapMC 
78.2 
66.3 
59.6 
56.7 
59.9 
63.9 
60.4 
46.2 
19.4 
16.2 
Jap CD 
1.5 
5.1 
16.5 
36.1 
52.0 
72.0 
117.1 
138.1 
171.8 
181.8 
Source: Data comprised from Hung, M. and E. C. Morencos (1990), World Rec-
ord Sales 1969-1990: A Statistical History of the World Recording Industry, /.on-
e/on: IFPI, in combination with IFPI (1996), The Recording Industry in Numbers 
1991-1995, London: IFPI 
Note: Am represents North American Unit Sales from Canada and the United 
States combined; Eur represents European Unit Sales from France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom combined; lap stands for Japan. 
As consumer adoption of the compact disc was secured in the world's 
main music markets, the major record companies rested on their laurels. 
Whereas prices for CD players fell rapidly, enabling the average customer 
to buy this new audio equipment, the record industry maintained its origi-
nal price levels for the compact disc (Burnett, 1996). Prices were not low-
ered and still doubled those of LP prices, while incremental innovations in 
digital technology resulted in cost improvements in the manufacturing 
process of CDs. Furthermore, the new format's compactness and solidity 
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made larger and easier shipping possible, cutting distribution costs. Al-
though recording costs rose slightly during the mid-1980s, profits on 
compact discs were considerably higher than profit margins on LPs and 
cassettes had ever been. And as long as consumers believed that the 
higher price was worth the increase in quality of sound, record companies 
had no intention to change their price policy. 
But there were yet even greater benefits to be reaped from the sub-
stitution of the traditional carriers by the CD. Many consumers that had 
made the step from vinyl to plastic were proprietors of large album col-
lections. Pleased with the enhanced quality of the CD system, these con-
sumers replaced their existing LP collections with a new assortment of 
compact discs. This demand for old music on new material was quickly 
recognized by the major record companies, which re-released their exist-
ing catalogue on CD. In this way, they not only benefited from sales of 
old repertoire, but also profited from a revival of this music among new 
generations of consumers. Without any investments in A&R and record-
ing, major record firms made big money on long-dead artists like Jimi 
Hendrix, Elvis Presley and Jim Morrison that were now selling millions of 
records across the globe (Burnett, 1996). 
The enthusiasm with which consumers purchased CDs containing 
'old' music material made the major record companies aware of the im-
portance of owning a large inventory of music from the past. This was 
tied to the fact that ownership of the rights connected to a particular piece 
of music automatically gives the controlling owner the right to release it. 
The arrival of the CD had shown the record industry that, apart from 
physical unit sales, there was yet another, and possibly even more impor-
tant, source of income attached to the creation of music. In the mid-1980s, 
record companies started to realize that their business was involved in a 
shift from the physical manufacturing and distribution of music products 
to the exploitation of copyrights attached to those recordings (Qualen, 
1985). Revenues could not only be generated through sales of music re-
leased on a particular format, but could also be collected by exploiting the 
rights connected to that piece of music. 
Inspired by rising sales and bright forecasts, the major record firms 
looked for new avenues to exploit their rights on a larger scale. During the 
recession years, most of them had neglected or even terminated interna-
tional operations in countries outside of Europe and America. As the fu-
ture looked promising once more, opportunities for foreign investment 
were reconsidered, although not all majors followed this route of interna-
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tionalization. EMI was hampered by major debts incurred when the com-
pany had been acquired by the British electronics corporation Thorn in 
1980. RCA, at one time the biggest record company in the world, did not 
have any interests in what was going on outside of the US at all. Still, the 
other majors did recognize the importance of reinforcing their worldwide 
presence: PolyGram extended its already impressive multinational setup, 
while Warner and CBS enhanced their European organizations, as they 
became involved in local artist development, and launched new affiliates 
in other parts of the world (Wallis and Malm, 1984). 
Their expansion of international operations intensified the majors' 
international approach to the music market. An international structure of 
operating companies made local artist development possible, while multi-
national distribution networks supported the release of records on as much 
markets as possible. Moreover, the major companies could cultivate their 
existing catalogues in new countries to new consumers. But there was 
another effect that turned their world-covering distribution networks into 
a highly valuable asset. In a way, these global distribution webs partially 
tackled major record corporations' inability to cope with new and prom-
ising music since the late 1970s, as they enabled access to the independent 
record labels that had traditionally been the experts on this matter. As 
both majors and independents needed each others' expertise, they started 
to approach one another in a symbiotic way (Hellman, 1983). 
As mentioned, major record firms had exploited the double-barreled 
strategy of overproduction and superstar reliance during the seventies. But 
when the recession hit the industry, large amounts of creative staff were 
dismissed, and artist rosters were drastically cut. Majors only maintained 
contracts with big names and a few promising acts. In contrast, the main 
body of the artist rosters - consisting of artists who had not proven them-
selves yet or had signed up shortly before - was laid off, and this left the 
amount of contracted acts as small as 10 percent from the original rosters 
(Denisoff, 1986). The notion of overproduction lost its meaning in this 
adapted strategy, in which there was little to no room for investment in 
new artist development. As a consequence, the major record corporations 
primarily relied on superstars such as Michael Jackson and Prince, who 
recorded million-selling albums and were proven global celebrities. 
Although independents had not been immune to the drop in consumer 
interest into music, the depression had hurt the major corporations more. 
Their entrepreneurial approach, market orientation and small size made 
independent record companies much more flexible in searching for ways 
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to survive. While the majors had focused their attention and resources on 
established superstars, independent companies achieved success by dis-
covering new acts and music styles (Sanjek, 1991). Some of them, like 
Motown or A&M, had been around since the mid-fifties, but the most 
successful independents of the early eighties had established themselves 
in the industry during the mid-seventies. Guided by men like Chris 
Blackwell, Richard Branson and David Geffen, independent record labels 
such as Island, Virgin and Geffen combined an entrepreneurial vision and 
an intricate knowledge of the industry into a successful business concept. 
While majors took no risks in those early years of the 1980s, these labels 
signed up progressive rock artists that sold impressive amounts of albums 
and perfectly suited the innovative playlists of MTV. 
However, these (and other) successful independents lacked the finan-
cial assets needed to make the video clips MTV wanted (Lopes, 1992). 
The creation of a video clip was an activity that consumed considerable 
amounts of money; thousands of dollars were needed to hire directors, 
equipment, actors, technicians and facilities necessary for an average clip. 
As independents used the revenues from successful releases to keep new 
talent development activities going, expensive videos were difficult to 
make. Another problem for independents was the absence of a company-
owned distribution channel (Denisoff, 1986). Traditionally, most inde-
pendents closed a deal with an independent distributor in their home base, 
but faced strong obstacles with respect to international distribution. Es-
tablishing agreements with individual distributors in foreign countries was 
a time-consuming and expensive process as different distribution compa-
nies operated in different national markets. 
But as independent labels achieved international success, it became 
very attractive to hook up with a major record corporation that controlled 
a multinational distribution network and had deep pockets. Indeed, many 
of the successful independents closed distribution and video production 
agreements with a major in the early and mid-1980s (Lopes, 1992). Their 
records could now be sold more efficiently on an international level 
through the major distributor (saving time and money), while access was 
gained to financial resources for music video production. Evidently, these 
agreements were mutually beneficial: majors not only enlarged their share 
of worldwide record distribution at the cost of local independent distribu-
tors, but also enjoyed economies of scale in their distribution operations 
(Lopes, 1992). Furthermore, majors were now able to better follow new 
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promising acts and music styles by monitoring the products of independ-
ents in their channels (Hellman, 1983). 
Multimedia Developments 
For more than half a century, record companies had been convinced that 
making profits had primarily been a matter of delivering a maximum 
amount of tangible products to the consumer market. Their strategies had 
focused on market share growth, while the definition of markets had over 
time evolved in the mass consumption of prerecorded material. But during 
the 1980s, this notion radically changed when record companies became 
increasingly aware of the expanding possibilities surrounding the exploi-
tation of their copyrights. Imagine that a record company has contracted a 
global celebrity. This person could write his or her memoirs, published in 
a biography. Such a book is turned into a film accompanied by a sound-
track. The film can be promoted on various TV channels and, later on, be 
issued on video. Furthermore, international advertisers and magazines 
might also want to profit from the movie's success, displaying the star in 
marketing campaigns and on front covers. 
During the second half of the eighties, record companies therefore 
jumped into the business of music publishing, concerned with the devel-
opment and cultivation of composed music material. Publishing is a very 
profitable business: there are virtually no production costs, while revenues 
can mount to almost half of the performance fees and incomes generated 
for the composer. Most of the major record companies already owned 
separate music publishing departments to integrate recording and pub-
lishing agreements into a single contract for artists that composed their 
own music (Wallis and Malm, 1984). Still, before the eighties, many art-
ists signed up with independent music publishers. As the majors recog-
nized the significance of a large back catalogue, they turned their attention 
to these independent publishing companies. They began to purchase small 
and local publishing companies, and at the same time acquired large and 
internationally operating publishing houses (Burnett, 1996). 
PolyGram, which deeply regretted its 1984 disposal of Chappel and 
Intersong, invested more than $100 million to create a new publishing 
division called PolyGram Music only three years later. In 1987, Warner 
acquired Chappel and merged it with its own publishing unit into what 
would become the largest publishing company in the world: Wamer-
Chappel Music. In 1989, an amount of $40 million was involved when 
CBS acquired America's oldest music publishing house Big Tree. EMI, at 
145 
COEVOLUT10N AT THE INDUSTRY LEVEL 
last free from its post-merger restrictions since its integration in the Thorn 
conglomerate, paid more than $300 million for the 250,000 songs of the 
SBK. publishing company. Building a catalogue was a priority for major 
record companies in the second half of the eighties, and these examples 
represent only the big take-overs of that time (see Table 6.17). According 
to the NMPA, music publishing revenues on the world-wide level had 
grown 10% a year from 1982 onwards to more than $3.5 billion by 1990, 
more than 20% of which was accounted for by the US. Both the increase 
in acquisitions and publishing revenues indicated the strategic importance 
of music publishing to the record industry. 
Table 6.17: Prominent Music Publishing Acquisitions 
Major Purchaser 
BMG-RCA 
Sony-CBS 
Publishing Company 
Doubleday 
Dell 
Lodge Hall/Milsap 
Blackrock 
Big Tree International 
Conway Twitty 
Year of Takeover 
1986 
1986 
1989 
1987 
1989 
1990 
EMI SBK Entertainment 
Combine Music 
Filmtrax 
1989 
1989 
1990 
MCA 
PolyGram 
Mayday Medians Music 1989 
Musiplex 1987 
Lawrence Welk Music Group 1988 
Sweden Music AB/Polar Music 1989 
Warner Chappell Music Group 
Mighty Tree Music Group 
1987 
1990 
Source: NMPA 
The sudden emphasis on this secondary source of income also 
changed record companies' attitude towards the value of television broad-
casting (Malm and Wallis, 1992). Deregulation of the telecommunication 
industries spurred the growth of cable companies, satellite channels and 
network TV, which enlarged the role of advertisers in the TV broadcast-
ing industry (Malm and Wallis, 1992). By the end of the eighties, the 
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number of commercial television channels - depending in their operations 
on advertising revenues - had grown dramatically. To global advertisers, 
MTV Networks was an attractive outlet as it reached large audiences in 
the United States and Western Europe, which together represented the 
world's richest consumer base. Youth-oriented corporations like Levi's, 
Coca-Cola, Benetton and Nestle therefore invested heavily in American-
wide and pan-European marketing campaigns for MTV (Wallis and 
Malm, 1988). In order to make them successful, an international and 
multi-cultural element was added to these campaigns. Because music is a 
true global language, these giant consumer corporations used hits from the 
past for the promotion of their products on (M)TV. 
These commercials often resulted in the return of a particular track to 
the hit parade (increasing direct album sales), as the ads were also shown 
on non-music television channels. As a result, record companies' income 
through rights collection strongly increased, further emphasizing the sig-
nificance of these secondary revenues (Malm and Wallis, 1992). Increas-
ingly, record firms were spotting new opportunities to license their music 
to a variety of outlets. For example, Hollywood's major movie production 
companies increased their use of prerecorded music when they noticed 
that musical celebrities drew more audience to their movies. In return, 
record companies profited from an act's exposure as the film's success 
increased sales of its soundtrack. The exploitation of rights across various 
forms of media turned into a very profitable business; revenues not only 
increased through direct sales of tangible products, but also through the 
indirect route of intangible copyrights. 
Table 6.18: Current Value of Music Sales in the 1980s (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Current Value 
3814.3 
4370.4 
4387.8 
4651.1 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Current Value 
5567.5 
6254.8 
6464.1 
7368.8 
Source: See Appendix B 
Company revenues were increasingly generated through licensing 
fees retrieved from a variety of other media companies that sold books, 
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magazines, videos, movie tickets and other consumer products. However, 
the opportunities to cultivate rights across a wide range of media did not 
escape the attention of corporations operating in other entertainment in-
dustries. These firms recognized the central role of music within different 
forms of entertainment, and were not only attracted by the increase in mu-
sic sales (see Figure 6.11 and Table 6.18), but also by music's potential to 
link these segments in a synergistic way (Turow, 1992). As a conse-
quence, the record industry was hit by a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
during the second half of the 1980s. Ownership structures within the mu-
sic industry changed radically as major record companies came under the 
control of multinational corporations that operated in the multi-media & 
publishing and consumer electronics industries. 
Figure 6.11: Constant Value of Music Sales in the 1980s (in US $ Millions) 
Source: See Appendix B 
In 1986, media conglomerate Bertelsmann AG became a major 
player in the global record industry when it made a move on the American 
music market. During the seventies, the German corporation had already 
operated on a modest scale in the record business through its local label 
Ariola, and in 1979 the company had gained a majority interest in Arista, 
an American independent. But now the big step into music for Bertels-
mann was made with the acquisition of publishing companies Doubleday 
and Dell, and the purchase of RCA Records, reorganizing all its music 
assets into the Bertelsmann Music Group (Hill and Weber, 1993). The 
$300 million purchase of RCA turned Bertelsmann into the largest media 
conglomerate in the world. But only three years later, the American cor-
porations Time/Life and Warner Communications merged, overtaking 
Bertelsmann's leadership. At the time, the rationale underlying this big 
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multi-media merger was stated in terms of synergies to be achieved from 
the simultaneous ownership of different media (Burnett, 1996). 
In an effort to cope with its poor financial situation at the time,Poly-
Gram had in 1984 planned a full merger with Warner to create what 
would have been the largest record company in the world. At the time, 
PolyGram faced heavy losses in the United States, and would have greatly 
benefited from a union with Warner. However, the US Federal Trade 
Commission ruled against the PolyGram-Warner combination because its 
position would be too dominant on the American market (Sanjek, 1991). 
Still, electronics manufacturer Philips regarded its stake in PolyGram as 
highly essential to keep abreast of developments in software, and pur-
chased Siemens' 50% ownership of PolyGram through a series of stock 
transfers in 1985 and 1987. Like Philips, its former partner Sony was 
convinced that a successful launch of new consumer electronics in the 
future would only succeed if supported by the availability of software. 
The Japanese electronics company thus acquired CBS Records in 1988 
for $2 billion, while another $3.4 billion was spent in the purchase of film 
company Columbia Pictures in 1989 (Malnight and Yoshino, 1990). 
Matsushita, which had won the VCR but lost the CD standardization 
struggle, shared Sony's feelings on the significance of owning a strategic 
software package. As the world's largest consumer electronics corpora-
tion, Matsushita could afford to spend $6 billion on the 1990 acquisition 
of the MCA entertainment company. This gave the Japanese giant control 
of a significant software package of US-based film and music, as it not 
only retrieved access to MCA's film division Universal Pictures, but also 
got hold of MCA Records. Although one could hardly call MCA's record 
division a major company at the international level, it held a fair share of 
the American market for prerecorded music and, moreover, owned a large 
catalogue of titles. MCA's healthy progress over the second half of the 
1980s had culminated in the 1990 purchase of Geffen Records, home to 
successful acts like Nirvana and Guns'n'Roses, for $550 million (Rayport 
and Peralta, 1995). 
Within a period of five years, the record industry's formal ownership 
structure had changed dramatically. Whereas the music business had tra-
ditionally been an affair dominated by American companies and (more 
recently) a few European firms, these changes in formal control turned the 
industry into a more international one. At the start of the 1990s, six major 
companies dominated almost 80% of the worldwide record industry. Only 
Warner Music was still American-owned, while CBS and MCA had been 
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incorporated by Japanese conglomerates. As for Europe, EMI, PolyGram 
and RCA were owned by Thorn (UK), Philips (the Netherlands) and 
Bertelsmann (Germany) respectively. Furthermore, the record industry 
became firmly integrated in two related industries. While Warner and 
RCA were part of publishing and media conglomerates (Time-Warner and 
Bertelsmann), the consumer electronics companies Thorn, Philips, Matsu-
shita and Sony were in control of EMI, PolyGram, MCA and Columbia. 
Foundation and Proliferation of Capabilities 
Table 6.19 shows the collection of capabilities, categorized in four types, 
which were founded when the industry's rules of competition shifted once 
again during the mid-1980s. Managerial-based capabilities referred to the 
strategic knowledge that the cultivation of musical property rights could 
well be even more important than the generation of revenues via sales of 
physical recordings. Consumers became multiple-time buyers of the same 
piece of music over time, and this made it crucial for record companies to 
be in command of its property rights. Input-based capabilities covered 
physical assets such as distribution networks and CD manufacturing 
plants that supported the widespread cultivation of record catalogues (the 
record company's organizational capital). Transformation-based capabili-
ties embodied the innovative process through which majors and inde-
pendents cooperated in a symbiotic way to unite different parts of the 
value chain, and to disperse both established and unproven acts or music 
styles. 
Table 6.19: New Capabilities in the Mid-1980s 
Managerial 
Cultivation of 
musical property 
rights 
Multiple-time 
buyers of piece 
of music 
Input-Based 
Multinational 
distribution net-
works 
Scale-based CD 
manufacturing 
plants 
Transformation Output-Based 
Cooperative 
combination of 
value chain 
parts 
Specialized 
popular and al-
ternative artist 
building 
Expansion of rec-
ord catalogues 
Network of deals 
with independ-
ents 
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As a result, record companies' output-based capabilities covered the 
rights that were created in the processes of alternative and popular artist 
development, as well as the (majors' networks of) licensing agreements, 
manufacturing & distribution deals, and video production contracts. Al-
though the data does not reveal whether one firm in particular introduced 
these new competitive rules and capabilities, it does show how capabili-
ties were proliferated in three activity areas. Artist development became 
more and more directed towards the creation of global superstars that 
were involved in other forms of entertainment besides music. Relatedly, 
marketing and promotion of artists turned into a multi-media exercise to 
exploit musical property rights via an increasing variety of outlets. Fur-
thermore, record companies transformed into music companies as they 
became heavily involved in publishing, the trade of which had tradition-
ally been separated from the recording business. 
SUMMARY 
The history of the music industry demonstrates how record companies' 
search for new capabilities at the industry level was embedded in the dy-
namics of competition. In the early years of this century, the struggle for 
technological superiority between the disc and cylinder systems domi-
nated rival behavior. Not long after the disc technology was accepted as 
the standard, the essence of competition shifted towards selling recordings 
instead of gramophone cabinets in the mid-1910s. After the depression, 
competition was based on the idea of mass consumerism, where the star 
system allowed for bigger margins and culminated into a dominant market 
position of four major companies just after WWII. But this spell was bro-
ken during the mid-1950s as the principle of rivalry shifted from mass 
marketing established stars to discovering and developing new acts and 
music styles. From the late 1960s on, the competitive rules were based 
upon the organizational method of the multi-label federation, while the 
market was invaded by foreign rivals. After the second depression of the 
early eighties, the focus on musical property rights in a multi-media world 
underlined the next competitive doctrine. 
Table 6.20 displays these various competitive regimes that mark the 
industry's evolution, along with their particulars in terms of products, 
markets, technologies and primary organizational processes. The table 
thus shows how shifts in the competitive rules embodied changes in the 
character of core products and consumer markets, and reflected different 
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points of value creation within rival firms' organizations. The table also 
lists the various industry-specific technologies developed and employed 
during each competitive regime. Other technologies originating from out-
side the boundaries of the record industry appear to also have played a 
role in the competitive process. As TV replaced radio in the early fifties, 
the rejuvenation of local radio stations presented an opportunity to inde-
pendent labels. At a later stage, television became an important channel of 
promotion to the industry for the creation of artist images. Radio was also 
important in the development of newly-created stars during the late thir-
ties, but at the same time had been a threat to the industry when the Great 
Depression induced music consumers to look for alternative forms of en-
tertainment. 
Table 6.20: Competitive Regimes in the Music Industry 
Technology 
logic 
(early 1900s) 
Software shift 
(mid 1910s) 
Star system 
(mid 1930s) 
Alternative 
music 
(mid 1950s) 
Federal system 
(late 1960s) 
Rights shift 
(mid 1980s) 
Basic 
Product 
Gramophone 
cabinets 
Gramophone 
records 
Music re-
corded by 
celebrity artists 
Music re-
corded by 
alternative 
artists 
Music as social 
awareness 
Music as prop-
erty right 
Target 
Market 
Market for 
home enter-
tainment 
Market for 
musical variety 
Market for 
mass enter-
tainment 
Youth market 
segments 
Multi-market 
segments 
Global multi-
media markets 
Company 
Value Point 
Separate re-
cording and 
manufacturing 
Batch-based 
capacity pro-
duction 
Scale-based 
marketing and 
distribution 
A&R integrated 
with flexible 
distribution 
Label auton-
omy and HQ 
control 
Chain coopera-
tion and pub-
lishing 
Carrier 
Technology 
Disc system 
_ 
_ 
Vinyl record 
Tape recording 
Tape cassette 
Compact disc 
Obviously, both economic depressions had a negative impact on the 
industry's performance, like the Second World War had a positive impact 
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on the position of US-based music on international markets. While it was 
theorized in Chapter 3 that industry evolution is endogenous in nature be-
cause of competitive dynamics, it is clear that the evolution of the music 
industry has also been affected by some exogenous developments. Still, 
the data strongly support the notion that competition and capabilities 
coevolve as competitive interactions shaped the foundation and prolifera-
tion of capabilities during competitive regimes. The various tables shown 
at the end of each regime throughout this chapter displayed the foundation 
of capabilities in terms of the general distinction between managerial, in-
put-, transformation- and output-based capabilities. They made it clear 
that a change in the rules of competition was based on a radically new 
bundle of capabilities founded at the industry level. 
Table 6 .21 : Proliferation of Capabilities 
Input-Market 
Activities 
Output -Market 
Activities 
Organizat ional 
Design 
Technology logic 
Software shift From theater artists From standard From technology 
to anonymous per- cabinets to target start-up to record 
formers models company 
Star system From contracting From billboard to From small com-
artists to developing radio and movie pany to corporate 
stars promotion bureaucracy 
Alternative music From artist discov-
ery to image build-
ing 
From local to net-
work radio & TV 
promotion 
From A&R indi-
viduals to A&R 
departments 
Federal system From artist variety 
to overproduction 
From sales promo-
tion to elaborated 
marketing 
From multiple 
labels to foreign 
subsidiaries 
Rights shift From music artists 
to entertainment 
stars 
From local to global 
multi-media net-
works 
From record com-
pany to music 
company 
While in two out of six competitive regimes the data did not enable a 
positive identification of the strategic innovator - the company responsi-
ble for the introduction of the new capabilities to the industry - it was 
clear that capabilities were proliferated at the industry level in at least five 
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regimes.1 Table 6.21 summarizes the proliferation of capabilities as hap-
pened in each of the competitive regimes of the record industry's evolu-
tion. It shows how this process took place in terms of distinct activities 
that link a record company to (1) the creative community from which it 
extracts artists, and (2) the consumer market where music is actually sold. 
In essence, these input- and output-based activities further exploited rec-
ord companies' capabilities in artist strategies and marketing & promotion 
policies respectively, and were framed within a competitive regime's ex-
isting doctrine. Further changes in the organizational context supported or 
facilitated the proliferation of capabilities in distinct input- and output-
market activities. 
This chapter has narrated how, at the industry level, capabilities were 
founded and proliferated during the dynamics of competition which, to a 
large degree, shaped the music industry's evolution. Still, this first part of 
the empirical study into the record business has primarily stressed arising 
similarities between record companies as the competitive process un-
folded, rather than the more fine-grained differences between them. The 
force of imitation made individual firms more uniform as to the capabili-
ties required to compete effectively in the industry, but potential differ-
ences in the way by which record companies managed this process of 
replication were not discovered. The next chapter, in contrast, aims to deal 
with the latter issue, and narrates how individual firms created and refined 
capabilities during one particular competitive regime in the nineties. In 
other words, it studies (differences in) firm behavior in a context in which 
the rather abstract notion of competition becomes explicit in terms of ma-
nipulation and adaptation. 
1 As mentioned in Ihe course of this chapter. Victor. Decca. Atlantic and Warner were the 
strategic innovators in the early 1900s. mid 1930s, mid 1950s and late 1960s respectively. 
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Coevolution at the Firm Level: 
A Multiple-Case Study of Record Companies 
IFPI figures display how worldwide music sales almost doubled from 
$12.25 billion in 1985 to $24.10 billion in 1990. As said, the sustained 
price setting of the compact disc and the increasing returns on musical 
property rights had made giant multi-media and consumer-electronics 
corporations aware of music's value to other entertainment products. 
They had expanded or seized ownership control of the six dominant play-
ers in the music industry, which were increasingly relying on back cata-
logue sales. They had cut into their artist rosters during the recession of 
the early eighties, but the rise in revenues had reduced the need for a 
move back to strong A&R policies like some of the more prominent inde-
pendents had done. To make up for this detriment and, moreover, to gain 
control over the rights attached to rich catalogues, the majors turned their 
attention to these successful independent labels. Appendix C lists some of 
these acquisitions, such as the purchase of the American labels Geffen 
and Motown by MCA and PolyGram respectively. Yet, the most dramatic 
of these acquisitions took place in the UK. 
It is this specific part of the music industry that is the focus of inves-
tigation in this second empirical chapter. Here, a longitudinal study is pre-
sented that covers an eight-year period of coevolution of capabilities and 
competition in the British music industry. It describes and analyzes 
coevolution from a firm level perspective, in that it stresses differences in 
how record companies created and refined capabilities during a particular 
competitive regime in which the rules of the game were again redefined. 
In line with the methodological guidelines discussed in Chapter 5, a 
'three-dimensional' analysis of the context, content and process tied to 
organizational change at seven record companies is performed. This in-
quiry into how individual firms search for capabilities as they adapt to (or 
even manipulate) their competitive environment is embedded in a pano-
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ramie account of the competitive dynamics that shaped the UK industry 
during the period 1990-1997. To put things into perspective, this chapter 
commences with a brisk retrospect of the UK industry's development. 
TOWARDS A N E W COMPETITIVE REGIME 
During the second half of the sixties, the British record industry emerged 
as one of the major sources of repertoire in the worldwide music market 
when UK artists achieved international success. Starting with the Beatles, 
and followed by acts like the Rolling Stones and Led Zeppelin, British 
artists sold substantial amounts of records in the United States and on the 
European continent. This not only established Anglo-Saxon repertoire as 
the prominent source of music for the Western world in those years, but 
also made major record companies aware of the value of developing Brit-
ish talent and music. The positions of PolyGram and British EMI, based 
on a strong presence in British classical music, were eroded by the en-
trance of American majors CBS and Warner in 1965 and 1970 respec-
tively. Although sales increased during the seventies, the UK industry's 
growth was halted by the same recession of the early eighties that had also 
affected the American record business. 
Figure 7.1: Constant Value of UK Music Sales at 1997 Prices (in UK£ millions) 
Source: BPI Statistical Handbook 1998 
Figure 7.1 shows the (constant) sales values experienced by the Brit-
ish record industry from 1978 to 1992. A similar pattern is noticeable 
when compared to that of the US industry (as discussed in the previous 
chapter on how developments in the music business became more global 
in character during the 1980s). Indeed, prominent independents such as 
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Island and Virgin had engaged in manufacturing and distribution deals 
with BMG and PolyGram, and the average combined major distribution 
market share (representing BMG, EMI, PolyGram, Warner and Sony) 
over the period 1984-1990 was 82.8% (see Table 7.1). Like its American 
counterpart, most of the new music introduced to the UK market sprang 
from the musically innovative behavior of independent labels, whereas the 
major record companies focused on the cultivation of superstars and ex-
isting catalogues. This was reflected in a relatively modest combined 
market share that averaged 62% during those same years. 
Table 7.1: Market Shares of Majors and Independents 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Majors: 
Record 
Company 
60.4 
60.5 
62.3 
62.8 
60.9 
61.0 
66.3 
66.4 
72.8 
Majors: 
Distribution 
84.3 
83.1 
85.5 
86.2 
83.1 
83.1 
84.6 
85.5 
83.6 
Indies: 
Record 
Company 
39.6 
39.5 
37.7 
37.2 
39.1 
39.0 
33.7 
33.6 
27.2 
Indies 
Distribut 
15.7 
16.9 
14.5 
13.8 
16.9 
16.9 
15.4 
14.5 
16.^  
Source: Compiled from data displayed in BPI Statistical Handbook 1995 
Note: Both record company and distribution shares involve the market for albums. 
Table 7.2 displays some of the record labels that were founded in this 
period of musical innovation, which indicates the independent sector's 
health during those years. On the surface, the division of labor between 
A&R-oriented independent labels and majors specialized in manufactur-
ing and distribution proved fruitful to the industry. Figure 7.2 presents 
how British music sales more than doubled between 1985 and 1988 to 
almost $2 billion. In addition, the UK industry experienced an average 
growth rate of over 31%) during the same period. This expansion made it 
the best performing national music market of the Top Four major world 
markets, surpassing that of the United States, Japan and Germany (see 
Table 7.3). But the data also show a sudden halt to the UK industry's suc-
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cessful path of development, and Figure 7.1 visualizes how sales actually 
declined during the start of the nineties.1 
Table 7.2: Prominent Independent Labels Founded in the Eighties 
Record Company 
Creation Records 
Co! Discs 
Mute Records 
China Records 
Food 
Big Life Records 
Cooking Vinyl 
FFRR Records 
One Little Indian 
ZTT Records 
Date Founded 
1983 
1983 
1983 
1984 
1984 
1986 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Prominent Artists 
Jesus and Mary Chain 
Primal Scream 
Beautiful South 
Paul Weller 
Depeche Mode 
Erasure 
Art of Noise 
The Levellers 
Blur 
Jesus Jones 
Yazz 
De La Soul 
Bhundu Boys 
Oyster Band 
Salt ' N ' Pepa 
Utah Saints 
The Shamen 
The Sugarcubes 
Seal 
808 State 
Source: Adapted from Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1994), The Supply of Re-
corded Music, London: HMSO 
At the same time, the joint market share of British independent labels 
began to erode (see Table 7.1) when the most celebrated of these compa-
nies were attacked by major record corporations. In their search for record 
catalogues and publishing rights, EMI and PolyGram purchased the four 
biggest independent record companies that in 1987 had a market share of 
16.5%. At a total cost of £682 million, EMI acquired Chrysalis Records 
and Virgin Music Group between 1989 and 1992, increasing its market 
share from 12.7% to 22.2%. In the same way, PolyGram purchased Island 
Records and A&M Records for a figure of $822 million in 1989 and 
1990, raising its share from 16.1% in 1989 to 23.3% in 1992. 
' The fact that 1990 sales have a higher value than 1989 sales in Figure 7.2 (in $). while 
Figure 7.1 (in £) shows exactly the opposite, is due to fluctuations in exchange rates. 
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Figure 7.2a: Sales Values in Top Four Music Markets (in US $ Millions) 
Source: Compiled from IFPI Data 
Figure 7.2b: Sales Growth Rates in Top Four Music Markets (in %) 
BUS RJIUO 
D JAP Ratio 
• GER Ratio 
• UK Ratio 
B mi 
'—ms 
Source: Compiled from IFPI Data 
Table 7.3: Sales Growth in the World's Major Music Markets (in US $ Millions) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
US 
Sales 
4388.8 
4651.1 
5567.5 
6254.8 
6464.1 
7368.8 
Gr. % 
0.4 
6.0 
19.7 
12.3 
3.3 
14.0 
JAP 
Sales 
1299.6 
1972.9 
2396.9 
2969.3 
3152.0 
3039.8 
Gr. % 
-4.9 
51.8 
21.5 
23.9 
6.2 
-3.6 
GER 
Sales 
845.8 
1199.6 
1530.0 
1657.0 
1646.3 
2273.9 
Gr. % 
16.8 
41.8 
27.5 
8.3 
-0.6 
38.1 
UK 
Sales 
862.4 
1089.1 
1500.0 
1973.4 
1989.9 
2117.5 
Gr. % 
28.7 
26.3 
37.7 
31.6 
0.8 
6.4 
Source: Compiled from IFPI Data 
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At the time, the doubts of industry participants about the impact of 
these developments on the health of the record business increased. Espe-
cially after the Virgin acquisition, both independent and (rival) major 
companies commented on the industry becoming 'too corporate.'- How-
ever, an unexpected and constructive side effect would emerge out of 
these take-overs. 
THE CASE OF ISLAND RECORDS 
Because independent record companies were traditionally regarded as the 
engine of musical innovation, this merging of majors and indies was not 
favorably received. It was believed that it would obstruct the svmbiotic 
process between both groups and therefore block a renewal of artists and 
music which the industry so badly needed now that it was perceived to be 
in a state of depression during the early nineties.3 But it was the 1989 ac-
quisition of Island Records by PolyGram that brought the industry to a 
new level of rivalry and helped the UK music industry to regain its health. 
Case Box 7.1 describes the process of change at Island after the take-over 
in detail, and provides the basic input for an analysis of Island's search for 
capabilities as it manipulated its competitive environment. Table 7.4, pre-
sented thereafter, summarizes both the context and the content for change, 
that is, why the change happened in the first place and what the exact na-
ture of the transformation came to be. 
CASE BOX 7.1: ISLAND RECORDS 
Within a six month period, from July 1989 to January 1990, PolyGram purchased two 
of the industry's most eminent independent record labels, Island Records and A&M 
Records, for a combined figure of $822 mill ion. This set the stage for a new era in the 
life of PolyGram, the global music industry's third largest player. During the eighties, 
the record corporation had expanded primarily through internal growth, but with 
these acquisitions the firm's portfolio of labels almost doubled. Alain Levy, the man 
who had negotiated both deals and would become PolyGram's new CEO within one 
year, had thus created the opportunity for strengthening the company's market posi-
tion and corporate organization. But he also knew that his new labels needed to be 
restructured to integrate them into the firm's existing label group, formed by Phono-
gram-Mercury, Polydor and London. The following case study describes the strategic 
2 See, for example, the commentary articles "Virgin Rivals Eye Deal with Caution" and 
"A Sad Day for Independents" in Music Week, 14 March 1992. p. 3. 
3 Laing, D., "Industry Faces Difficult Time after Record-Breaking 80s." Music Business 
International, February 1991. p. 22. 
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change process at Island Records and analyzes how the company was able to im-
prove its competitive position in the market. 
Island's Hollow Success of the 1980s 
In 1962, Chris Blackwell was on his way from Jamaica, the island where he had spent 
his youth, to Britain, when he stopped over in New York to have lunch with Atlantic 
Records' Ahmet Ertegun. Inspired by this conversation, Blackwell started what would 
be one of Britain's most celebrated independent record companies: Island Records. 
Originally focused on selling Jamaican records, by the seventies Island had built an 
impressive roster with acts like Traffic, Cat Stevens and Bob Marley, while striking 
various label deals which gained access to the talents of King Crimson and Roxy Mu-
sic. During the eighties, Island enjoyed worldwide success when it sold millions of 
records through its international distribution deals with Warner and BMC. This was 
the time when Robert Palmer, Steve Winwood and Grace Jones all scored their big-
gest hits, Frankie Goes to Hollywood broke through, and U2 established itself as a 
global superact. 
So when Chris Blackwell and PolyGram's Levy agreed to appoint thirty-year-old 
Marc Marot in May 1990 to be the label's new Managing Director responsible for 
spearheading Island's restructuring program, it seemed his task would be a relatively 
easy one (especially given the fact that Marot was a six-year Island 'veteran' having 
run three of Island's other businesses including its music publishing division). How-
ever, behind this facade of success, Island was not in very good health as one of the 
most fundamental problems of the eighties had been the uncertain inflow of new 
recording talent. Basically, new artists came to the company through its A&R activi-
ties and its label deals - Frankie Goes to Hollywood, for example, was a license deal 
with ZTT Records. But worryingly, Island's A&R had virtually been a one-man show 
as Blackwell had positioned himself as the sole creative force within the record com-
pany. When during the second half of the 1980s most of the label deals ended and 
Blackwell turned his interest - as well as the company's funds - to other areas of 
entertainment such as movies, Island Records was left empty-handed in terms of its 
A&R capability. 
Furthermore, Island's dependence on its four superstars Robert Palmer, Steve 
Winwood, Grace Jones and U2 in reality meant that incomes were relatively modest 
due to their demands of higher advances and royalty payments. The company's diver-
sion of profits to its film business not only obstructed the development of a next gen-
eration of recording artists, but also hampered Island's ability to preserve three out of 
four of its superstar contracts. When these contracts expired, the company lacked the 
necessary capital to match the more lucrative offers made by rival record companies, 
leaving Island with only U2 as a 'superstar' act. A further source of deception was 
Island's high-cost infrastructure: large numbers of employees were tied to a swelling 
roster of artists, of which but a few were commercially viable. Reflecting on that 
situation, Marot commented how "at the time we were twice as big in terms of per-
sonnel as Mercury Records which was twice as big [as Island] in terms of turnover, 
while in terms of roster we were four times as big as Mercury Records."' 
Creating a New Island Philosophy 
Being a fat company in terms of its infrastructure but a hollow one regarding its A&R 
and marketing capabilities, Island managed to survive the late 1980s by exploiting its 
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catalogue through the release of numerous 'best-of albums and occasional hits from 
the likes of the Christians and Mica Paris. Faced with these gloomy facts, Marot real-
ized that major changes were inevitable if Island was to be among the top record 
companies of the industry again. He thus embarked on his role as a change agent by 
evaluating the company's key resources and developing a new vision for the com-
pany. Although in need of serious polishing, Island's artistic logo and culturally inno-
vative reputation were among the most prominent assets that could be used for future 
purposes. Equally important was the presence of company chairman Blackwell, 
whose reputation, industry expertise and connections were invaluable. The label's 
third core asset was its U2 contract; since its signing in 1980, the band had sold more 
than 50 million albums, which showed Island's commercial ability to the creative 
community. 
Another property base was the firm's respectable catalogue which, although it 
had already been exploited to a considerable degree, reflected Island's values to-
wards a diversity of musical streams. Finally, the new bonds of ownership not only 
provided vital access to PolyGram's deep pockets, but also reflected the music corpo-
ration's commitment to the successful execution of Island's turnaround program. 
Based upon this analysis of the company's pivotal assets, Marot set out to create a 
vision in which the label's successful past could be merged with the demands of the 
future. Island's history provided a rich context out of which a revived direction for 
new, cutting-edge music could be distilled that, at the same time, had to be in line 
with the commercial reality of the record business. The new philosophy thus chal-
lenged accepted industry knowledge that innovation in music and its effective com-
mercial exploitation could not be combined in a single record company. 
In his campaign to differentiate Island from the competition, which at the time 
had "retreated into bankable catalogue exploitation and mainstream pop,"" Marot 
thus defined his company as a commercially alternative label. "Commercially alterna-
tive meant to us that we were always going to be looking for alternative forms of un-
derground music, but we were going to be very, very keen to sell bucket loads of 
them if we could."1" With a background in Island's music publishing division, an area 
which enables people to develop skills in both music and business, Marot knew that 
it wasn't enough to just restore Island's A&R capability. The company also needed to 
be much more commercially oriented, and the lack of sufficient marketing expertise 
demanded the creation of new competence in this domain. But before he could in-
stall his new vision in the organization, he secured the support of Chris Blackwell and 
chairman Tom Hayes so that he could restructure Island into a focused and compact 
group of enthusiastic individuals. 
Restructuring Island's Cost Base 
Part of the aspired increase in Island's organizational effectiveness and efficiency was 
realized as a direct consequence of the PolyCram purchase. The corporation not only 
took care of the manufacturing and distribution of all Island records, but also created 
a new and bigger sales team, called AIM, which represented the combined product of 
Island and sister label A&M. Apart from the removal of much of Island's financial 
accounts department to a centralized unit within the corporation, PolyCram was also 
involved in the division of Island's music and more expensive film interests. The latter 
were placed in a separate company, Island World Communications, so that Island 
Visual Arts could concentrate its efforts and resources on the production of sell-
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through videos (to be distributed by PolyCram). Finally, the royalty and copyright 
functions of Island's publishing branch were transferred to the corporation's growing 
publishing company PolyCram Music. 
Although synergistic benefits flowed both ways, Island still faced a cost base 
disproportionate to its value-adding activities. While most of the functions involved in 
the various arrangements with PolyGram carried limited amounts of personnel, the 
number of staff within the remaining departments in no way related to their respec-
tive performance levels. The only way to get a grip on such an "expensively built 
company" for Marot was to identify "pockets of cynicism and absolute entrenched 
acceptance of failure" within some corners of the company.'" He thus reviewed and 
evaluated each person in every single department, not only on the basis of their past 
performance, but also in terms of their future potential. Quite a few people in key 
positions appeared to be anchored in Island's past practice, obstructing Marot's intent 
to instill new blood into the organization. Over the next 18 months, he removed 40% 
of the original 119 people within the various layers of Island's organization. 
A second source of Island's excessive cost base was rooted in its voluminous art-
ist roster of a total of 64 UK-signed acts, all in need of advances, recording costs, 
promotional material, management and tour support. The problem was that, apart 
from U2, only five of these acts broke even in terms of the costs ascribed to them. In 
a drastic move, Marot dropped more than 50% of this highly unprofitable roster dur-
ing those first 18 months. The limited value of Island's roster at the time was under-
lined by the virtual absence of competition for these acts: only two of them were able 
to get a record deal again on another label. For PolyCram these actions meant that 
the need to invest did not stop after it had acquired Island. During the following two 
years the corporation sustained heavy losses as Island disbanded half of its artist and 
employee contracts. But even more money was involved when Marot started his 
quest for rebuilding the label's capability base. 
Constructing Island's Capability Base 
The execution of downsizing policies represented but one of two parallel tracks that 
made up the change program. The other trajectory involved the restoration of Island's 
A&K competence and the development of new marketing capabilities. Marot realized 
that the key to a resurgence of company profits and turnover lay in developing a high-
quality repertoire; his principal objective in this respect was to bring the right A&R 
people into the organization. Although he had a basic sense of the musical direction 
Island would have to take to be successful again, Marot acknowledged that, coming 
from a music publishing background, he didn't have the expertise to actually make 
records. In need of a vigorous A&R team with "a backbone of experience in how to 
turn the vision into a practical physical reality of making records," the Island MD 
hired Nick Angel as head of A&R and promoted Julian Palmer as head of the 4th and 
B'way label.v Coming from Mercury and CBS respectively, their assignment was to 
pursue Island's musical history while at the same time start looking for music in 
places that no other record company would look. 
While the A&R team could build on Island's musical philosophy of the past, 
there was a lack of existing marketing skills and infrastructure within the company. 
Before the acquisition, there had been only one marketing executive for the 211 acts 
signed worldwide. This was born out of Blackwell's traditional distaste for marketing 
peonle, believing them to obstruct the creative process of delivering music of a high 
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caliber. But Marot believed that marketing staff can play a vital and creative role and, 
moreover, recognized the significance of strong marketing capabilities if he wanted to 
realize his vision of Island's pioneering role as a commercially alternative label. He 
therefore created a marketing team from scratch to establish a new competence bun-
dle that could actually sell records, while at the same time emphasize their artistic 
value. Paul McGarvey was hired from RCA as head of marketing, while the arrival of 
Phonogram's marketing director Nick Rowe as general manager further boosted the 
accumulation of marketing knowledge within the company. 
Apart from the creation and development of marketing and A&R capabilities, Is-
land's commercial focus was reinforced by the incorporation of a legal and business 
affairs department headed by Ian Moss. In line with Island's new business philosophy, 
the label was restructured according to how labels were design at major records 
firms. At Island, top positions within this structure were assigned to managers coming 
from major record companies, while the front-line positions were staffed by people 
with a background of working for independents companies. Reacting upon this ob-
servation, Marot explained that at "the key positions within the company in terms of 
making the business tick, I needed to have real core competences; while in terms of 
making the company exciting, I needed people that had challenging ideas and a kind 
of different excitement."1" 
Energizing the Island Organization 
Marot realized that in addition to this renewed 'lean and mean' Island, he needed to 
make his people hungry for success and to instill in them a sense of purpose. He thus 
created three basic vehicles through which he could raise employee moral and trigger 
enthusiasm among his staff. Foremost, there was Island's reason for existence: "there 
was nothing better than giving them good music; I gave them something to feed 
on.""" Furthermore, he composed a select group of people who would communicate 
his new vision further down the organization, designing a context in which employ-
ees could freely apply their creativity. Finally, Marot hired management consultants 
who set up action learning groups, risk-taking courses and implemented alternative 
team-building exercises throughout the company. But there was another event during 
the summer of 1991 that united the Island organization, be it that the incident was 
not engineered by Marot himself. 
On the day of release of the rap group NWA's album Efil4Zaggin, a police 
squad from Scotland Yard confiscated more than 12,000 copies, claiming it violated 
the British obscenity law. Although Island had released the album, its parent was also 
involved as the albums were seized from a PolyCram distribution plant. Unless both 
companies would decide to fight the move, the police would destroy the copies of 
the controversial album. When Marot turned to the record industry's trade organiza-
tion for financial and legal support, the BPI denied his request, as it didn't approve of 
the notorious record. His claim that this was not a matter of aesthetics but a "wider, 
more compelling issue in this case is censorship and freedom of speech,"Vl" earned 
him the full support of PolyGram's board and, moreover, a court victory. Again, Is-
land had displayed its role as an industry pioneer, and winning the first and last legal 
obscenity test against a recording created a sense of pride and loyalty within the 
company. 
PolyGram's added value to Island was certainly not limited to legal back up in 
the NWA case or cost reductions through attending the label's back office functions. 
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Without being aware of it, Marot enjoyed personal protection from PolyCram's CEO 
Alain Levy during the label's turnaround. Although perhaps doubtful about the com-
mercial viability of Island's new signings, he still backed him against Blackwell when 
required, who feared that Marot was turning Island into a major.'" This political sup-
port enabled the Island M D to pursue his vision and change program in a constant 
dialogue with PolyCram's corporate management. Another source of protection was 
embodied in his personal mentor, chairman of PolyCram UK Roger Ames, whose 
experiences through good and bad times taught him valuable lessons. Finally, the 
PolyCram structure provided Marot room for discussion of problems and industry 
issues on an informal level with colleagues at PolyCram's other labels. 
Island's Marked Success of the 1990s 
The label's new bundle of A&R and marketing capabilities aimed at alternative forms 
of music lead to Island's remarkable resurgence in the early 1990s. By the end of 
1992, the company had managed to sign Nine Inch Nails, PJ Harvey, PM Dawn and 
Stereo MCs, fol lowed by Cranberries, Pulp and Tricky in the next two years. As the 
A&R staff had indeed searched for acts in alternative areas of music where nobody 
else was looking, lack of competition prevented these deals from being hugely ex-
pensive. Artist development and creative marketing ensured that each of these acts 
was introduced successfully; a 1994 survey of 380 music industry employees indeed 
revealed that Island Records was considered to be the top record company in break-
ing and developing new acts." The rejuvenated label went from a situation of "mas-
sive unprofitability to very good and very stable profitability" within the first three 
years, while experiencing a 250% increase in turnover over a five-year period."' 
Exhibit 7.1: Island's Performance in Awards and Market Shares 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Ma 
Album 
rket Share 
1.4 
2.0 
2.0 
2.4 
2.4 
2.6 
1.7 
Brit 
Awards 
1 win, 2 nom 
-
2 win, 1 nom 
1 nom 
2 win, 7 nom 
1 nom 
8 nom 
Mercury 
Prize 
n/a 
n/a 
1 nom 
3 nom 
1 nom 
2 nom 
1 win 
Source: BP1 Statistical Handbook 1997, The UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 
Exhibit 7.1 shows Island's market share figures and the various awards won or 
nominations gained for in a seven-year interval. UK industry figures demonstrate that 
Island was the only registered label in the business that consistently maintained or 
increased its market share throughout the period 1990-1995. Exhibit 7.2 reflects Is-
land's enhanced capacity to get the best out of its artist roster, portraying the im-
provement in effectiveness with which the label commercialized its repertoire. The 
different awards and nominations express the record industry's and artistic commu-
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nity's recognition of Island's achievements. Sensing that their record company was 
back on the right track, U2 renewed its contract in a six-album worldwide deal with 
Island in 1993. Various employees were promoted during the fol lowing year, not 
only as a reward to their efforts and commitment in building a successful and stable 
Island, but also with the intention to prevent them from leaving in response to attrac-
tive offers by rival firms. 
Exhibit 7.2: Island's Performance in Repertoire (in Number of Signings) 
Year Super Profitable Commer- Unproven Total 
Profitable cial Viable Roster 
1990 1 1 4 63 69 
1996 4 4 4 24 36 
Source: Island company records 
The high visibility of Island Record's A&R policy's success inevitably attracted 
the attention of many competitors. Marot remembered how in the early nineties there 
was "a very small, well-stocked rock pool that we were sitting on the side of fishing, 
and every time we put our hook in, we pulled a fish out with nobody else fishing in 
the pool. I suddenly [early 1996] looked around and found there were much fewer 
fish left in the pool and everybody was fishing around it.""" In addition to this sudden 
increase in competition for new and alternative music, Island's management practice 
had become routinized, obstructing the flow of creativity within the company. In 
celebrating its success, Marot now believed that Island was struck with a certain 
amount of arrogance and even drowsiness, culminating in disappointing performance 
figures for 1996. Eight years older now, Island's M D Marc Marot was again con-
fronted with the need to change. But this time, things were different as he intended to 
transform the label's top-level management without the supervisionary eye of Black-
well, who had decided to leave PolyGram in November 1997. 
Endnotes 
' Recorded Interview, September 24th 1997. 
" Marot, M., 'Opinion,' Music Week, May 11th 1991, p. 4. 
'" Recorded Interview, September 24th 1997. 
~ Recorded Interview, January 27th 1998. 
" Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
•" Ibid. 
"" Marot, M., "Opinion,' Music Week. August 31st 1991, p. 4. 
" In his comments upon this text, Marc Marot stressed that ' I was not always at odds with Chris Blackwell; we could not have 
made the changes without his support. I believe though that he thought that sometimes I went loo far." 
* Editorial, "Survey Reveals the Industry's Winners," Music Week, October 1st 1994, p. 11. 
" Recorded Interview, September 24th 1997. 
"" Ibid. 
(See Appendix D for secondary sources) 
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The prime trigger for Island's organizational change trajectory was 
the label's new ownership relation with PolyGram. The Dutch major saw 
opportunities to create synergy benefits by incorporating activities like 
manufacturing and distribution, sales, accounting and publishing into its 
own operating structure, and to increase efficiency at the label itself. Still, 
the actual change process only got going after Marc Marot was appointed 
as Island's new Managing Director. Although the company had experi-
enced an average 3.6% market share between 1984 and 1988, Island's 
market performance had suddenly declined: in the year of its take-over, 
the label had a 0.8% market share, mainly due to the departure of three of 
its superstars and its reliance on label deals for A&R. Still,Marot had no-
ticed a new opportunity for his company as he saw how competition in the 
record industry evolved around the exploitation of existing catalogues and 
the development of acts into mainstream pop music. 
Table 7.4: Context and Content of Organizational Change at Island Records 
Change Context 
New executives Appointment of Marc Marot as new Managing Director 
New ownership PolyGram's £272 mill ion acquisition of Island 
Threat/opportunity Competition focused on catalogue and mainstream pop 
Performance decline Rapid decrease of company market share over 1989 
Change Content 
Vision Merge Island's musical past with future commercial demands 
Scope Introduce new music/artists to a wide audience 
Positioning Island as a commercially alternative record label 
Capabilities Rebirth/formation of A&R and marketing capabilities 
The MD's knowledge of this industry opportunity came to shape the 
content of change at Island. Marot developed a new vision in which the 
label's successful music history could be merged with the commercial 
demands of the future. His primary aim was to lift Island to a situation in 
which it introduced new alternative artists as well as new musical genres 
to the market, but to a much larger audience than was previously thought 
possible. Common sense in the record industry held that innovation in 
music and the commercial market were mutually exclusive opposites. But 
Marot based his change program on a different perception of the business, 
and positioned Island as a commercially alternative record label among its 
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rivals. Still, Island needed to create new capabilities to realize its novel 
strategy. Its dormant A&R capabilities had to be awoken, while capabili-
ties in marketing had to be bred considering the near absence of market-
ing skills within the company. 
Table 7.5: M a i n Events at Island Records 
Event Date 
PolyCram acquires Island Records for $320 million 
Publishing department to PolyCram 
Combined sales team for Island and A&M 
Marc Marot becomes new M D 
Removal of staff at key A&R positions 
Nick Angel becomes new head of A&R 
Account department integrated in PolyCram; 
Closure of art department; 
More staff removal 
Paul McCarvey becomes new head of marketing; 
Ian Moss 'brings in ' business affairs department; 
Joanne Turner becomes new A&R coordinator 
Island Visual Arts streamlined 
Julian Palmer becomes new head of 4th&B'way; 
Marc Marot publicly claims record companies have to take risks 
and break new genres instead of just artists 
Start of NWA obscenity case 
Island wins NWA case 
Nick Rowe becomes new general manager 
U2 renews its contract for six more albums 
Promotion of department heads as reward for success 
Island wins 1995 M W A&R award 
Nick Rowe leaves Island 
Chris Blackwell leaves Island 
July 1989 
March 1990 
April 1990 
May 1990 
July 1990 
August 1990 
September 1990 
January 1991 
February 1991 
May 1991 
June 1991 
November 1991 
March 1992 
June 1993 
April 1994 
March 1996 
October 1997 
November 1997 
Island's search for such new capabilities embodied a process of or-
ganizational change, which started with the appointment of Marc Marot 
and ended near the end of 1992 when it had signed the first four acts that 
would be part of its successful artist roster - Nine Inch Nails, PJ Harvey, 
PM Dawn and the Stereo MCs. Table 7.5 lists the major events during 
these 214 years of transformation (as well as the specific dates of their oc-
currence) covered in the Case Box of Island Records. Furthermore, Table 
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7.6 displays an outline of the core features of the strategic change process 
at Island. The label's new business philosophy was to extract high-quality 
repertoire from the creative community that had a higher than average 
commercial potential to a broad consumer music market. As a prelude to 
the mandatory restructuring of Island's organizational processes, the 
video division was streamlined, while the art department was terminated. 
Table 7.6: Process of Organizat ional Change at Island Records 
New philosophy Discover high-quality repertoire with commercial potential 
Reorganization Structure with new A&R and marketing staff at top and front-line 
positions 
Internal ventures Launch of internal legal and business affairs department 
Novel acquisitions 
New alliances 
Status reevaluation Declining influence of founder Blackwell on label strategy 
Learning new skills Marketing new and alternative music (genres) 
Resolving dilemmas Innovation in and commercialization of music 
In addition, 40% of the company's staff was discharged to make 
room for new people from outside the firm with experience and skills in 
both A&R and marketing. Marot structured Island's organizational proc-
esses conform to the designs he had observed at individual labels of major 
record companies. This enabled him to place managers with a 'corporate' 
history at top positions and put staff with working experience at indies in 
front-line positions. The heightened awareness of commercial aspects also 
required the launch of a new legal and business affairs department that 
would keep track of the label's property rights and contractual relation-
ships. Founder Chris Blackwell's influence on the label's direction was 
eroded. Finally, new skills were learned as new acts and music styles 
were marketed on a broad consumer market. In the end, Island Records 
managed to resolve the dilemma between innovation in, and commerciali-
zation of, music. 
As for the effects of Island's transformation on its financial perform-
ance, Table 7.7 shows the label's resurrection in terms of turnover and 
gross profits. From 1990 onwards, these figures display a steady growth 
pattern over the first half of the nineties, which was slightly interrupted 
only in 1993. 
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Table 7.7: Island Records' Financial Performance (in £1000) 
Turn-
over 
Cross 
Profit 
Operat. 
Profit 
1990 
20140 
4877 
(4606) 
1991 
25159 
4230 
(2062) 
1992 
37718 
8441 
1270 
1993 
37375 
8188 
880 
1994 
40949 
8548 
234 
1995 
45823 
10693 
361 
1996 
37390 
8658 
(2963) 
Source: Compiled from the UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 1993-1998 
THE C A S E OF VIRGIN RECORDS 
At about the same time that Island's Marc Marot hired a new general 
manager as one of his final moves in the label's transformation process, a 
major event took place in the UK music industry. In March 1992, major 
record corporation EMI purchased the Virgin Music Group from founder 
Richard Branson for £560 million. This take-over induced a process of 
organizational change at London-based Virgin Records, which in the end 
would make an important contribution to the revival of British acts and 
music on an international level. Case Box 7.2 narrates the change process 
at Virgin after the 1992 purchase in more detail. This text supports a sub-
sequent analysis of the label's search for capabilities in a changing com-
petitive environment. This discussion starts with Table 7.8 that displays 
the primary features of the change context (why did the change happen), 
as well as the main attributes that made up the change content (what was 
its exact character). 
CASE BOX 7.1: VIRGIN RECORDS 
When Colin Southgate took over as Thorn EMI's new CEO in 1987, the corporation's 
music company entered a new era in its long history. Rooted in its contract with The 
Beatles and its fair share of the classical market, EMI Music had established itself as a 
major world player during the '60s and '70s. But after its incorporation into the Thorn 
conglomerate in 1980, the firm became what many in the record industry regarded as 
a 'sleeping giant." Lacking a winning culture and governed by people who lived on 
memories of past success, EMI had turned into a company that was poorly managed 
and organized. Southgate designed a new strategy to cope with EMI's need for both a 
different approach to the market and a stronger presence within the worldwide music 
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industry. Regarding the latter component of his strategy, Southgate had initially been 
outbid by MCA and PolyCram, when respectively Ceffen and Island were up for sale. 
But he definitely managed to rock the industry in 1992 when EMI acquired the most 
prominent of all independents: Virgin Records. 
How the Maiden Lost Her Virtue 
After two years of operating as a record retailer, Richard Branson launched the Virgin 
record label in 1973. Modeled after Chris Blackwell's Island label, Branson wanted 
his company to be involved in music outside the commercial mainstream. Branson's 
entrepreneurial touch was complemented by the creative talents of co-founder Simon 
Draper, who became responsible for the label's artistic direction. This combination of 
skills lead to the signing of Mike Oldfield and The Sex Pistols during the seventies. 
Although the new record company enjoyed staggering sales and even more publicity 
in those years, Virgin's success really gained momentum during the eighties with acts 
like Phil Collins, Human League and Simple Minds. In the mean time, Ken Berry had 
joined the company to govern the label's business affairs and firm management. This 
enabled Branson to reduce his personal involvement in Virgin Records to negotiating 
multi-mill ion dollar deals with big acts such as Janet Jackson and The Rolling Stones. 
In the late 1980s, Virgin expanded into 25 countries, and in the United States 
immediate success followed as deals were struck with artists like Paula Abdul, Lenny 
Kravitz and Meat Loaf. However, as the label's size surged, new staff and acts were 
contracted without much regard to their commercial viability, and the corporation's 
entrepreneurial culture even seemed to encourage such unlimited growth. Moreover, 
Virgin's prosperity had pulled the company into the area of mainstream pop music, a 
competitive environment in which it was surrounded by commercially focused major 
record corporations. Despite this shift away from the label's original positioning and 
his virtual non-interference with operational matters, Branson remained emotionally 
attached to his record label. In January 1992, when asked about a possible sale of his 
music company, he insisted that "as Virgins we've enjoyed our virginity for 20 years 
and don't really want to lose it."" 
Yet, during the second half of the 1980s the unpredictable Branson had moved 
into the airlines business, where he perceived unexploited new market opportunities. 
Here, he quickly saw his business costs rise in a capital-intensive and cyclical indus-
try where competition was dominated by large national airline operators. In his hunt 
for more cash, Branson made an unsuccessful attempt to raise external capital 
through the London Stock Exchange between 1986 and 1988. In the next year, he 
sold 25% of his music assets to the Japanese media corporation Fujisankei for £115 
mill ion. Although he raised another £40 million through Sega's purchase of Virgin 
Mastertronic in 1991, the British entrepreneur was still in need of substantial capital 
to compete effectively with the likes of British Airways and Pan Am. Two months 
after his statement that the Virgin Music Croup was not for sale, Branson abandoned 
his flag ship for the £560 mill ion offered by Thorn EMI. 
Putting the Lady on a Diet 
Thorn EMI's CEO Southgate realized that his acquisition of Virgin offered immense 
opportunities to create the world's biggest record corporation, but at the same time 
he knew that their amalgamation could leave both companies worse off. Virgin Rec-
ords' unique entrepreneurial style had accounted for much of its success, and a full 
171 
COEVOLUTION AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
merger with the prudent EMI institution would undoubtedly destroy much of the 
company's future value. Still, Southgate intended to implant part of EMI's business 
philosophy into the Virgin organization to avoid extravagant expenditures and to get 
the company focused again. He thus called upon the services of his number one man, 
Jim Fifield, to implement the changes necessary to rationalize Virgin's cost structure. 
Southgate had appointed Fifield in 1988 to shake EMI out of its doze, and under his 
leadership profit figures had increased sharply.'" 
Commenting upon his latest assignment, in which he had to team up with the 
Virgin Music Croup's new CEO Ken Berry, Fifield said that "we are obviously going 
to look for efficiencies and the right synergies, but we are not going to take away the 
spark and entrepreneurial spirit which Virgin has shown over the years."IV Most of the 
synergy benefits, a reported £47 mill ion, were realized through Virgin's product flow 
in EMI's worldwide manufacturing sites and distribution channels. Significant cost 
reductions were also achieved through the absorption of Virgin Music Publishing into 
EMI's publishing arm, raising the latter's catalogue with 25,000 titles. But the larger 
part of the actual downsizing took place at Virgin Records, where more than 30% of 
the total staff was laid off within one year. Most employees were forced to resign, but 
some left the label voluntarily claiming that "Virgin is a different company from what 
it was and without saying it with any recrimination or bitterness, sometimes you 
know when it's time to leave."v 
Apart from removing its classical music label to EMI's Classics division, a fair 
number of Virgin's sub-labels were disbanded in that same year. Imprints such as Ten 
Records that were related to contracts with specific A&R people, and labels that were 
tied to particular artists such as Boy George's More Protein imprint were the first to 
go. These policies were initiated against the background of curtailing Virgin Record's 
voluminous artist roster that had grown to more than 150 acts in the UK alone. With 
the exception of the company's superstar deals, all artists were evaluated on the basis 
of their artistic and commercial value in the near future. Within 1P. months after the 
acquisition, Virgin had cut its roster to 70 acts, generating turnover almost exclusively 
via releases of its superstars during 1993 and 1994. Additional revenues in this period 
were derived from Virgin's domination of the compilations market segment with its 
'Best Album in the World' and 'Now!' series - the latter via a long-standing alliance 
with EMI and PolyCram. 
How the Lady Got Back in Shape Again 
Virgin thus managed to remain profitable during the shake-up, but it was self-evident 
that the company needed new repertoire to be successful in the future and to lower 
its dependence on past A&R achievements. Having been involved in the full process 
of restructuring for 18 months, Virgin's Managing Director Paul Conroy now set out 
to re-build the company's musical and commercial capabilities. Although Conroy had 
not been appointed by Southgate himself, the EMI CEO knew he was the right man 
for the job; three months before Virgin's acquisition, Southgate had offered him the 
job of turning daughter-label Chrysalis around, but in the end Branson came up with 
a better offer. Having developed industry expertise at Warner and Chrysalis in areas 
as diverse as marketing, international affairs and general management, Conroy started 
to develop a new vision for Virgin Records. The key of that vision lay in building 
new, cutting-edge repertoire: "this is the year for focusing on new talent; when our 
A&R strategy comes of age."vl 
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Conroy's philosophy of how to develop new Virgin repertoire was structured 
around three core themes. First, artists had to be created for the world, in that each 
and every act would be contracted with a global audience in mind. As a UK-based 
record company, Virgin had the British advantage of the English language and a his-
torically determined international outlook. Although it would be virtually impossible 
to break all of its acts on a global basis, Virgin had much to gain by an explicit inter-
national business perspective. Furthermore, new repertoire had to be built in alterna-
tive music spheres; during the eighties, Virgin had drifted towards mainstream pop 
music, but it needed to focus on areas where new styles continued to pop up. Finally, 
the label had to maintain Virgin's original entrepreneurial culture, but in a much 
more focused way. In this respect, EMI's performance standards, which had guided 
the label's management during the restructuring phase, would be useful in creating a 
proper context. 
According to Conroy, the heart of the matter was not simply to build Virgin's 
marketing and A&R capabilities but, moreover, to blend them in a way that business 
and musical objectives would become one. Whereas in most record firms marketing 
and A&R departments often clash because of different viewpoints, the Virgin MD was 
blessed by the presence of his two deputies, Ray Cooper and Ashley Newton. These 
men had worked together at Island Records before teaming up and launching the 
Circa label within Virgin in 1987. Responsible for signing and breaking acts like Mas-
sive Attack and Neneh Cherry, Newton's A&R talents and Cooper's marketing skills 
had already earned them the supervision of Virgin's associate labels in 1991. Recog-
nizing the unique value of their partnership, Conroy appointed Cooper and Newton 
to be his deputy managing directors in 1992 when Thorn EMI obtained ownership. 
After some 18 months of downsizing, Virgin's new management team started to di-
rect their full attention to what they could do best: developing and commercializing 
new repertoire. 
The Development of Virgin's New Capability Base 
At the same time, the new Virgin management team had to be careful not to repeat 
the record company's historical folly of unlimited and unstructured growth. For with-
out a clear sense of direction, the label could easily drift away as it had done during 
the late eighties. Recognizing the strategic value of Virgin's original ethos, the man-
agement team set out to create a structured organizational setting in which creativity 
could flow without disturbing the various creative processes themselves. Core to this 
idea was to structure the Virgin organization as a network of satellite labels, division-
alized along three broad musical categories: pop, alternative and dance. Whereas 
established artists and mainstream pop acts continued to be signed directly to the 
Virgin front-line label, two distinct departments were founded to deal with the com-
pany's exploration into the areas of alternative and dance music. 
Installed to deal with the discovery and development of new talent and music, 
both divisions were headed by experienced A&R men who would be responsible for 
an organic growth process of their departments through a number of sub-labels. The 
alternative music division came to be managed by David Boyd, who had founded his 
Hut label - home to acts such as Smashing Pumpkins and Urban Dance Squad - un-
der the Virgin umbrella in 1991. Accordingly, the new dance department came under 
the supervision of Andy Thompson, who had successfully managed London Record's 
ffrr dance label. Virgin Record's full ownership of its alternative and dance imprints 
173 
COEVOLUTION AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
thus reflected a long-term commitment to the cultivation of what Ray Cooper re-
garded as "a core competence in the discovery, development and marketing of artists 
on a global level."v" Although the absence of third-party interests made the com-
pany's label policy an expensive matter, it effectively expressed the credibility of Vir-
gin's commitment to its artists. 
In line with the ambition of Virgin's management team to establish a focused but 
creative company, both departmental managers had to be highly selective in their 
signing policy. The idea of housing a limited amount of high-quality acts within each 
imprint was to establish a creative environment where, according to Cooper, "a team-
based atmosphere enhances communication with the artist and activities continue to 
be comprehensive for those involved."vl" As a consequence, marketing and promo-
tion capabilities and A&R competences were cultivated at an operational level within 
the company where creativity could emerge instantaneously. In contrast, Virgin's 
general A&R direction and marketing course were shaped by top management along 
distinct planning stages. Coordination among various layers of responsibility was 
achieved via open channels of communication within the company and, more for-
mally, by means of common management systems and performance criteria. 
A New Virgin, A New Success 
Within two years, Virgin Records had become a very different company from what it 
used to be before the EMI purchase, be it that Branson's original Virgin philosophy 
was still alive within the label. With a trimmed record company and no worries about 
manufacturing and distribution, Virgin's management had managed to install a sense 
of discipline within the organization while at the same time encouraging an interac-
tive flow of creativity throughout the company. Referring to the benefits of Virgin's 
new network of in-house imprints, Cooper stressed how "the relationships of people 
within a record company are crucial to its success, and that's why communication 
channels must be open at all times.""1 In the end, Virgin's A&R and marketing capa-
bilities were enhanced and exploited on a company-wide level. Moreover, they were 
integrated in a way that business objectives would not undermine the search for high-
quality music. 
Exhibit 7.3: Virgin's Performance in Awards and Market Shares 
Year Album Bri t Mercury 
Awards Prize 
1991 6.4 n/a n/a 
1992 7.3 n/a 
Market Share 
9.0 
8.6 
8.3 
10.7 
10.3 
1993 2 nom 1 nom 
1994 2 win, 2 nom 
1995 2 nom 
1996 1 win, 3 nom 
1997 3 win, 8 nom 2 nom 
Source: BP1 Statistical Handbook 1997, The UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 
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Exhibits 7.3 and 7.4 show the impact of Virgin's strategic change program on its 
performance for the period 1991-1997 in terms of industry awards, record company 
market share, and repertoire. The company's steady growth of sales and operating 
profits since the EMI take-over reflect the success of Virgin's rehabilitation efforts, 
whi le the same can be argued if one observes the increase in album market share: 
official BPI figures show that no other record company could match Virgin's 4.3% 
growth in market share over these six years. The transformation in Virgin's repertoire 
composition expresses the label's effectiveness with which it built and marketed its 
artist roster. Leaving aside a few smart signings (like George Michael after he broke 
up with Sony Music), incomes were derived from the label's capabilities in re-
searched-based marketing and style-searching A&R. This is clearly mirrored in the 
commercial success of artists like Janet Jackson and Spice Girls, and the breakthrough 
of acts such as Verve and the Chemical Brothers. 
Exhibit 7.4: Virgin's Performance in Repertoire (in %) 
Year Super Profitable Commer- Unproven Total Ros-
Profitable cial Viable ter 
1992 5 10 20 65 100 
1997 15 20 35 30 100 
Source: Estimated on the basis of artist rosters 
In 1996, Virgin's UK artist roster accounted for sales of more than 4.3 million 
albums, which made Virgin "the most successful in the UK at signing and developing 
British talent" according to research performed into the performance of British record 
labels." However, Virgin's management team has recognized the dangers inherent to 
that unique performance, described by Cooper as "the toughest thing we're con-
fronted with again and again is to keep the boundaries of the company within clearly 
defined limits, and to prevent staff growing out of its corporate jacket.""' Another 
challenge for Virgin presented itself when deputies Newton and Cooper crossed the 
Atlantic at the end of 1997 to run Virgin Records America. Although their presence in 
the US company created an opportunity for Conroy to break his acts in America, the 
Virgin M D would now have to adapt his organization in order to keep the balance 
between A&R and marketing alive. 
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From an outsider perspective, the most observable cause of Virgin's 
trajectory of transformation was the transfer of the firm's formal owner-
ship to Thorn-EMI. EMI's CEO Southgate publicly stated how synergy 
benefits could be achieved as distribution and manufacturing of Virgin 
products (formerly taken care of by rival PolyGram) would be dealt with 
by the major. Additional economies were to be gained by incorporating 
Virgin's publishing division and its classical label into the equivalent op-
erations of EMI. A second drive for change was the formation of Virgin 
Record's new top management team, consisting of three individuals with 
complementary skills. Whereas Virgin's average market share during the 
period 1985-1990 had been 7.6%, the label had experienced a drop in per-
formance as its market share had declined to 6.4% in 1991. But Managing 
Director Paul Conroy had noticed an opportunity in that there was no 
competition in the industry for alternative music at an international level. 
Table 7.8: Context and Content of Organizational Change at V i rg in Records 
Change Context 
New executives Formation of new three-headed management team 
New ownership Thorn-EMI's £560 mill ion acquisition of Virgin 
Threat/opportunity No competition for new music on a global level 
Performance decline Sudden decrease of company market share in 1991 
Change Content 
Vision Merge Virgin's entrepreneurial past with future global demands 
Scope Deliver new music/artists to a worldwide audience 
Positioning Virgin as a globally focused record company 
Capabilities Convergence of new A&R and marketing capabilities 
Conroy therefore developed a vision in which Virgin's original entre-
preneurial culture could be blended with a global approach to new music. 
His principal goal was to turn Virgin into a focused record company that 
would have a superior competence in delivering alternative forms of mu-
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sic and new acts to a worldwide audience. This meant that artists would 
not necessarily have to be UK-based, but could also originate from other 
parts of the world. From a competitive point of view, Virgin was therefore 
positioned in the industry as a globally oriented record company in the 
discovery and development of new acts. But to realize these ambitions, 
Virgin had to shake off some of the more negative effects of its entrepre-
neurial culture, which had culminated in its unrestrained and inefficient 
growth. Moreover, the company needed to construct new capabilities in 
A&R and marketing and, furthermore, to converge these capabilities in an 
international frame of mind. 
Table 7.9: M a i n Events at V i rg in Records 
Event Date 
Paul Conroy becomes new Virgin M D 
EMI acquires Virgin for £560 mill ion 
Removal of 80 staff; 
Termination of 80 artist contracts; 
Publishing department and Classics label to EMI; 
Ray Cooper and Ashley Newton become deputy MDs 
Offside label M D Lascelles leaves Virgin 
Ten label M D Clark leaves Virgin; 
Termination of More Protein label 
Removal of staff at international department 
Fifield claims Virgin to be more focused and profitable 
David Boyd becomes head of new alternative music 
Division 
Conroy publicly states Virgin's reorganization is over and 
that Virgin has spent the past 18 months into new music 
areas 
Andy Thompson becomes head of new dance department 
Virgin signs Chemical Brothers; 
Promotion of marketing and A&R staff to management 
team 
Conroy publicly states four years of hard work pay off 
Virgin moves into pop with Spice Girls 
Virgin wins eight 1 996 M W awards 
Research confirms Virgin's A&R department as the most 
successful at signing and developing British talent 
Ray Cooper and Ashley Newton move to Virgin America 
February 1992 
March 1992 
June 1992 
October 1992 
November 1992 
May 1993 
December 1993 
January 1994 
June 1994 
March 1995 
April 1995 
October 1995 
September 1996 
March 1997 
April 1997 
October 1997 
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Virgin's search for such new capabilities embodied a process of or-
ganizational change, which started with the acquisition of the company by 
Thorn-EMI in March '93 and formally ended in June '94 when Conroy 
publicly proclaimed the end of Virgin's reorganization process.4 Table 
7.9 lists the major events and their corresponding dates during these years 
of transformation as described in the Virgin Records Case Box. In addi-
tion, Table 7.10 presents a structured overview of the most prominent 
features that made up Virgin's change process. The company's new phi-
losophy was directed at the discovery and development of creative and 
alternative artists for a worldwide music audience. A head count reduction 
of more than 30%, the termination of more than half of its original artist 
roster to 70 acts, and the divestment of particular sub-labels tied to indi-
vidual artists or A&R people preceded the necessary restructuring of the 
label's organizational processes. 
Table 7.10: Process of Organizat ional Change at V i rg in Records 
New philosophy Discover alternative repertoire with global potential 
Reorganization Internal network of divisionalized sub-labels 
Internal ventures Launch of alternative and dance departments 
Novel acquisitions 
New alliances 
Status reevaluation Increasing attention to research-based marketing 
Learning new skills Coordinating creative and planning functions 
Resolving dilemmas Diversity in A&R and targeted marketing 
Virgin's internal organization was structured as a company-owned 
network of small satellite labels which were categorized into three broader 
music divisions (pop, alternative and dance). These departments were 
headed by managers like David Boyd and Andy Thompson, who had sig-
nificant A&R experience in their respective musical areas. To create such 
an organization, two new departments were launched that would manage 
Virgin's operations in alternative and dance music. This new organiza-
tional setup facilitated the development of specific A&R and marketing 
capabilities at the front-line level where creativity was key, while the 
company's more general A&R and marketing course was planned at top 
4
 However, the analysis presented here suggests that the process of reorganization could 
have continued until at least March 1995 when Virgin launched its new dance division. 
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level. Marketing policies came to be much more founded on marketing 
research techniques. All this cumulated in Virgin's ability to resolve the 
dilemma between diversity in artist development and targeted marketing 
at the global level. 
Table 7.11: Virgin Records' Financial Performance (in £1000) 
Turn-
over 
Gross 
Profit 
Operat. 
Profit 
1991 
80130 
41743 
19110 
1992 
73685 
39255 
3129 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
93545 132968 142767 164168 219562 
43964 63111 66012 76242 87632 
27408 27079 31693 34650 42621 
Source: Compiled from the UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 1993-1998 
From a financial point of view, Virgin's turnaround came to be a suc-
cess (see Table 7.11). In the five years after the label had been acquired 
by Thom-EMI, Virgin managed to triple its turnover and saw its gross as 
well as its operating profits increase in a significant way. 
MAJORS' RESPONSE TO THE N E W REGIME 
Apart from acquisitions like those of Island and Virgin, majors and inde-
pendents were also moving closer to one another through more compli-
cated relationships other than formal ownership structure. Cooperation via 
production and distribution deals that had linked both types of companies 
during the eighties became more complex in character at the start of the 
nineties. On the one hand, major companies recognized the value of inde-
pendents in terms of their ability to discover new acts: an industry survey 
of 380 industry employees revealed that 83% of the respondents consid-
ered the independent sector to be more important than ever.5 On the other 
hand, independents themselves acknowledged the fact that majors had 
superior skills in distribution and marketing.6 More often than not, indies 
- Editorial. "Survey Reveals Industry's Winners." Music Week. 1 October 1994. p. 11. 
6 Editorial. "Indies and Majors: Happy to Fraternise with the Enemy." Music Week. 15 
December 1990. p. 15. 
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faced cash shortages, tortuous distribution operations and a lack of mar-
keting knowledge, which endangered the label's survival (Lee, 1995). 
During the early nineties, major corporations and independents thus 
began to combine their complementary strengths through cooperative 
ventures. This resulted in the formation of webs of complex relationships 
between majors and minors, breaking down the conventional distinctions 
between both genres (Negus, 1992). Apart from the mode of an outright 
acquisition, three principal types of partnerships between the major record 
companies and independent labels emerged in the UK industry in the late 
eighties, all of which were increasingly adopted during the first half of the 
nineties (Hesmondhalgh, 1996). First of all, the major could acquire a mi-
nority stake from the owner-manager of an independent label with an op-
tion to purchase the remainder at some later point in time. The label's 
management retained full creative control and operated in a relatively 
autonomous manner. In the meantime, the major took care of local and/or 
international distribution of the label's products, backed up its financial 
position, and provided legal and administrative expertise. 
The earliest reported example of this type of partnership goes back to 
1987 and regards PolyGram's purchase of a 49% stake in Go! Discs. The 
main advantage to the major company in such a setting was that it could 
track and evaluate the independent's (lack of) success over time, which 
made the investment decision to buy the remaining shares less risky. 
However, the termination of the Go! Discs label in 1996 shows how these 
cooperative ventures could lead to conflicts between label management 
and the major at a later stage (as will be discussed in the Independiente 
case presented later on in this chapter). This cooperative mode could also 
take the shape of a joint venture in which both the label managers and the 
major took a 50% ownership stake, and worked together more closely. 
For example, in their joint venture with BMG, the managers of the De-
construction label were responsible for the major's overall dance strategy, 
while they accessed BMG's operational structure. 
A second type of partnership is the so-called funding and distribution 
deal, in which the major did not purchase an ownership share of the label 
but still provided it some financial resources. Flere, collaboration was on a 
fixed-term basis and evolved around complete label autonomy and major 
distribution. Chronicled as the prototype of this kind of alliance is EMl's 
1988 deal with Food, home to acts as Blur and Jesus Jones. In 1994, this 
agreement turned into a 25%-75% stakeholder partnership, with EMI 
gaining formal control of the label. Still, Food continued its A&R policy 
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outside EMI, although the major was now involved in both the marketing 
and distribution of its products.7 Another example of the funding and dis-
tribution deal is the relationship between indie label Blanco Y Negro and 
Warner Music, managed by founder Geoff Travis in close collaboration 
with Warner's front-line label WEA. Again, this agreement evolved into 
an elaborated shareholder relationship. 
Finally, there is the license agreement in which the independent label 
licenses individual acts or recordings to the major that takes care of eve-
rything else apart from the initial discovery of the particular artist. The 
license deal was, to a minor extent, in use in the late 1980s, and has been 
extended to an international level in the early 1990s. In this way, inde-
pendent companies were relieved from the time-consuming, expensive 
and complicated activity of negotiating licensing and export agreements 
with a number of foreign independent labels. The major partner, in turn, 
collected international revenues and paid its minor counterpart a licensing 
fee, usually in terms of a certain percentage of the wholesale price. Over 
time, even more sophisticated agreements came to life, as deals were con-
structed that combined elements of these three basic types of strategic al-
liances. A prime example is the cooperative venture between Creation 
Records and Sony Music UK's Licensed Repertoire Division. 
Sony had already launched this division in 1992 to coordinate its in-
ternational licensing activities with regard to its affiliated independent 
companies. It established partnership deals with labels like Creation, 
Nude and Network in which it acquired up to 50% of their shares. In this 
way, these independent labels could piggyback on Sony Music's interna-
tional marketing and distribution, gain financial stability, and absorb ad-
ministrative and legal expertise. Creation, for instance, was offered £3.5 
million in 1992 to sell 49% of the label to Sony's LRD. Apart from the 
fact that acts like Oasis were professionally marketed on a world-wide 
level by Sony, Creation also benefited from this deal as it learned how to 
set up a focused and efficient record company. As a consequence. Crea-
tion changed into a company where both music and business were consid-
ered to be crucial to its success. The deal was extended in 1996, when 
Creation was reported to have generated a pre-tax profit of £7.0 million.8 
7
 Editorial, "Food Men Sell to EMI." Music Week, 23 April 1994. p. 1. 
8
 Sources: Editorial. "Creation's £3.5 Million Deal Sees Sony Go 'Indie'." Music Week, 
22 August 1992. p. 1; Gorman, P. "Indie Pioneer's Ambitions Go Beyond Hitting Number 
One," Music Week, 26 August 1995. p. 8: Editorial. "Creation Finds the Perfect Partner." 
Music Week. 15 June 1996. p. 3; Editorial, "Dane Report Names Creation as Top Indie," 
Music Week, 23 August 1997, p. 1. 
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THE CASE OF BMG INTERNATIONAL UK 
The increase in cooperative ventures was a general phenomenon in the 
UK industry in that all majors were creating ties with independent labels. 
However, some major firms were more involved in these practices than 
others: apart from Sony Music's Licensed Repertoire Division, the other 
major record corporation that came to build its strategy on a comprehen-
sive approach to collaboration was BMG International UK. Because the 
firm had its roots in RCA, the American record company that once had 
been one of the 'big four' companies until the mid-1950s, its repertoire 
had been primarily US-based. But as British music was important to the 
company's International group, the UK company had to create a sound 
base of local repertoire. Case Box 7.3 narrates the process of change in-
volved in this assignment, and supports the analysis of BMG's search for 
capabilities in a changing competitive environment. Subsequently, Table 
7.12 displays the characteristics of both the context and content of change. 
CASE BOX 7.3: BMG INTERNATIONAL UK 
When the German media conglomerate Bertelsmann AG acquired RCA Records from 
General Electric in 1986, it entered an international arena in which five major players 
- CBS, EMI, MCA, PolyGram and Warner - were competing for global dominance. 
Driven by its ambition to be one of the world's Top 3 record companies, the German 
corporation created the Bertelsmann Music Group as an organizing framework for its 
various labels and publishing houses. BMG International, responsible for the group's 
worldwide music activities outside North America, responded to these aspirations by 
boosting its overall market share from 11 % to 1 5% in just five years. With an average 
annual growth ratio of 22%, gross revenues increased from $665 million to $1749 
million between 1986 and 1991, whi le the total number of countries in which BMG 
International had a presence expanded from 1 7 to 34. However, the British operating 
company was not able to follow this successful growth pattern. Even worse, the UK 
subsidiary's market share declined from 9% to 4.7% during these same years, making 
it BMG International's worst performer.1 
BMG UK as Repertoire Source 
From its inception in 1986, BMG International has been headed by Rudi Gassner, 
who had previously worked as Executive Vice-President of PolyGram's International 
division in London. Most record companies traditionally regarded such international 
departments as simple operational divisions, responsible for licensing records to over-
seas partner companies. His new job presented Gassner with a tremendous opportu-
nity to build a genuine international organization. His vision of how this could be 
done effectively consisted of three principal elements: (1) incorporating Bertelsmann's 
philosophy of entrepreneurial management at autonomous operating companies, (2) 
stimulating the development of domestic repertoire at these units, and (3) leveraging 
182 
A M U L T I P L E - C A S E S T U D Y 
local artists to an international level. To realize his dreams, Cassner developed a two-
stage international management structure in which managing directors at national 
operating companies were given a high level of autonomy. At the same time, cross-
border coordination was achieved through frequent meetings among regional direc-
tors that headed one of five territories." 
In this way, Cassner built an infrastructure in which all operating units could 
concentrate on local repertoire development in their national markets, and still have 
the possibility to break acts on a regional or even global basis. This would reduce his 
"fear of being too dependent on English-speaking repertoire," and install a coopera-
tive and border-crossing attitude among the members of the BMC International 
group.'" At the same time, Gassner accepted the reality that no global record corpora-
tion could do without Anglo-American repertoire, simply because this can be more 
easily exploited on a global scale than its non-English-speaking counterparts. With the 
US (together with Canada) having its own division within BMC, the crucial operating 
company in this respect within the International group was therefore BMC UK. Using 
Cassner's own words, "The United Kingdom, despite its relatively small profits, was 
our largest source of repertoire, a major supplier." lv 
The UK company's declining performance therefore not only affected BMC's 
competitive position on the British playing field, but also obstructed a potential in-
crease in revenues at other units within the International group. Acting as licensees, 
foreign sister companies could earn substantial amounts of money via the release of 
English-speaking acts without the costs of signing and developing this repertoire 
themselves. Cassner understood the significance of the British company to BMC In-
ternational as a whole, and saw the United Kingdom as an "area where our market 
share is below the expected standard."" He also claimed that in the UK far too much 
money was spent with the primary objective of immediate chart success and that the 
British industry "has almost lost its focus and certainly overlooked long-term [artist] 
development."v' To John Preston, regional director and chairman of BMC UK, the 
message was clear: he had to streamline his company and create a sound base of new 
repertoire. 
Organizational Restructuring at BMG UK 
In the spring of 1991, Preston started a process of organizational change by removing 
eight percent of his staff, mostly at a managerial level within the company. Apart from 
eliminating one layer of middle management, he dismissed both managing directors 
at RCA and Arista, handing him direct control of operational affairs at the BMG UK 
company's main pop labels. Building upon his experiences as MD of Polydor Records 
and the old RCA Records, Preston aimed at refocusing established practice within the 
bottom of the organization. But when Preston "began to realize there were aspects of 
my role as chairman that were not being given as much time as I would have liked," 
he appointed new MDs to these labels in 1992."" Their assignment was to be engaged 
in structural artist development and to create new repertoire that would reduce the 
UK company's dependency on American superstars such as Whitney Houston. 
RCA's new managing director Jeremy Marsh, like Virgin's MD Paul Conroy a 
former protege of Warner Music chairman Rob Dickins, recognized the rapid rise of 
dance music, and accordingly redesigned the label's modest dance department. In 
this process, he took on Pete Hadfield and Keith Blackhurst of RCA's licensing im-
print Deconstruction as dance A&R consultants responsible for the label's dance 
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strategy. At the same time, Marsh ended a licensing deal with Perfecto, RCA's second 
dance imprint led by Paul Oakenfold, as "Perfecto had a very different agenda that 
did not line up with what we wanted," enabling Blackhurst and Hadfield to create a 
coherent dance policy within RCA.VI" The label's new focus indeed delivered success: 
its album market share rose from 2.3% in 1992 to 3.7% in 1995, RCA's best 
achievement in the UK ever under BMC's umbrella. In contrast, Arista couldnot live 
up to expectations during this period and experienced its worst performance ever 
since 1986. 
To address this enduring problem, chairman Preston promoted his successful 
change agent Jeremy Marsh to president of a newly created BMC UK Music Division. 
This division comprised the company's main labels RCA, Arista, BMC Classics and 
Deconstruction, which by then almost operated as an autonomous label. Marsh's task 
was to deal with strategic priorities of these labels concerning their organizational 
and environmental contexts, as well as to deal with complexities in possible relation-
ships between them. Marsh expressed his intention to leverage capabilities across 
BMC's autonomous front-line labels as "a chance to harmonize the skills we have 
across the labels while maintaining their identities.""1 In addition, he formed a new 
department that would be responsible for marketing the Music Division's four-legged 
repertoire internationally, while strengthening the Classics label through the acquisi-
tion of the classical independent Conifer Records. 
Developing BMG's Label Infrastructure 
Meanwhile, RCA underwent further changes under the new supervision of its former 
marketing director Hugh Goldsmith after being promoted to the vacant chair of MD. 
In pursuit of his goal to broaden the label's musical domain from mainstream pop 
acts such as Take That, Goldsmith had divided RCA's marketing and promotion ac-
tivities into three separate departments. Whereas each of them was targeted at differ-
ent styles of music, the label's A&R function continued to operate as an integrating 
platform. At Arista, the new MD Martin Heath had created the so-called 'hub-system,' 
in which a project management organization acted as an interface between the Arista 
label and its various imprints. Being designed to encourage internal competition in 
the Arista label, this system aimed at integrating its A&R and marketing capabilities 
into project teams. Each team was headed by a project manager and covered a portfo-
lio of projects linked to sub-labels like Rhythm King, Boilerhouse and Urgent. 
The apparent complexity within BMC UK's organizational set-up was closely re-
lated to the company's continuous need for creative expertise in music circles. As a 
major record firm, BMG had strong capabilities in the areas of sales, manufacturing 
and distribution, all embedded in an organizational context which was dominated by 
tight financial guidelines and, to a lesser degree, technological considerations. But 
top management was well aware that the company could only employ its core capa-
bilities if it could attract the attention of the artists providing the actual content of 
recordings. Managerial efforts were thus directed at the gradual development of an 
infrastructure that would enable BMG's front-line record labels to manage the re-
quired interface with recording acts. In this sense, the launch of several fully-owned 
satellite labels by RCA and Arista was aimed at the creation of compact and artist-
friendly operating structures on a project basis within the company. 
BMG's evolving label infrastructure also allowed for a closer cooperation with 
independent record companies via licensing agreements and joint ventures. Referring 
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to the intensity of competition for creative talent among independents, Music Divi-
sion president Jeremy Marsh argued that "there's a lot of new talent being nurtured 
there, so one of our strategies is to continue to build strategic alliances with the in-
dies."" Whi le satellite labels were launched with the intention to actually internalize 
creative resources from the artistic community, joint ventures and licensing deals 
were closed with a different purpose in mind, according to director of business affairs 
Clive Rich: "the rationale for such agreements is that you manage to access creative 
partners, who in turn give you access to the bands that you wouldn't be able to have 
access to if you were just BMC.'"" 
BMG's Network of Relationships 
Not hampered by organizational procedures and formal structures, independent la-
bels had a clear advantage over their major counterparts; not only were these small 
record companies able to operate at street level where they were quick to move and 
do deals, but a lack of formality also made them much more attractive to young art-
ists. Another reason mentioned by Rich for linking up with independent labels was 
that "it's very, very difficult for record companies to have a 360 degree beam, and 
covering all the different niches and trends that are going on at one time."x" Together 
with the firm's sub-labels, BMG's joint ventures and licensing deals increased the 
company's market outlook, in the process creating an infrastructure for managing the 
internalization and access of creative resources and capabilities. Exhibit 7.5 shows 
how this infrastructure made up a significant part of BMC UK's elaborate network of 
relationships with its surrounding music community. 
Exhibit 7.5: The BMC Network as of Early 1997 
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The company's key centralized departments embodied a second route through 
which the company nurtured these linkages. Whereas the Music Publishing division 
maintained its relationships with songwriters and composers, BMG's business affairs 
department intermediated between the firm's front-line labels and record producers, 
recording studios, and video production companies, generating services through 
which more long-lasting relationships were also forged ocassionally. BMC UK's 
manufacturing and distribution division was linked to some 25 small record labels, 
and offered its services to another 30 independents through its alliance with Total and 
3MV, intermediates specialized in distribution, marketing and sales activities. Crucial 
in managing these interfaces was that "BMC is at the heart of it, and there are lots of 
different operating structures to accommodate these different activities."1"" This web 
allowed the company to develop along a process in which both organic growth and 
acquisitions played a role. 
A perfect example of the strategic value of BMG's cooperation-based network to 
the firm's evolution has been the gradually rising prominence of the Deconstruction 
label within the overall company. Its relationship with BMG UK started in 1988 with 
a distribution deal and evolved about two years later into a licensing agreement with 
RCA. Another two years later, Deconstruction's owners Blackhurst and Hadfield were 
promoted to internal consultants responsible for RCA's overall dance strategy when 
Jeremy Marsh restructured this struggling label. In 1994, Deconstruction changed into 
a joint venture company in which its owners and BMC UK shared a 50% stake, at 
that moment demonstrating its gift for success with M People's Mercury Prize victory. 
By 1996, Deconstruction had evolved into a self-contained front-line label within 
BMG's Music Division, even signing up its own label deals. Although it took 8 years 
and millions of pounds, BMG had managed to develop a new UK-based label. 
The Return of a Major Player 
Apart from the recovery of RCA, the birth of a new lead label, and the fortification of 
BMC Classics with Conifer Records, BMC had also launched a new business venture 
called Global to enter the fast-growing market segment of TV-marketed compilation 
albums. Backed up by a steadfast annual average distribution market share of 15% in 
the period 1991-1996 (making BMG the UK's third largest distributor after EMI and 
PolyGram) the firm's album market share steadily recovered from the 1990 extreme 
low. Recalling that BMG's market share had dropped from 9.0% to 4.7% during the 
second half of the eighties, the company had showed its vitality by re-capturing 8.3% 
of the market by 1996 (see Exhibit 7.6). With a stronger repertoire base, in which US-
based acts like Puff Daddy and Toni Braxton were complemented by established and 
new UK artists such as Annie Lennox, Lisa Stansfield, Posh and Sleeper, BMG was 
back in the race with Warner and Sony for the third spot on the list. 
Despite the successful recovery of the company in terms of market share and lo-
cal artist development, BMC found itself faced with further challenges near the end of 
1997. Apart from some immediate setbacks such as the unexpected departure of 
RCA's M D Goldsmith and the termination of the firm's eight-year relationship with 
Total, a more strategic management issue involved BMG's expanding organization. 
The increasing number of cooperative ventures with various creative sources had not 
only boosted the company's A&R activities, but had also amplified the organization's 
complexity. As each of these projects embodied individual profit centers, it became a 
more of a challenge to maintain appropriate cost controls and keep track of margins 
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throughout BMG's network structure. It was up to the company's management to 
think of ways in which both A&R and best business practice could be further inte-
grated. 
Exhibit 7.6: BMG's Performance in Market Shares 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
BMG 
4.7 
5.2 
5.1 
7.0 
4.8 
8.1 
8.3 
RCA 
1.5 
2.5 
2.3 
2.9 
1.7 
3.7 
3.2 
Arista 
1.6 
1.2 
1.9 
2.2 
0.7 
n/a 
n/a 
Decon. 
0.2 
-
-
-
0.8 
0.9 
1.1 
Classics 
n/a 
1.7 
2.6 
5.3 
3.8 
3.1 
4.9 
Source: BP1Statistical Handbook 1997 
Note: Figures in BMG and Classics columns are record company markets shares: figures in 
RCA, Arista and Decon(struction) columns are label market shares 
Endnotes 
' In August 1996, BMG International changed its name into BMG Entertainment International. For matters of convenience, 
the original company name will be used in this case. 
" These territories or regions were: the German-speaking countries. Central Europe, Spain & Latin America, Asia-Pacific and 
the United Kingdom. 
'" Hill, L.A. and K.S. Weber, Rudi Cassner and the Executive Committee of BMC International, Harvard Business School 
Case, 1993. 
'" Ibid. 
" Editorial, 'BMG's Five-Year Man," Music Business International, January 1993, pp. 18-21. 
•' Ibid. 
" Editorial, "Marsh Coup Gives BMG Shot in Arm,' Music Week, March 14th 1992, p. 5. 
"" Editorial, "Perfecto is Pushed Out," Record Mirror, November 14th 1992, p. 1. 
" Editorial, "Marsh to Work Magic on BMG," Music Week, July 15th 1995, p. 1. 
" Editorial, "Preston Predicts Bright Future,' Music Week, September 16th 1995, pp. 8-9. 
" Recorded Interview, October 16th 1997. 
'" Ibid. 
•'" Ibid. 
(See Appendix Dfor secondary sources) 
In contrast to the cases of Island and Virgin, there was no change of 
ownership to trigger the change process. Although RCA had been ac-
quired by multi-media conglomerate Bertelsmann AG, this had already 
happened in 1986. While RCA's US-based musical focus was indirectly 
responsible for the changes that were about to take place, a time lag of 
some six years makes it difficult to assume the presence of a direct cau-
sality. Whereas no executive replacements occurred at the highest mana-
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gerial level within BMG UK, the appointment of Jeremy Marsh as new 
Managing Director at the RCA label level was an important catalyst for 
the firm's transformation. Furthermore, the company had experienced a 
significant performance decline. Whereas its average share of the market 
during the period 1986-1988 had been 8.2%, this figure tumbled to 5.2% 
over the next three years. But the increasing emphasis on local content in 
the world's music markets provided an opportunity for BMG to recover. 
Table 7.12 Context and Content of Organizational Change at BMG Intern. UK 
Change Context 
New executives Appointment of Jeremy Marsh as RCA Managing Director 
New ownership 
Threat/opportunity Increase in consumer attention for local content 
Performance decline Significant decrease of company market share 1989-1991 
Change Content 
Vision Merge Bertelsmann's management ethos with local market 
demands 
Scope Deliver commercial artists to international audience 
Positioning BMC UK as internationally-oriented local record corporation 
Capabilities Incorporation of local A&R capabilities 
This was reflected in the content of change at the company of which 
the vision was to combine Bertelsmann's traditional strength in autono-
mous and entrepreneurial management with the market demands for UK 
music. A fundamental objective was to make BMG UK the International 
group's main source of repertoire. This meant that it had to deliver com-
mercially attractive British music not only to the local market, but also to 
other parts of the world covered by the International group. The company 
was therefore positioned among its rivals - that is, the other major record 
companies - as an internationally-oriented local record corporation. But 
with almost no experience in local A&R, BMG had to create new capa-
bilities to meet such a deficit in British artist development. However, 
building local A&R capabilities from scratch would be a time-consuming 
matter, and the company therefore needed a fast route to incorporate ca-
pabilities and expertise in local artist development. 
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Table 7.13 Main Events at BMG International UK 
Event Date 
Removal of staff, including RCA and Arista MDs, and a layer of 
middle management April 1991 
)eremy Marsh becomes new RCA M D March 1 992 
Pete Hadfield and Keith Blackhurst head RCA's new dance 
strategy July 1992 
Perfecto label leaves RCA November 1992 
John Preston publicly states 12 months of restructuring are 
over December 1992 
Deconstruction becomes 50% joint venture August 1994 
Deconstruction wins Mercury Prize September 1994 
Launch of Global TV October 1994 
Hugh Goldsmith regroups RCA's marketing in line with A&R December 1994 
Heavenly Records signs label deal with Deconstruction April 1995 
Jeremy Marsh becomes president of new Music Division; 
Hugh Goldsmith becomes new RCA M D July 1995 
Jeremy Marsh publicly states objective to link up with indies September 1995 
New International Marketing department in Music Division; 
BMG acquires classical label Conifer Records November 1995 
Martin Heath becomes new M D at Arista to create 'hub' 
system April 1996 
Urgent and Boilerhouse become 50% joint ventures with 
Arista September 1996 
Delirious Records signs label deal with RCA November 1996 
Hugh Goldsmith leaves RCA July 1997 
Total ends eight-year deal September 1997 
BMG UK's search for these capabilities embodied a process of or-
ganizational change, which seems to have started with company chairman 
John Preston's decision to remove his label MDs in early 1991 and ended 
near the end of 1996 with two joint venture deals.9 Table 7.13 lists the 
major events, tied to specific dates, which occurred in these years of 
transformation as described in the Case Box of BMG International UK. 
Furthermore, Table 7.14 displays an outline of the essential elements that 
comprised BMG's change process. The corporation's new business phi-
9 It has to be noted that the removal of a layer of middle management was an act of 
downsizing; the actual building of new capabilities seems to have started a year later with 
the arrival of Jeremy Marsh. 
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losophy was to build local repertoire at label level that could be leveraged 
to other BMG companies and music markets in the world. The reorgani-
zation of BMG's internal processes essentially happened at two different 
levels within the company. On the one hand, the creation of separate de-
partments and project-based structures enabled a focused approach to 
A&R and marketing at BMG's front-line labels. 
Table 7.14: Process of Organizat ional Change at B M G International U K 
New philosophy Build local repertoire to be leveraged internationally 
Reorganization Music Division at corporate level; projects and departments at 
label level 
Internal ventures Launch of satellite labels and Global TV 
Novel acquisitions Purchase of classical Conifer Records 
New alliances Various license deals and joint ventures 
Status reevaluation Increasing attention to cross-label coordination 
Learning new skills Managing a network of interfaces with the creative community 
Resolving dilemmas Access to and internalization of creative resources 
On the other hand, more strategic concerns that surpassed individual 
labels and other cross-label issues were made manageable through the 
formation of BMG's new Music Division at the corporate level. Whereas 
the labels used to operate autonomously from each other, more emphasis 
was given to the coordination and leveraging of skills across the com-
pany's front-line labels. Still, the creation of a network of license deals, 
joint ventures and satellite labels took place at both the label and corpo-
rate levels within the company. In addition, the BMG Classics label was 
strengthened via the purchase of independent Conifer Records, while a 
new business venture was launched to enter the TV compilation albums 
market. In the process of developing such an elaborated organizational 
structure, BMG created distinct skills in managing its interface with the 
creative community. Moreover, its evolving label infrastructure enabled 
BMG UK to both access and internalize creative resources. 
In the end, the company's performance in terms of turnover and gross 
profits increased rapidly from 1992 onwards, while operating losses were 
turned into substantial profits, as the following table of BMG International 
UK's financial figures shows. 
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Table 7.15: BMG International UK's Financial Performance (in £1000) 
Turn-
over 
Cross 
Profit 
Operat. 
Profit 
1990 
42899 
18736 
(738) 
1991 
48850 
19163 
(140) 
1992 
42420 
15277 
(2423) 
1993 
48963 
20798 
871 
1994 
63945 
27859 
6034 
1995 
84736 
40160 
11432 
1996 
100243 
43799 
13674 
Source: Compiled from the UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 1993-1998 
T H E CASE OF W A R N E R M U S I C UK 
BMG had not been the only major record company that had noted a shift 
in consumer preferences from US-based music to local artists. Warner 
Music had also experienced this trend at the cost of declining worldwide 
sales of its American superstars. With its roots going back to Ahmet 
Ertegun's Atlantic Records and Steve Ross's federation of autonomous 
labels, Warner had always been the most American-oriented major of all. 
It had established itself in London in the sixties when British pop came to 
a rise, and had expanded internationally during the seventies and the first 
half of the eighties. In those years, its principal aim had always been to 
distribute and market US-based acts instead of being involved in local 
artist development. But now that local content came to be more valued by 
the market, Warner's operating companies were in need of local reper-
toire. Case Box 7.4 describes how this issue was dealt with by its UK 
company, after which an analysis of Warner UK's search for new capa-
bilities is presented. 
CASE BOX 7.4: WARNER MUSIC UK 
In 1989 the largest media conglomerate in the world was created when Time ac-
quired Warner Communications Inc. for $14 bil l ion. Although the formation of the 
Time-Warner combination did have an impact on Warner's music business outside 
America, the effect was more a matter of speeding up a change in the company's 
course that had already been set in progress. During the late eighties, WEA Interna-
tional had decided to modify its traditional strategy of developing and marketing 
American superstars on a global level. Although the worldwide successes of artists 
like Madonna and Prince demonstrated WEA's strength in this area, the International 
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division's management was well aware of a shift in consumer preferences towards 
local music products. In 1990 Ramon Lopez, CEO of the newly named Warner Music 
International, started his search for national talent by purchasing local independents 
such as Carrere in France and Alfa Moon in Japan, and by reshaping his operating 
companies in key markets. 
The Split of Warner Music UK into WEA and East West 
In the most prominent of these key territories, Warner Music companies were divided 
into two separate units to bring more balance between US-based and local repertoire. 
In the United Kingdom, the first of these principal label groups, WEA Records, would 
focus on marketing American acts from the Elektra, Reprise and Warner Bros, labels. 
It would also access local artists through licensing deals with independents Blanco Y 
Negro and ZTT. The launch of Warner Music UK's second front-line label, East West 
Records, was primarily aimed at building a strong base of local repertoire, backed up 
by the solid roster of its US-based Atlantic sister label. The complementarity of these 
two label pillars created a double-edged organizational context which enabled the 
UK company to be involved in the costly process of local repertoire building. At the 
same time, financial growth and stability were secured, as both label groupings were 
active in marketing and developing American acts. 
During the period 1991-1995, both WEA and East West steadily restructured 
their A&R ranks to meet chairman Rob Dickins' objective of boosting Warner Music 
UK's share of domestic repertoire. Yet, despite the employment of A&R consultants 
by both front-line labels, results failed to meet expectations regarding the balance of 
the company's repertoire base during the first two years. WEA MD Moira Bellas, who 
had replaced Jeremy Marsh after his departure to RCA in 1992, and her counterpart at 
East West, Max Hole, thus complied to the more drastic measures proposed by their 
chairman. Commenting upon the initiated radical employee turnover at the com-
pany's A&R departments in 1993, Rob Dickins argued that "A&R is the beating heart 
of any record company which takes itself seriously and that heart has to beat strong. 
Marginal changes are pointless and I have to go in for some deep surgery and heart 
surgery is a fairly major business."' 
Exhibit 7.7: Warner's Market Share Performance 
Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Source: BPI Statistical handbook 1998 
Note: WEA includes Warner Bros.: East West includes Atlantic. 
Warner Music 
12.6 
11.7 
10.3 
9.8 
9,9 
9.6 
WEA Records 
3.5 
3.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.8 
2.5 
East West 
3.6 
3.5 
2.4 
2.6 
3.0 
2.6 
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Apart from appointing new A&R managers and directors, WEA also extended its 
licensing deals with independents Blanco Y Negro and ZTT into shared ownership 
joint ventures, whi le East West created an alliance with Dave Stewart's Anxious label. 
Furthermore, both front-line labels contracted individuals who worked in the industry 
as DJs or record producers to manage newly launched imprints, like Paul Oakenfold's 
Perfecto label at East West and WEA's Eternal venture with Steve Allen. Not only did 
Warner Music UK's A&R rejuvenation increase the share of domestic repertoire from 
15% to 32% between 1991 and 1995, but it also brought the company into new mu-
sic segments such as dance and underground. Although at first sight the change pro-
gram had been effective as it brought more balance into the company's repertoire, 
Exhibit 7.7 shows how Warner Music UK's album market share declined by 2.7% 
over the same period. 
Warner Music's Move into Compilation Albums 
Confronted with this drop in performance, Dickins refused to believe that his busi-
ness philosophy nor the people in the revived Warner organization were to blame, 
and thus dismissed the idea that another major restructuring would be helpful. In-
stead, Dickins sought an alternative way to improve Warner Music's competitive 
position in the UK market by stepping into the unknown territory of multi-artist com-
pilation albums. For years Dickins had refused such a move, believing that an in-
volvement in compilations would distract his company from focusing on long-term 
development of strong acts. Yet faced with the reality that all the other major record 
companies were competing in a market segment that had captured 26.9% of overall 
album sales by 1995, he changed his mind, recognizing this major segment as "an 
interesting profit and loss area."" At the end of 1995, Dickins launched a new divi-
sion, warner.esp (enterprises and special projects), and appointed Martin Craig as 
general manager with a brief to expand the company into compilations. 
Until the early nineties, the compilation area had been dominated by specialist 
companies such as Telstar and Dino, that composed multi-artist albums by licensing 
songs from other record firms' catalogues. Not bothered by any investments in A&R, 
these specialists committed substantial resources to market their compilation albums, 
more than 80% of which was directed at TV advertising to reach an audience as large 
as possible. Apart from the successful 'Now!' series by the EMIA/irgin/PolyCram joint 
venture, major record companies in those years limited their involvement in this 
segment to the release of compilations during the Christmas season. But with the rise 
of dance music (primarily released on the singles format), the majors could no longer 
ignore an area which had grown over a five-year period from 15.1% to 22.6% of the 
total market in 1993. After all, they were the companies that owned large catalogues 
and the copyrights attached to them. 
Most majors simply reviewed the number of tracks they licensed to specialists 
and realized that revenues would be higher if they took control of their catalogue and 
entered the compilations segment themselves. The growing number of competitors in 
this market niche made TV advertising budgets rise rapidly: in 1990 an estimated 
£6.2 mill ion was spent by the industry on TV advertising over six months, while only 
four years later the same amount was spent in one quarter. Furthermore, as the supply 
of multi-artist compilations grew, competition started to evolve around exclusivity 
deals and tactics such as doubling the number of tracks on an album. But without 
access to strong catalogues and large promotional budgets, the specialist compilation 
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companies quickly saw their market prominence eroded by the majors. When BMC 
launched its Global TV compilations venture, Telstar's access to BMC's catalogue 
came to a halt, forcing Telstar to establish a joint venture TV compilations company 
with Universal Music, the smallest of the majors. 
Warner.esp's Collaborative Capability 
When in late 1995 national sales manager Martin Craig and chairman Rob Dickins 
got together, it turned out that both shared the opinion that Warner Music's catalogue 
was largely being left unexploited, despite the presence of a growing compilations 
market. Recalling those meetings, Craig observed how "in conversations with the 
chairman it became clear the time was right; his views and mine met and there was 
an opportunity to create something new."'" The outcome of their discussion material-
ized in the brand-new warner.esp division. Although Warner Music was the last of 
the majors to move into compilations, the timing seemed just about perfect: the com-
pany's restored A&R capabilities started to deliver in fresh local products, and its 
dance labels Eternal and Perfecto were performing well in the singles market. Exploit-
ing this proven repertoire, warner.esp immediately released six compilation albums 
within six months after its conception, two of which scored a number one position in 
the charts, selling over half a mil l ion copies. 
But the department's immediate success could not be completely attributed to 
Warner Music's hit repertoire. Another critical factor was Craig's deliberate choice to 
cooperate with other record companies in the process of creating compilation al-
bums. After observing the success of the 'Now!' series and various failures by other 
record companies to set up TV compilation divisions, .esp's general manager con-
cluded that "the way forward is the sharing of expertise, repertoire and risk. We have 
to share in the profit, but that's acceptable because of the other elements."IV During 
the two years after warner.esp's launch, the number of releases was increased via 
different projects with other majors, of which the self-initiated 'Hits' alliance with 
BMC's Global TV and Sony TV came to be highly successful. Apart from .esp's un-
proven position as a late entrant, various other reasons backed Craig's philosophy of 
cooperation, the most obvious being the reduction of risk through mutual investment 
and the reduction of competition by taking a rival out of the marketplace. 
A crucial motive for warner.esp to be engaged in multi-company compilation 
projects was the creation of stronger albums as partners contributed tracks from their 
prime repertoire. Moreover, the combination of expertise and creativity in compiling, 
branding and marketing the compilation further strengthened its quality, improving its 
position at retailers. Despite this cross-company sharing of resources and capabilities, 
Craig stressed that "nobody forgets that we are all in competition with each other, so 
we are careful in how we deal with each other, sharing and discussing as much in-
formation relevant to the joint project as we can without compromising ourselves."v 
While intelligence on chart analyses and costs of TV campaigns was publicly avail-
able and could therefore be exchanged to a virtually unlimited extent, more firm-
specific data like TV supplier contracts were treated as confidential towards partners. 
Warner.esp's Coordinative Capability 
In addition to its responsibility of developing Warner Music UK into a key player in 
the compilations business, warner.esp's second primary task was to take care of those 
issues and activities that concerned the company as a whole. Although the presence 
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of competition between the WEA and East West labels created an organizational cli-
mate in which both could thrive, such internal rivalry could at the same time endan-
ger the interests of the overall Warner Music corporation. Projects turned down by 
the label groupings but critical to the company as a whole created a "hole in the 
middle of the company," according to Craig, who continued that "if you create an 
identity for East West and an identity for WEA, there has to be something also taking 
care of the interest of Warner Music."vl Warner.esp was thus set up as a separate divi-
sion to deal with company-wide and cross-label issues and opportunities, embodying 
a central unit of coordination that recognized the labels' distinct identities. 
One of the department's new core activities in this respect was the exploitation 
of Warner's overall back catalogue, an area that had until that moment been un-
charted extensively by WEA and East West. The general feeling at the individual label 
groupings was that their artists could well be unhappy about what was traditionally 
regarded as an inferior or musically irreverent activity. Applying a somewhat more 
contemporary perspective, Craig felt that "perhaps we erred too much on the side of 
caution; I think we can work our catalogue a little bit more effectively and the 
changes in the marketplace have allowed us to do that."™ Closely related to its coor-
dinative task of catalogue marketing was warner.esp's functioning as a central market-
ing body without interfering with the respective marketing capabilities of WEA and 
East West. The idea of installing such an intelligence agency was to offer the labels 
access to data that had been gathered via a systematic and scientific approach to 
market analysis and research. 
Comparing warner.esp's marketing recipe to the music industry's traditional in-
stinctive practices, its general manager argued how "we can help become a bit more 
scientific to be able to prove things, understand things better. We can still then follow 
our instincts and ignore the analyses if we choose to. But it's far better to choose to 
ignore that rather than to ignore that in complete ignorance."1"" Craig's views clearly 
corresponded with those of chairman Rob Dickins who expressed his "want to re-
lease fewer records, better records [...] as it gets more and more competitive, I want 
to see more focus on how we market them."'x Installing this focus implied a pivotal 
role for warner.esp within the overall Warner Music organization; not simply because 
it was the core supplier of supporting market data, but above all because it aimed to 
provide an environment where strategic thought and debate would take place among 
various people throughout the company. 
Ready for the Digital Age 
Exhibit 7.8 displays warner.esp's success over the past few years in terms of its rap-
idly growing market share of the compilations segment, also expressed in the increase 
of releases and number of copies sold. Warner.esp's prosperity also seems to have 
had a positive contribution to Warner Music UK's halt to its declining overall market 
share. The growing prominence of warner.esp's role within the Warner Music organi-
zation was underlined by the integration of the company's licensing division and its 
classical label into warner.esp at the end of 1997. The move seemed to be a legiti-
mate one as a major part of Warner Classics' revenues were obtained through themed 
compilations created from a growing classical catalogue. Furthermore, incorporating 
the licensing department's responsibility for clearance of catalogue material to third 
parties for use in compilations, soundtracks and commercials concentrated all cata-
logue operations within the .esp division. 
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Exhibit 7.8: Warner.esp's Performance in Figures 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Market 
Share 
2.0 
4.4 
5.1 
7.3 
No. of 
Releases 
3 
12 
17 
31 
Unit Sales 
(xlOOO) 
470 
760 
1300 
1700 
Certified Awards 
Silver 
0 
1 
2 
5 
Gold Plat. 
1 2 
3 4 
9 4 
12 5 
Source: Warner.esp company records 
Note: The number of compilations released via joint ventures was 3, 10, 14 and 21 for 
each of the above years. Qualifying levels in the UK for silver, gold and platinum 
awards are sales of 60.000, 100.000 and 300.000per album respectively. 
Recognizing new opportunities in the near future with respect to on-line music 
delivery via the digital mode of the Internet, another part of Craig's assignment had 
been to keep track of new technological developments. One prominent scenario liv-
ing in the minds of many industry executives is that in such a digital future, record 
firms' wi l l only be able to distinguish themselves by focusing on a few core activities. 
While A&R wi l l be crucial to the effective filtering of the enormous supply of music, 
clear and well-targeted marketing programs wi l l be indispensable to corporate and 
product branding. As consumers are undoubtedly going to compile their own favorite 
albums via the Internet, catalogue building wi l l be essential to capture increasing 
copyright revenues. With warner.esp in between the WEA and East West front-line 
labels, the Warner Music company covers all three bases and seems to be prepared 
for the music industry's jump into the digital age. 
Endnotes 
Editorial, "Dickins Plans A&R Surgery," Music Week. May 15th 1993, p. 3. 
Editorial, 'Rob Dickins," Music Business International, December 1995, pp. 22-23. 
Recorded Interview, November 17th 1997, 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
1
 Ibid. 
Editorial, "Warner: Aiming for a Leaner and Fitter Future," Music Week, September 2 1st 1996, pp. 6-7. 
(See Appendix D for secondary sources) 
Again, Table 7.16 presents the core features of the change content 
and context at Warner Music UK (why did it happen and what was its 
nature). To some extent, the $14 billion acquisition of Warner Communi-
cations Inc. by media firm Time in 1989 seems to have induced the proc-
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ess of transformation. Although plans were underway at Warner Music to 
become more involved in local artist development over the second half of 
the eighties, this alteration in ownership speeded up that process. Al-
though no executive replacements took place at the top, the appointment 
of WEA's MD Moira Bellas and wamer.esp's Martin Craig both induced 
organizational change. But in contrast to the other cases so far, the com-
pany had not experienced a decline in performance; during the period 
1985-1990, Warner had enjoyed an average market share of 13.0%. Still, 
Warner saw a move towards more intensive local artist development in 
the UK as an opportunity to improve its market position. 
Table 7.15: Context and Content of Organizational Change at Warner Music UK 
Change Context 
New executives Appointment of WEA M D Bellas and warner.esp G M Craig 
New ownership Time's $14 billion acquisition of WCI 
Threat/opportunity Increase in consumer attention for local content 
Performance decline 
Change Content 
Vision Merge Warner's traditional marketing approach with local market 
demands 
Scope Deliver commercial artists to UK audience 
Positioning Warner UK as locally-oriented American record corporation 
Capabilities Coordination and development of A&R capabilities 
This perceived opportunity came to shape Chairman Rob Dickins's 
vision in which the company's historical strength in marketing major 
American artists could be merged with local market demands in the UK. 
His main objective was to turn Warner into a record company with a bal-
anced and commercially successful repertoire of both US- and UK-based 
acts. In other words, the company had to introduce British acts in a dis-
tinct but American style to the consumer market. In terms of positioning 
among its competitors, Warner came to be a locally-oriented American 
record company. Although it had moved into local artist development to 
some extent during the second half of the eighties, A&R capabilities in 
this respect were far from what they needed to be to realize this strategy. 
Moreover, Warner was split up in two parts, which meant that the devel-
opment of capabilities at the label level had to be coordinated somehow. 
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Table 7.17: Main Events at Warner Music UK 
Event Date 
WEA International divisionalizes into WEA Records 
and East West Records 
WEA International is renamed Warner Music International 
East West signs deals with A&R consultants 
Moira Bellas becomes new WEA M D 
East West forms joint venture with Anxious label 
Rob Dickins replaces key A&R staff, claiming it to be the 
most dramatic change in ten years 
Steve Allen becomes WEA's A&R manager 
Clive Black becomes WEA's A&R coordinator 
East West signs deal with Perfecto dance label 
WEA launches Eternal dance label, headed by Steve Allen 
Rob Dickins publicly states how music in non-traditional 
Warner areas start to pay off 
Launch of new compilations division, warner.esp, 
headed by Martin Craig 
Warner.esp reports start(l)ing success 
Ian Dewhirst becomes catalogue manager at warner.esp 
Warner.esp reports enduring success 
Warner's licensing division and Classics label are inte-
grated into warner.esp 
January 1990 
September 1990 
August 1991 
March 1992 
April 1992 
May 1993 
June 1993 
January 1994 
April 1994 
January 1995 
September 1995 
October 1995 
June 1996 
August 1996 
September 1996 
November 1997 
Warner UK's search for such capabilities embodied a process of or-
ganizational change, which formally started with the division of Warner 
into its two principal label groupings, WEA Records and East West Rec-
ords. However, since this move was done in all the prominent territories, 
the actual process of change at the UK company can be assumed to have 
started only after Moira Bellas was appointed as WEA MD. The end of 
Warner's transformation, as far as can be determined at this stage, was 
shaped by a last move of restructuring at the end of 1997, when the com-
pany's licensing division and its Classics label were integrated into war-
ner.esp. Table 7.17 lists the core events and their dates during these five 
years of change as narrated in the Warner Music Case Box, and shows 
how the change process comprised two distinct phases.10 In addition, Ta-
'0 Between March 1992 and September 1995 (when Dickens stated how the development 
of music in non-traditional Warner areas started to pay off), local A&R capabilities were 
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ble 7.18 presents a structured overview of the main features that consti-
tuted this two-staged change process at Warner. 
Table 7.18: Process of Organizat ional Change at Warner Music U K 
New philosophy 
Reorganization 
Internal ventures 
Novel acquisitions 
New alliances 
Status reevaluation 
Learning new skills 
Resolving dilemmas 
Build local repertoire to be leveraged via catalogue exploitation 
Separate label groupings (WEA and East West) and warner.esp 
Launch of TV compilations division 
Various license deals and JVs at labels; compilation alliances 
Increasing attention to systematic market analysis 
Sharing of company knowledge across label groupings 
Competition and cooperation at intra- and inter-firm levels 
Over time, the firm's new business philosophy was aimed at the dis-
covery and development of UK artists to build an exploitable catalogue. 
Warner's reorganization was largely a corporate issue; first in terms of the 
creation of separate label groupings, and later through the launch of war-
ner.esp that acted as an integrative body for cross-label issues as well as a 
central intelligence unit. During this second stage, new skills were devel-
oped to share knowledge across label groupings, which enhanced both 
label groupings' appreciation for a more scientific approach to market 
research. Furthermore, the move into compilations introduced Warner to 
cooperative venturing with other major record companies. 
Table 7.19: W a r n e r Music U K ' s Financial Performance (in £1000) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
86261 106710 111388 112217 132134 150814 n/a 
23003 39027 43340 44847 59570 77003 n/a 
2605 8966 11535 10638 20948 31452 n/a 
Turn-
over 
Cross 
Profit 
Operat. 
Profit 
Source: Compiled from the UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 1993-1998 
built at the level of the individual label groupings. During the two subsequent years, the 
launch and expansion of warner.esp created a more integrated company at corporate level. 
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During the first stage, various licensing deals, joint ventures and satellite 
imprints were created, which expanded the company's interface with the 
creative community. In the end, Warner Music UK managed to resolve 
the dilemma between competition and cooperation, both within the firm 
and across its boundaries. Although the company's market share de-
creased gradually during the nineties, Warner's new capabilities have had 
a positive impact on its financial performance in these years, as Table 
7.19 shows. From 1994 onwards, both turnover and profits increased at a 
rapid pace. 
INDEPENDENTS' RESPONSE TO THE N E W REGIME 
Both Rudi Gassner and Ramon Lopes, CEOs of the International groups 
of BMG and Warner respectively, were not unique in their ambition to 
install a higher awareness of the significance of local content into their 
operating companies. In fact, all the major record corporations had started 
to increase their emphasis on local artist development during the late '80s 
and early '90s, be it that the European majors had a lead advantage over 
their American rivals due to their heritage (Laing, 1992). Apart from in-
tensifying local A&R activities, majors purchased national independents 
in their quest for local repertoire and expertise. Table 7.20 displays some 
of these acquisitions in Western Europe during the period 1990-1994. 
Table 7.20: Prominent Acquisitions of European Independent Labels 
Year 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1992 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
Independent 
Label 
Polar 
Carrere 
Minos 
Sonet 
Vogue 
Medley 
DRO 
Trema 
Dino 
Intercord 
Major 
Purchaser 
PolyCram 
Warner 
EMI 
PolyCram 
BMG 
EMI 
Warner 
Sony 
BMC 
EMI 
Country 
Sweden 
France 
Greece 
Sweden 
France 
Denmark 
Spain 
France 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Source: Adapted from Hardy, P. and D. Laing (1995), The European Music Busi-
ness: Markets and Players, London: Financial Times Management Report 
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Clearly, the dominance of American music in the world, born out of the 
prominent position of the United States following the Second World War, 
was being eroded. This process was further intensified by the rising im-
portance of Asia as a collection of local-oriented music markets. 
Table 7.21: Continental Shares of Worldwide Music Sales 
1985 
1990 
1995 
US 
35.8 
30.6 
30.5 
Europe 
32.6 
42.8 
33.8 
Japan 
10.6 
12.6 
19.0 
Asia 
2.9 
5.5 
5.2 
L. America 
5.1 
2.6 
5.2 
Source: Compiled from IFPI data 
The declining importance of America's traditional superiority in mu-
sic can be illustrated in two basic ways. First of all, whereas the European 
and Japanese markets showed higher growth rates, the share of US music 
sales of total world sales declined significantly during the second half of 
the eighties (Rutten, 1991). Table 7.21 shows this development, and illus-
trates how in subsequent years American sales remained at some 30% of 
total worldwide value. The table also indicates how Latin-American. 
Asian and Japanese markets have grown in importance during the nine-
ties, primarily at the cost of Europe's share of overall music sales. The 
second way in which the decline of American hegemony in music can be 
underlined is by observing national markets' international repertoire as 
percentage of market value over time. Although this ratio also includes 
domestic sales of foreign music other than from American origin, it is still 
dominated by US (and to a lesser extent British) artists, at least with re-
spect to the European continent (Laing, 1992). 
On the next page, Table 7.22 displays these ratios for the largest na-
tional markets, as categorized along continents between 1992 and 1997.11 
Although there is a lack of data regarding Latin America, it appears that 
Brazil and Mexico follow an opposite trend, which could be due to Mex-
ico's close location to the United States. In Asia, all the largest markets 
are involved in a movement towards more, instead of less, international 
repertoire. This can be related to the majors' entrance into this part of the 
' ' Obviously, domestic repertoire as a % of market value displays a reversed pattern. 
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world during the early '90s, and the subsequent expansion of operations 
and investment in activities over recent years. In Europe, however, there 
is a general trend in which individual markets are moving towards more 
local music at the cost of international (primarily American) repertoire. 
The decline of American superiority becomes even more pronounced if 
one realizes that there actually has been an increase in artist recordings 
and music publishing that cross national borders within Europe in the first 
half of the nineties.12 
Table 7.22: International Repertoire as Percentage of Market Value 
Europe: 
Germany 
UK 
France 
Netherl. 
Asia: 
Japan 
Taiwan 
Sth Korea 
Thailand 
L Amer.: 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Argentina 
Colombia 
1992 
60.0 
-
49.8 
77.0 
19.9 
20.0 
20.0 
5.9 
40.0 
-
-
— 
1993 
60.0 
46.8 
48.2 
68.0 
19.4 
25.0 
26.0 
5.9 
40.0 
30.0 
-
— 
1994 
57.0 
41.8 
46.5 
64.7 
27.6 
26.0 
30.0 
21.4 
39.2 
30.0 
-
— 
1995 
56.0 
42.7 
45.1 
65.0 
23.7 
28.4 
31.0 
28.5 
35.0 
30.0 
32.6 
40.0 
1996 
50.5 
42.0 
42.7 
68.0 
26.9 
23.3 
35.7 
19.1 
32.8 
40.0 
24.8 
30.0 
1997 
50.0 
39.0 
44.3 
65.0 
24.3 
25.9 
30.6 
21.6 
28.0 
42.0 
30.0 
20.0 
Source: Adapted from IFPI, The Recording Industry in Numbers 98, London: IFPI 
The growing attention to local music demands can also be observed 
in the rise of local and regional music television channels across Europe. 
Launched in August 1987, MTV Europe had enjoyed a virtual monopoly 
for half a decade in its supply of music television to European viewers. 
But from 1992 onwards, a host of new stations entered the market for mu-
sic television, most of them targeted at local and/or regional viewers. 
' 2 De Whalley, C , "Europe's Songwriters Cash in on International Success," Music Busi-
ness International, August 1995, pp. 53-55; Editorial, "US Looks On as Europe Goes 
Live and Kicking," Music Business International, August 1996, p. 13. 
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Tablie 7.23: Increasing Competition in the European Music TV Business 
Channel 
MTV 
VH-1 
VIVA 
TV Zwei 
The Box 
Fun TV 
CMT 
MCM 
TMF 
ZTV 
Mad TV 
+ Musica 
Countries Covered 
UK and Ireland 
Italy 
Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland 
Scandinavia, France, 
Belgium and Nether-
lands 
UK and Ireland 
Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland 
Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland 
Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland 
UK and Ireland 
Belgium, Netherlands 
and Luxembourg 
Italy 
France 
Europe 
France 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Greece 
Spain 
Launch Date 
August 1987 
September 1994 
March 1995 
December 1993 
December 1993 
March 1992 
November 1 995 
Apri l 1997 
February 1997 
November 1992 
July 1989 
May 1995 
May 1992 
November 1996 
July 1997 
Penetration rate 
6.4 mil l ion 
15 mil l ion 
19 mil l ion 
13.7 mil l ion 
6 mil l ion 
8 mil l ion 
25.9 mill ion 
18.4 mil l ion 
1.9 mil l ion 
2 mil l ion 
7.5 mil l ion 
0.2 mil l ion 
4.5 mil l ion 
2 mil l ion 
5.3 mil l ion 
1.8 mil l ion 
0.6 mil l ion 
n/a 
Source: Adapted from Talbot, M., "More May Equal Less as Music TV Growth Dis-
sipates Audience," Music Business International, December 1997, pp. 29-31. 
These channels, displayed in Table 7.23, were welcomed by record com-
panies as they focused on national markets and domestic repertoire. Even 
MTV could no longer deny the growing market demand for local music in 
Europe, and in 1996 divided its signal over three general European re-
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gions to cope with this increase in competition for the continent's 150 
million households. Moreover, it launched a separate channel for the UK 
in July 1997, stressing the significance of the British music industry, and 
its move towards more local content.13 
While the major companies intensified operations in national markets 
to meet increasing local consumer demands, independent labels began to 
pay more attention to international market opportunities. Traditionally, 
independent companies had focused on their immediate or national mar-
ket environment as they lacked resources, skills and a global outlook. But 
as cooperative ventures between majors and independents increased in 
number, indie labels accessed the international marketing and distribution 
channels of the majors while adopting a broader market perspective. 
Creation Records and Nude Records are examples of UK labels that 
achieved worldwide success after they had teamed up with Sony Music's 
Licensed Repertoire Division. In a similar vein did British independent 
labels XL Recordings and Mute Records score in America when they 
closed licensing deals with Warner-backed Maverick Records.14 
THE CASE OF ROADRUNNER RECORDS 
An independent company that had already developed an international per-
spective in the second half of the eighties was Roadrunner Records, a 
small label specialized in metal music with its home base in the Nether-
lands. In those years, the Dutch company had expanded its international 
scope towards its major surrounding countries (France, Germany and the 
UK), after which it set up overseas units during the nineties (Brazil, Japan 
and Australia). However, these foreign affiliates were primarily responsi-
ble for marketing Roadrunner's largely US-based repertoire, which the 
label extracted from its office in New York. But now that British acts be-
came increasingly successful on an international level, Roadrunner aimed 
'3 Sources: Eade, C , "Labels Give Backing to MTV's Regional Revamp," Music Week, 
24 August 1996, p. 5; Talbot, M."' 'Clutter-Free' MTV UK Promises More Music," Music 
Week, 21 June 1997, p. 3. According to BPI figures, the share of UK artists in total British 
album sales rose from 49.3% in 1991 to 58.3% in 1997, whereas the American share de-
clined from 35.4% to 28.4% over the same period (as listed in BPI Statistical Handbook 
1998). Furthermore, it is reported in The UK Industry Annual Survey 1998 that the number 
of UK acts in the annual album Top 20 rose from 9 to 16 in the period 1993-1997. 
'4 Gorman, P. "Reaching Their Domestic Limits. Local Players Look Further Afield," 
Music Business International, December 1997, pp. vii-ix; Gorman, P. "Flexibility Is Key 
to Indie Success," Music Business International, December 1997, pp. xiv-xv. 
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to develop its UK company into a international repertoire source. Case 
Box 7.5 narrates the change process that was involved in more detail, and 
provides the input for an analysis of Roadrunner's search for capabilities 
as it adapted to a changing competitive environment. 
CASE BOX 7.5: ROADRUNNER RECORDS 
During the first half of the nineties, independent Roadrunner Records experienced an 
unmatched degree of success in the heavy and alternative metal segment of the music 
industry. With a string of top-selling albums by its prime acts Sepultura, Type O 
Negative, Life of Agony, Machine Head and Fear Factory, the company managed to 
establish itself among the world's leading metal labels. Suddenly, in 1995, Roadrun-
ner had a big hit in Europe with Technohead's 'I Want to Be a Hippy' song, which 
brought the company into the dance music arena. This chart success expressed Road-
runner's diversification move into other musical areas, a strategy which had been 
designed by Chairman Cees Wessels only a year before. Considering the fact that the 
United Kingdom represented the European center for dance music at the time, his 
aim was to increase the UK share of Roadrunner's repertoire that had traditionally 
been primarily American-based. To implement his idea, new capabilities had to be 
built at Roadrunner's London office. 
Roadrunner's International Growth 
Incorporated in 1981 by Cees Wessels and Jan van der Linden, Roadrunner Records 
entered the record business with an initial product-market strategy that was, although 
sharply defined, rather narrow in scope. In early those days, the label operated as a 
licensee for record companies like Metal Blade and Music for Nations, releasing the 
catalogues of these overseas independents exclusively in the Benelux markets. Still, 
Wessels had always intended Roadrunner as a record company involved in the de-
velopment of its own artists instead of merely marketing external repertoire. Four 
years after the label's founding, he ended his partnership with Van der Linden to be-
come full owner, leaving him free to decide over the company's future. Backed by a 
steady growth in turnover derived from Roadrunner's license-based activities, Wessels 
hired a small A&R staff and opened a New York office in the early eighties. His per-
sonal involvement in A&R turned him into the all-round entrepreneur traditionally 
associated with independents. 
As a specialized record company, Roadrunner operated in the niche market for 
heavy metal music. At the time, Wessels had realized that the virtual absence of ma-
jor record corporations in this segment and the relatively small number of European 
metal labels were key to Roadrunner's successful entrance into the business. Even 
during its starting years, Roadrunner licensed repertoire from metal labels only, 
through which it released acts such as Anthrax, Metallica and Slayer. The label's fo-
cus on metal music was sustained when Roadrunner's strategy became more oriented 
towards developing its own roster of metal acts. In this sense, the launch of the New 
York office had been a logical step as the larger part of the successful metal bands 
were US-based, and most of the innovation in this particular type of music happened 
in America. Roadrunner's American A&R capability was built by Monte Conner, who 
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joined the US company in its early years and would be responsible for signing up the 
label's biggest acts. 
As its artist roster flourished, the company gradually expanded its international 
presence from its home base in the Netherlands to other territories. During the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, new subsidiaries were established in the UK, Germany and 
France, while the first half of the nineties witnessed the launch of affiliates in Austra-
lia, Brazil and Japan. Roadrunner's international growth trajectory was guided by two 
principal criteria, the first of which was the respective market's size in terms of sales 
potential. In addition to being a major music market, territories had to be substantial 
sources of music from which high-quality artists could be mined. In other words, 
countries were considered to be suitable entry candidates when they offered the op-
portunity to both sell many records and sign great acts. Within less than fifteen years, 
Roadrunner had evolved from a small and licensed-based label to a multinational 
record company with an increasingly successful artist base and expanding catalogue. 
Roadrunner's Multinational Set Up 
In line with the dual nature of Roadrunner's international intent, each of the operating 
companies was divided into an A&R department and a marketing & promotion unit. 
Long-term artist development, key to Roadrunner's business philosophy, was built on 
a mutual understanding between a particular act and the label. Marcus Turner, direc-
tor of business affairs at the company's International headquarters, mentioned that 
"Roadrunner has survived on the strengths of its artists and we have a lot to thank 
them for." It was therefore simply natural, he continued, that "any artist we have on 
the label can pick up the phone and speak to the owner of the label."' When asked 
about his motive for signing up with Roadrunner, the drummer of Machine Head 
explained that "one of the reasons we went with Roadrunner is because it's very 
small; we wanted that kind of family, gut-level record label."" Acts were therefore 
signed and nurtured at a local level, where personal communication was most effec-
tive in maintaining relationships. 
Still, the operating companies depended upon the International head office for 
legal and administrative expertise; it was in this nucleus of the organization that the 
actual artist contracts were designed and royalty incomes or payments were man-
aged. But there was more that made this unit, using Turner's words, "the beating 
heart of the organization."'" Whereas the image-building of an act and the recording 
of its album were handled by the respective local office, International took care of the 
album's centralized manufacturing. Furthermore, headquarters made sure that all the 
operating companies, distributors and licensees received the components required for 
a record's release. Finally, the corporate office transferred knowledge on the act's 
image and the album's marketing approach (developed by the office where the act 
had been signed) to all other companies involved. With all subsidiaries on the same 
footing, each could market and promote the record in accordance with the specifics 
of the local market. 
On a more administrative level, International performed its tasks as a financial 
control center towards the operating companies through the design of yearly budgets, 
which incorporated sales targets, marketing expenditures and cost of sales figures. In 
addition, the company's internal (inter-unit) royalty structure, as well as the protection 
of mechanical rights and copyrights, were administered at headquarters. Apart from 
closing publishing deals and licensing agreements, International was also responsible 
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for managing Roadrunner's network of distributors. According to Marcus Turner, this 
task was an unavoidable one because "it's always been a policy decision not to do 
our own distribution."1" Instead of being involved in a worldwide distribution deal 
with a major record company, Roadrunner pursued separate agreements in specific 
countries. In high-sales territories, the label's products were usually distributed by 
majors, while local independent firms were dealt with in regions were sales were 
medium or low.v 
Exhibit 7.9: Roadrunner's Multinational Setup 
Legal and Administrative Base 
Roadrunner 
Germany 
Roadrunner 
France 
Roadrunner International 
(Headquarters) 
/ 4 \ \ 
* / Publishing d? Licensing \ ^ 
/ Royalties <?• ('opyrights \ 
Roadrunner 
Benelux 
1 
Roadrunner 
UK 
\ 
Roadrunner 
America 
\ 
Roadrunner 
Australia 
Roadrunner 
Brazil 
Roadrunner 
Japan 
A&R and Marketing & Promotion Base 
Source: Roadrunner International 
Creating Musical Capabilities 
It was in this context of a growing multinational organization, built around the label's 
headquarters, that a process of change at the UK company had to take place. Wes-
sels' aim to increase the share of UK acts in Roadrunner's global repertoire was, in 
essence, driven by two factors: (1) Roadrunner's diversification move into dance mu-
sic on the European continent, and (2) the successful way in which British music had 
conquered the international market during the first half of the nineties. Although a 
few bands like In The Nursery and Front Line Assembly had been early UK signings, 
it had been the paramount responsibility of the London office to market and promote 
overseas metal acts until 1993. But in the summer of that year, A&R man Miles Leon-
ard joined the company from Virgin Records where he had discovered The Verve. 
His presence increased the emphasis on A&R at the UK company, which didn't last 
for long as he went to EMI's Parlophone label somewhat more than a year later. 
In January 1995, Wessels appointed Ruth Robinson as the UK company's new 
A&R manager. In line with Roadrunner's latest strategy, his instruction was to expand 
the label's roster from its traditional metal base into new musical areas, and to de-
velop the subsidiary's straggling A&R capability. With previous working experience at 
both Virgin and MTV, Robinson directed the company into British indie and dance 
music, where she signed acts like Bennet and Babyfox. At the same time, new mar-
keting and promotion staff, skilled in dance as well as metal, was hired to cope with 
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the increase in diversity in Roadrunner's products. Within 18 months, the number of 
employees at the UK office increased from eight to thirteen, while the UK artist roster 
expanded by almost 50%. Reflecting on this quite radical development, Turner men-
tioned how "we saw the need to step that up a level in terms of profiling the label [as 
it] had grown to a level where we needed the presence of a certain personality."Vl 
Chairman Wessels detected this personality in 25-year industry veteran Jimmy 
Devlin, who joined the UK office as Managing Director in June 1996. Having worked 
at RCA and EMI as promotions manager and at Polydor as MD, Devlin simply stated 
his ambitions as "developing Roadrunner from being the best alternative metal label 
in the world to the best label in the world."v" He recognized the need for the com-
pany to profile itself more strongly in the UK, both to the artistic community and the 
music media, if it wanted to succeed in signing acts for a worldwide audience. At the 
same time, he mentioned how "I 'm Roadrunner and Roadrunner is me," when he 
referred to his role in the process of profiling the label. In terms of A&R, Devlin saw 
no limits as to the styles of music the company could diversify into. In this sense, he 
reasoned that "if you perceive two musical areas as being opposites, just place them 
on both ends of a horseshoe and you'l l find that they are actually very close to one 
another. "vl" 
Installing a Business Focus 
Remote as this may seem, Devlin was also a realistic man who saw the need to install 
a more professional business attitude into the UK company. Already in 1993, when 
he was M D at Polydor, he had exclaimed that "it's vitally important that business 
affairs becomes a more directly-controlled function of A&R."'X Now, at Roadrunner, 
Devlin's second main task was to make clear that it takes discipline to sign and break 
a limited number of new acts, while simultaneously attending to the label's existing 
artists pool. With limited availability of financial resources, the company needed to 
"match artistic creativity and business rationality.'"1 Devlin's decision to team up with 
major record corporation PolyCram after its distribution deal with independent Pin-
nacle expired in January 1997 underlined his philosophy. Not only did PolyCram 
have highly efficient and modern manufacturing plants and reporting systems; its 
traditional orientation to rock music also made the major relatively open to Roadrun-
ner's extreme products. 
Another example of the label's growing emphasis on commercial concerns of the 
business was the appointment of a full-time bookkeeper, which effectively brought 
the financial administration function inhouse. Still, this was more a consequence of 
an efficiency drive that took place in the entire Roadrunner organization at the time. 
In the summer of 1995, Cees Wesseis nominated Koos de Vreeze to be a kind of stra-
tegic Managing Director of the whole Roadrunner group to properly monitor the 
company's rapid growth. The reason for this was quite simple, as Marcus Turner ex-
plained: "with increasing staff by about 20 to 30 percent in most territories and 
thereby increasing overhead by as much, bigger acts, and a lot more money being 
spent on acts, there was a need to be efficient at the same time.'"" It turned out that 
the expertise of De Vreeze, who had been director of business affairs at PolyCram 
and Managing Director of Sony in Holland, perfectly suited the chairman's skills in 
A&R and entrepreneurship. 
Supervised by De Vreeze, the efficiency program was largely facilitated by the 
installation of new information technology. Corporate-wide computer systems linked 
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the operating companies with Roadrunner's headquarters, while reducing complexity 
and increasing the speed of administrative coordination. In addition to intranet and e-
mail applications, subsidiaries could tap into contract and royalty modules designed 
as knowledge reservoirs. The success of these IT systems confirmed the already grow-
ing status of two International departments within Roadrunner Records as a whole. 
Turner mentioned how the administration department was "a lot more capable, and a 
lot more efficient and knowledgeable these days than it was before.""" The increasing 
emphasis on rights and royalties as a source of income also enlarged the prominence 
of the legal affairs department. While new A&R and marketing capabilities were cre-
ated and built at the operating companies, a business focus was spread throughout 
the company from the center. 
Repertoire implications 
After more than a decade of international expansion, metal-based label Roadrunner 
Records had pursued a rather revolutionary period of change during the period 1995-
1997. The company had diversified into alternative musical directions and, at the 
same time, had become explicitly budget- and target-oriented. But as 75% of Road-
runner's repertoire still consisted of metal acts, the need to augment its musical capa-
bilities continued to press upon the company. Recognizing this pressure, Turner rea-
soned that "if you want to reach the next level, you cannot just focus on heavy metal 
music; it's going to be in decline or out of fashion at some point in time, so you have 
to have a huge stable of artists from different arenas.'""" The same could be said for 
the geographical nature of Roadrunner's company-wide artist roster, 80% of which 
was US-based. In this sense, the growing emphasis on local A&R capabilities and 
repertoire development would be key to the label's prospective musical diversity and 
its future performance. 
Although the UK company's share of overall repertoire had grown to some ten 
percent, it remained to be seen whether the London office could sustain its slice of 
the roster. As a long-term artist development company, Roadrunner operated in a 
local industry which was increasingly characterized by record companies looking for 
short-term chart successes. Furthermore, an explosive increase in competition for 
artists had boosted expenses on artist agreements; these days, acts were signed for a 
minimum of £100,000. It was therefore quite logical, said Turner, that "you focus 
your activities on signing US bands which do really well in Europe, as opposed to 
signing very expensive acts which aren't doing very well with the exception of one or 
two territories."x'v Finally, another threat that could challenge the position of the UK 
subsidiary was the growing importance of the Australian company within the group 
as a source of Anglo-Saxon repertoire. 
Endnotes 
' Recorded Interview, Seplember 3rd 1998. 
" Martin, A., 'Machine Head: Roadrunner Brings Californian Metal Act Out of Obscurity," Mmic Week, 22nd April 1995, p. 
17. 
'" Recorded Interview, September 3rd 1998. 
~ Ibid. 
* Whereas distribution in most of the territories where Roadrunner had an actual presence was taken up by majors (Sony in 
America, Holland and Australia, BMG in Brazil and PolyGram in the UK), independent deals covered the smaller countries 
in which the company did not have an office. Over the years, Roadrunner had experienced that in these cases independent 
distributors were often more hungry for the business, and could thus achieve higher sales, than majors where the label's 
repertoire was only a tiny share of its overall business. 
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(See Appendix Dfor secondary sources) 
To start the analysis, Table 7.24 outlines the context and content of 
organizational change (that is, the 'why' and 'what' of change) at Road-
runner Records. Roadrunner had always been an independent company in 
that its shares were privately owned by its chairman Cees Wessels. As he 
planned to keep it that way, and because the label had, over time, devel-
oped a healthy financial position, no alterations in ownership triggered the 
change trajectory. The appointment of Ruth Robinson and Jimmy Devlin 
as A&R manager and Managing Director at the UK company, as well as 
the new role of Koos de Vreeze at the International office were important 
catalysts to change. Although Roadrunner had not experienced a drop in 
market performance - in contrast, the label had achieved unmatched suc-
cess in the metal segment of the market - the chairman of the company 
spotted an opportunity to increase Roadrunner's base of international rep-
ertoire. 
Table 7.24: Context and Content of Organizat ional Change at Roadrunner Records 
Change Context 
New executives Appointment of Robinson, De Vreeze and Devlin 
New ownership 
Threat/opportunity Increase in consumer attention for British music 
Performance decline 
Change Content 
Vision Merge Roadrunner's traditional A&R approach with diverse 
market demands 
Scope Deliver UK artists to international audience 
Positioning Roadrunner as internationally-oriented diversified record label 
Capabilities Creation of A&R and coordination capabilities 
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The sudden success of the label's dance act Technohead in 1995 and 
the rising popularity of British music made him develop a vision in which 
Roadrunner Record's historical strength in personal A&R could be com-
bined with a move into other market segments. Wessels's primary aim 
was to convert Roadrunner into a record company that would also be ac-
tive in various non-metal styles of music with a British accent to its US-
dominated repertoire. In other words, Roadrunner Records had to develop 
new artists in Britain as a repertoire source for its international consumer 
markets. Roadrunner UK was therefore positioned in its competitive envi-
ronment as an internationally-oriented record label. However, the com-
pany had to create novel capabilities to realize this new strategy. First, 
new A&R capabilities had to be developed at Roadrunner UK to step into 
the alternative and dance music segments. Second, new capabilities were 
needed to increase efficiency and coordination at the International unit. 
Table 7.25: Main Events at Roadrunner Records 
Event Date 
Miles Leonard becomes new UK A&R manager 
Marcus Turner becomes head of new legal affairs department 
at International 
Ruth Robinson becomes new UK A&R manager 
Roadrunner UK launches Malawi dance label 
Koos de Vreeze becomes strategic Managing Director at 
International 
Roadrunner UK incorporates financial administration 
Roadrunner UK signs dance act Babyfox 
Implementation of new IT systems at Croup level 
Roadrunner UK signs indie acts Bennet 
| immy Devlin becomes new UK M D 
Distribution deal with P'olyGram for the UK 
|immy Devlin leaves Roadrunner UK 
August 1993 
September 1993 
January 1995 
April 1995 
June 1995 
August 1995 
September 1995 
January 1996 
March 1996 
)une 1996 
February 1997 
December 1997 
Roadrunner's search for new capabilities embodied a process of or-
ganizational change, which gained substance through the appointment of 
Ruth Robinson in January 1995 as A&R manager at the London office, 
and terminated in December 1997 when Jimmy Devlin left the UK com-
pany. In chronological order, Table 7.25 lists the main events during these 
two years of transformation as covered in the Roadrunner Records Case 
211 
COEVOLUTION AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
Box. This outline suggests that the process of change simultaneously took 
place at two distinct but related levels within the overall company: at the 
UK subsidiary and within Roadrunner' International. Furthermore, Table 
7.26 summarizes the process of change according to its primary features. 
The label's new business philosophy was to develop a diverse repertoire 
of acts that could be leveraged on an international level. At the UK office, 
a reorganization took place in which new marketing and promotion staff 
was hired and the administrative function was brought in-house. 
Table 7.26: Process of Organizational Change at Roadrunner Records 
New philosophy Develop diverse repertoire to be leveraged internationally 
Reorganization Staff reshuffle in UK office; new IT systems at International 
Internal ventures 
Novel acquisitions 
New alliances UK distribution agreement with PolyCram 
Status reevaluation Increasing status of administrative and legal affairs departments 
Learning new skills Intra-company knowledge sharing; property rights protection 
Resolving dilemmas Local A&R and international coordination 
However, the main part of the reorganization (in terms of a business 
approach in which a move towards enhanced efficiency was stressed) 
happened at Roadrunner's International office in the Netherlands. Here, 
new information systems enhanced the flow of intra-company informa-
tion, and increased speed in administrative procedures. This improved the 
status of both administration and legal affairs departments in the company 
as a whole. In addition, these departments were primarily responsible for 
the development of skills that involved intellectual property rights protec-
tion and cross-subsidiary coordination. The distribution deal with Poly-
Gram in the UK also showed an increasing commitment towards a more 
rational business approach at the London office. Although high signing 
costs in the UK limited the company's move into non-metal music areas, 
Roadrunner Records appears to have made a promising start in resolving 
the dilemma of local artist development and cross-market coordination. 
Whereas turnover increased with 25% per annum at the International 
Group level over the period 1994-1997, Table 7.27 displays how this fig-
ure at Roadrunner's UK company grew at a significantly more rapid pace. 
At the same time, however, profits decreased or turned into losses in op-
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erating terms because considerable investments in A&R and repertoire 
development had been made. 
Table 7.27: Roadrunner UK's Financial Performance (in £1000) 
Turn-
over 
Cross 
Profit 
Operat. 
Profit 
1991 
286 
n/a 
n/a 
1992 
314 
n/a 
7 
1993 
372 
n/a 
4 
1994 
415 
299 
2 
1995 
1424 
288 
(69) 
1996 
2928 
70 
(481) 
1997 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
Source: Compiled from the UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 1993- / 998 
THE CASE OF INDEPENDIENTE 
Although its new strategy gave the label a truly international character 
only in the 1990s, Roadrunner had been one of the few independent rec-
ord companies that had already operated across its national borders in 
earlier years. Apart from prominent labels such as Island and Virgin, most 
independents established during the eighties in the UK (as presented ear-
lier in Table 7.2) did not have an explicit international approach to their 
business. That is, they signed artists to be released successfully in the UK, 
and if an act would happen to enjoy success in overseas countries, this 
was regarded as a coincidental and lucky side effect. But during the nine-
ties, independents began to develop an explicit international approach to 
artist development, and Case Box 7.6 describes this change at one of 
them: Independiente. The text supports a subsequent analysis of the com-
pany formerly known as Go! Discs, and is focused on its search for new 
capabilities in a changing competitive environment. 
CASE BOX 7.6: INDEPENDIENTE 
During the second half of the 1980s, the UK music industry had witnessed the rise of 
a number of successful independent record companies, the most prominent of which 
came to be Andy Macdonald's Co! Discs. The 27-year old entrepreneur had launched 
his record label in 1983 with an initial investment of only f 1,500, turning the venture 
into a financially stable and profitable company with a turnover of £6.7 million over 
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the next seven years. Between 1990 and 1995, Co! Discs doubled its UK market 
share to 1.5%, making it the second most successful British independent non-
compilations record label of that year. But in 1996, the label's prosperity abruptly 
came to an end when PolyCram acquired full ownership of Co! Discs, closing down 
the company in the process. Without his artist roster - which was redistributed over 
PolyCram's front-line labels - but wi th a cheque of an estimated £20 mil l ion in his 
pocket, Macdonald rebutted by launching a new and ambitious record company dur-
ing the fall of 1996: Independiente. 
From Go! Discs to Independiente 
The early growth of Macdonald's Co! Discs record company was largely based upon 
his distinct A&R talents, not only in artist discovery but also in managing the label's 
artist roster. Keeping his stable within clearly defined limits, Macdonald was able to 
focus his personal attention on a relatively small number of serious acts without being 
distracted by the demands of a busy release schedule. The independent label's suc-
cess during the late eighties wi th The Housemartins and The Beautiful South was 
extended in the first half of the '90s with quality acts as Cabrielle, Paul Weller and 
Portishead. Through these years, Co! Discs' market share increased rapidly. This co-
incided with the introduction of a new management team, including the appointment 
of Mike Heneghan as general manager in 1992. Having founded marketing & promo-
tion specialist companies Platinum and 3MV, Heneghan appeared to be the perfect 
complement of the musically oriented Macdonald, claiming that "you get good at 
marketing when you accept it as a supplementary function to the music."' 
Things started to go seriously wrong when renegotiations between Co! Discs and 
PolyCram UK over a prolongation of their existing ownership and licensing deal 
came to a stalemate in August 1996. The old agreement, in place since 1987, had not 
only tied Co! Discs to the Dutch major through a worldwide licensing deal, but had 
also seen PolyCram taking a 49% stake in the label for a reported £0.75 mill ion. 
Now, after eighteen months of discussions, the partners could not reach an agreement 
over what to do with the remaining 5 1 % of the ownership shares. Although )ohn 
Kennedy, chairman of PolyCram UK, claimed that Co! Discs was offered a similar 
kind of deal as the one between Sony and Creation Records, Macdonald replied that 
"PolyCram is not interested in negotiating the kind of deal which would have pre-
served the label's independence." A disappointed man, the entrepreneur therefore 
continued that "under such circumstances, and with the greatest reluctance, I felt I 
had no option other than to resign."" 
Although PolyCram proposed Mike Heneghan to be Co! Discs' new Managing 
Director, assuring that the company would continue to operate as an autonomous 
label under PolyCram's umbrella, the former general manager declined this offer. 
Instead, he joined Andy Macdonald as Managing Director in his new Independiente 
venture, where he would manage the creation and development of a new record la-
bel together with chairman Macdonald. Right from the start, the choice between "go-
ing up the corporate ladder or continuing with my friend and business partner" 
proved to be an easy one, especially since this enabled him to keep control of his 
own destiny within the label."1 In the end, most of the former Co! Discs staff ex-
pressed the same attitude and enthousiasm: eleven out of nineteen people working 
for Independiente had been part of the Go! Discs team before PolyGram's purchase, 
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among which were creative director Tony Crean and director of business affairs John 
Kellett. 
Independiente's Philosophy and Aspirations 
Both shareholders Macdonald and Heneghan shared the feeling that Independiente 
had to embrace the key principle which had made Co! Discs flourish. In other words, 
their task was to develop an artist-friendly record company that would be known for 
putting out cutting-edge music and, in the future, alternative entertainment products. 
Crucial to this objective would be the label's capability in artist development, and the 
creation of an environment where acts were given the freedom to apply their musical 
creativity to a maximum degree. In that sense, Independiente's role was primarily one 
of support without interfering in the actual artistic process. Or, as Mike Heneghan put 
it, "artist development is like gardening in that you prepare the ground, make the soil 
fertile, remove obstacles, sow seeds, and then allow time for the seeds to grow."'" 
Whereas most record companies, in search of immediate commercial success, 
are inclined to interfere in their artists' creative process, Independiente's management 
team realized that this could be detrimental to, or even stall, an eventual break-
through. Whi le this focus on artistic values was clearly part of the Co! Discs heritage, 
a broader geographic outlook distinguished Independiente from its predecessor. At 
Co!, all acts had been primarily developed with the British market in mind, but now 
the idea was to build a repertoire base that would lift Independiente to the global 
stage. According to Heneghan, the objective was "to have success beyond what's 
predictable in the UK, but then also to be playing in a bigger playing field, so our 
artists have a great opportunity for success in other territories."" In addition to devel-
oping British artists at the international level, Independiente's future growth would 
also be coming from foreign signings. 
To realize its global ambitions, Independiente linked up with Sony Music in a 
worldwide licensing deal, which also included a sales and distribution agreement for 
the UK. Apart from Sony's marketing muscle and a track record at breaking British 
acts internationally, the corporation's successful cooperative ventures with labels 
such as Creation and Nude through its Licensed Repertoire Division made it the most 
suitable partner for Independiente. At the time of the deal, Andy Macdonald under-
lined Sony's reputation as an indie-friendly major by telling how "Sony proved fully 
responsive to our needs and aspirations as an independent company," referring to 
Sony's capability in creative collaboration.'" This was manifested in the launch of an 
Independiente office in New York alongside Sony Music's Epic label. This affiliate 
served as an interface between Independiente and Sony in the US, and as an A&R 
base for American acts. 
Synthesizing Music and Business at Independiente 
The company's international outlook was a direct consequence of management's aim 
to install a vision in which Independiente's musical orientation was integrated with a 
professional business attitude. Crucial to Heneghan in communicating such a vision 
throughout the organization was "to dispel the myth that it was one thing or the 
other, to dispel the myth that it's either suits and finances or magic and music all the 
time."1"1 But although the philosophy stressed that music and business were two sides 
of the same coin, the music f lowing out of the acts' creativity would under no cir-
cumstance be adapted to the commercial demands of the record industry. In this 
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sense, the future growth and development of the company would not depend on al-
bum sales, but on the size of Independiente's artist roster. Although balanced be-
tween music and business, the course taken by the label thus depended upon the 
musical direction incorporated in Independiente's signing policy. 
Independiente's attitude that a compromise between art and commerce was out 
of the question was fueled by the belief that the company could create a future of its 
choosing. Heneghan argued that in conjunction with signing up great bands, "part of 
our job is the molding of the industry machinery to squeeze out every sale and have 
commercial success.'""" The firm's confidence in its own abilities was reflected in an 
aspired success ratio of 70%, which means that at least seven out of ten acts signed to 
Independiente would have some or considerable success in the marketplace. If real-
ized, this ratio would bring the label a significant competitive advantage in an indus-
try where the average percentage of acts becoming successful is about 10%. 
Independiente's desire to "be prepared to do things in a different way than they 
are normally done and to be quite investigative about them" made it very careful in 
its signing policy, according to Mike Heneghan.'" Keeping the artist roster within 
clearly defined boundaries enabled the label to establish long-term relationships with 
acts and nurture them in a way that a high proportion of them would break through. 
Also, the compactness of its artist stable provided the company a unique opportunity 
to tailor a distinct and individual marketing approach to each of its acts. Here, the 
company was involved in creative thinking to come up with marketing ideas that had 
a high impact without them being very costly. Instead of simply buying high-cost 
advertising space at numerous media outlets, marketing efforts were closely tied to 
the innovativeness of the music being released, and in this respect Independiente had 
developed a capability for 'art terrorism' marketing practices. 
Integrating Functional Capabilities at Independiente 
In order to let this bridge between commercial creativity and musical artwork flourish 
within the company, Independiente's management had created an environment 
"where people could be freed up from their self-imposed limitations to create activi-
ties and to generate results beyond their own expectations." MD Heneghan continued 
that this creative dreaming took place in an organizational context of "effectively-run 
meetings out of which action plans are created, with a very high, down-to-earth, solid 
efficiency about how the information then gets communicated."" Interaction patterns 
among the label's staff ran through a large number of small and informal dialogues, 
and through regular formal sessions such as communication, artist and project meet-
ings. After each meeting, its minutes were imported into a computer system and tran-
scribed into action plans, which specified the assignments to those involved and, 
furthermore, served as a tool for feedback after implementation. 
Although Independiente's organization was formally divided into a number of 
distinct departments, the multitude of meetings encouraged people to cross functional 
boundaries, especially with respect to marketing and A&R. Here, cross-fertilization of 
knowledge and creativity was achieved as discussions opened up the attitudes of 
A&R and marketing staff, and formal communication patterns made them involved in 
each other's line of work. Moreover, management installed a project organization in 
which employees were no longer regarded as departmentally driven labor input, but 
instead as creative resources available to specific projects. Organizational members 
were thus involved in several projects simultaneously, while the integration of such 
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marketing, A&R and financial resources was the main responsibility of their project 
leaders. As a result, Independiente's employees were continuously being reconfig-
ured into different project teams, thus increasing the company's cohesiveness in the 
process. 
Such a project-based structuring of work processes created an organization in 
which creativity could circulate openly and, at the same time, could be channeled 
into desired directions. The resulting virtual absence of hierarchy did not turn the 
label into an uncontrolled and chaotic company, however. Project leaders and top 
management provided the strong leadership needed to keep employees focused and 
to stay on top of all developments which could impact Independiente's organiza-
tional performance. Instead of perceiving its functioning in terms of coordination and 
control, Heneghan argued for "a balance between leadership and democracy.'"" To 
him, intense patterns of communication among organizational members, through 
personal conversations or even by means of Independiente's newly developed digital 
intranet, were crucial in maintaining that balance and "to keep the conversation 
alive." 
Ready for the Future 
After 12 turbulent months during which the groundwork for the company's hoped-for 
success had been laid, Independiente's compact roster included acts like Travis, Vi-
tro, Sunhouse and American-signed Deejay Punk-Roc. As the construction of its 
premises 'The Drill Hall ' neared completion at the end of 1997, Independiente was 
set for a promising start in the music business. Depending upon the speed with which 
its artist roster would expand, Independiente's management aimed at a double-digit 
company growth over the next five years. The deal with Sony allowed for a gradual 
expansion of the label over the globe; close cooperation with the Japanese multina-
tional would allow Independiente to profit from its expertise in starting new subsidiar-
ies in major territories. Also, the success and downfall of Co! Discs had provided 
Independiente's management with a wealth of experience of owning and managing a 
new, ambitious record label. 
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Table 7.28: Context and Content of Organizational Change at Independiente 
Change Context 
New executives 
New ownership 
Threat/opportunity 
Performance decline 
Change Content 
Vision 
Scope 
Positioning 
Capabilities 
PolyCram's estimated £20 million purchase of 51 % of Co! Discs 
Less competition for innovative music on an international level 
Merge Co! Discs's A&R history with international alternative 
market demands 
Deliver creative artists to international audience 
Independiente as internationally alternative record label 
Incorporation of international and commercial capabilities 
Again, Table 7.28 presents the core features of the change content 
and context at Independiente (in other words, why did the change happen 
and what was its specific nature). The most observable cause of the com-
pany's transformation from Go! Discs to Independiente was PolyGram's 
acquisition of the remaining 51% ownership shares of Go! Discs in 
August 1996. Claiming that the major was no longer interested in the la-
bel's independent status, Andy Macdonald sold his stake and started a 
new record company that would have complete independent ownership. 
Although their positions officially altered from MD and General Manager 
to Chairman and MD respectively, the label's shareholders Macdonald 
and Heneghan continued to embody its management team. 
Table 7.29: Go! Discs' Financial Performance 
Turn-
over 
Gross 
Profit 
Operat. 
Profit 
1989 
587 
n/a 
n/a 
1990 
1192 
n/a 
(204) 
1991 
4254 
974 
203 
1992 
4977 
1285 
106 
1993 
4954 
1325 
57 
1994 
5966 
1555 
4 
1995 
10790 
2517 
(21) 
Source: Compiled from the UK Record Industry Annual Surveys 1993-1997 
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In terms of market performance, there appeared to be no need for change 
as Go! Discs's market share had grown from 0.2% to 1.4% between 1991 
and 1996, while turnover and operating profits had increased steadily 
during the first half of the nineties (see Table 7.29). Still, the firm's man-
agement had spotted an opportunity to expand its scope internationally. 
Compared to its predecessor Go! Discs, a new Independiente vision 
was thus developed in which the company's strong A&R history could be 
blended with a more international business approach. Top management's 
principal objective was to create a new label responsible for the develop-
ment of an alternative and high-quality repertoire base for an international 
or even worldwide audience. This meant that acts would not necessarily 
have to be rooted in the UK, but could also be signed in foreign territories. 
Independiente was therefore positioned as an internationally alternative 
record label in the industry from a competitive point of view. But in its 
Go! Discs years the company had primarily focused its activities on the 
UK without much regard to foreign policies. As a consequence, Inde-
pendiente had to create new capabilities that would allow it to deal with 
its international operating context. As a prerequisite, the record label 
needed capabilities to manage its activities with a more professional busi-
ness attitude. 
Table 7.30: Ma in Events at Independiente 
Event Date 
Acquisition of 49% ownership by PolyGram 
Mike Heneghan joins as general manager 
Co! Discs wins 1994 M W A & R award 
Andy Macdonald sells his 51 % stake to PolyCram 
PolyGram offers Mike Heneghan M D position at Go! Discs 
Macdonald incorporates Independiente 
Independiente signs its first act (Travis) 
PolyGram terminates Go! Discs 
Mike Heneghan becomes Independiente MD; 
Tony Crean becomes creative director; 
John Kellet becomes director of business affairs 
Independiente closes deal with Sony Music 
Launch of New York office 
Implementation of IT system 
Dave Gilmour becomes senior director of A&R 
Completion of the 'Dril l Hall ' 
June 1987 
November 1992 
March 1995 
August 1996 
September 1996 
October 1996 
December 1996 
January 1997 
January 1997 
February 1997 
March 1997 
Course of 1997 
September 1997 
December 1997 
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Independiente's search for new capabilities essentially embodied a 
process of organizational change, which started with the sell out of the 
remaining 51% ownership shares of Go! Discs to PolyGram in August 
1996 and ended when the construction of its London quarters was finished 
in December 1997. Table 7.30 presents a chronology of the major events 
involved in this period of transformation as narrated in the Case Box of 
Independiente. Furthermore, table 7.31 outlines the core features of Inde-
pendiente's change process. The company's new business philosophy was 
to develop a compact roster of highly creative artists through which an 
international consumer base could be attracted. This meant that Inde-
pendiente's future growth and success would be shaped by its ability to 
discover creative resources and to introduce these acts to the market. Such 
an increase in market awareness had already started to penetrate the label 
in its Go! Discs years after Mike Heneghan had joined up. But the phi-
losophy had now been widened towards an international understanding of 
Independiente's market. 
Table 7 .31: Process of Organizat ional Change at Independiente 
New philosophy Discover high-quality repertoire with international potential 
Reorganization Temporary and cross-functional project teams 
Internal ventures Launch of New York office 
Novel acquisitions 
New alliances UK distribution and International licensing deal with Sony 
Status reevaluation Increasing appreciation for creative action within a business 
setting 
Learning new skills Effective and efficient communication via meetings 
Resolving dilemmas Creativity in music and creativity in business 
Important in this respect was the label's international licensing deal 
with Sony Music: not only did it provide Independiente access to the ma-
jor's global distribution and marketing capability, but it also enabled the 
independent to learn from its partner. This would be of value to Inde-
pendiente's ambition to set up an international structure, which started 
with the launch of the American office. At the same time, organizational 
processes were structured along a project-based company texture where 
expertise and skills crossed functional boundaries. Increasingly, formal 
and informal meetings were valued as effective vehicles for communica-
tion which, through a balanced form of managerial leadership, increased 
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the organization's operational efficiency. Creative action could thus take 
place within the company without obstructing a more rational business 
approach. In the end, all this enabled Independiente to resolve a dilemma 
of managing creativity in music and creativity in business at the very 
same time. 
TOWARDS THE COMPETITIVE REGIME'S E N D 
The above collection of case studies represents only a sample of UK rec-
ord companies that were involved in a process of organizational change to 
search for new capabilities. Many other companies have been reported to 
be engaged in organizational change between 1992 and 1996. Like BMG 
and Warner, the other majors restructured their A&R departments and 
stepped into alternative music areas, which was guided by the replace-
ment of many top managers. When Paul Burger became chairman of Sony 
in early 1993, he appointed new managing directors at both front-line la-
bels Columbia and Epic with a brief to bring the company into new and 
British music during the next two years.15 Driven by the success of its 
new sister-label Island Records, PolyGram's front-line label Polydor re-
newed its A&R policy during 1994 and 1995. Its move into the unknown 
territories of dance and R&B paid off with a market share increase from 
2.3% in 1995 to 3.6% in 1996.16 
At EMI, both managing directors of the firm's front-line labels EMI 
and Parlophone were replaced in early 1993. Being previously central-
ized, both labels were split up into separate operating units with distinct 
A&R and marketing departments. (At the corporate level, another radical 
development took place when music corporation EMI demerged from 
electronics company Thorn in the summer of 1996.)17 In a similar vein, 
American Decca's direct descendant MCA was reorganized after Nick 
Phillips joined the UK company. Its new focus on breaking artists in non-
traditional genres was even reinforced by the investments of its new 
'5 Editorial, "Stringer Gets Epic." Music Week. 10 April 1993. p. 1; Editorial, "Outsider 
Gets Columbia," Music Week, 10 July 1993, p. I; Editorial, "Burger Urges Sony to Break 
UK Talent," Music Week, 24 September 1994. p. 10. 
16 Webb, S.. "Developing New Talent Takes Priority as Polydor Revives its A&R Tradi-
tions," Music Week, 25 November 1995, p. 6. 
'7 McGinlay, P., "Blur Triumph Underlines Resolve to Keep Parlophone Riding High," 
Music Week. 16 September 1995. p. 10; Ashton, R.. "EMI Enters New Era after Split with 
Thorn," Music Week, 24 August 1996. p. 1. 
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owner Seagram, which had acquired 80% of MCA's shares of Matsushita 
for $5.7 billion in April 1995. To facilitate integration of its newly ac-
quired label Interscope, Phillips renamed MCA into Universal Music and 
restructured the company into two separate label groupings, MCA/Geffen 
and Universal/Interscope.18 Between 1990 and 1997, Universal's album 
market share almost quadrupled from 1.2 to 4.6%. 
Table 7.32: Market Shares of Majors versus Independents 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Majors: 
Record 
Company 
67.5 
70.2 
76.9 
74.9 
74.9 
75.3 
76.3 
75.8 
Majors: 
Distribution 
84.6 
85.5 
83.6 
81.9 
81.0 
79.2 
78.8 
79.6 
Indies: 
Record 
Company 
32.5 
29.8 
23.1 
25.1 
25.1 
24.7 
23.7 
24.2 
Indies 
Distribut 
15.4 
14.5 
16.4 
18.1 
19.0 
20.8 
21.2 
20.4 
Source: Compiled from data displayed in BPI Statistical Handbook 1998 
Note: Major record companies comprise PolyCram, EMI (including Virgin after its ac-
quisition), Sony, BMC, Warner and Universal. 
Table 7.32 displays how, after EMFs purchase of Virgin in 1992, 
major record companies continued to hold some 75% of the British mar-
ket for albums. In contrast, their combined market share in distribution 
declined with 5.0% over the period 1990-1997. At first sight, this appears 
to be inconsistent with the forementioned increase in the number of manu-
facturing and distribution agreements between major and independent 
record companies. However, it has been discussed how such cooperative 
ventures (designed during the 1980s) were extended to more complicated 
deals. Apart from Roadrunner and Independiente, other independents such 
as Creation Records and XL Recordings became engaged in international 
'8 This move mirrored the division of Warner into WEA and East West. Sources: Edito-
rial, "MCA Buyout Hits Seagram Shares,'" Music Week, 22 April 1995. p. 5; Webb. S., 
"MCA's Fortunes on the Ascendant as Phillips Plans Yet More Success," Music Week, 13 
July 1996, p. 8: "Universal Splits Labels and Sets its 10% Target," Music Week. 19 July 
1997, p. 1. 
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licensing deals to expand their market scope. Part of the deal in these alli-
ances was that the major partner took care of distribution and marketing in 
other countries outside the UK. At the same time, distribution in the inde-
pendent's home territory continued to be taken care of by independent 
distributors to retain the label's independent character in the UK.19 
Figure 7.3: Constant Value of UK Music Sales at 1997 Prices (in UK £ Millions) 
Source: BPI Statistical Handbook I998 
Statistics show how the new competitive regime made the UK music 
industry regain its pre-1990 growth pattern. Whereas Figure 7.3 displays 
this recovery in terms of constant sales values, Table 7.33 reveals how 
unit shipments increased from 133.6 million in 1992 to 208.3 million in 
1996. Furthermore, this rejuvenation of the UK record industry at the na-
tional level can also be observed at the international level. 
Table 7.33: T rade Deliveries of Albums (in Millions of Units) 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Total Albums 
160.3 
162.6 
150.7 
142.5 
133.6 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Total Albums 
153.5 
176.9 
196.2 
208.3 
197.9 
Source. BPI Statistical Handbook 1998 
'9 Editorial, "MBI United Kingdom Report," Music Business International, December 
1994. pp. 29-39. 
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of Sales Growth Ratios in Top Four 'Mature' Markets 
Source: IFPI (1998), The Recording Industry in Numbers 98, London: IFPI 
Note: Figures denote real growth, taking account of consumer price rises and inflation. 
As Figure 7.4 illustrates, the UK was the top performer among the four 
largest markets for music that are considered to be in a mature stage of 
development. In the four-year period after 1992, the British music indus-
try experienced an average growth ratio superior to any of the other larg-
est mature markets for music. In addition, the UK industry's rising export 
figures for physical music carriers (see Table 7.34) express the heightened 
interest of foreign market consumers in music of British origin during the 
same period. 
Table 7.34: Value of Physical UK Exports (in UK £ Millions) 
Year 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Exports 
211.9 
260.0 
283.7 
Year 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Exports 
354.2 
359.2 
n/a 
Source: BPt Statistical Handbook 1997 
During the new competitive regime of the nineties, many UK record 
companies managed to improve the effectiveness with which they discov-
ered and developed new artists and music. Table 7.35 displays how the 
total number of album releases increased by more than 70% between 1993 
and 1997, which indicates the enhanced efforts of record companies in the 
musical domain. 
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Table 7.35: UK Industry Album Releases 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
Total Releases 
11,021 
10,141 
11,988 
10,716 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Total Releases 
11,654 
13,551 
15,393 
18,386 
Source: BPI Statistical Handbook 1998 
However, to correct for both an increase in compilation albums and new 
records from established artists, Figure 7.5 provides a more reliable 
measure of the increase in new artist development. It illustrates how, after 
1993, the number of newly launched acts in the yearly Top 50 albums 
chart outstripped a declining amount of successful albums as recorded by 
'superstars' with a chart history of more than five years. Not only did the 
'Top 50 presence' percentage of this group decline from 66% in 1993 to 
17% in 1997, but record sales of these established artists also did not meet 
expectations relative to their past performances during the eighties and 
early nineties. 
Figure 7.5: New Artist Development in the UK Industry 
DMcxe than five years 
jtJRveor lewer years >iWfi£ 
Source: The UK Record Industry Annual Survey 1998 
Note: The figure displays Top 50 albums of the year, divided between artists with five 
or fewer years of chart history and those with more than five years of chart history. 
Greatest Hits albums are not included. 
The increasing variety of relationships between majors and independ-
ents in the first half of the 1990s not only enhanced record companies' 
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abilities in artist development, but also improved their business focus.20 
In a competitive regime where firms needed to be focused on business 
and music simultaneously, the major companies internalized and accessed 
A&R capabilities and creative resources, whereas the independent labels 
became more professional and adopted structural capabilities and superior 
marketing skills. This was clearly reflected in the differential rates at 
which industry-wide profits and turnover increased over the period 1992-
1996: whereas turnover grew from £1.35 billion to £1.92 billion at an av-
erage annual rate of 9.2%, gross profits increased from £331.6 million to 
£570.8 million at an average annual rate of 14.7%.21 Indeed, such an im-
provement in financial performance was experienced by major record 
corporations as well as their independent counterparts. 
Figure 7.6: Share of Turnover by Category 
• Indies 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19% 
Source. See Appendix E 
Further analysis of comprehensive data on turnover and profits (as 
categorized into major, linked and independent companies) supports the 
idea that the improvement in performance was not confined to a particular 
type of record company, but was indeed an industry-wide phenomenon. 
Whereas Figure 7.6 shows that the relative shares of turnover among 
these three categories are rather stable over time (with independent and 
major companies accountable for marginal fluctuations), Figure 7.7 indi-
cates how they move towards one another in terms of gross profit margins 
during the mid-nineties. Apparently, the increasing similarity among dif-
ferent types of record companies as to their competitive capabilities is 
matched by this convergence in profit margins. Despite this performance 
20 Editorial, "MBI United Kingdom Report," Music Business International, December 
1995, pp. 25-35. 
21 Calculated from data presented in 7"/ie UK Record Industry Annual Survey 1998. 
226 
A MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY 
improvement at British record companies, industry-wide turnover, profit-
ability, sales, and trade deliveries stagnated once more in 1997, which 
marked the end of the UK music industry's successful expansion. 
Figure 7.7: Gross Profit Margins by Category 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19% 
Source: See Appendix E 
Note: Gross profit figures for independents in 1991 were not available. 
THE C A S E OF V2 MUSIC GROUP 
According to Music Business International, 1996 was a year in which the 
majority of record companies in the UK consolidated their business.22 
One year later, company executives aimed to deal with disappointing re-
sults by stressing further cultivation of the company's licensing and pub-
lishing operations. During the mid-1990s, record companies had recog-
nized both the importance of international licensing revenues and the sig-
nificance of publishing departments as A&R sources in signing promising 
acts and composers. Both licensing and publishing activities were there-
fore integrated in a more comprehensive approach to artist development 
to gain additional (international and publishing) revenues as the industry's 
growth stagnated.23 It was in these times of consolidation that Richard 
Branson made his comeback in the music industry with the launch of V2 
Music Group. Case Box 7.7 narrates V2's rapid entrance in more detail, 
and provides the input for an analysis of the firm's search for capabilities 
as it aimed to manipulate its competitive environment. 
2 2
 Editorial. "MBI United Kingdom Report," Music Business International, December 
1996, pp. 17-29. 
2 3
 Editorial. "MBI United Kingdom Report," Music Business International, December 
1997. pp. 19-27. 
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CASE BOX 7.7: V2 MUSIC GROUP 
In December 1996, Richard Branson returned to the music industry after a pause of 
more than two years, a period in which the dynamic entrepreneur saw himself as "a 
dog without a bone."' After he had sold Virgin Music in 1992 to Thorn-EMI for £560 
mil l ion, Branson had focused his attention on Virgin's involvement in industries as 
diverse as airlines, insurance and radio. Part of the EMI deal had been an agreement 
in which Virgin promised not to launch a new record label for 30 months, and this 
non-competition clause had frustrated Branson's desire to continue his striking pres-
ence in the record business. Almost immediately after the clause's expiration date, he 
set up a working party to investigate a renewed entrance into the industry, and in this 
respect arranged meetings with quite a number of record company executives. While 
nothing really came of these meetings, Sony's Jeremy Pearce took the initiative and 
approached the Virgin chief himself. Attracted by his unconventional ideas of how to 
create a new independent and international record company, Branson appointed 
Pearce as CEO of what would become the V2 Music Croup. 
V2's Business Philosophy 
At Sony Music, Jeremy Pearce had managed the formation of the Licensed Repertoire 
Division in 1992, establishing Sony as the first 'indie-friendly' major record company 
in the British industry. Pearce's LRD business concept was based on his perception of 
the film business, where he had observed that "several large companies have gained 
expertise in distribution, but there are any number of production houses making films 
because they have the creative ability."" He launched LRD as unit responsible for the 
coordination and administration of Sony Music UK's international licensing activities, 
aimed at the creation of partnership deals with independent labels like Creation, 
Nude and Network. The distinctive feature of these alliances »vas that Sony invested 
in its partners by acquiring up to 50% of their shares, securing mutual commitment to 
the deal. The partner labels therefore not only benefited from Sony Music's interna-
tional marketing and distribution capabilities, but also achieved financial stability. 
For Pearce, an important part of LRD's mission was to bridge the gap between 
cost-conscious Sony Music and the musically creative independents, gaining access 
to the entrepreneurial skills of these companies. Despite LRD's noticeable success 
over the years, Pearce could really realize his ambitions when he started out at V2, 
where he was not confronted by the inevitable corporate rigidities of a major record 
company. As over $100 million was committed to the new music venture for its first 
three years of operation, the new CEO was finally able to set up an artist-friendly 
record company that could compete with the financial muscle of the majors. Within 
one year of V2's official launch in December 1996, Pearce struck partnership deals 
with independents Big Cat, Gee Street and Junior Boy's Own (JBO). Although the V2 
Group did acquire equity stakes in them, these three partner labels continued to op-
erate alongside of the company according to their original values and culture. 
However, having cooperation-based access to independent repertoire sources 
and entrepreneurial capabilities was not enough to challenge the global dominance 
of the majors. V2 needed to have an international presence in the most prominent of 
the world's music markets as well if it aimed to capture market share from these 
mighty multinationals. With its home base in the UK, the one thing the company 
could not do was to license its repertoire to independent or even major record com-
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panies in foreign territories. Such an approach would not only lessen the incentive for 
small labels to link up with V2, but would also reduce its operating margins to the 
level of licensing fees. Furthermore, V2 would lose control over its repertoire with 
respect to marketing and promotion as its acts would have to compete with the licen-
see's repertoire. To Pearce, its was clear that only physical distribution of records 
could be outsourced, and that local subsidiaries had to be launched to keep control 
over the company's revenues and repertoire. 
V2's International Set Up 
Together with his director of finance Stuart Middleton, Jeremy Pearce developed V2's 
organizational structure, incorporating a legal, business and international perspective. 
Within eighteen months, affiliates were established on the Australian continent and in 
Germany, France, Scandinavia, Benelux, Italy and Spain. Furthermore, the New York 
offices of partner label Gee Street Records became V2's American headquarters, 
while Big Cat founder Steve Abbot became the new company's head of international 
artist development. Whereas the international affiliates mentioned before were 
wholly-owned, V2 established a joint venture in Japan and planned further joint ven-
tures in other South East Asian record markets to better cope with the radically differ-
ent cultures of these countries and their unique way of doing business. Looking back 
upon this global and revolutionary growth process of the company, Pearce noted how 
he encountered little difficulties as "we planned it quite carefully, we knew exactly 
where we wanted to go, and we had a clear strategy there."'" 
Still, his concerns during those eighteen months of unlimited expansion were 
twofold, the first of which concerned the laborious enterprise of employing some 200 
people in various parts of the world. The large majority of the qualified persons were 
employed at other record companies, and a lot of effort was involved in talking them 
out of their secure jobs and getting them excited to be part of a new venture. Another 
challenge for Pearce was to obtain repertoire as the V2 Music organization unfolded, 
simply because "it would have been completely disastrous if I had 200 people around 
the world and no records to sell; equally, I couldn't sell and sign artists until I had the 
people, because I wasn't licensing to other companies.",v The construction of a sound 
repertoire base was partly achieved through a policy of accessing other artist rosters: 
apart from licensing deals on given acts with labels like Blue Rose and Banana, V2's 
partner labels participated as primary repertoire sources here. 
But the V2 CEO recognized the temporary nature of licensing agreements and 
knew that joint ventures could be dissolved over time. Within two months after tak-
ing up his new assignment, Pearce installed a number of people on key positions 
within the company to develop an in-house artist roster, thus avoiding the danger of 
ending up as a hollow corporation. First of all, he hired Ronnie Gurr from Sony's 
front-line label Columbia to be the Group's creative director with the responsibility 
for building V2 Music's new A&R competences. Secondly, he appointed David 
Steele, who had previously worked at both Island Records and Virgin, to run V2's UK 
record label as its general manager. Whereas accessing external repertoire via coop-
eration-based ventures was a patter dealt with at the Group level, the various V2 
record companies in the world became home to the company's internal repertoire 
where contracts were being signed with acts (instead of other record labels) to build a 
strong artist roster. 
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V2's Organizational Processes 
A second benefit of V2's non-traditional set up was that it provided an environment in 
which informal relationships with acts were allowed to flourish without disturbing the 
company's professional attitude towards the harsh realities of business. According to 
CEO Pearce, "the artists really are the stars in this company, unlike the majors where 
the executives treat themselves like stars, even if the public doesn't give a shit."v V2's 
artist-friendly outlook was superbly reflected in its artists contracts, which were free 
from the regular packaging and CD deductions (originally introduced by major record 
companies to cover for breakages) and recognized artists' moral rights. Furthermore, 
each V2 act was considered to be a company-wide asset for the world, irrespective of 
the original operating unit where the artist was signed. This global artist policy stood 
in sharp contrast to the conventional approach of the majors where each operating 
unit owned its acts and received international licensing fees from other units over-
seas. 
Although V2 operating units were free to engage in local artist development, 
Pearce perceived the Croup's international market approach as key to its competitive 
position: "We plan each artist's career internationally right from day one, so we have 
regular international meetings where a new artist is introduced even before they've 
made a record. The plot is for the world right away.'™ While all the companies were 
involved in the development of a worldwide marketing plan, Croup headquarters in 
London decided which of the acts had international potential and accordingly funded 
all international activities. Like the UK head office's decision to centralize all world-
wide administrative functions, this policy relieved operating units from much of the 
burden of financial affairs, enabling them to concentrate more on the development of 
marketing and A&R capabilities. Cooperation among operating companies, and be-
tween local units and Croup headquarters, was thus a prerequisite to global success. 
The infusion of Branson's original Virgin ideology into the V2 Music Group cre-
ated a company in which teamwork and communication were not being hampered 
by hierarchy. Jeremy Pearce stressed the significance of such cooperation to the new 
record company's international outlook, mentioning how "there's a vibe of everyone 
being involved in the company; there aren't any people who don't have a real job 
and just sit around typing letters and stuff. And that's important, the atmosphere it 
creates, implying that our communications are very, very good."v" Quite a few em-
ployees had roles that overlapped traditionally different functions; for instance, the 
Croup's A&R managers spanned both publishing and record operations so that artists 
signed up for a record deal could also be contracted by V2's publishing arm. Right 
from the start, V2 Music Publishing had been fully integrated into the company's 
global set up, sharing offices with its counterpart in all the local subsidiaries. 
V2's Information Highways 
Narrating how Beethoven's publisher must have been the most important person in 
his life as he collected his income for him, Pearce defined the distinction between 
records and publishing as "a blip on the history of the music business." Based upon 
his earlier job as head of Sony Music Publishing in the UK, the V2 CEO argued that 
while physical carriers would undoubtedly disappear in the future, there would al-
ways be rights. In this sense, it would be foolish to separate the two, because "at that 
point the publishing right wi l l be very much the same as the recording right, and the 
systems wi l l be the same."vl" V2 was also prepared for any future technological de-
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velopment that spurred on-line music delivery, as a highly advanced computer system 
had been integrated into the Croup's worldwide organization. Information technol-
ogy indeed played a crucial role in V2's concept of the corporation, as was clear from 
the presence of two global databases that linked the London head office to its affili-
ates and distributors around the world. 
In line with the centralization of V2's administrative functions, a database was 
installed for managing distribution accounts and royalty payments. An integral part of 
the company's agreements with its various distributors over the world was for them to 
supply data on sales and prices via on-line systems. This direct information, processed 
centrally in London, not only provided V2 with valuable feedback on the effective-
ness of marketing campaigns, but also enabled the company to calculate and pay 
royalties to its artists on short notice. The application of this new information system 
implicitly demanded a high degree of proficiency at distributor partners which could 
not always be found at independent distribution companies. Although V2 preferred 
independent distributors - like PIAS in the Benelux and Rough Trade in Germany -
because they better understood the company's music, it was therefore forced to deal 
with majors in territories like the US and France where no strong independents could 
be found. 
The company's second information system supported V2's global artist develop-
ment approach and provided access to marketing data to all of the group's affiliates 
around the world. This international marketing database consisted of detailed infor-
mation on individual acts such as release target dates, marketing plans and pace of 
development in each and every territory. The coordination and sharing of this intelli-
gence among the different parts of the company not only cut overhead costs, elimi-
nated mistakes and increased speed of action, but also contributed to V2's capability 
in global artist development. Jeremy Pearce mentioned how the incorporation of 
these databases "sounds obvious but other companies just don't have it; it's some-
thing which takes quite a long time, particularly in an existing structure."'" He thus 
considered the information systems as crucial to the effectiveness of V2 Music's 
global business processes in its competitive attack on the major record corporations. 
V2's Competitive Challenge 
Only the future could tell whether this assault on the majors' domination of the rec-
ord business would bring success to Richard Branson's new music venture. But what-
ever would happen, his first man and CEO Jeremy Pearce had ignored established 
industry practice and managed to set up a truly distinctive company. Never before 
had a music company been set up with affiliates in all of the world's major markets at 
one go, and never before had the record industry known a company constituted upon 
worldwide cooperation and partnership deals. Together with young and promising 
people at key management positions, an artist-friendly attitude and a progressive ap-
proach to IT, V2 became the first truly transnational music company in the record 
industry where both publishing and recording capabilities were given equal attention. 
All this made V2 a professional and ambitious new entrant, focused on breaking even 
before the turn of the century. 
In the end, it would be the strength of its repertoire that would determine the 
company's success in the marketplace. With its boundaries determined by the size of 
the company, V2 Music's roster had grown to some 45 acts, half of which were direct 
signings such as Headrillaz and Stereophonies. The other 50% was contracted in by 
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its partner labels Big Cat, Gee Street and JBO, and consisted of acts like Addict, Jun-
gle Brothers and Underworld. Whereas the V2 Record label had initially focused on 
signing up guitar bands, the Croup's joint ventures brought V2 into a variety of musi-
cal spheres such as rap, R&B, dance and techno. Referring to his new company as "a 
supermarket of good taste," Pearce acknowledged the significance of developing a 
healthy artist roster in an industry where "the competition to sign artists is tougher 
than ever and the business is much more professional and sophisticated than it used 
to be."x 
Endnotes 
* Talbot, M„ "The 'Dog Without a Bone' Finds a Fresh Challenge to Chew On,* Music Week, December 7th 1996, p. 7. 
" Pride, D., "Sony Looks to Licensing to Fill the Talent Gaps." Music Business International, June 1992, p. 32. 
"' Recorded Interview, January 30th 1998. 
" Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
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(See Appendix Dfor secondary sources) 
Although V2's entry was not a matter of change, the attributes listed 
in Table 7.36 seem to be applicable to analyze the context and content of 
this new business venture. One trigger for entrance was the expiration of 
Branson's non-competition clause enforced by Thorn-EM.I when he had 
sold the Virgin Music Group. This enabled him to incorporate V2 Music 
under his Virgin Group umbrella next to his other businesses such as ho-
tels, airlines and radio. The primary catalyst to V2's launch, however, was 
the appointment of Jeremy Pearce as CEO responsible for the grand de-
sign of the new music company's strategy and organization. Obviously, a 
decline in market performance had not been-experienced, as the company 
had not existed before. Still, Pearce had noticed a substantial opportunity 
to do things differently from the conventional modes of operation and the 
traditional approach to organization as embraced by the major record cor-
porations. His perception of the competition, and his deviant ideas of how 
to organize a music company, came to shape the content of V2's entrance. 
Pearce developed a vision in which the Virgin Group's financial 
muscle could be merged with an artist-friendly approach to music. His 
primary aim was to create a music company with a truly international 
outlook, which delivered all sorts of music to various audiences over the 
world. Although its ownership structure made it a UK-based company, its 
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organizational setup as a consequence had to cross borders to sign artists 
all over the globe and to cope with this international variety in demand. 
V2 was thus positioned among its competitors (in other words, the major 
record corporations) as a transnational music company in which artists 
were company-wide resources (instead of being owned by individual op-
erating companies in the country were the respective act was signed). To 
realize such ambitions, capabilities had to be created that would facilitate 
the establishment of the new company. More specifically, these capabili-
ties concerned its international organization and coordination. 
Table 7.36: Context and Content of V2 Music Group's Business Venture 
Change Context 
Executives Appointment of Jeremy Pearce as CEO 
Ownership Virgin Croup's capital injection of more than $100 mill ion 
Threat/opportunity Major companies' conventional approach to organization and 
operations 
Performance decline 
Change Content 
Vision Merge Virgin Croup's financial strength with artist-friendly attitude 
Scope Deliver style variety in music to international variety in audience 
Positioning V2 as a transnational music company 
Capabilities Formation of (inter-)organizational capabilities 
Essentially, V2's entrance into the music industry was embodied by 
its search for these new capabilities, which started when Pearce was ap-
pointed as V2's CEO in March 1996 and ended in December 1997 with 
his public announcement that the firm was on course. Table 7.37 lists the 
main events and their corresponding dates during this period of entry as 
described in the V2 Music Group Case Box. In addition, Table 7.38 pres-
ents a structured overview of the core features that constituted this process 
of entrance. (As the V2 case essentially concerns a new business venture, 
the original attribute 'internal ventures' has been omitted from this table.) 
The company's business philosophy was characterized by an international 
but artist-friendly approach to artist development shaped by intracorporate 
knowledge sharing. This demanded a specific organizational setup, which 
started with the incorporation of local V2 record companies in each of the 
world's main music markets. 
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Table 7.37: Main Events at V2 Music Group 
Event 
Richard Branson sets up a working party to investigate his 
return to the music industry 
Branson publicly announces an attack on the majors; 
leremy Pearce becomes V2's CEO 
Ronnie Gurr becomes creative director 
David Steele becomes M D of V2 Records; 
Stuart Middleton becomes finance director; 
Richard Polding becomes manager of business affairs; 
Launch of V2's music publishing division 
V2 signs its first act (Stereophonies) 
V2 closes partnership deal with Big Cat label; 
Steve Abbott becomes head of international A&R 
V2 closes partnership deal with Gee Street label; 
Opening of American office 
Implementation of global databases 
Licensing deal with the JDJ compilations label; 
V2 signs distribution deal with BMG for North America 
Branson sells 33% stake of V2 Music to the McCarthy 
Corporation for £45 mil l ion 
V2 closes partnership deal with dance label JBO; 
Pearce publicly states V2's funding was in excess of $100 
mill ion 
Date 
December 1995 
March 1996 
May 1996 
July 1996 
August 1996 
October 1996 
December 1996 
Course of 1997 
March 1997 
June 1997 
December 1997 
Two global databases, one for planning international marketing cam-
paigns and the other for managing distribution accounts and royalty pay-
ments, turned this worldwide collection of operating companies into a 
transnational network. At each of V2's local subsidiaries, communication 
and teamwork was stressed, while publishing and recording operations 
were integrated at a managerial level. This underlined V2's focus on the 
significance of various musical property rights. At the corporate or group 
level, partnership deals and international licensing agreements were 
closed to access creative resources. In addition, V2's London headquar-
ters created skills in global planning and cross-company coordination 
across its network of local units as part of its responsibility for the dis-
semination of information and knowledge. As the music industry's first 
major yet independent transnational music company, V2 aimed to resolve 
the dilemma between managing local and global market demands. 
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Table 7.38: Process of V 2 Music Group 's Business Venture 
Philosophy Transnational artist development approach 
Organization Network of database-linked and project-based local companies 
Acquisitions 
Alliances Network of partnerships, licensing agreements and joint ventures 
Status evaluation Emphasis on musical rights through integration of recording and 
publishing 
Learning skills Global planning and cross-unit coordination 
Resolving dilemmas Differences in local and global market demands 
SUMMARY 
As it is beyond the scope of this study to forecast future developments in 
the industry, it remains to be seen whether V2 Music Group's innovative 
and deviant approach to organizing a music company will spearhead the 
industry's next competitive regime. All the same, V2's offensive posture 
towards the major record companies reflects its intention to manipulate its 
competitive environment. Like Island Records, it analyzed established 
competitive practices and positioned itself in a unique competitive space, 
in the process searching for revolutionary and distinctive capabilities. 
However, it is not yet clear whether V2 will force its rivals to adapt to a 
new competitive context in the way Island managed to do. Indeed, the 
various case descriptions displayed between those of the two innovators 
showed how rival firms adapted to changes in their competitive environ-
ment. Thus, the current study of the British music industry demonstrates 
that record companies' search for new capabilities at the firm level was 
embedded in a dynamic of manipulation and adaptation. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 7.8, where the institutionalization 
of the competitive regime of the nineties is depicted in the competitive 
moves of the various case-study companies. As discussed, the manufac-
turing and distribution deals between major record corporations and inde-
pendent labels during the eighties had resulted in a further specialization 
of record company value chain activities in commercial business and 
creative music respectively. The new competitive concept of the nineties, 
initiated by Island, evolved around the convergence of an innovative ori-
entation towards music and a focused business perspective. The figure 
shows how BMG and Warner created new capabilities in A&R to adapt to 
the new demands of musical innovation, moving upwards on the 'creative 
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music' capability dimension. Warner's move to the right on the 'commer-
cial business' capability dimension expresses its novel dedication to the 
exploitation of property rights through the launch of warner.esp. 
Figure 7.8: The Dynamic of Manipulation and Adaptation in the UK, 1990-1997 
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Independent record labels Roadrunner and Independiente, originally 
positioned in the opposite corner of Figure 7.8, created new capabilities in 
organizational coordination and financial administration, moving further 
on the 'commercial business' capability dimension. Roadrunner's move 
upward on the 'creative music' capability dimension illustrates its diversi-
fication move into new musical arenas. Island and Virgin moved along 
both dimensions simultaneously as they rebuilt their dormant A&R capa-
bilities and created focused marketing capabilities. Whereas Island had 
historically been more orientated towards the introduction of new acts and 
new music, Virgin had traditionally been more involved in commercial 
artist development while expanding on an international level. At V2, these 
dimensions were already integrated as a basic 'platform of departure.' Its 
progressive capabilities in organization, not present at any other company 
in the music industry at the time of incorporation, can therefore possibly 
initiate a subsequent competitive regime. 
236 
A MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY 
Although Figure 7.8 shows how the case companies moved towards 
one another as followers adapted to changes in their competitive environ-
ment, the way in which new capabilities were actually created differed 
significantly among individual firms. Indeed, each of the case companies 
developed a unique strategy as an input for organizational change that 
embodied its search for new capabilities. The cases show this diversity in 
strategy in terms of both competitive positioning and developed strategic 
capabilities. They also illustrate how the nature of reorganization differed 
across companies and how each firm learned new but distinctive skills. In 
other words, the study of the UK music industry demonstrates how all 
companies were involved in a process of organizational change as they 
searched for new capabilities. Whereas this search brought them closer to 
each other from a competitive point of view, a basic level of variety was 
present in both its process and outcomes. 
The case studies indicate that the reason for this observed diversity is 
rooted in the companies' past. At each of the case companies, the vision 
for change comprised a future and an historical component, the merger of 
which came to guide the company's search for capabilities. Island's musi-
cally innovative history, Virgin's entrepreneurial heritage, BMG's decen-
tralized management ethos, Warner's traditional US marketing approach, 
Roadrunner's past of'family-based' A&R, and Independiente's legacy of 
introducing new musical styles all influenced the future direction of these 
companies. On the other hand, these past strengths had at an earlier point 
in time obstructed the companies' ability to change in a more voluntarily 
setting (and not induced by outside forces). Further refinement of capa-
bilities that underlay these strengths had apparently resulted in a compe-
tence trap, as can be observed in four of the case studies presented in this 
chapter. Although this study, in line with earlier expectations stated in the 
methodology chapter, unavoidably paid more attention to explorative 
search, these core rigidities deserve some attention at this point. 
At Island, Blackwell's expertise had been fundamental to the label's 
successful artist roster over time, but had at the same time prevented the 
company from focusing on critical activities such as marketing and devel-
oping a company- instead of a person-specific A&R base. Virgin's entre-
preneurial culture had been an important factor in its prosperity in earlier 
years, but had also created a company where acts were signed on the basis 
of A&R managers' personal tastes and where new staff was hired in an 
internal context of unlimited growth. BMG's emphasis on management 
decentralization had been key in the establishment of a multinational cor-
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poration, but made the process of change difficult for the UK company: 
after the restructuring of A&R activities at the company's front-line la-
bels, Jeremy Marsh needed to launch a new Music Division to centralize 
strategic management decisions. Warner's traditional strength in US-
based repertoire and marketing had created a flourishing company over 
the years, but obstructed the company in its objective to increase local 
artist development, a process that would take almost five years. 
This chapter has described how, at the firm level, capabilities were 
created and (to a lesser extent) refined in a dynamic of manipulation and 
adaptation, which shaped a process of organizational change at individual 
record companies. Whereas Chapter 6 focused on similarities between 
record companies as the competitive process at the industry level un-
folded, this second part of the empirical study investigated the differences 
between firms in their search for new capabilities. Although it generated 
no clear-cut findings on the refinement of capabilities, this multiple-case 
study into the UK music industry showed that firms are different (and that 
this variety increases over time), even when they move towards each 
other to conform to a new set of rules of the competitive game. The next 
chapter concludes this thesis with a discussion of the outcomes of the em-
pirical investigation as confronted with the theoretical framework outlined 
earlier. 
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Discussion and Conclusion: 
Principal Findings of the Research Project 
The previous two chapters presented a two-layered study of the music 
business in which the coevolution of capabilities and competition was in-
vestigated at both firm and industry levels of analysis. This chapter closes 
the thesis and completes the research project by comparing evidence and 
theory. Spurred by new knowledge of record companies and the music 
industry, it returns to the original research question. As a first step, the 
propositions are considered in light of the evidence presented in both the 
historical study and the multiple-case study. The objective is to examine 
the validity of the integrative framework developed in Chapter 4, which 
leads to a more detailed discussion on the conclusions and implications of 
the research project. In addition, the basic flaws and advantages of the 
empirical research approach adopted in this thesis are reflected upon from 
a methodological perspective. Finally, several future research trajectories 
for the field of strategic management are suggested. 
PROPOSITIONS AND FINDINGS 
As stated at the outset of this thesis, the principal aim of the current study 
has been to gain new insights into the relatively unexplored phenomenon 
of coevolution between capabilities and competition. This goal was ini-
tially prompted by the observation that existing theories on competition 
and capabilities display fundamental differences as to their assumptions 
on firm idiosyncrasy and uniformity. Drawing upon the notion of search, 
a theory-induced framework of coevolution has been constructed to rec-
oncile these conflicting perspectives. It aims to integrate firm and industry 
levels of analysis in accordance with two sets of propositions, each related 
to one of these levels (see Table 8.1). The framework was then applied in 
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a historical study and a multiple-case study of (record companies com-
peting in) the music industry. The result of this exercise has been that all 
propositions are supported by the findings derived from this data, as will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Table 8.1: A Recap of Propositions 
Industry Level of Analysis 
l a : Coevolution of capabilities and com-
petition is shaped by search behavior of 
rival firms in a process of innovation and 
imitation. 
l b : Explorative and exploitative search 
behavior of rival firms results in the foun-
dation and proliferation of capabilities. 
1c: Coevolution of capabilities and com-
petition embodies a sequence of competi-
tive regimes. 
Firm Level of Analysis 
2a: Coevolution of capabilities and com-
petition is shaped by search behavior of 
rival firms in a process of manipulation 
and adaptation. 
2b: Explorative and exploitative search 
behavior of rival firms results in the crea-
tion and refinement of capabilities. 
2c: Coevolution of capabilities and com-
petition embodies a sequence of organ-
izational changes. 
The study seems to confirm the basic premise that firms do not search 
in isolation; instead, the search behavior of a particular firm has implica-
tions for that of other firms operating in the same competitive environ-
ment. The historical exposition of the music industry displays how the 
search for capabilities at innovative record companies like Victor, Decca, 
Atlantic and Warner resulted in a competitive struggle at the industry 
level in which rivals' search behavior was directed at the imitation of 
these previously unknown capabilities. In addition, the case studies show 
how, from a firm-level point of view, Island's search behavior was essen-
tially manipulative in character as it forced other rival firms to adapt to the 
resulting change in their competitive environment, and to search for new 
capabilities as well. These findings strongly support Proposition la and 
Proposition 2a on how the search behavior of firms shapes the coevolu-
tion of capabilities and competition. 
Next, the history of the music industry demonstrates how exploration 
at the industry level was a matter of creative search for distinct capabili-
ties by both innovators and imitators. But once the innovator's advantage 
had been eroded, and rival companies had become more identical in terms 
of strategies and capabilities, the founded capabilities were further prolif-
erated. This was observable in the exploitation of distinct activities that 
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linked record companies to the creative community and to the consumer 
market. These activities consisted of bundles of the earlier founded capa-
bilities that in this way came to be proliferated across the industry as con-
ventional practice.1 Although the data presented in the historical study 
does not reveal in-depth knowledge on the search behavior of imitators, it 
does indicate that the latter are also involved in explorative search be-
havior when trying to replicate the innovator's new capabilities base. In 
four out of six competitive regimes, it took rival record companies several 
years before they had managed to erode the innovator's competitive ad-
vantage, which reflects the strenuous nature of their search behavior. 
The multiple-case study is more informative in this respect: it clearly 
shows how both manipulators and adaptors were engaged in explorative 
search as the studied record companies created new capabilities and dis-
sociated themselves from established practice. Indeed, the contemporary 
case studies provide ample evidence to support the idea that exploration at 
the firm level was in fact the creative search for new capabilities by both 
manipulators and adaptors. However, it was less clear how the newly cre-
ated capabilities were further refined. Yet the data shows that, in four out 
of six possible cases of rejuvenation, record companies found it difficult 
to change as they had fallen into a competency trap. In line with existing 
theory, this indicates that previously created capabilities are refined over 
time - even to the extent that core capabilities become core rigidities, and 
further amplify ;he internal differences between firms. In sum, the empiri-
cal findings support Proposition lb and Proposition 2b on the distinction 
between explorative and exploitative search behavior as related to the de-
velopment of capabilities.2 
Also, the empirical studies register the necessity for rival firms to be 
engaged in a sequence of organizational change trajectories in order to 
survive. As said, the multiple-case study displays how record companies 
had become locked into old routines that had turned historical capabilities 
into barriers to change. In a similar vein, the history of the music industry 
exhibits how Edison's National Phonograph Company failed to survive as 
it sustained the production of cylinders. After the rise of the independents 
' This switch from explorative to exploitative search brought rival companies even closer 
to one another, and precluded the rise of clear competitive advantages among them. 
2 Again, it must be stressed that empirical evidence on how new capabilities were refined 
ai the firm level was less pronounced than that on how capabilities were proliferated at the 
industry level of analysis. 
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in the mid-1950s, RCA and Decca were not able to conform to the new 
rules of the competitive game; it was only when both companies were ac-
quired by major capital providers Bertelsmann and Matsushita respec-
tively that they were able to regain their strength. However, the case 
studies clearly show how record companies also managed to adopt a stra-
tegic choice perspective. This enabled them to shake off old habits and 
routines, and to renew their search for novel capabilities through radical 
processes of organizational change. 
This sequential nature of the dynamic between explorative and ex-
ploitative processes of capability development can also be found at the 
industry level. But in contrast to the above where firms again move closer 
towards one another in their competitive strategies and capabilities, dif-
ferences among rivals start to increase at the industry level as a new stra-
tegic innovator spearheads the next competitive regime. Both the histori-
cal and the multiple-case study indeed show how entrepreneurial record 
companies were radically different in their capabilities as they introduced 
new competitive practices that replaced the existing rules of the game. 
This not only induced explorative search at rival companies, but also took 
the industry to a next round of development or, in other words, to a new 
competitive regime. These empirical findings strongly support Proposition 
lc and Proposition 2c, thus suggesting that capabilities and competition 
coevolve over multiple competitive regimes and trajectories of organiza-
tional change. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the individual propositions seem to stand the test of empirical evi-
dence, the validity of the integrated framework of coevolution presented 
in Chapter 4 can be sustained. Firms coexist and search in a competitive 
ecology, in which the creation and refinement of capabilities at individual 
rival firms impacts the foundation and proliferation of capabilities that 
shapes their industry (and vice versa). As search behavior alternates be-
tween the rejuvenating properties of exploration and the maturing tenden-
cies of exploitation, the industry and its constituent rival firms coevolve 
over time. This dynamic, displayed in the framework as a continual and 
cyclical movement at both firm and industry levels of analysis, indeed 
substantiates the call for more dynamic models of strategy as voiced by 
prominent authors in the field (e.g., Porter, 1991; D'Aveni, 1994). In this 
respect, two conclusions can be derived from the application of this par-
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ticular dynamic framework to the music industry: (1) the coevolutionary 
interaction of search processes at firm and industry levels is a major and 
endogenous force of development, and (2) a coevolutionary perspective of 
the relationship between capabilities and competition allows for the inclu-
sion of conflicting perspectives on firm idiosyncrasy and uniformity. 
Figure 8.1: Competitive Regimes and Growth % of US Music Sales 
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First, integration of the results obtained from the historical and multi-
ple-case studies suggests that coevolution of capabilities and competition 
shapes change at both firm and industry over time. In other words, the 
process of reciprocity between capabilities and competition represents a 
major endogenous force of development that moulds the evolution of the 
industrial system and its constituent rival firms. Figure 8.1 plots the an-
nual growth ratio in American music sales (based on constant value) for 
the period 1910-1990. if one adjusts this pattern for the rather excessive 
ratios during the Great Depression and around the Second World War, it 
can be observed how the coming of new competitive regimes as described 
in Chapter 6 influenced the US record industry's prosperity. In each case, 
a significant increase of the real growth ratio followed the establishment 
of a new competitive regime based on explorative search behavior that 
rejuvenated the industry. At the same time, the figure displays how the 
launch of a new regime was preceded by stable or even negative values 
that attended the degenerative features of exploitative search behavior. 
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In addition, Figure 8.2 presents a more detailed view of the impact 
coevolution of capabilities and competition had on industry growth during 
a particular competitive regime in the UK. Island's innovative search for 
ways to converge creative music with commercial business spearheaded 
the organizational change programs of many record companies. In effect, 
this resulted in the institutionalization of the new regime during the nine-
ties, which in turn drove the British music industry's growth ratio to 
higher levels. Whereas Virgin, BMG and Warner entered the process of 
transformation at an early stage, Roadrunner and Independiente changed 
their organizations only after they had experienced increased returns. 
Recognizing that organizational change programs place significant costs 
upon a company, this observation seems to be consistent with data pre-
sented earlier on. It was shown in Chapter 7 how gross profit margins for 
independents stagnated from 1994 onwards, whereas gross profit margins 
for majors and linked companies displayed exactly the opposite pattern. It 
seems that cooperation between majors and linked minors induced the 
speed with which these companies searched for new capabilities. 
Figure 8.2: Organizational Change and Growth % of UK Music Sales 
Island Virgin, BMG, Warner Roadrunner Independiente V2 
-5 - ^/^ ^ S f c ^ . X ^S, 
-10 - ** 
-15 -
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Source of Growth %: Calculated from Constant Sales Value as presented in the 
BPI Statistical Handbook 1998 
Still, the slower response of the independent companies to the new 
rules could not prevent a downturn in the UK industry's prosperity. Rep-
resenting 80% of industry profits and turnover, the other two categories 
made sure that the founded capabilities were further proliferated. As a 
consequence, the British music industry's real growth ratio dropped to 
3.6% over 1996 and even turned negative during the following year. As 
Decca, Atlantic, Warner and Island had done in their times, V2 aimed to 
create a new concept of competition during these years of decline. Al-
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though it remains to be seen whether V2's innovative behavior will lead 
to the launch of the next competitive regime, Schumpeter (1934) already 
noted that periods of downturn or stagnation offer fertile ground for stra-
tegic innovations to occur. Moreover, the above conforms to the theory of 
Schumpeter that development is an endogenous process, and contributes 
to his thoughts with the specific assertion that it is, to a large degree, the 
coevolution of capabilities and competition that drives renewal of both the 
industrial system and its constituent firms. 
Clearly, this contradicts existing views that development is largely 
determined by forces of an exogenous nature such as the pace of technol-
ogy, government policies and consumer demographics (e.g., Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Hrebeniak and Joyce, 1985). In a similar vein, cultural 
studies claim that the recurrent pattern in the music industry's sales 
growth is due to developments in the creative community itself (e.g., Pe-
terson and Berger, 1975; Lopes, 1992). They argue that the creative po-
tential present in the artistic community determines the industry's health, 
and that the cyclical growth of the industry is shaped by fluctuations in 
this exogenous variable. In other words, these studies acknowledge the 
existence of record companies, but downplay their role as endogenous 
forces of development. This thesis provides an alternative perspective, in 
which the industry has been shaped by the interactive search behavior of 
its constituent rivals over time. Spurs in industry growth have been a con-
sequence of the creativity of record companies that managed to introduce 
novel business practices and launched new competitive regimes. 
A second fundamental outcome of this research project is that a 
coevolutionary perspective towards the reciprocity between capabilities 
and competition allows for the inclusion of contradictory doctrines that 
focus on differences and similarities between firms in an industry. In par-
ticular, a marriage of the results of the historical study with those of the 
multiple-case study implies that rivals can be both different and similar to 
one another in terms of their capability bases at the same time. Table 8.2 
compiles the new capabilities that were founded (and later on proliferated) 
during each competitive regime as discussed in Chapter 6. In essence, 
record companies that aspired to keep up with the competition, or to at 
least ensure survival, were forced to develop these basic capabilities. That 
is, they had no choice but to change their strategies, mindframes and or-
ganizations, and search for novel capabilities that conformed to the new 
rules of the game. In this respect, rival firms in the record business moved 
towards uniformity over a competitive regime as they copied andprolifer-
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ated capabilities tied to the extraction, development and commercializa-
tion of creative resources. 
Table 8.2: Competitive Regimes and New Capabilities 
Tech-
nology 
logic 
Software 
shift 
Star 
system 
New 
music 
Federal 
system 
Rights 
shift 
Managerial 
• Market for 
home entertain-
ment 
• Availability of 
minimum soft-
ware 
• High fidelity of 
recordings 
• Market for 
music recordings 
• Availability of 
minimum hard-
ware 
• Consumer 
preference for 
celebrities 
• Manipulation 
of consumer taste 
• Upcoming 
popular youth 
market 
• Continuous 
generation of 
new music 
• High market 
responsiveness 
• Multiple market 
coverage 
• Synergy across 
focused labels 
• Cultivation of 
music property 
rights 
• Multiple-time 
buyers of music 
Input-Based 
• Horizontal disc 
technology 
• Zinc master-
plate for record-
ing 
• Financial and 
technological 
knowledge 
• Theater and 
opera performers 
• Technological 
skills and experi-
ence 
• Compact roster 
of celebrities 
• Marketing and 
promotion budg-
ets 
• Roster of un-
proven and 
popular artists 
• Low-cost re-
cording studios 
• All-round skills 
of owner/mana-
ger 
• Collection of 
acquired record 
labels 
• Headquarters' 
corporate knowl-
edge 
• Multinational 
distribution net-
works 
• Scale-based CD 
manufacturing 
plants 
Transformation 
• Structured firm 
organization 
• Efficient manu-
facturing plant 
• Separate re-
cording and 
production 
• Innovation in 
recording/manu-
facturing 
• Capacity-based 
production 
• Avant-garde 
marketing cam-
paigns 
• Economic ra-
tionale of costs vs 
revenues 
• Talent discov-
ery and develop-
ment 
• Entrepreneurial 
management 
• Label culture of 
musical innova-
tion 
• Label auton-
omy in A&R and 
marketing 
• Shared admini-
stration and P&D 
setup 
• Cooperation 
within value 
chain 
• Specialization 
of artist devel-
opment 
Output-Based 
• Quality gramo-
phone disc 
• Technology 
license agree-
ments 
• International 
strategic alliance 
• High release 
variety in record-
ings 
• High techno-
logical status 
• Network of 
distribution 
channels 
• Network of 
jukebox contracts 
• Independent 
distribution net-
work 
• Network of 
local radio con-
tacts 
• Label reputa-
tion 
• High musical 
variety in album 
releases 
• Popular corpo-
rate image 
• Expansion of 
record catalogues 
• Network of 
deals with inde-
pendents 
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At the same time however, the case studies in Chapter 7 showed how 
different record companies displayed a significant degree of diversity in 
the specific way they developed new capabilities during the unfolding of a 
new competitive regime. While all of the studied companies were similar 
in their aim to converge creative music with commercial business (in line 
with the new competitive rules as initially pioneered by Island), each of 
them pursued a different route in its search for new capabilities. Table 8.3, 
displayed on the following page, recapitulates the basic features of the 
organizational change trajectories followed by the case companies, and 
shows substantial variation in terms of market positioning, capability de-
velopment, organizational realignment and the learning of new skills. As 
time passed, these initial differences were amplified through exploitative 
search, which increased individual firm idiosyncrasy. Thus, based upon 
historical and multiple-case research into the music industry, it can be 
concluded that, in line with the integrative framework, the coevolution of 
capabilities and competition embodies multi-level but counter-moving 
patterns of firm uniformity and idiosyncrasy. 
In other words, this idea suggests that both Schumpeterian and re-
source-based theories on the appearance of rival firms over time carry an 
element of truth, and that a synthesis of both perspectives could be of 
value to a dynamic theory of competitive strategy. Two basic themes ap-
pear to stand out in such a dynamic notion of strategy as fundamentally 
based on the concept of search behavior. First, it is important to realize 
that there is more than one way for firms to achieve similar strategic ob-
jectives and to develop new capability bundles in a competitive context. 
In this sense, Schumpeter's idea that competitive interaction makes rival 
firms move towards one another can be complemented with the resource-
based argument that firms are essentially unique in their appearance and 
behavior. Similarly, the resource-based principle that companies need to 
be different to be competitively successful can be matched with the 
Schumpeterian view that the process of competition evolves around cer-
tain fundamental rules of the game. Such two-way integration allows for 
the theorem that a competitive advantage is built on capabilities and can 
therefore only be temporary. 
The second theme is that interaction patterns among rivals and path 
dependencies at individual firms can have both a positive and a negative 
impact on the development of new capabilities. It has already been dis-
cussed how interactive behavior through acquisitions, joint ventures and 
strategic alliances among record companies speeded up the capability de-
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velopment process at these firms. Although this was beneficial to the in-
dividual companies in their struggle to conform to the new competitive 
rules, it also pushed the industry into an early stage of exploitation and 
falling growth levels. This seems to conform to D'Aveni's (1994: 333) 
argument that "cooperation usually leads to more intense levels of com-
petition." In a similar vein, it has been mentioned how the existence of 
path dependencies prevents firms to change their capabilities in times of 
competitive turbulence due to long-term commitments and excessive 
learning effects (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991; Levinthal and March. 1993). 
However, the case studies also showed that firms are able to break free 
from these competence traps; moreover, they narrated how record compa-
nies profited from their unique history by retaining its positive virtues and 
integrating them into new entrepreneurial actions. 
Table 8.3: Organizational Change and New Capabilities 
Positioning Capabilities Organization Skills 
Island 
Virgin 
Commercially 
alternative record 
label 
Formation of 
A&R and market-
Globally focused Convergence of 
record company A&R and market-
ing 
Major/indie staff 
at top/front-line 
positions 
Marketing new 
and alternative 
music 
Internal network Coordinating 
of divisionalized planning and 
sub-labels creative functions 
BMG 
Warner 
Road-
runner 
Indepen-
diente 
V2 
Internationally-
oriented local re-
cord corporation 
Locally-oriented 
American record 
corporation 
Internationally-
oriented diversi-
fied record label 
Internationally-
oriented alterna-
tive record label 
Transnational 
music company 
Incorporation of 
local A&R 
Formation and 
coordination of 
A&R 
Creation of multi-
national coordi-
nation 
Development of 
international 
base 
Creation of (inter) 
organizational 
setup 
Music division of 
project-based 
front-line labels 
Central division 
between separate 
label groupings 
IT-oriented head-
quarters with 
local units 
Temporary cross-
functional project 
teams 
Network of inter-
linked record 
labels 
Managing a net-
work of creative 
interfaces 
Sharing cross-
label grouping 
knowledge 
Sharing intra-
corporate knowl-
edge 
Communicating 
effectively and 
efficiently 
Coordinating 
local-global busi-
ness processes 
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This research project aimed to contribute to an enhanced under-
standing of the concept of coevolution and, to achieve this aim, generated 
a dynamic and integrative framework that crosses multiple levels of 
analysis. It led to the following conclusions: Over the past two decades, 
strategic management thinking has evolved from the point of view that the 
sources of a company's success lie in the industry to the belief that the 
determinants of superior performance are to be found in the firm itself. 
Obviously, it is both. Firms do not search in isolation but exist in ecolo-
gies of competition, and this is why barriers to entry and barriers to imita-
tion do not last forever. Rival firms search for new capabilities within 
their organization, but they also search for capabilities that rest in their 
competitive environment. The coevolutionary perspective advocated here 
enables an integrated view of these search processes at both firm and in-
dustry levels, and shows how their interaction makes industries and firms 
coevolve endogenously over time. Moreover, it allows conflicting per-
spectives on firm differences and similarities to be united if one perceives 
coevolution of capabilities and competition as multi-level but counter-
moving patterns of firm uniformity and idiosyncrasy. 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The above discussion suggests that there seem to be at least three points 
of value tied to the dual nature of the empirical research design as applied 
in this study. First of all, the incorporation of both a historical study and a 
multiple-case study facilitated description and analysis of the topic from a 
clear longitudinal perspective. Traditionally, research into strategy and 
competitive advantage has searched for the determinants of superior posi-
tions at a particular point in time. However, Porter (1991) argued that the 
strategic management academy should be more concerned with studies of 
dynamic processes instead of continuing to address this 'cross-sectional 
problem.' Moreover, he claimed that inquiries into the more intriguing 
'longitudinal problem' should focus on the two fundamental variables of 
initial conditions and managerial choice. This thesis proved his point as it 
exhibited that (1) history does matter because of path dependencies, and 
(2) firms do shape their future as a result of voluntary actions. In other 
words, it dealt with what Van den Bosch (1997) explained as the balance 
between determinism and strategic choice. 
Second, following the original aim of the current study, the dual 
methodology enabled the investigation of processes at different levels of 
249 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
analysis as more recently advocated by academics such as Levinthal 
(1995) and Henderson and Mitchell (1997). One of its major benefits was 
that some of the findings that had been independently generated from the 
individual studies pointed at the existence of similar patterns and mecha-
nisms, especially with regard to the direction and causality of search be-
havior. In addition, the individual methods of historical and multiple-case 
study proved to be complementary: defaults in one method could be met 
by revelations in the other (and vice versa). For example, the reported ab-
sence of in-depth insights into imitators' search behavior in the historical 
study was to some extent relieved by detailed insights into adaptors' 
search behavior as reported in the multiple-case study. In turn, the lack of 
clarity into the refinement of capabilities in the multiple-case study could 
be partly covered by specific findings on how capabilities were prolifer-
ated as analyzed in the historical study. 
Leonard-Barton (1990), who encountered similar research benefits, 
maintained that such parallels and matches between distinct methodolo-
gies enhance both internal and construct validity. This seems to be par-
ticularly important to the third advantage of the dual methodology, which 
has already been extensively discussed in the above: the integration and 
synthesis of findings tied to different levels of analysis in pursuit of a 
more dynamic notion of strategy and competitive dynamics. Despite these 
various benefits, application of the dual methodology is clearly not a bed 
of roses. The researcher can be overwhelmed by the sheer volume of data 
involved in the empirical part of the research, and can accordingly be con-
fronted with problems related to its collection or organization. However, 
these dangers can be dealt with through careful planning and structured 
coordination of activities at the outset of a project. A more serious prob-
lem is that it can be dangerous to cover up faults in one study by revela-
tions in the other because, in the end, one investigates different levels of 
analysis. Thus, the paramount advantage of the dual methodology can, at 
the same time, be its major liability. 
This pitfall suggests that, in the future, additional research could be of 
value to the ideas developed here and, in particular, to the further refine-
ment of the integrative framework constructed in Chapter 4. It appears 
that more effort needs to be put into an investigation of the impact of ex-
ogenous forces, a topic that has been underexposed in the current project. 
A reason for this omission can be found in the fact that the music industry 
has traditionally not been heavily influenced and restricted by govern-
mental policies - although this may change in the near future as record 
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companies do become more concerned with the protection of their intel-
lectual property rights. It is therefore imperative that the just explored 
concept of coevolution of capabilities and competition has to be studied in 
other creative or traditional industries as well. In this respect, a number of 
possible trajectories for future research are suggested in more detail in the 
following pages. 
Much of the empirical work that has (implicitly) studied the search 
behavior of firms, has traditionally focused on pioneering companies that 
exhibit superior performance (e.g., Peters and Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 
1983; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Christensen, 1997). However, empirical 
findings from the historical study suggest that an appreciation of how 
search subsequently takes place at imitators is indispensable for a thor-
ough understanding of competitive dynamics. As firms do not search in 
isolation, it seems to be important to at least know the determinants and 
effects of search as competitive interactions among firms at the industry 
level. Moreover, as more and more industries appear to have experienced 
a shift towards hypercompetition (D'Aveni, 1994), further research into 
search as a fast-response driver to imitation would be of value, especially 
since most companies take on the role of imitator. Such studies would 
require a fine-grained analysis of the behavior of rival firms during a par-
ticular competitive regime. 
In a similar vein, the majority of research efforts that has (implicitly) 
focused on the outcome of companies' search behavior i,i terms of capa-
bilities, has mainly been concerned with content instead of process issues 
(e.g., Bower and Hout, 1988; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Chesbrough and 
Teece, 1996; Miller and Shamsie, 1996). That is, the focus of attention 
was on what (type of) capabilities are developed at firms, but not on how 
these capabilities are actually generated and cultivated. In addition, pre-
liminary findings from the multiple-case study suggest that the field of 
strategic management is in need of more knowledge on how newly cre-
ated capabilities are refined over time, especially since such behavior can 
culminate in the rise of core rigidities or competence traps. One way to 
track capability refinement is to conduct in-depth case studies of firms 
(which have been identified up front as having created new capabilities) 
over significant periods of time. 
A third research issue that deserves attention in the future concerns 
the effects of a shift in behavior from exploration to exploitation and vice 
versa. Levinthal and March (1993) argued how excessive exploitation 
endangers the health of both the industry and the firm. Although evidence 
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from the music industry shows that firms are able to break free from this 
negative spiral by commencing or returning to explorative search, the data 
on the spiral itself is still somewhat ambiguous. Whereas the idea that 
negative returns to exploitation exist at the firm level has received more 
attention in recent years (e.g., Ghemawat, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Rumelt, 1995), there is still little knowledge on the degenerative effects of 
exploitative behavior by rivals at the industry level. Studies into this proc-
ess of 'self-destruction' should not only observe the health of an industry 
in terms of specific industry-wide measures, but should also take notice of 
the possibility that major exogenous events conceal or impact such a de-
generative process. 
Whereas the research trajectories suggested above directly involve 
the process of coevolution and emphasize the potential value of the search 
concept to the field of strategic management, the following suggestions 
spring from more specific empirical observations. The historical analysis 
could not find any evidence that capabilities had been proliferated during 
the first competitive regime. A lack of data from these earlier years could 
be a possible explanation, but a more credible one can be found in studies 
on technological competition for so-called 'dominant designs' (Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990; Suarez and Utterback, 1995). Here, rivals compete 
for a technological standard, a struggle in which the firm that manages to 
lock its technology into the market is the eventual winner (Arthur, 1989). 
This firm usually has a progressive licensing policy, meets customer de 
mand via a wide availability of compatible software, and creates a limited 
number of horizontal strategic alliances (Hill, 1997). 
The music industry's first competitive regime was indeed character-
ized by this technological struggle for standardization, and Victor clearly 
met the requirements for winning the battle between disc and cylinder. 
Because rivals were, for some years, not certain about what system to 
adopt, it is very likely that capabilities were not (or only to a limited de-
gree) proliferated at the industry level. When it was finally clear that the 
disc system had won out, it was not long before the industry moved to the 
next regime in which rivalry evolved around the production of records. 
And the music industry has been a software-based industry ever since, 
during which capabilities were proliferated in each subsequent competi-
tive regime. Essentially, the shift in the industry's nature from hardware 
to software raises the interesting question whether further exploitation of 
capabilities matters at all in industries were technology plays a dominant 
role in the rise and fall of competitors over time. 
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
Looking at the attributes of organizational change in the multiple-
case study, it can be observed how firm organization played a significant 
role in the creation of new capabilities. This is no surprise if one remem-
bers that companies in the music industry depend to a large degree on the 
knowledge and communicative capacities of their people. It seems that 
music companies can provide fertile ground for studies into the contribu-
tion of knowledge and organizational form to the firm's ability to develop 
new capabilities. Organizational form is claimed to be crucial to a firm's 
performance (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1994) and to its abil-
ity to balance exploration and exploitation of capabilities (Volberda, 
1998). Knowledge flows, which underlie the firm's organizational form, 
evolve over time, determine changes in the integration of knowledge 
components (Van Wijk and Van den Bosch, 1998), and therefore shape 
alterations in the firm's capabilities development process. 
As an empirical jungle, the music industry seems to offer enormous 
opportunities to the field of strategic management. Its rich history can be 
of value to those interested in path dependencies, while intriguing devel-
opments such as digital distribution of music can be an input into studies 
concerned with the value of intellectual property rights to firm behavior. 
Furthermore, the music industry is a 'creative business' where creative 
resources have to be marketed commercially, and plays the role of major 
content provider in a converging network of industries. Also, the observed 
diversity in record company behavior, as well as the value of knowledge-
and relationship-based resources to record companies' performance, can 
be illuminative to those concerned with the 'hidden' determinants of firm 
success. As for me, there can be no doubt that the choice for this un-
charted empirical setting played an important part in the ambitious goal of 
contributing to a dynamic theory of strategy. 
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Appendix A: 
Interview Guidance Questions 
The semi-structured interviews v/ere, to a large degree, f-aned arourd basic knowledge of the 
firm's development during the niretes v/h ch hac been generated throjgn oreliminary data 
collection. Still, to enable eventja coss-case comparson, simiar issues and topics hac to be 
covered, and in this -espect the general quest ons belov/ guided tne interviews. 
Questions of a personal nature, involving the interviewee's 
previous working experience 
current ob description 
role in tneorganizaton 
Questions concerning the company's development, in terms of 
key h;stori;a! events 
positioning and performance ever t me 
future goals ana ooject ves 
Questions regarding the companv's strategic reo-ientation, as to 
its core rat.orale 
new ma'ket opportunit es 
executive resoons bi it\ 
Questions on major steps in the companv's transfo'matbn. such as 
cost-cutting activities 
major staff appointments 
setup of new departments or d visions 
Questions on changes in the company s organization, especially its 
main organization principle 
organ zational processes 
key nodes and activities 
Questions concerning the company s learning experiences, in terms of 
changing emphasis on activities 
managing business and arist policies 
developing unknown skills 
Questions regarding (changes in) the company's cce ohilosoohy on 
alist oe\elopment 
international perspective 
determinants of growth 
Questions on the company's attitude towaros cooperaticn, in te-ms of 
licensing and distribution deals 
joint ventures and all.arces 
intracorporate knowledge transfer 
Questions of a general nature, invoking tne interviewees ideas or 
major changes within the ncustry 
key developments in competition 
inpac o : fitu-e technologies 
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Appendix B: 
Computation of US Music Sales 
To obtain a somewhat more transparent understanding of the long-term growth pattern in record 
sales, available current value figures have been translated into constant value figures, guided by 
annual growth ratios. The current values (in $ millions) are derived from the Recording Industry 
Association of America, as reported by Gronow (1983) for the years 1921-1968, and from the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry as reported by Hung and Morencos (1990) 
for the years 1969-1990. Data between 1910 and 1920 were incomplete, and have therefore 
been estimated on the basis of United States CNP figures as presented in Mitchell (1993). Re-
gression was performed in line with Sanjek's (1991) account that sales in 1920 were reported to 
be $100 mill ion. The resulting pattern appeared to be consistent with Cronow's (1983) assump-
tion that US record sales in the early 1910s must have been at least 30 mill ion records (with an 
average retail value of 1 dollar), and that growth was slow until the war years and rose rapidly 
afterwards. The constant values (in $ millions) were computed to take account of rising con-
sumer prices and to correct for inflation, according to the fol lowing simple formula: constant 
value - current value / (consumer price index * 0.01). CPI figures for the period 1913-1990 
were collected from the US Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics, and were corrected 
for 1990 as 100. Whereas annual growth ratios concern current values, real growth ratios are 
based upon constant values; both reflect the difference between a particular year and the previ-
ous one. The figures and tables displayed in Chapter 6 are based on the following table: 
Year 
1910 
1915 
1920 
1925 
Current 
Value in S 
Millions 
39 
39 
43 
43 
42 
44 
53 
66 
84 
92 
100 
106 
92 
79 
68 
59 
70 
70 
73 
75 
Annual 
Growth 
Ratio 
_ 
0 
10 
0 
-2 
5 
20 
25 
27 
10 
9 
6 
-13 
-14 
-14 
-13 
19 
0 
4 
3 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
7.6 
7.7 
7.7 
8.3 
9.8 
11.6 
13.2 
15.3 
13.7 
12.9 
13.1 
13.1 
13.4 
13.5 
13.3 
13.1 
13.1 
Constant 
Value in $ 
Millions 
-
-
-
565.8 
545.5 
571.4 
638.6 
673.5 
724.1 
697.0 
653.6 
773.7 
713.2 
603.1 
519.1 
440.3 
518.5 
526.3 
557.3 
572.5 
Real 
Growth 
Ratio 
. 
-
-
-
-4 
5 
12 
5 
8 
-4 
-6 
18 
-8 
-15 
-14 
-15 
18 
2 
6 
3 
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Year 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
Current 
aliii- in $ 
Millions 
46 
18 
11 
6 
7 
9 
11 
13 
26 
44 
48 
51 
55 
66 
66 
109 
218 
224 
189 
173 
189 
199 
214 
219 
213 
277 
377 
460 
511 
603 
600 
640 
687 
698 
758 
862 
959 
1173 
1358 
1586 
Annual 
Growth 
Ratio 
-39 
-61 
-39 
-45 
17 
29 
22 
18 
100 
69 
9 
6 
8 
20 
0 
65 
100 
3 
-16 
-8 
9 
5 
8 
2 
-3 
30 
36 
22 
11 
18 
-1 
7 
7 
2 
9 
14 
11 
22 
16 
17 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
12.8 
11.6 
10.5 
10.0 
10.3 
10.5 
10.6 
11.0 
10.8 
10.6 
10.7 
11.2 
12.5 
13.2 
13.5 
13.8 
14.9 
17.1 
18.4 
18.2 
18.4 
19.9 
20.3 
20.4 
20.6 
20.5 
20.8 
21.5 
22.1 
22.3 
22.6 
22.9 
23.1 
23.4 
23.7 
24.1 
24.8 
25.6 
26.6 
28.1 
Constant 
Value in S 
Millions 
359.4 
155.2 
104.8 
60.0 
68.0 
85.7 
103.8 
118.2 
240.7 
415.1 
448.6 
455.4 
440.0 
500.0 
488.9 
789.9 
1463.1 
1309.9 
1027.2 
950.6 
1027.2 
1000.0 
1054.2 
1073.5 
1034.0 
1351.2 
1812.5 
2139.5 
2312.2 
2704.0 
2654.9 
2794.8 
2974.0 
2982.9 
3198.3 
3576.8 
3866.9 
4582.0 
5105.3 
5644.1 
Real 
Growth 
Ratio 
-37 
-57 
-32 
-43 
13 
26 
21 
14 
104 
72 
8 
2 
-3 
14 
-2 
62 
85 
-10 
-22 
-7 
8 
-3 
5 
2 
-4 
31 
34 
18 
8 
17 
-2 
5 
6 
0 
7 
12 
8 
18 
11 
11 
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Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
Current 
Value in $ 
Millions 
1660.0 
1744.0 
1924.0 
2001.0 
2186.4 
2378.3 
2732.0 
3500.8 
4131.4 
3685.4 
3862.1 
3969.9 
3641.6 
3814.3 
4370.4 
4387.8 
4651.1 
5567.5 
6254.8 
6464.1 
Annual 
Growth 
Ratio 
5 
5 
10 
4 
9 
9 
15 
28 
18 
-11 
5 
3 
-8 
5 
15 
0 
6 
20 
12 
3 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
29.7 
31.0 
32.0 
34.0 
37.7 
41.2 
43.5 
46.4 
49.9 
55.5 
63.0 
69.5 
73.8 
76.2 
79.5 
82.3 
83.9 
86.9 
90.5 
94.9 
Constant 
Value in S 
Millions 
5589.2 
5625.8 
6012.5 
5885.3 
5799.5 
5772.6 
6280.5 
7544.8 
8279.4 
6640.4 
6130.3 
5712.1 
4934.4 
5005.6 
5497.4 
5331.5 
5543.6 
6406.8 
6911.4 
6811.5 
Real 
Growth 
Rati( 
-1 
1 
7 
-2 
-1 
0 
9 
20 
10 
-20 
-8 
-7 
-14 
1 
10 
-3 
4 
16 
8 
-1 
1990 7368.8 14 100 7368.8 
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Appendix C: 
Major Acquisitions 1986-1996 
Purchaser 
Bertelsmann 
Poly Gram 
Sony 
PolyGram 
Thorn-EMl 
PolyGram 
PolyGram 
Time-Life 
MCA 
Thorn-EMl 
Matsushita 
Virgin 
Thorn-EMl 
Thorn-EMl 
Sony 
PolyGram 
PolyGram 
Seagram 
BMG 
MCA 
PolyGram 
Record Company 
RCA Records 
Go! Discs (49%) 
CBS Records 
Island Records 
Chrysalis Records (50%) 
Big Life Records (49%) 
A&M Records 
Warner Communications* 
Geffen Records 
IRS Records 
MCA 
EG Records 
Chrysalis Records (50%) 
Virgin Music Group 
Creation Records (49%) 
Big Life Records (51%) 
Motown 
MCA (80%) 
Conifer Records 
Interscope (50%) 
Go! Discs (51%) 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1992 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1996 
Price 
$300 million 
£0.75 million 
$2 billion 
£272 million 
£54 million 
£1.5 million 
$500 million 
$14 billion 
$550 million 
£2.25 million 
$6.6 billion 
$3 million 
£35 million 
£560 million 
£3.5 million 
n/a 
$300 million 
$5.7 billion 
n/a 
$200 million 
£20 million 
* Warner Music Group is part of Warner Communications 
Sources: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1994). The Supply of Recorded Music, 
London: HMSO; Editorial, "The Acquisition Question," Music Business Inlernalional. 
April 1996, p. 16. 
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Appendix D: 
Case Study Secondary Sources 
Island Records 
Gorman, P., "Paul McGuinness: How the Fifth Man Turned Empire Builder," Mu5/c Business 
International, October 1997, pp. 13-15. 
Laing, D., "Maestro from Metz," Music Business International, February 1991, pp. 22-27. 
Music Week: 
"A&M and Island AIM to Take the High Road," March 24, 1990. 
"Marot In, Three Out at Island," July 28, 1990. 
"PolyGram Takes Reins of Island Finances," September 22, 1990. 
"Island Shapes Up," January 26, 1991. 
"Island Splits Video Division," February 16, 1991. 
"Island Back to A&R Roots," March 30, 1991. 
"Island's M D in Obscenity Row," June 8, 1991. 
"PolyGram to Fight NWA Case," August 24, 1991. 
"Island Beats Obscenity Rap," November 11, 1991. 
"Marot Hires Rowe," March 14, 1992. 
"Island Rejigs as Rowe Arrives," May 9, 1992. 
"U2: We're Wi th Island for Good," June 12, 1993. 
"Island Elevates Four Senior Staff," April 2, 1994. 
"Island's Manners Moves Up," May 14, 1994. 
"Island Goes Solo in US as Turnover Doubles," July 2, 1994. 
"New Acts Boom in UK Gold Rush," November 19, 1994. 
"Pulp and Tricky Help Island to Victory in A&R Category," March 16, 1996. 
"Rowe to Leave Island as Label Restructures, " October 4, 1997. 
"Blackwell Walks as Island Era Ends," November 15, 1997. 
Virgin Records 
Banks, D., "Jim Fifield," Management Today, August 1996, pp. 40-44. 
Jackson, T., Virgin King: Inside Richard Branson's Business Empire, Harper Collins, London, 
1994. 
Laing, D., "The Fifield Factor," Music Business International, September 1991, pp. 16-19. 
Kets de Vries, M.F.R. and R. Dick, Branson's Virgin: The Coming of Age of a Counter-Cultural 
Enterprise, INSEAD Case, Fontainebleau, 1995. 
Music Week: 
"The Master Motivator," April 13, 1991. 
"AVL Drops Name in Circa Merger," June 1, 1991. 
"Virgin Wins Conroy Deal," December 21 , 1991. 
•Virgin Axes 80 Jobs," June 13, 1992. 
"Now Virgin's Axe Falls on Classics," June 20, 1992. 
"Ten M D to Quit Virgin," November 7, 1992. 
"Virgin Axes Protein Diet," November 7, 1992. 
"Virgin Doubles LP Share," October 29, 1993. 
"New Virgin Division Takes in Hut," December 11, 1993. 
"Hut Frontman Heads Virgin Indie Launch," February 19, 1994. 
"Virgin Blooms as EMI Profits Grow," June 4, 1994. 
"A&R with Attitude," June 18, 1994. 
"Signed, Sealed and Delivered," June 18, 1994. 
260 
APPENDICES 
"Virgin Poaches ffrr's Thompson," March 18, 1995. 
"Virgin Restructures Management Team," April 29, 1995. 
"Signed and Sealed," July 22, 1995. 
"New Signings Give Virgin Strength Across All Genres," October 7, 1995. 
"Singles Add Spice to Virgin's Year," September 28, 1996. 
"Virgin Celebrates Eight M W Award Victories," March 15, 1997. 
"Virgin Duo Take on US," October 4, 1997. 
BMG International UK 
Editorial, "Deconstruction Seals RCA Deal," Record Mirror, July 1992, p. 1. 
Music Week: 
"BMG Sets Up New Indie A&R Division," June 23, 1990. 
"24 Redundant at BMG," April 13, 1991. 
"Principled Principal," September 21 , 1991. 
"MCA Extends BMG Deal for Global Push," September 11, 1993. 
"Deconstruction Builds Label Deal," August 6, 1994. 
"RCA Celebrates Mercury Victory," September 24, 1994. 
"Dino Duo Quit to Set Up BMG-Backed TV Label," October 8, 1994. 
"RCA Regroups to Stress Key Styles," December 3, 1994. 
"Deconstruction in Heavenly Link-Up," April 22, 1995. 
"Farbman to Spearhead BMG's Global Ambitions," November 4, 1995. 
"BMG Acquires Conifer Records," November 18, 1995. 
"Arista Opens the Door for Transatlantic A&R," September 28, 1996. 
"BMG Confident of Topping a Bum," September 28, 1996. 
"Delirious Deal Boosts RCA Dance Repertoire," November 2, 1996. 
"BMG to Boost Output in Chocolate Factory Move," September 13, 1997. 
"Preston and Marsh in Big Apple Summit," September 15, 1997. 
Warner Music UK 
Editorial, "Uncertain Times at Warner," Music Business International, June 1995, p. 7. 
Editorial, "The Compilation Wars," Music Business International, April 1996, p. 35. 
Music Week: 
"Ertegun's Stamp Underpins WEA's East West Records," January 20, 1990. 
"Compilations Corner Big Budgets," November 24, 1990. 
"WEA's A&R Hunt Ends at Geffen," February 9, 1991. 
"East West Boosts A&R," August 3, 1991. 
"Bellas Heads WEA," March 21 , 1992. 
"East West Buys Stake in Anxious," March 28, 1992. 
"Dunbar Role in Doubt as East West to Rejig," January 30, 1993. 
"WEA Puts DJ and Artist into A&R," June 12, 1993. 
"A&R Chief to Stem US Flow at WEA," January 29, 1994. 
"Oakenfold Set for East West," April 9, 1994. 
"The Rising Price of TV Advertising," May 28, 1994. 
"Rivalry Intensifies Between TV Labels," October 15, 1994. 
"Majors Move In on Compilations Boom," December 1 7, 1994. 
"Europop Champion Celebrates with a Second N r l , " July 15, 1995. 
"Diversity Pays Off for Warners," September 23, 1995. 
"Warner Taps Craig for Strategy Role," October 14, 1995. 
"A&R Is Driving WEA's Reputation as a Hitmaker," June 1, 1996. 
"ESP Off to a Flying Start," June 1, 1996. 
"Dewhirst Is Tempted by Warner.esp Catalogue," August 3, 1996. 
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"Telstar Joins Universal to Bolster TV Business," May 3, 1997. 
"Telstar TV and Warners Link for Catalogue Deal," June 21 , 1997. 
"Rejig Sees Expanded Role for Warner.esp," November 29, 1997. 
Roadrunner Records 
Music Week: 
"Dark Horse Bags Top Polydor Job," September 28, 1991. 
"A&R Man Leonard Shifts to Roadrunner," September 18, 1993. 
"Frenchman in as Devlin Moves on," September 10, 1994. 
"Hitman Returns with New Label," November 19, 1994. 
"Roadrunner Recruits Robinson," April 1, 1995. 
"Roadrunner Launches Dance Label," April 22, 1995. 
"Roadrunner UK Races Off into Some New Musical Directions," March 16, 1996. 
"Devlin Recruited as M D of Roadrunner," June 1 5, 1996. 
"PolyGram Picks Up Roadrunner Deal," January 25, 1997. 
Independiente 
Music Weefc: 
"Major League Contender," July 6, 1991. 
"Co! Discs Recruits Heneghan," November 7, 1992. 
"Go! Earns A&R Prize," March 11,1995. 
"Kennedy Vows to Keep Go! Discs on Course," August 31,1996. 
"Heneghan Offered Top Job at Go! Discs," September 7, 1996. 
"Travis: Independiente's First Signings," December 14, 1996. 
"Go! Discs to Close After Departure of Heneghan," January 18, 1997. 
"Go! Discs Staff Reunite in Macdonalds New Team," February 8, 1997. 
"Cool Deal Puts Teamwork Behind Weller," May 3, 1997. 
"Independiente Signs Up Gilmour," September 27, 1997. 
V2 Music Group 
Editorial, "Label Start Ups Follow Different Patterns," Music Business International, December 
1997, p. 21. 
Scott, A. (Ed.), "Independents Report 1997," Music Business International, December 1997. 
Music Week: 
"Pearce Swaps to Licensing Division," February 29, 1992. 
"Branson Stirs the Pot," December 23, 1995. 
"Branson Returns to Challenge Majors," March 30, 1996. 
"Pearce Joins Branson in New Label Venture," March 30, 1996. 
"Columbia's Gurr to Join New Branson Venture," May 18, 1996. 
"V2 Begins to Take Shape," July 13, 1996. 
"Forte to Build V2's Publishing OffshooJ," July 27, 1996. 
"V2 Signs First Band and Hires A&R Man," August 1 7, 1996. 
"V2 Buys Big Cat Share as Launch Date Approaches," October 30, 1996. 
"Gee Street Licensing Goes to V2," December 7, 1996. 
"V2 Clinches DJ Mix Deal as Branson Moves into Dance," March 1, 1997. 
"V2 launches New Imprints," March 15, 1997. 
"V2 Strikes North American Deal," March 29, 1997. 
"Branson Sells V2 Stake to Fund Name Signings," June 21 , 1997. 
"Underworld Deal Marks V2's First Birthday," December 6, 1997. 
"Branson's Cash Gives the Luxury of a Long-Term Approach," December 13, 1997. 
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Appendix E: 
Industry Profits and Turnover 
Computation of industry-wide figures on turnover, profitability and margins are based on data 
presented in the 1997 and 1998 editions of The UK Record Industry Annual Survey. Both issues 
display accumulations of the financial performance figures of the British industry's main record 
companies, most of them experiencing a turnover of more than £500,000 per annum. These 
firms include over 60 independent labels, the six majors, and a number of record companies 
linked to the latter by means of shareholdings. Whereas data concerning 'independents' has 
been adopted directly from the original source, the major companies have been separated from 
the linked ones for purposes stated in the thesis. The category 'majors' concerns BMG Enter-
tainment International UK & Ireland (including BMC Eurodisc, the Arista label in the UK), EMI 
Records, PolyGram Record Operations, Sony Music Entertainment UK, Universal Music UK and 
Warner Music UK. The International branches of these companies - that is, the units responsible 
for dealing with overseas fellow subsidiaries within the overall corporation - have been left out 
because no profit figures were available for the period under consideration (1991-1996).' The 
fol lowing companies have been categorized under the heading 'l inked': 
Company 
A&M Records 
China Records 
Chrysalis Records 
Creation Records 
FFRR Records 
Gee Street Records 
Food 
Go! Discs 
Island Records 
Know Existence 
M&G Records 
Magnet Records 
PWL International 
This Record Co 
Tommy Boy Music 
Virgin Records 
ZTT 
Linked to 
EMI 
Warner 
EMI 
Sony 
PolyGram 
PolyGram 
EMI 
PolyGram 
PolyGram 
PolyGram 
BMG 
Warner 
Warner 
PolyGram 
Warner 
EMI 
Warner 
Via Shareholding 
100% 
50% 
100% 
49% 
49% 
50% 
100% 
49% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
50% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
50% 
Other linkages, such as the joint ventures between Anxious Records and Warner and between 
Dome Records and EMI, or the 75% stake of BMG in Dedicated are recognized, but not incor-
porated as no gross or operating profit figures were available. 
For each of the three categories, turnover, gross profit (margin) and operating profit (margin) 
were computed and/or accumulated, as presented in the following table: 
Together, these units were responsible of more than £220 million on turnover in 1996. 
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Turnover 
Majors 
Linked Labels 
Independents 
Gross Profit 
Majors 
Linked Labels 
Independents 
Gross Profit 
Margin 
Majors 
Linked Labels 
Independents 
Operating 
Profit 
Majors 
Linked Labels 
Independents 
Operating 
Profit Margin 
Majors 
Linked Labels 
Independents 
(in £ millions) 
Notes: 
(1) There is a consistently negative impact on major operating profits by continuing operating 
losses at EMI Records over the period 1991-1996. 
(2) There is a consistently negative impact on linked operating profits by continuing operating 
losses at Chrysalis Records, Know Existence and PWL International over the period 1991-1996. 
(3) During the period 1991-1996, Virgin Records' average share of turnover and gross profits in 
the linked category has been 48% and 64% respectively. 
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1991 1992 1993 
739.7 778.2 759.9 
198.2 198.0 204.4 
238.6 248.1 311.3 
171.9 182.0 190.9 
72.7 71.1 69.5 
n/a 61.1 87.4 
23.2 23.4 25.1 
36.7 35.9 34.0 
n/a 24.6 28.1 
8.7 11.7 (9.7) 
12.9 (9.3) 26.3 
4.1 (0.8) 10.4 
1.2 1.5 (1.3) 
6.5 (4.7) 12.9 
1.7 (0.3) 3.3 
1994 1995 1996 
846.3 929.7 1055.0 
246.9 268.6 298.8 
334.5 345.8 303.6 
231.9 285.3 336.2 
89.8 96.2 113.3 
107.1 104.4 86.2 
27.4 30.7 31.9 
36.4 35.8 37.9 
32.0 30.2 28.4 
33.5 50.5 69.6 
25.3 28.5 37.5 
14.1 3.2 (10.3) 
4.0 5.4 6.6 
10.2 10.6 12.6 
4.2 0.9 (3.4) 
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek in de bedrijfskunde op het gebied van strategisch 
management richt zich specifiek op ondernemingsgedrag op de lange termijn. In het 
afgelopen decennium heeft dit veld een raadselachtig dubbelleven geleid. Veel 
deskundigen zijn ervan overtuigd dat concurrence de basis vormt voor het handelen 
van managers. Immers, winstgerichte ondernemingen wedijveren over het algemeen 
met andere bedrijven in het verkrijgen van aandacht en financiele middelen van 
consumenten en andere afnemers. Andere onderzoekers, daarentegen, beweren dat 
specifieke competenties van ondernemingen ten grondslag liggen aan commercieel 
succes. Indien een bedrijf unieke en tevens superieure vaardigheden bezit, zal het 
weinig te duchten hebben van andere spelers op dezelfde markt. 
Beide zienswijzen zijn logisch en lijken verenigbaar: juist door haar sterke 
kanten te benadrukken, kan een onderneming de concurrentieslag winnen. Maar het 
zijn de wetenschappelijke ontwikkelingen binnen het het strategisch management 
veld die de zaak om twee redenen complex maken. Allereerst is er het probleem dat 
de theorievorming van beide perspectieven zich richt op verschillende niveaus van 
analyse. Terwijl het verloop van de concurrentiestrijd zich afspeelt binnen een 
bedrijfstak, is de ontwikkeling van vaardigheden een ondernemingsaangelegenheid. 
Ten tweede is er de complicatie dat de bestaande theorie over concurrence in wezen 
statisch is, en haar tegenhanger op het gebied van vaardigheden dynamisch van aard 
is. Concurrentieanalyses bezien de relatieve positie van een onderneming op een 
bepaald moment in de ti jd, terwijl beschouwingen over vaardigheden vooral de 
ontwikkeling van competenties over tijd onder de loep nemen. 
Doelstelling en Theorie 
Gezien het tijdsafhankelijke karakter van strategic, heeft dit promotieonderzoek tot 
doel tegemoet te komen aan bovenstaande tekortkomingen en bij te dragen aan de 
vorming van een dynamische theorie over strategie die verschillende niveaus van 
analyse integreert. Specifiek betekent dit dat gepoogd wordt inzicht te verkrijgen in 
de wederkerige verbanden (ofwel de 'co-evolutie') tussen concurrentiedynamiek en 
ondernemingsvaardigheden zoals deze zich op lange termijn voordoen. Daartoe zijn 
in het eerste hoofdstuk drie onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd die zich richten op (1) 
de mate waarin ondernemingen daadwerkelijk uniek zijn in een context van 
rivaliteit, (2) hoe het proces van co-evolutie zich manifesteert op beide niveaus van 
analyse en (3) de essentie van het zoekgedrag van bedrijven naar nieuwe vaardig-
heden tijdens dit proces. Deze vragen bepalen aldus de richting van het onderzoek 
dat uiteindelijk resulteert in het ontwerp van een empirisch toetsbaar theoretisch 
raamwerk. 
In hoofstuk 2 en 3 wordt allereerst de bestaande theorie over vaardigheden en 
concurrence aan een nadere analyse onderworpen. Het vaardigheden gedachten-
goed, geworteld in het werk van Edith Penrose, beweert dat een zekere mate van 
heterogeniteit binnen een groep van ondernemingen kan leiden tot een duurzaam 
concurrentievoordeel bij een van hen. Bedrijven kunnen, door de tijd heen, unieke 
competenties ontwikkelen die moeilijk te doorgronden zijn voor anderen. Deze 
ondoorzichtigheid, tezamen met de onstane padafhankelijkheden, werpt barrieres op 
die voorkomen dat andere ondernemingen die competenties kopieren. Deze ideeen 
staan in scherp contrast met het klassieke economische werk van Joseph Schumpeter 
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dat zich op het niveau van de industrie als geheel richt.1 Hij en zijn volgelingen 
beargumenteren dat concurrentievoordelen tijdelijk van aard zijn door onvermijdelijk 
imitatiegedrag. Innovaties of zogenaamde 'creatieve destructies' zullen gekopieerd 
worden, hetgeen opnieuw mogelijkheden schept voor weer anderen om nieuwe 
praktijken te introduceren. 
Ondanks dat beide doctrines dynamisch van aard zi jn, bevinden zij zich op 
verschillende niveaus van analyse. Terwijl de eerste zich richt op de ontwikkeling 
van de individuele onderneming in termen van haar vaardigheden, concentreert de 
tweede zich op de evolutie van de bedrijfstak als geheel door opeenvolgende 
creatieve destructies. Om deze kloof te overbruggen wordt in hoofdstuk 4 de zoek-
gedrag-theorie, afkomstig van organisatiekundigen Richard Cyert en James March, 
geintroduceerd: ondernemingen zoeken actief naar altematieven voor bestaande 
praktijken en doen dit door middel van exploratie van nieuwe vaardigheden of 
middels exploitatie van bestaande competenties. Dergelijk zoekgedrag komt binnen 
de onderneming tot stand maar wordt geinitieerd door gebeurtenissen in haar directe 
omgeving. De convergentie van deze drie theorieen gaat gepaard met de formulering 
van een aantal proposities die, wanneer gebundeld, ten grondslag liggen aan een 
geintegreerd raamwerk van co-evolutie. 
Methode en Empirie 
De muziekindustrie vormt het empirisch kader waarin voornoemde proposities en 
raamwerk getoetst worden op hun validiteit. Zowel haar 120-jaar lange historie als 
het persoonsgebonden en kennisintensieve karakter dat deze bedrijfstak onderscheidt 
van meer traditionele sectoren motiveerde de keuze voor de muziekindustrie. 
Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert een overzicht van de gebruikte onderzoeksmethoden 
alsmede een discussie over de analyse en validiteit van de verzamelde data. Het 
empirisch ondorzoek is tweeledig van aard. Het eerste deel beslaat een historischp 
studie, waarbij het onstaan en de verdere ontwikkeling van de Amerikaanse muziek-
industrie tot aan de jaren negentig bestudeerd wordt. Het tweede gedeelte behelst 
een meervoudige case-studie van zeven platenmaatschappijen in Croot-Brittannie 
waarin gekeken wordt naar specifieke organisatieveranderingen gedurende de 
periode 1990-1997. In beide delen staat een procesdimensie centraal waarin gezocht 
wordt naar opeenvolgende patronen van gebeurtenissen en de oorzaken daarvan. 
De evolutie van de muziekindustrie wordt in detail beschreven in hoofdstuk 6. 
Daarbij wordt zowel descriptief als analyserend te werk gegaan om zodoende de 
beschrijving van de data en de daaruitvolgende uitleg aan elkaar te koppelen. Het 
blijkt dat de ontwikkeling van deze bedrijfstak een zestal opeenvolgende regimes van 
concurrentie beslaat. Elk regime onderscheidt zich van het voorgaande door ver-
anderingen in de regels van het concurrentiespel zoals die zich uiten in specifiek 
benodigde vaardigheden, nieuwe product-markt combinaties en alternatieve 
organisatievormen. Bovendien wordt duidelijk dat deze regimes afwisselende 
periodes kennen waarin exploratie en exploitatie van vaardigheden plaatsvond. 
Vanaf het moment dat de meeste rivalen nieuw geintroduceerde competenties van 
1
 Daar waar Iheorie aangaande ondernemingscompelenlies zich de afgelopen jaren grotendeels onlwikkeld 
heeft binnen het stralegisch management veld, is Schumpeters gedachtengoed op puur socio-economische 
basis gesloeld. Toch is de keuze voor deze dynamische theorie een bewuste, aangezien beslaande allerna-
lieven binnen hel veld, zoals Michael Porters vijf-krachten model, statisch van aard zijn. 
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pioniers hadden gekopieerd, werden voordien losstaande vaardigheden verder 
uitgebuit door de bundeling daarvan in specifieke ondernemingsactiviteiten. 
Terwijl de historische analyse vooral de industrie als geheel in beeld brengt, laat 
de meervoudige case-studie in hoofstuk 7 de lotgevallen van een zevental 
platenmaatschappijen zien gedurende een enkel regime. Ook hier worden descriptie 
en analyse gecombineerd om zodoende de essentie van de aanwezige processen 
beter te kunnen begrijpen. Uit deze studie blijkt dat individuele ondernemingen 
middels organisationele vernieuwing vaardigheden ontwikkelen zodat zij hun 
concurrentie-omgeving kunnen manipuleren of, wat vaker voorkomt, zich daaraan 
kunnen aanpassen. Processen van imitatie via samenwerking of concurrentie zorgen 
dat rivalen zich hierbij duidelijk naar elkaar toe bewegen. Tegelijkertijd verschillen 
ondernemingen significant in de manier waarop zij dat doen door het bestaan van 
ondernemingsspecifieke padafhankelijkheden. Deze verschillen worden gedurende 
de loop van een bepaald regime groter doordat de bestudeerde bedrijven de neiging 
vertoonden nieuw ontwikkelde competenties verder te exploiteren. 
Conclusies 
De empirische bevindingen ondersteunen de proposities in sterke mate en lijken 
daarmee de validiteit van het integratieve raamwerk te bevestigen. In dat model staat 
het zoekgedrag naar vaardigheden centraal, hetgeen aansluit bij de algemene indruk 
dat ondernemingen zulk gedrag vertonen in interactie met andere rivalen. Twee 
primaire conclusies, gepresenteerd in het laatste hoofdstuk, kunnen uit dit onderzoek 
getrokken worden. Allereerst blijkt dat het endogene proces van co-evolutie tussen 
ondernemingsvaardigheden en concurrentiedynamiek de belangrijkste motor is 
achter de ontwikkeling van de bedrijfstak. Datgene wat ondernemingen zelf doen 
tijdens het zoeken naar nieuwe competenties in een interactieve context van 
mededinging bepaalt uiteindelijk het verloop van de industrie. Dit in tegenstelling tot 
het meer gevestigde en deterministische idee dat exogene krachten als technologie, 
demografie en politiek de loop der dingen bepalen. Ondernemingen zijn niet alleen 
in staat zichzelf te transformeren, maar tevens de hele bedrijfstak waarin zij opereren. 
De tweede conclusie is van onderzoekstechnische aard. Het gebruik van een 
duale methodologie heeft als voordeel dat aparte doch integreerbare studies gericht 
op verschillende niveaus van analyse kunnen leiden tot een sterkere theorievorming. 
Zo kwamen in het onderhavige onderzoek eensluidende bevindingen naar boven die 
onafhankelijk van elkaar in de verschillende deelstudies hun oorsprong vonden. De 
gebruikte tweeledige methodologie faciliteert bovenal de integratie van niveau-
gebonden waarnemingen, waardoor tegengestelde doctrines met elkaar verenigd 
kunnen worden. Ondernemingen verschillen significant van elkaar vanwege hun 
unieke verleden, maar vertonen tevens grote overeenkomsten door de aanwezigheid 
van concurrentiekrachten. Toekomstig onderzoek binnen het veld van strategisch 
management dat dynamiek hoog in het vaandel heeft, zal zich in toenemende mate 
bewust moeten worden van het belang van niveau-overschrijdend onderzoek. 
Studies in de muziekindustrie of andere bedrijfstakken gericht op entertainment 
kunnen daarbij wellicht tot verrassende inzichten leiden. 
279 
Before taking up his position as a PhD research associate at the Rotterdam 
School of Management's Strategy Department, Marc Huygens studied 
business administration with a degree in strategic management at the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. During those years, he not only made a 
living out of jobs as diverse as cook, stevedore, and roadie, but also 
developed an interest for business management. He was involved as project 
coordinator in the design, creation, and launch of Europe's best-selling, 
strategy textbook Strategy: Process, Content, Context, authored by Bob de i 
Wit and Ron Meyer. At the same time, he worked at Horringa & de Koning, 
the Dutch affiliate of the Boston Consulting Group, from which he derived I 
his award-winning masters thesis on the relationship between business, 
portfolio diversification and corporate headquarters capabilities. These' 
activities, together with his interest in entertainment industries, culminated I 
in Marc's latest research project on competitive dynamics within the music: 
industry. 
280 

iafrgtf^ggg&g 
jj^gg=gP^:?oaff^ 
